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The sum total of dissertations engaging Jürgen Moltmann’s work—numbering over 
400—is testament to both his widespread appeal and the controversy of his claims. 
But while Moltmann’s interlocutors provide significant comment on key issues in 
his theology, the role that Scripture plays in his project is often only given limited 
attention, or even overlooked completely. This dissertation thus seeks to shed light 
on this frequently neglected aspect of Moltmann’s theology. 
 In attending to the “role” of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology, this disserta-
tion’s aim is twofold. First, it will investigate the nature of Scripture according to 
Moltmann—its relationship to God, the church, and wider humanity. Second, it will 
address the function of Scripture in his theology—how it informs other areas of the-
ological construction, such as eschatology, the theology of the cross, and the doctrine 
of the Trinity. Taking up this definition, the dissertation proceeds through six chap-
ters to explore the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s early theology; Theology of Hope; 
the eschatology and political theology of the mid- to late-sixties; The Crucified God; 
the doctrine of the Trinity leading up to and in The Trinity and the Kingdom; and later 
theology—particularly Experiences in Theology. 
In addition to various insights arising from studies of these different periods, 
this dissertation concludes with three key claims. First, Scripture plays a central and 
non-negotiable role in the construction of Moltmann’s theology. He cannot be 
properly understood apart from his this commitment. Second, Moltmann invokes a 
contrastive paradigm throughout his career, identifying allegedly non-biblical fea-
tures in traditional and contemporary theology, and answering these with his own 
proposals derived from the biblical text. Third, Moltmann can be profitably under-
stood as a “speculative” theologian—in the best sense of the term. He is not bound 
to a particular hermeneutic but reads Scripture creatively in order to open up new 
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Not yet satisfied with the year I spent reading and reflecting on Moltmann’s work 
for my master’s, I decided to dedicate another three years of my life to the task in 
writing a doctoral dissertation. My reasoning was that reading one of the most ac-
claimed contemporary theologians for such a length of time would serve as a kind 
of intensive introduction to all things theological. The study in theology that I had 
completed up until that time had not yet made me confident to speak as a theologian. 
Looking back on the last three years, however, I am still somewhat reticent in claim-
ing the title! But it is not necessary to be an expert in everything in order to reflect on 
God and on the world in light of God. What I have learnt from Moltmann is that it is 
at least necessary to engage and not retreat to the churchly and otherworldly—inso-
far as these bear little to no connection to everyday matters. Theology is a public 
discipline, and in this time of xenophobia and climate change denial, white suprem-
acy and new nationalisms, anti-science and populism—not least in the church!—
Christians must heed the call to creative action in the public sphere. Due to the nature 
of this project, and perhaps the nature of academia in general, this public-theological 
aspect will not be a major feature of this dissertation. I mention it here though as it 
is perhaps the most significant gift I have received in reading Moltmann’s theology. 
 There are a number of other people involved in my life over the last three years 
whom I also owe my thanks to. After supervising my honours and master’s theses, 
Christopher Holmes graciously agreed to supervise a dissertation on Moltmann—
all the more gracious considering his Websterian and Thomist inclinations. I thank 
him not only for enduring my enthusiasm for some of Moltmann’s more radical pro-
posals, but most of all for his pastoral approach to supervision and his feedback pro-
vided throughout the process. I also thank David Tombs, my secondary supervisor, 
for feedback on earlier drafts of some of my chapters. In our conversations I’ve found 
myself consistently more interested in his line of research than my own! Outside of 
my department, the library staff have been a huge help. I thank those working in 
interloans for their detective work in tracking down some of the more obscure items 
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in Moltmann’s corpus and in the secondary literature, working off my prior guess-
work. I thank those working in collections who assented to significantly expanding 
the library’s Moltmann collection at my bequest, and found a workaround for an 
electronic book supplied with pagination. 
 The postgraduate community in theology during my time at Otago University 
has been a particular highlight, making the journey all the more memorable. There 
are too many to name whose friendship and stamina through almost daily etymo-
logical trivia on my part are much to be admired. Here, though, I thank Joel Banman 
especially for his close reading of and feedback on my final draft. His ever-readiness 
to respond to my ongoing typographical disquiet, always insisting that I am not dis-
rupting him, has led me to conclude that Canadian politeness is the tenth fruit of the 
Spirit. I also thank another friend Caleb Day, who gave some of his time on short 
notice to offer an intensive review of a couple of my chapters. Through it all, my wife 
Chloe has been my biggest supporter. Meeting for the first time just six months out 
of starting my doctorate and then marrying with still over two years to go, this pro-
ject has been a large part of our relationship. She has never stopped being encourag-
ing, patient, and loving. Finally, I thank my heavenly Father for the call to the voca-
tion of theology and the power of the Spirit to engage with my subject matter in a 
very direct way. May he become greater and I become less. 
In the dissertation ahead I have employed gender-neutral language, but I 
have not made any effort to point out or remedy gendered language in quotations. 
German translations of Moltmann’s work are abundant and generally relia-
ble. Where I have adjusted translations or drawn attention to German words, I have 
indicated the parallel passage in the German original. Unless as part of a phrase, 
German adjectives and verbs are given in their lexical rather than inflected forms, 
for ease of reference. In any case, when referring to the German text, page numbers 
for the original appear immediately after the abbreviation, Ger., appended to the 
English citation. Bibliographical details for Moltmann’s major works in German can 
be found under the English counterparts in the list of works cited, whereas other 
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German texts receive their own entries because I do not always cite them in conjunc-
tion with the English. In a few places, for the sake of clarity, I have added or removed 
punctuation, adjusted capitalisation, or standardised the spelling of proper nouns. I 
make no mention of the German text at these points and include only the note: 
“slightly adjusted.” 
Where no ET is available I work directly with German texts. Here, all trans-
lations into English are mine, unless otherwise stated. In order to give a clearer pic-
ture of the development of Moltmann’s theology, I have frequently referred to the 
original German publication date of his various writings in parentheses, following 
abbreviations for his works. For essay collections, the date refers to the original pub-
lication of the specific essay. Some works will thus have different dates, depending 
on which part is being cited at the time. Original publication data can most often be 
found in the front matter of translated works. This is not always the case for individ-
ual essays, however. I have thus also referred to James Wakefield’s bibliography in 
order to determine the earliest appearance of a text, largely omitting reference to 
Wakefield for sake of succinctness.  
Almost all quotations of the Christian Bible are taken from the 1989 New Re-
vised Standard Version (NRSV), and I have explicitly noted the exceptions. I have 
also made no distinction throughout this dissertation between the Holy Bible and 
Holy Scripture. While I can see how such a distinction might be helpful in some 
studies, I have not detected a difference in Moltmann’s own use of the terms and 
thus proceed to employ them interchangeably. 
The image on the title page is a close-up of the angel in Simon Martini’s and 
Lippo Memmi’s Annunciation with St. Margaret and St. Ansanus altarpiece. It is in the 
public domain, and I use it here with thanks to The Yorck Project and Wikimedia. 
Moltmann writes about the work in The Coming of God: “Earlier, when I was writing 
on other subjects, I had a picture before me on my writing desk. And during my 
work on this eschatology of ‘the coming of God’ I have again had a picture in front 
of me: It is the Angel of the Annunciation, by Simone Martini, painted in 1315 and 
now in Galleria Uffizi in Florence. The angel is not looking back to the wreckage of 
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history, as does Paul Klee’s ‘Angelus Novus’, which Walter Benjamin called the An-
gel of History. This angel of the future is gazing with great eyes towards the messi-
anic Child of the coming God, and with the green branches in his hair and in Mary’s 
hand proclaims the Child’s birth. The tempest of the divine Spirit is blowing in the 
angel’s garments and wings, as if it had blown him into history. And its meaning is 
the birth of the future from the Spirit of promise.”1 
  
 
1 Jürgen Moltmann, The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology, trans. by Margaret Kohl (Min-




Works by Moltmann 
BP    A Broad Place. 
CG    The Crucified God. 
CoG    The Coming of God. 
CPS    The Church in the Power of the Spirit. 
EH   The Experiment Hope. 
ExpTh   Experiences in Theology. 
FC    The Future of Creation. 
GC    God in Creation. 
HP   Hope and Planning. 
HTG   History and the Triune God.  
PTh   Perspektiven in Theologie. 
RRF   Religion, Revolution and the Future. 
SL    The Spirit of Life.  
TH   Theology of Hope. 
TKG    The Trinity and the Kingdom. 
WJC    The Way of Jesus Christ. 
 
Other Abbreviations 
CD   Barth, Church Dogmatics. 
DGG  Welker, ed., Diskussion über Jürgen Moltmanns Buch, “Der 
gekreuzigte Gott”. 
DTH  Marsch, ed., Diskussion über die “Theologie der Hoffnung” von Jürgen 
Moltmann. 
ET   English translation 
FH   Herzog, ed., The Future of Hope. 
Ger.   Original German 
GWBAA  Bauckham, ed., God Will Be All in All. 
JM   Lapide and Moltmann, Jewish Monotheism. 
NRSV  New Revised Standard Version 
Wakefield  Wakefield, Jürgen Moltmann: A Research Bibliography. 
 







1. Jürgen Moltmann: Theologian of the Bible 
Jürgen Moltmann remains one of the most important theologians to read today. With 
an active career spanning from the late 1950s to the present, he has made invaluable 
contributions to the theological conversation over a broad range of different subject 
areas. His 1964 Theology of Hope compelled his contemporaries to reconsider Chris-
tian theology as thoroughly and fundamentally eschatological. His 1972 The Crucified 
God initiated passionate debates over the relationship between God and suffering, 
and spurred on criticisms of traditional concepts of God. And his 1980 The Trinity 
and the Kingdom inspired a generation of social trinitarians to rethink the meaning of 
the core Christian witness to the three-personed God. But the breadth of Moltmann’s 
career is only matched by his vigour. At the age of ninety-three, although retired 
from teaching, he continues to publish, present at conferences, and is even supervis-
ing a doctoral student.1 
 In view of this, Moltmann’s readers have called him “one of the world’s fore-
most theologians,”2 and “the most important German-speaking Protestant theolo-
gian since the Second World War.”3 Indeed, “Jürgen Moltmann has probably had 
more influence worldwide than any other Protestant dogmatic theologian alive to-
day.”4 But others have been less enthusiastic about the value of his work. This lack 
 
1 Moltmann’s most recent book is Christliche Erneuerungen in schwierigen Zeiten (Munich: 
Claudius, 2019). The title translates as Christian Renewals in Difficult Times. In June 2019 he 
presented a paper at the “Reconciliation, Divine and Human” conference at St. Andrews 
in Scotland. For information on Moltmann’s latest work in doctoral supervision, see “Jür-
gen Moltmann Will Co-Advise LSTC Student Brach Jennings’s Doctoral Studies,” Lu-
theran School of Theology at Chicago (website), published 3 January, 2019, 
https://www.lstc.edu/about/news/article-515. Jennings informs me that he has since trans-
ferred from LSTC and is working under Moltmann as his primary supervisor at Tübingen. 
2 M. Douglas Meeks, “Preface,” in Jürgen Moltmann and the Work of Hope, ed. M. Douglas 
Meeks, ix-xii (Lanham, MA: Lexington, 2018), ix. 
3 Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power: The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 
trans. by John Bowden (London: SCM, 2000), 12. 
4 Richard Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the Making (Hants, UK: Marshall Mor-
gan and Scott, 1987), 1. 
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of enthusiasm is apparent above all in the evaluation offered by Randall Otto: “Molt-
mann has through his sinful reason and idolatrous imagination formulated a theol-
ogy that appeals to the rebellious desires of man to be as God, to create a world of 
his own, a world better than God himself did create.”5 But while I cannot agree with 
Otto’s assessment, such a response is understandable in light of the biting polemics 
that Moltmann himself advances throughout his career.6 Taking a less combative po-
sition, a theology lecturer I once met relayed to me that there is no value in teaching 
Moltmann at the undergraduate level. I had to disagree, seeing as I do not think 
twentieth century theology can be rightly understood without Moltmann, but the 
sentiment is of note, nonetheless, as another significant example of the range of re-
sponses that this polarising theologian has been met with. 
 It is not my concern in this dissertation to either exonerate or condemn Molt-
mann. I seek first to understand him. Although it cannot be said of all works that 
depart from Moltmann’s conclusions, I think Richard Bauckham’s observation is still 
applicable to much of the secondary literature today: “Too many criticisms of Molt-
mann are based on careless reading and misunderstanding of his work.”7 Certainly, 
individual theologians can be read too much and placed in the context of their times 
and concerns a little bit too generously, their defenders a priori shutting down any 
meaningful dissent. It is my hope that this dissertation will not reach such false 
heights, and instead provide a sympathetic exposition of Moltmann’s thoughts on 
 
5 Randall E. Otto, The God of Hope: The Trinitarian Vision of Jürgen Moltmann (Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 1991), 232. 
6 See, e.g., some of the responses given to Otto. Richard Bauckham, one of Otto’s original 
examiners, writes, “The book is a remarkable example of understanding grossly distorted 
by polemical determination.” Richard Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann (Lon-
don: T&T Clark, 1995), 24. And Matthias Remenyi comments that his analysis “ultimately 
disqualifies Otto as a serious dialogue partner in scientific discourse”! Matthias Remenyi, 
Um der Hoffnung willen: Untersuchungen zur eschatologischen Theologie Jürgen Moltmanns (Re-
gensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 2005), 112 n. 191. Ironically, these statements could just as well 
apply to various passages in Moltmann’s corpus. T. David Beck has defended Otto in this 
connection. See his The Holy Spirit and the Renewal of All Things: Pneumatology in Paul and 
Jürgen Moltmann (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co, 2010), 126n.2. My disagreement with 
Otto in his readings of Moltmann will be apparent in my footnote commentary throughout 
this dissertation. 
7 Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, x. 
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his own terms, ready to be heard and wrestled with, rejuvenated or rejected, 
amended or received as a source of new theological life for future readers. Indeed, 
such a purpose is in accordance with Moltmann’s own aims: “My whole concern has 
been, and still is, to stimulate other people to discover theology for themselves—to 
have their own theological ideas, and to set out along their paths.”8 
1.1. The Purpose of This Dissertation and the State of the Conversation 
One important part of Moltmann’s theology that is often overlooked or misunder-
stood is the role that Scripture plays in his work. The reader does not have to look 
far to find criticisms of his use of Scripture. As J. Matthew Bonzo writes, “Molt-
mann’s references to scripture are used more as proof-texts for his particular philo-
sophical position than in sustained exegetical analysis.”9 Similarly, Stephen Williams 
summarises, “Moltmann confidently derives theological conclusions from a cross 
and resurrection-centered christological vantage-point, showing few qualms about 
brushing aside or riding roughshod over both biblical and theological considerations 
which challenge his construction.”10 And, in the same volume, Lanier Burns ponders, 
“Is he not speaking to himself, when he argues, ‘It always causes misunderstanding 
when biblical texts are torn out of their proper contexts in the biblical tradition, and 
 
8 ExpTh, xv (2000). 
9 J. Matthew Bonzo, Indwelling the Forsaken Other: The Trinitarian Ethics of Jürgen Moltmann 
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2009), 10. Nonetheless, Bonzo writes a few pages earlier, “What-
ever criticism I may bring against his thought in this thesis, it is important to confess that it 
is far outweighed by my indebtedness to the creativity and energy he has personified in 
his writing over the years.” Ibid., 5. 
10 Stephen N. Williams, “Moltmann on Jesus Christ,” in Jürgen Moltmann and Evangelical 




are used to legitimate other concerns’”?11 At best, then, “his use of the Bible is une-
ven.”12 At worst, however, Moltmann’s theology “cannot be acknowledged to be a 
legitimate expression of the biblical view of God and his world.”13 
 But others have praised Moltmann’s use of Scripture. As Joy McDougall 
writes, “Ever since his first major publication, Theology of Hope, Moltmann has un-
waveringly turned to the biblical witness as the chief source and norma normans for 
his theology.”14 Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz, a personal friend of Moltmann’s, claims, 
“All his life, as he once said to me, he has remained a ‘Bible boy’, who allows himself 
to be addressed by Holy Scripture ever more directly.”15 Kurt Richardson, observing 
the same patterns as Moltmann’s critics, can offer a much more positive assessment 
in regard to The Trinity and the Kingdom: “Throughout the work, Moltmann develops 
his reflection on the overall contours of Scripture. His is not a highly exegetical 
method but his total shaping in the revelatory narratives of Scripture along with its 
didactic rigor is not lacking. Hardly can one imagine a more engaged Scriptural rea-
soning.”16 Even the critics themselves have allowed similar statements: Moltmann 
“trains our eyes in the direction in which the biblical witness trains our eyes and 
biblical and dogmatic theology are thus prepared for felicitous fusion. This is a 
 
11 Lanier Burns, “Moltmann’s Theological Anthropology: From Crisis to Kingdom,” in Jür-
gen Moltmann and Evangelical Theology, ed. Chung, 69-103, at 97, quoting GC, 30. 
12 Burns, “Moltmann’s Theological Anthropology,” 96. 
13 Otto, God of Hope, 11. Nonetheless, “far from admitting the impotence of the biblical nar-
ratives, Moltmann intends his social interpretation of the traditional language of the Bible 
and church to bear witness to a God who provokes men to practical hope in the historical 
transformation of the world.” Ibid., 62. For other criticisms, see e.g., Beck’s comment that 
Moltmann “relies on Scripture to lay out the territory and basic parameters of the subject. 
Within these parameters, he then exercises a great deal of freedom in rendering an inter-
pretation of Scripture…. Sometimes his conclusions are consistent with a historical-critical 
exegesis of the relevant biblical texts. However, at other times he strays into conclusions 
that are defined more by theological speculation and/or political and social rhetoric than 
the scriptural witness.” Beck, The Holy Spirit, 105 
14 Joy Ann McDougall, Pilgrimage of Love: Moltmann on the Trinity and Christian Life (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 11. 
15 Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, 12. 
16 Kurt Anders Richardson, “Moltmann’s Communitarian Trinity,” in Jürgen Moltmann and 
Evangelical Theology, ed. Chung, 17-39, at 35. But while certainly generous, it is perhaps too 
much to say, “He is clearly not dominated by any extra-biblical model, even while very 
well-versed in the Christian metaphysical tradition.” Ibid., 38. 
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strength in all of his works.”17 Moltmann can thus be praised for the centrality of 
Scripture to his work, even if his reading is not always governed by conventional 
hermeneutical principles: “His theology is, for the most part, grounded in the biblical 
text, but he is no simple biblicist.”18 
In view of this brief catalogue of somewhat conflicting claims, in this disser-
tation I seek to clarify the role that the Bible plays in Moltmann’s theology. I have 
deliberately chosen the general term, “role” to guide my investigation, as it covers 
both his theology of the Bible—that is, what he understands it to be in its relationship 
to God, the church, and wider humanity—and how it functions in connection to 
other areas of theological construction, such as eschatology, the theology of the cross, 
and the doctrine of the Trinity. But I will outline my project in greater detail towards 
the end of this introductory chapter. Before doing so, a brief survey of how this 
theme has previously been approached in the literature will help to identify areas 
requiring further attention. 
Out of over four hundred master’s theses and doctoral dissertations on Molt-
mann’s work, not one provides a comprehensive survey of the role of Scripture in 
his theology.19 This represents, in my view, a basic understatement of the importance 
of Scripture for Moltmann’s project. Nonetheless, various features of the role of 
 
17 Williams, “Moltmann on Jesus Christ,” 122. Williams has been a persistent critic of Molt-
mann over the years. See idem, “On Giving Hope in a Suffering World: Response to Molt-
mann,” in Issues in Faith and History, ed. Nigel M. de S. Cameron, 3-19 (Edinburgh: Ruther-
ford, 1989); the subtly titled, “The Problem with Moltmann,” European Journal of Theology 
5:2 (1996): 157-68; and “Jürgen Moltmann: A Critical Introduction,” in Getting Your Bear-
ings: Engaging with Contemporary Theologians, ed. Philip Duce and Daniel Strange, 75-124 
(Leicester: Apollos, 2003). 
18 Graham Buxton, “Moltmann on Creation,” in Jürgen Moltmann and Evangelical Theology, 
ed. Chung, 40-68, at 64. So, earlier, Stanley Grenz and Roger Olson: “While he is by no 
means a fundamentalist and is highly critical of ‘literalistic biblicism,’ his theology is bibli-
cally grounded.” Stanley J. Grenz and Roger E. Olson, 20th Century Theology: God and the 
World in a Transitional Age (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1992), 174. 
19 See Cameron Coombe, “Jürgen Moltmann Bibliography: Dissertations and Theses,” ofthe-
makingofmanybooks (blog), accessed 18 July, 2019, https://ofthemakingofmany-
booksblog.wordpress.com/jurgen-moltmann-bibliography/bibliography-dissertations-and-
theses/. Müller-Fahrenholz rightly notes, “By now the secondary literature on Moltmann 
has become so extensive that to describe it would amount to an independent research pro-
ject.” Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, 11. 
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Scripture in Moltmann’s theology have not been completely neglected in the litera-
ture. Indeed, a few readers have still provided detailed comment on some of these. 
Steven Phillips investigates the role of Scripture in liberation theology. He 
has high praise for Moltmann. “Jürgen Moltmann laces his theology with countless 
biblical references. His thematic theological presentations have been fully substanti-
ated by biblical corroborations.”20 Phillips proceeds to identify three major aspects 
of Moltmann’s hermeneutic. These are the assumption of the Bible’s eschatological 
orientation, reading with the eyes of the poor and oppressed, and trinitarian inter-
pretation. Particularly notable is Phillips’s compilation of a Scripture index for six of 
Moltmann’s English works, namely, Theology of Hope, Religion, Revolution and the Fu-
ture, Hope and Planning, Theology of Play, The Crucified God, and Church in the Power of 
the Spirit. He uses this data to identify preferences in Moltmann’s use of the Bible. 
Phillips focusses his attention on Moltmann’s reading of the four gospels, Romans, 
and 1 Corinthians, which together comprise 56.29% of the biblical references in these 
six works. He also notes a strong preference on Moltmann’s part for the NT, which 
accounts for 88.03% of the references.21 Phillips’s investigation sets an important 
precedent for future studies of the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology in that 
it is sympathetic and appreciative. Although there is certainly room for more critical 
comment, this dissertation is a happy contrast to those which seek to dismiss Molt-
mann’s claims ahead of giving him a fair hearing. Moreover, Phillips’s creative treat-
ment of Moltmann’s biblical preferences provides an important angle on Molt-
mann’s work, one that has not yet been repeated in any noteworthy way. Following 
Phillips, I have decided to compile a somewhat lengthier index, accounting for those 
references overlooked by him, as well as those from Moltmann’s later works. I have 
included this as an appendix to this dissertation. 
 
20 Steven Phillips, “The Use of Scripture in Liberation Theologies: An Examination of Juan 
Luis Segundo, James H. Cone, and Jurgen Moltmann,” Ph.D. diss. (The Southern Baptist 
Theological Seminary, KY, 1978), 96. 
21 Phillips, “Use of Scripture,” 116. 
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In his research on Scripture in modern theology, Hendrik Marinus Vroom 
notes that theologians inevitably draw on other criteria, besides the content of Scrip-
ture alone, to inform their conclusions.22 In one chapter, he attends to Moltmann’s 
1968 proposal that praxis be the criterion, alongside Scripture, for sound theology. 
While Vroom provides some critical comment, however, he acknowledges that the 
criterion of praxis does not control Moltmann’s theology at every turn. 
 Steven Johnson’s 1995 dissertation remains the most comprehensive account 
of the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology.23 He takes up the hermeneutical the-
ory of the so-called Yale School, namely Hans Frei, George Lindbeck, and David Kel-
sey, to guide his investigation. Although in his interest in historical criticism Molt-
mann departs from the Yale theologians, he also shares much in common with them, 
such as in taking key biblical events like the exodus and the resurrection to be reve-
latory of God’s identity; reading Scripture as a coherent whole, particularly, for Molt-
mann, in regard to the theme of promise; and assuming that human beings are called 
to participate in the same story narrated by Scripture. Johnson’s work is especially 
illuminating in drawing on a particular, established hermeneutical theory to under-
stand Moltmann’s project. Nonetheless, this also means that there is yet room for a 
more inductive approach to discerning the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology. 
In his master’s thesis, Hyo-Dong Lee employs Moltmann’s political herme-
neutics to respond to accusations that the Bible is complicit in the ecological crisis. 
For Lee, Moltmann’s hermeneutic is of particular interest, not only because he at-
tends to ecological questions in some detail, but because such a hermeneutic “listens 
 
22 Hendrik Marinus Vroom, De schrift alleen? Een vergelijkend onderzoek naar de toetsing van 
theologische uitspraken volgens de openbaringstheologische visie van Torrance en de hermeneu-
tisch-theologische opvattingen van Van Buren, Ebeling, Moltman en Pannenberg (Kampen, Neth-
erlands: Kok, 1978), 157-81. 
23 Steven D. Johnson, “Moltmann, Yale, and the Interpretation of Biblical Narrative,” Ph.D. 
diss. (Drew University, NJ, 1995). Interestingly, another dissertation completed in the 
same year also uses George Lindbeck’s work as a framework for interpreting Moltmann’s 
theology. Here, though, the emphasis is not so much on the role that Scripture plays in 
Moltmann’s project but the ways he draws on non-biblical sources to inform it. See Daniel 
L. Leister, “Experience, Language, and Dialogue in Postmodern Theology: A Study of Jür-
gen Moltmann’s Theological Method,” Ph.D. diss. (McMaster University, Canada, 1996). 
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first and foremost to the voice of the victims.”24 And these are not merely human 
victims but victims of humans in the modern age, namely nature. Significantly, Lee, 
too, notes “the relative paucity of literature on Moltmann’s biblical hermeneutic.”25 
A number of studies have also been conducted on Moltmann’s reading of 
particular biblical texts. Michael Gilbertson, for example, observing the keen interest 
given to the Book of Revelation in the theologies of both Wolfhart Pannenberg and 
Moltmann, develops his own reading of the biblical text and proceeds to evaluate 
the eschatological theology of Pannenberg and Moltmann in light of this. Gilbertson 
finds that Revelation supports some of their respective conclusions, whereas other 
times it departs from them, such as in its more deterministic view of God’s relation-
ship to the world.26 Poul Guttesen also investigates Moltmann’s theology against the 
background of Revelation, centring the discussion on the concept of the kingdom of 
God. Guttesen’s reading, however, is more dialectical than Gilbertson’s, not only 
reading Moltmann critically against Revelation, but employing Moltmann’s pro-
posals to illuminate Revelation for today.27 Other studies include that of T. David 
Beck, who, finding Moltmann’s eschatology to be insufficiently pneumatological, 
takes up the writings of Paul in order to offer a corrective.28 And Patricia Sharbaugh 
draws Moltmann into conversation with the OT theology of Walter Brueggemann, 
including a helpful and critical chapter on the role of the OT in Moltmann’s theology 
 
24 Hyo-Dong Lee, “Jürgen Moltmann as a Biblical Theologian: Political Hermeneutic of 
Scripture as Foundational for Ecological Theology,” master’s thesis (McGill University, 
Canada, 1995), 82. On the same theme, see Jeremy Law, “Jürgen Moltmann’s Ecological 
Hermeneutics,” in Ecological Hermeneutics: Biblical, Historical and Theological Perspectives, ed. 
David G. Horrell et al., 223-39 (London: T&T Clark, 2010). 
25 Lee, “Jürgen Moltmann as a Biblical Theologian,” vi. 
26 Michael Gilbertson, God and History in the Book of Revelation: New Testament Studies in Dia-
logue with Pannenberg and Moltmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
27 Poul F. Guttesen, Leaning into the Future: The Kingdom of God in the Theology of Jürgen Molt-
mann and in the Book of Revelation (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2009). Besides these two mono-
graphs, an earlier treatment was provided by John E. Stanley as “Two Futures – Jürgen 
Moltmann’s Eschatology and Revelation’s Apocalyptic,” Asbury Theological Journal 53:2 
(1998): 37-48. 
28 Beck, The Holy Spirit. 
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of the cross.29 Most recently, Lidija Gunjević has taken a thematic approach, arguing 
that Moltmann’s theology of Sabbath and Jubilee helpfully illuminates the biblical 
texts dealing with these concepts. She also criticises him, however, for neglecting to 
develop this into a more concrete programme for the modern context.30 
Besides these longer treatments, various articles also provide comment on 
different aspects of the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology. I will attend to the 
most important of these in the main body of the dissertation. The above, however, 
shows that this theme has not yet received the attention due to it in research on Molt-
mann’s theology. Three observations in particular can be made. First, a general study 
on this topic has not yet been undertaken. The investigations above tend to treat 
Moltmann alongside other theologians or focus only on particular aspects of the role 
of Scripture in his theology. Johnson’s dissertation is perhaps the one exception here. 
Second, however, an inductive approach is also required. While comparisons with 
other theologians, such as those in the Yale School, are certainly necessary, inductive 
research that seeks its starting point in Moltmann himself is essential if Moltmann is 
to be understood on his own terms. Third, there is yet room for a diachronic account 
of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology, demonstrating early precedents and later de-
velopments. The tendency in the above studies is to read Moltmann’s theology the-
matically, which is in danger of obscuring the historical shape of his thought. 
Obviously this study will have its own biases, so that attempts at generality 
can never be fully actualised—not least in view of the sheer extent of Moltmann’s 
literary output. Readers will note that the majority of my exposition is devoted to the 
first half of Moltmann’s career, up until 1980, by which time his basic concerns have 
been established and his later theology proceeds from these. I bring with me my own 
presuppositions, so that the inductive approach, too, represents the ideal rather than 
 
29 Patricia A. Sharbaugh, “Uncovering the Roots of the Crucified God: How Walter 
Brueggemann’s Old Testament Theology Challenges and Contributes to Jürgen Molt-
mann’s and Jon Sobrino’s Interpretations of the Cross,” Ph.D. diss. (Duquesne University, 
PA, 2009). 
30 Lidija Gunjević, Jubilee in the Bible: Using the Theology of Jürgen Moltmann to Find a New Her-
meneutic (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2018). 
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a perfect reality. And I have chosen in some places to organise the discussion around 
certain themes, so as not to lose my readers in the breadth of issues addressed in 
each period of Moltmann’s theology. Nonetheless, the methodological concerns of 
generality, inductivism, and diachrony will guide my investigation throughout. 
1.2. Moltmann’s Contrastive Paradigm 
From his theological beginnings to his most recent contributions, Moltmann has 
shown continued interest in the distinctness of biblical concerns over and against 
those found in Greek philosophy and thought in particular, and the Christian tradi-
tion in general. This was already perceived by Christopher Morse some decades ago, 
who wrote of Moltmann’s theology, “Accompanying each positive statement we 
find a polemic directed against some alternative position which is rejected as a pre-
vailing misconception in Christian thinking.”31 The negative exemplar, along with 
its major faults, is typically presented first, opening up space for Moltmann to de-
velop his own position. I have named this feature Moltmann’s “contrastive para-
digm,” a term which I will use throughout this dissertation. Among other aspects of 
the role that Scripture plays in his theology, applications of this paradigm are to be 
found at key points in Moltmann’s career, lending support to his argumentation with 
the claim that his conclusions derive from biblical concerns, against other positions 
which circumvent Scripture with philosophical logic. As Moltmann writes as re-
cently as 2014, he seeks “to understand what the Bible means by the ‘living God’ and 
 
31 Christopher Morse, The Logic of Promise in Moltmann's Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress, 
1979), 27. Jerry Irish had earlier called this “Moltmann’s theology of contradiction,” 
though he did not differentiate between the two forms of contradiction he identified. The 
first is that between two theological commitments Moltmann wants to uphold, namely the 
crucifixion and resurrection. The second is that between Moltmann’s own position and the 
position he rejects—the form of contradiction that Morse also points out. Jerry A. Irish, 
“Moltmann’s Theology of Contradiction,” Theology Today 32:1 (1975): 21-31. Others have 
observed a slightly more sophisticated structure: “We frequently encounter in his [Molt-
mann’s] literature a form of argument along the lines of : ‘Neither A nor B’ (standard theo-
logical alternatives) ‘but C’ (which either negates both or incorporates elements of truth in 
them into a higher synthesis).” Williams, “Moltmann on Jesus Christ,” 112-13. While Wil-
liams does not provide a source, this same observation was made decades earlier by Doro-
thee Sölle in DGG, 112-13. Remarkably, the pagination is identical! 
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to free the God of Israel and Jesus Christ from the imprisonment of metaphysical 
definitions, which are due to Greek philosophy and the religious Enlightenment.”32 
 In the sharp contrast he draws between Greek and Christian thought, Molt-
mann is not alone in Christian history. Indeed, the contrast seems to go back to the 
NT itself. As Paul writes, “Jews demand signs and Greeks desire wisdom, but we 
proclaim Christ crucified, a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles 
[Hellēnes],33 but to those who are the called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power 
of God and the wisdom of God” (1 Cor 1:22-24). In another place, Luke contrasts the 
philosophical curiosity and scepticism of the Athenians with the call of the gospel 
(Acts 17:19-21, 32). And while some patristic authors tended to adopt a more gener-
ous view of certain insights explicitly derived from Greek philosophy, others made 
plain their antagonism. For example, Tertullian famously proclaimed, “What has Je-
rusalem to do with Athens, the Church with the Academy, the Christian with the 
heretic? Our principles come from the Porch of Solomon, who had himself taught 
that the Lord is to be sought in simplicity of heart…. After Jesus Christ we have no 
need of speculation, after the Gospel no need of research.”34 
It is not difficult to find similar sentiments expressed in the Reformation era. 
In his 1518 Heidelberg Disputation, Luther warns against the undisciplined use of 
Greek philosophy in theology, echoing Paul’s terminology in 1 Corinthians. “He 
who wishes to philosophize by using Aristotle without danger to his soul must first 
become thoroughly foolish in Christ. Just as a person does not use the evil of passion 
well unless he is a married man, so no person philosophizes well unless he is a fool, 
 
32 Moltmann, The Living God and the Fullness of Life, trans. by Margaret Kohl (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox, 2015), xi, emphasis mine. 
33 Or “Greeks.” 
34 Tertullian, The Prescriptions against the Heretics, 7.9-10, 12, in Early Latin Theology: Selections 
from Tertullian, Cyprian, Ambrose and Jerome, ed. and trans. by S. L. Greenslade, full work on 
pp. 25-77 (London: SCM, 1956). Tertullian’s famous statement does not, however, entail a 
rejection of reason altogether, but only the type of reason that Athens represents in opposi-
tion to Jerusalem. E.g., “’Athens’ and ‘Jerusalem’ stand here as symbols… of the opposi-
tion between a mode of thought which believes that fact conforms to reason, and another 
which  believes that reason must conform to fact.” Justo L. González, “Athens and Jerusa-
lem Revisited: Reason and Authority in Tertullian,” Church History 43:1 (1974): 17-25, at 22. 
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that is, a Christian.”35 Melanchthon, too, takes up a similar position in the first edition 
of his Loci Communes, making the distinction between Scripture and Aristotelian 
thought a central feature of the work. “In this book the principal topics of Christian 
teaching are pointed out so that youth may arrive at a twofold understanding: 1. 
What one must chiefly look for in Scripture. 2. How corrupt are all the theological 
hallucinations of those who have offered us the subtleties of Aristotle instead of the 
teachings of Christ.”36 
It is in later German liberal theology, however, that this theme finds full and 
programmatic expression. Adolf von Harnack is its most famous exponent. In the 
beginning of his History of Dogma, Harnack claims, “Dogma in its conception and 
development is a work of the Greek spirit on the soil of the Gospel.”37 That is, the 
logical formulation of Christian doctrine “for scientific and apologetic purposes,” is 
a fundamentally Greek—and therefore unwelcome—innovation in church history.38 
For Harnack, while the historical development of dogma may be admirable, faith 
and now historical criticism require that dogma no longer have the exalted place it 
once held in the church. Wherever it stands opposed to faith or the fruits of historical 
investigation, it must be set aside. Thus, “the Gospel since the Reformation… is 
 
35 Martin Luther, Luther’s Works, vol. 31, Career of the Reformer I, ed. Harold J. Grimm (Phila-
delphia, PA: Fortress, 1957), 41, theses 29-30, numbering removed. 
36 Philip Melanchthon, Loci Communes Theologici, trans. by Lowell J. Sartre, in Melanchthon 
and Bucer, ed. Wilhelm Pauck, 18-152 (London: SCM, 1969), 19. On Melanchthon’s compli-
cated relationship to Aristotle, of which the first edition of Loci Communes is definitely not 
representative, see Nicole Kuropka, “Philip Melanchthon and Aristotle,” trans. by Timo-
thy J. Wengert, in Irene Dingel, et al., Philip Melanchthon: Theologian in Classroom, Confes-
sion, and Controversy, 19-28 (Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012); Wil-
helm Pauck, “Loci Communes Theologici: Editor’s Introduction,” in Melanchthon and Bucer, 
ed. Pauck, 3-17. 
37 Adolf von Harnack, History of Dogma, trans. by Neil Buchanan, 7 vols. (London: Williams 
& Norgate, 1894), 1:17. On Harnacks’ Hellenisation thesis, see, in English, Christoph 
Markschies, “Does It Make Sense to Speak about a ‘Hellenization of Christianity’ in Antiq-
uity?,” Church History and Religious Culture 92:1 (2012): 5-34; and various essays in Wendy 
E. Helleman, ed., Hellenization Revisited: Shaping a Christian Response within the Greco-Roman 
World (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994). Alister E. McGrath draws a con-
nection between Harnack and Moltmann in The Making of Modern German Christology: From 
the Enlightenment to Pannenberg (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 207. 
38 Harnack, History of Dogma, 1:1. 
13 
 
working itself out of the forms which it was once compelled to assume.”39 For Har-
nack, the chief problem with dogma is that the church has taken up doctrines devel-
oped in particular historical circumstances and understood them to be eternal truths, 
making them binding for future generations. But “specifically Hellenic ideas form 
the presuppositions neither for the Gospel itself, nor for the most important New 
Testament writings.”40 Nonetheless, here I can only provide snapshots of Harnack’s 
Hellenisation thesis, which is certainly much more nuanced than this brief treatment 
will allow. 
It is difficult to situate Moltmann in this tradition—or perhaps even claim 
that there is a tradition in the first place, as each of these authors wrote for different 
purposes in vastly divergent historical contexts.41 Moltmann himself draws attention 
to a similar issue, that of too closely identifying Reformation theology and historical 
criticism: “It becomes very questionable whether there is a historical relationship be-
tween the Reformation and [the] positivistic historical-critical method; … whether 
Luther’s struggle to free theology from (scholastic) metaphysics can in any way be 
said to be analogous to the historical and positivistic ‘overcoming of metaphysics’…. 
In any case, however, the distance of the Reformation faith from the autonomy and 
subjectivity of the individual which has been set free by the historical method and 
the abstract unhistoricality of society must be preserved at all costs.”42 
But this should not be a question of choosing between the broad strokes of a 
tradition, on the one hand, and a historical context that makes Moltmann irreducible 
to any tradition, on the other hand. Considering the amount of attention I will give 
 
39 Harnack, History of Dogma, 1:21. 
40 Harnack, History of Dogma, 1:48 n. 1. 
41 This “tradition” has taken on new forms in modern and contemporary theology. Paul 
Gavrilyuk’s term, “the theory of theology’s fall into Hellenistic philosophy,” has gained 
some prominence. See Paul L. Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God: The Dialectics of 
Patristic Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1. Gavrilyuk defines this trend 
narrowly so that it concerns only divine impassibility, though it is surely broader than 
that—as I will show in the following chapters. He briefly explores some examples, includ-
ing Moltmann, in an appendix. See ibid., 176-79. 
42 HP, 59-60 (1962). 
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to the distinctive nature of Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm throughout this disser-
tation, I clearly favour reading his theology on its own terms, ahead of hastily situ-
ating him in a particular tradition. I have provided above a few examples of others 
who have in their own ways maintained explicit distinctions between Greek philo-
sophical claims or approaches and the content of the gospel, however, for two rea-
sons. First, Moltmann is not working in a historical vacuum, so it is important to 
point out some significant historical precedents to his contrastive paradigm. And, 
second, if Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm is to be engaged critically—a task that 
remains necessary, albeit one that I can only contribute to by way of brief comments 
scattered throughout my exposition—it would be unfair to dismiss it conclusively 
without also attending to its potential antecedents in Scripture and the tradition. Alt-
hough the precedents I have identified are anything but exhaustive, I hope that in 
future they will nonetheless provide some preliminary pointers for critics of Molt-
mann’s contrastive paradigm. 
When reading through Moltmann’s corpus, three applications of his contras-
tive paradigm can be identified that hold a central place in his theological construc-
tion. Interestingly, all three concern the nature of God and the Trinity. The first of 
these is the traditional theological approach to the divine eternity and to its relation-
ship to created temporality. In his early writings, Moltmann becomes increasingly 
aware of the fundamental significance of history and eschatology to the biblical wit-
ness. This culminates in one of the central theses of Theology of Hope—that the future 
of creation is not already realised in God’s eternity, a claim implicit, according to 
Moltmann, in the theologies of both Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Barth, but that crea-
tion awaits a real future that does not yet correspond to anything in God. The con-
sequence, though only hinted at in TH, is that God’s being, like the world’s being, 
remains unfinished—certainly a departure from the tradition against which Molt-
mann polemicises. In subsequent writings, he contends for a notion of divine being 
that is located in the future. In place of what Moltmann identifies as the eternal pre-
sent of God, then, comes the historical and futurist nature of God’s being. 
15 
 
The second key aspect of this tradition that Moltmann rejects is its doctrines 
of divine impassibility and immutability. In impassibility the tradition claimed that 
God does not suffer, and in immutability it claimed that God does not change. In-
deed, Moltmann had already begun to dismantle the latter in proposing a historical 
God. If this was not enough, however, the doctrine all but topples in his audacious 
theological proposals concerning the suffering of the Father and the Son in the cru-
cifixion. Beginning development in the late sixties, this idea found full expression in 
Moltmann’s The Crucified God, where Moltmann treats divine suffering in the context 
of the doctrine of the Trinity. In place of the impassibility and immutability of God, 
then, comes the trinitarian suffering of God. 
Finally, Moltmann turns his attention to conventional theological construc-
tions of divine unity, focussing in particular on their modern articulation in the the-
ologies of Barth and Karl Rahner. While his alternative can be seen in development 
from at least the late sixties, it is worked out extensively in The Trinity and the King-
dom, where Moltmann contends that the shared community of the divine persons 
forms the basis for their unity, rather than a shared substance. This coincides with 
the contention that the three persons constitute three active subjects, against Barth’s 
and Rahner’s claims that God is a single subject. In place of the substantial and sub-
jective unity of God, then, comes the social unity of God. 
 These three applications of Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm showcase his 
critical retrieval of what he perceives to be a biblical doctrine of God and the Trinity 
against undue, external influence in the Christian tradition—Greek or otherwise. 
They are intertwined with other assumptions about the nature of Scripture and its 
function in theological construction. I have drawn attention to them here so that the 
overall shape of Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm can be understood before attend-
ing to these various applications in detail in the following chapters. In my estimation, 
this paradigm constitutes the central logic of the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s the-
ology. The value of the paradigm itself is difficult to determine, however. I refer to it 
here in general terms for the sake of analysis, but Moltmann himself never does so. 
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His readers will need to take into consideration how the paradigm is applied in con-
nection to other hermeneutical and theological commitments. Throughout this dis-
sertation, then, I explore this paradigm in conversation with these various commit-
ments. Of course, this also stems from a more basic decision, noted in the previous 
section, to present a general account of the role that Scripture plays in Moltmann’s 
theology—not one that focusses exclusively on his contrastive paradigm. 
1.3. Dissertation Outline 
In the following study I have divided the material into six chapters, loosely corre-
sponding to different developments in Moltmann’s career over time, though with 
some necessary back-tracking in places for context and ease of understanding. My 
exposition proper begins in CHAPTER TWO with an investigation into Moltmann’s 
early theology. A remarkable level of interest in questions concerning Scripture is 
already discernible at this stage in his career. Moreover, the significance of reading 
these intial proposals becomes particularly clear in view of the relative paucity of 
attention given to them in the secondary literature. In CHAPTER THREE I proceed to 
the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s first major work, Theology of Hope. My main focus 
in this chapter is on the application of his contrastive paradigm, distinguishing be-
tween an ahistorical concept of divine being and the biblical witness to God’s histor-
ical being. I also explore other features of Moltmann’s use of Scripture, such as the 
place of the biblical canon in TH, and the relationship between the OT and NT. 
 I continue to trace the development of Moltmann’s theology in CHAPTER FOUR, 
with a discussion of his work after TH into the latter half of the sixties. Here the 
constructive side of his contrastive paradigm is apparent in his close alignment of 
the being of God with the future. Besides this, I address the important role that Scrip-
ture plays in Moltmann’s burgeoning political theology. The second part of the chap-
ter provides an account of the transition from a theology of hope to a theology of the 
cross in The Crucified God. So follows CHAPTER FIVE, in which I explore the relation-
ship between this focus on the cross and Moltmann’s theology of Scripture. This is 
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also the place in which I explore the second major application of his contrastive par-
adigm in his distinction between traditional accounts of the God who does not suffer 
apart from the body of Christ and the biblical witness to the cross, which Moltmann 
argues requires quite a different interpretation of the crucifixion. Other matters such 
as Jesus’ relationship to the OT, and the historicity of biblical texts are also addressed 
in this chapter. 
 In CHAPTER SIX, I turn to Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity in The Trinity and 
the Kingdom. Here I discuss the third major application of his contrastive paradigm, 
which concerns the distinction between traditional notions of divine unity and one 
that is derived from the biblical witness to the three persons of the Trinity. While I 
dedicate most of the chapter to this subject, I also comment on other methodological 
commitments in TKG, producing a picture of how the Bible functions in Moltmann’s 
theological construction in this work. My final expository chapter, CHAPTER SEVEN, 
is included to provide an account of the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s later theol-
ogy. This is particularly important in regard to the hermeneutical programme that 
Moltmann forwards in his final major work, Experiences in Theology, though I also 
attend to developments elsewhere in his corpus. 
 In my CONCLUSION I offer a summary of major themes addressed in each chap-
ter. Alongside each of these, it becomes clear that Scripture plays a central and non-
negotiable role in the construction of Moltmann’s theology. He cannot be properly 
understood apart from this commitment. I then draw attention to two fundamental 
features of Moltmann’s use of Scripture. The first is his contrastive paradigm, which 
challenges readers to measure their theology against Scripture, as well as inspiring 
them to reimagine their theology in light of Scripture. The second is Moltmann’s 
commendably speculative approach to reading the Bible, which, like that of a novel-






2. Text, History, and Promise: Beginnings  
A reading of Moltmann’s first essays, prior to the publication of Theology of Hope, 
demonstrates the central significance that Scripture held in his early thought.1 Al-
ready at this point, Moltmann seeks to move critically beyond the Barthian, Bult-
mannian, and historicist orthodoxies of his day, grasping after the eschatological 
horizon of Scripture that will shape the rest of his theological career. I have divided 
the material into three sections, proceeding chronologically through key essays 
where Moltmann comments on Scripture, or where his argumentation reveals im-
portant presuppositions and conclusions pertaining to Scripture. In the first section, 
I explore Moltmann’s discussion of fundamental questions such as the inspiration of 
Scripture and the relationship between Scripture and tradition. In the second, the 
theme of an eschatological horizon begins to emerge—particularly significant for 
Moltmann at this stage in determining the universal scope of preaching and the per-
sistence of the church despite the torrents of history. Finally, I attend to this concept 
of the horizon in two later essays, where Moltmann tests it in dialogue with Barth, 
Bultmann, and proponents of historical criticism. In these more sophisticated discus-
sions, an important link is forged between the promises of Scripture and the work of 
the present, both in relation to their common horizon. 
One essay from this period treating the theme of Scripture directly, namely, 
“Scripture, Tradition, and Traditions,” has been excluded.2 This is because the essay 
is simply a summary of the discussions at an ecumenical conference and demon-
strates little of Moltmann’s own concerns. 
 
1 Of the little that has been written on this period of Moltmann’s theology, see Ton Van 
Prooijen, Limping but Blessed: Jürgen Moltmann’s Search for a Liberating Anthropology (Am-
sterdam: Rodopi, 2004), 9-72; Markus Dröge, “Über Moltmanns Frühschriften: Ekklesiolo-
gische Leitmotive in der Theologie Jürgen Moltmanns 1952-1964,” Evangelische Theologie 
66:3 (2006): 173-85; Nigel G. Wright, “Predestination and Perseverance in the Early Theol-
ogy of Jürgen Moltmann,” Evangelical Quarterly 83:4 (2011): 330-345. 
2 Moltmann, “Schrift, Tradition, Traditionen: Bericht über die Arbeit der Sektion II,” Öku-
menische Rundschau 13 (1964): 104-11. The essay has not yet been translated into English. 
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2.1. Some Fundamental Questions: The Earliest Essays 
In two of his earliest essays, Moltmann attends to some fundamental questions 
around the nature and role of Scripture in the church. In his first essay he takes up 
the theme directly, inquiring into issues like inspiration and the scientific validity of 
biblical claims. In his second essay on what it means to be Reformed today, Molt-
mann reminds the church of the ongoing need to read and reform tradition in light 
of Scripture. 
2.1.1. 1959: “The Bible as the Word of God and the Word of Human Beings”  
In this essay, Moltmann advances constructive proposals for a doctrine of Scripture, 
beginning with Paul’s theology in 2 Cor 4. Notably, I have not been able to find any 
treatments of Moltmann’s theology that address this piece in any significant way, if 
at all.3 This is somewhat surprising, since the essay is unique in Moltmann’s theol-
ogy. It will not be for another forty years, in his 2000 Experiences in Theology, that he 
will again give sustained attention to the doctrine of Scripture.4 
Moltmann begins with two claims made of the Bible that make it questiona-
ble today. First, the Bible is God’s word.5 Such a claim is met with offence on the part 
of non-believers, as it cannot be justified on the basis of human reason, nor with re-
gard to the Bible’s practical relevance for those outside the church. Rather, believers 
quickly find themselves invoking absolutes, which by nature are neither demonstra-
ble nor falsifiable. The second claim that brings the Bible into question is that God 
 
3 But see Gerhard Diekmeyer, Wort und Gewißheit: das Schriftprinzip in der Theologie Hermann 
Cremers (Wuppertal: Brockhaus, 1999), 67, 136. The essay appears in bibliographies at the 
end of at least two dissertations on Moltmann’s theology, though neither of these address 
it in the body of the text. Peter Fumiaki Momose, Kreuzestheologie: eine Auseinandersetzung 
mit Jürgen Moltmann (Freiburg: Herder, 1978); Russell W. McConnell, “The Passion of God 
as Methodological Paradigm in the Theologies of H. Wheeler Robinson and Jürgen Molt-
mann,” Ph.D. diss. (Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, TX, 1998). 
4 See section 7.5. of this dissertation. 
5 Due to the overlap of divine word and human word in the context of this essay, I have 
chosen to consistently translate Wort as the lowercase “word.” Because nouns are capital-
ised in German, Moltmann does not make the same orthographical distinction between 
God’s Word and human word that is typical in much English-language theology. 
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speaks in the Bible through human words. There is nothing inherently divine about 
the human words themselves. It is only that God has chosen to speak through this 
medium. 
Interestingly, Moltmann suggests, Paul faced similar questions. His defence 
in 2 Cor implies a number of allegations that were made against him. For example, 
not only does Paul “lack the captivating, ecstatic power of speech,” but his ministry 
has not been certified by the church in Jerusalem.6 It is thus indistinguishable from 
that of “swindlers, fools, and charlatans.”7 For Paul, however, it is Christ himself 
who guarantees the authenticity of the ministry. The commission to preach God’s 
reconciliation to human beings is given by Christ. For the apostle, questioning his 
ministry is thus questioning Christ himself. Moreover, Paul does not require any 
certification from Jerusalem. In doubting Paul’s apostleship, “since the fact that the 
Corinthians are Christians has arisen from his apostolic service, they would, after all, 
have to renounce being Christian.”8 That is, Paul does not here appeal to Scripture, 
the other apostles, the words of Jesus, or reason. Rather, for him, Christ himself es-
tablishes the truth of the word through faith in the hearts of those to whom the word 
is proclaimed. 
Nonetheless, Paul also appeals to conscience (syneidēsis) in 2 Cor 4:2, “an ap-
parently objective and neutral authority.”9 But, Moltmann wonders, following the 
polemics of dialectical theology, “Does this not contradict that which was said earlier 
of the unprovable nature of the word in the things of this world, of the unique self-
evidence of the divine word?—Is then the conscience nevertheless the religious au-
thority that is always available within human beings, to which the word of revelation 
must correspond, and to which it is attached, that proves them right?”10 The truth of 
 
6 Moltmann, “Die Bibel als Gotteswort und Menschenwort: eine biblische-theologische 
Betrachtung anhand von 2. Kor 4,1-6,” in Die Bibel – Gotteswort oder Menschenwort? 
Dargestellt am Buch Jona und am Apostolat des Paulus nach 2 Korinther 4, ed. Hans Walter 
Wolff, Jürgen Moltmann, and Rudolf Bultmann, 36-48 (Neukirchen: Neukirchener, 1959), 
38. 
7 Moltmann, “Die Bibel,” 38. 
8 Moltmann, “Die Bibel,” 39. 
9 Moltmann, “Die Bibel,” 39. 
10 Moltmann, “Die Bibel,” 40. 
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the word would be made dependent, if only in part, on human beings. In response, 
Moltmann contends that such fears overlook the eschatological location of the con-
science in Paul’s theology.11 For Paul, the conscience is not a “divine spark” in human 
beings that enables them to confirm the truth of the word. Rather, it consists in the 
confession given at the last judgement—which is on the cusp of taking place.12 “Paul 
feels that in this legal dispute with his opponents he is placed before the gates of 
God's last judgement. In this situation… he calls upon everybody's common 
knowledge of his apostolic message to be a witness for his word.”13 
Paul lastly appeals to the Holy Spirit. For him, neither history nor tradition 
could make comprehensible the presence of God in the crucified Christ. The apostle 
knew it was only the Holy Spirit that could bring about faith through the word. As 
such, Paul compares this act to the act of creation (2 Cor 4:6). It is through the Holy 
Spirit that mere human words become God’s own word. 
Throughout his exegesis, Moltmann is determined to demonstrate that it is 
not Paul’s words themselves but that to which they witness that ensures their truth. 
But neither should this result in complete disregard for the words. As Moltmann 
puts it, “So little the human, apostolic word matters—for us the Bible—before the 
Lord Jesus Christ; so much it matters in service to the church for Jesus’ sake.”14 The 
meaning of these words become clearer as Moltmann proceeds to evaluate the doc-
trine of “verbal inspiration,” where the Holy Spirit inspires every single word of the 
biblical text.15 
In his discussion of verbal inspiration, Moltmann begins with the rejection of 
two extremes. On the one hand, the inspiration of Scripture is not simply located 
 
11 Moltmann cites Rom 2:15 and 9:1, and 2 Cor 1:12 and 5:11 in this connection. 
12 Moltmann, “Die Bibel,” 40. 
13 Moltmann, “Die Bibel,” 40. 
14 Moltmann, “Die Bibel,” 38. 
15 The following has much in common with the position of Moltmann’s Doktorvater, Otto 
Weber, in his Foundations of Dogmatics, vol. 1, trans. by Darrell L. Guder (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 1981), 228-40. Indeed, Moltmann refers to this passage explicitly in his 2000 
criticism of the doctrine, in ExpTh 136 n. 97. Cf. my n. 17 below. For more on Moltmann’s 
relationship to Weber, see BP, 45-48 (2006); M. Douglas Meeks, Origins of the Theology of 
Hope (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1974), 21-24. 
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externally in the heart of every individual to whom the Holy Spirit has imparted 
faith. On the other hand, however, neither is Scripture’s inspiration simply located 
within the words themselves, apart from their being heard. Following 2 Tim 3:16-17, 
Moltmann writes, “The Holy Scripture with which we deal is always the Scripture 
of this practical application. It is not simply there. It wants something from us.”16 
Simply put, claiming that “the Bible possesses a tangible, heavenly quality that is 
demonstrable to everyone and automatically given with its origin,” and treating it 
as such, is to “engage in idolatry.”17 Such a claim would overlook the nature of Scrip-
ture as a human witness and seek security for faith in something other than God. The 
Bible is much rather like a sacrament, the sign under which God’s word comes to 
human beings. And sacraments are yet more than signs. “They not only signify what 
they testify, but they administer what they testify. In this way the Bible is the sign 
and administration of the one word in which God has determined the salvation of this 
world: the sign and administration of Jesus Christ.”18 To say anything more would 
be to open “a gate and a door to corrosive Enlightenment criticism of the Bible.”19 
But this is not all there is to the doctrine of inspiration. Indeed, while he re-
jects some of the excesses of the doctrine of verbal inspiration, Moltmann can still 
affirm its basic insight. The doctrine “is intended as a guide, saying, ‘This is what 
you should listen to!’ It is intended to ensure that precisely in hearing the words of 
this and no other text we really hear the words of the eternal God’s own address to 
us human beings.”20 Taking this into account, Moltmann turns to Calvin to address 
 
16 Moltmann, “Die Bibel,” 43. 
17 Moltmann, “Die Bibel,” 44. This sentence closely resembles the words of Weber: “The 
concept of inspiration (4) serves the effort to ascribe to the Bible a tangible quality, inher-
ently present in it, automatically given by its origin and means of development.” Weber, 
Foundations in Dogmatics, 1:233. 
18 Moltmann, “Die Bibel,” 44, emphasis original. 
19 Moltmann, “Die Bibel,” 45. 
20 Moltmann, “Die Bibel,” 43. Similar sentiments are expressed by Barth. E.g., “The Reform-
ers took over unquestioningly and unreservedly the statement on the inspiration, and in-
deed the verbal inspiration, of the Bible, as it is explicitly and implicitly contained in those 
Pauline passages which we have taken as our basis, even including the formula that God 
is the author of the Bible, and occasionally making use of the idea of a dictation through 
the biblical writers. How could it be otherwise? Not with less but with greater and more 
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the witness of the Spirit in the hearts of those who hear the word of God. While with 
the coming of the end the judgements of God and Christ will finally be justified be-
fore all creation, in the present it is the Spirit who champions these from within hu-
man beings, ensuring that they hold to the truth of the word ahead of its eschatolog-
ical vindication. Again, then, the words themselves are not inspired apart from their 
being taken up into the divine economy and made effective by the Holy Spirit. 
Finally, Moltmann returns to the questions with which he began. First, Chris-
tians need to take reason’s doubts of the Bible seriously. “As Christians we cannot 
raise our heads from the earth like moles and cry, ‘We have it!’—and then, when the 
inquiries come, crawl into the sand and keep our eyes shut.”21 Rather, the doubts of 
others need to be taken seriously, not dismissed from the outset. These doubts may 
even be valid insofar as the central claims of the Bible do not depend on accordance 
with science, history, or even morality. They are valid rather in the way that they are 
taken up by the Holy Spirit as witness to Christ. Second, then, “we are not the advo-
cates for the Bible and should not lose ourselves in any ingenious argumentation that 
remains so tentative.”22 The word is proclaimed in the presence of God. It is the Spirit 
and not human beings that will advocate for it in the hearts of others.  
This essay richly demonstrates the extent to which the early Moltmann had 
thought through the doctrine of the Scripture. Throughout, the Bible cannot be ab-
stracted from its witness to Christ, nor from its missiological purpose, effected by the 
Holy Spirit. This is the case with Paul’s words, which find their rationale in bearing 
witness to Christ and, eschatologically, in having been the medium through which 
the Corinthians came to Christ. Particularly noteworthy here is Moltmann’s distinc-
tion between words falling from heaven, which would erase the human quality of 
Scripture, and human words that serve as a sign to point to Christ. Although he does 
not go into detail, for him, affirming the Bible’s human character means that the 
claims made by the ancient authors that present problems for the modern reader can 
 
radical seriousness they wanted to proclaim the subjection of the Church to the Bible as 
the Word of God and its authority as such.” Barth, CD I/2, 521. 
21 Moltmann, “Die Bibel,” 47. 
22 Moltmann, “Die Bibel,” 47. 
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yet be appreciated for their role in administrating Christ. And it is only the true Ad-
vocate for biblical claims, the Holy Spirit, who can ultimately confirm their validity 
in this regard. 
2.1.2. 1959: “What Does ‘Reformed’ Mean?” 
In this short piece on the meaning of “Reformed,” Moltmann also includes some im-
portant comments that reflect his theology of Scripture. He begins with some obser-
vations on dialogue between the different generations in Germany’s Reformed 
churches. This not only involves appreciation for what the Spirit has done in the 
history of these churches, “but it also occurs in the freedom to criticise, which a per-
son who is called out into their own responsibility and obedience receives, and can 
therefore no longer hide behind the answers of their Reformed grandfathers.”23 To 
be Reformed, then, is to ask after “the reforming impact of the word today.”24 
 This central feature of the Reformed churches in Germany finds further sup-
port in their diverse history. Whereas some scholars have characterised the churches 
after their apparent connection to the famous Reformer, John Calvin, Moltmann 
draws on the work of Heinrich Heppe and Ernst Friedrich Karl Müller to argue oth-
erwise. First, up until 1577 even the Lutheran churches “called themselves ‘re-
formed’ churches and at no time was this meant as a confessional or ideological self-
designation.”25 It was from around 1560 that “Reformed” began to be used in certain 
areas in the more specific sense—referring to a movement within Protestantism. And 
yet, Moltmann contends, Calvin was still not a major figure in this movement. Ra-
ther, “we find among the contributors… a colourful and rather pluriform society of 
spirits: students from Wittenberg who are faithful to Melanchthon, such as [Zacha-
rias] Ursinus and [Christoph] Pezel; Zwinglians like [Thomas] Erastus and [Albert] 
 
23 Moltmann, “Was heißt ‘reformiert’?” Reformierte Kirchenzeitung 100 (1959): 24-28, at 25. 
For a similar article in English, though with some differences, see Moltmann, “The Origin 
and Structure of the Reformed Church in Germany,” Reformed and Presbyterian World 27:3 
(1962): 108-13. 
24 Moltmann, “Was heißt ‘reformiert’,” 24. 
25 Moltmann, “Was heißt ‘reformiert’,” 25. 
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Hardenberg; French and Dutch Calvinists like [Caspar] Olevian and [Peter] Da-
theen; and, finally, many humanists, who cannot be classified according to any con-
fession, such as [Andreas] Hyperius.”26 These Reformed churches, especially follow-
ing persecution at the hands of Lutheran churches in Germany, could boast a gener-
ous orthodoxy, albeit not one that was centred around the figure of Calvin. “They 
venerated Luther as the pioneer and originator of the Reformation in Germany, per-
ceived its continuation in Melanchthon, and welcomed the French and Dutch Cal-
vinist church system as a help and guidance for the realisation of their own goals of 
reform.”27 
 In light of this history, Moltmann proceeds to address the place of Scripture 
and tradition in the Reformed churches today. He quotes the Italian Reformer, Hier-
onymus Zanchius, who contended that Calvin, Zwingli, and Luther should not 
simply be pitted against one another but be read in light of Scripture. Where Calvin’s 
words better represent Scripture, Luther must be set aside. But the converse is also 
true. Unfortunately, the town council discharged Zanchius from Strasbourg in 1563, 
following the response of the Lutheran Johann Marbach to this principle. Marbach 
had argued that Zanchius’s principle endangered the “religious consensus.”28 That 
is, Moltmann explains, for Marbach and others the truth of Luther’s theology was no 
longer seen primarily in relation to its agreement with Scripture but in relation to the 
time, insofar as the events surrounding Luther in the Reformation were seen as apoc-
alyptic events, the ushering in of the end. Accordingly, Luther’s truth was found 
instead in his being the eschatological Elijah who preceded Christ’s coming. Rather 
than invoke Calvin as a counter-authority, though, the Reformed commended Scrip-
ture against “this apocalyptic absolutisation of Luther and his doctrine.”29 
For the Reformed churches in Germany at the time of Moltmann giving this 
paper, this last point is of particular importance. It must not primarily be specific 
confessions that dictate the theological work of these churches but Scripture itself. 
 
26 Moltmann, “Was heißt ‘reformiert’,” 26. 
27 Moltmann, “Was heißt ‘reformiert’,” 26. 
28 Moltmann, “Was heißt ‘reformiert’,” 27. 
29 Moltmann, “Was heißt ‘reformiert’,” 27. 
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Yet Moltmann does not stop there. He takes the opportunity to highlight the dis-
tinctly radical nature of this principle. “A theology conducted in this way and a 
church determined by it must be open to the truly ecumenical horizon of the word 
of God…. For this reason we should not so much say: ‘We are Reformed!’—but 
should ask what will reform the whole church of Christ.”30 Moltmann also draws 
attention to the situation that young ministers find themselves in. Whereas the pre-
vious generation witnessed the ousting of cultural Protestantism at the hands of di-
alectical theology and in the struggle for truth in the churches under the Third Reich, 
it is all too easy in this subsequent time of relative peace to “adopt corollaries, with-
out taking the time to make new calculations,” or to “embrace an orthodoxy that 
accepts answers, without having done the questioning.”31 For this, however, it is not 
back to Scripture but forward to the horizon of Christ’s eschatological lordship to 
which Moltmann turns. Nonetheless, neither is this horizon a departure from Scrip-
ture. Indeed, the two necessarily presuppose one another. “There is no middle with-
out the horizon, no centre without the perimeter, no Christ without his royal lord-
ship in the worldly, incarnate life, no word of God that does not push to become 
flesh in the obedience of faith.”32 
Here, Moltmann has reminded his Reformed companions of their duty to 
uphold the primacy of Scripture to confession. The task of the Reformation is not yet 
complete. The role of the Bible remains that of continually converting the church to 
the image of Christ. Strikingly, it is not simply Christ but Christ against the horizon 
of his eschatological lordship to whom the church is to be conformed. The church 
cannot only look back to Scripture but must look forward too. This eschatological 
orientation was hinted at in the essay I discussed above, in the previous subsection 
(2.1.1.), with Moltmann’s interpretation of the conscience. Moltmann begins to reflect 
more deeply on this theme of horizon from this point on, as the following expositions 
will demonstrate. 
 
30 Moltmann, “Was heißt ‘reformiert’,” 27. 
31 Moltmann, “Was heißt ‘reformiert’,” 28. 
32 Moltmann, “Was heißt ‘reformiert’,” 28. 
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2.2. Looking to the Horizon 
Another piece of Moltmann’s from 1959 is also of note, along with two others from 
the following years. At this point, the theme of the eschatological horizon that lies 
beyond the church takes an increasingly central place in his theology. In the first 
essay, Moltmann draws on Barth, Bonhoeffer, and others in order to demonstrate the 
scope of Christ’s coming lordship, often overlooked in preaching that is directed pri-
marily to the individual and the domestic sphere. Next, in an essay from the follow-
ing year, Moltmann argues that this horizon secures both continuity through history 
and the historical character of history. The horizon remains the same throughout 
history, while preaching must be faithful not only to this horizon but to the ever-
changing circumstances of the present. Finally, in a third essay, Moltmann returns 
to ecclesiology in order to speak to the nature of the church in light of this horizon. 
2.2.1. 1959: The Church Community against the Horizon of Christ’s Lordship  
The eschatological horizon in Christ’s coming kingdom is the central theme of this 
essay, published in booklet form. Its contents are divided into four sections. First, 
Moltmann draws on the work of Karl Barth to demonstrate the close and inseparable 
relationship between Christ and his kingdom. This is significant because although 
preaching has become centred on Christ, this Christ is often abstracted from his king-
dom. But Barth provides a reply here, in that Christ’s lordship denotes a universal 
state of affairs, namely his rule over all things. Thus, in accordance with Barth, “the 
expectation with which we attend church services suffers from our stupidity—that 
we dare not hope for anything more.”33 Preaching must look at Christ in the context 
 
33 Moltmann, Die Gemeinde im Horizont der Herrschaft Christi (Neukirchen: Neukirchener, 
1959), 13. Moltmann will write of this piece later, “When I read this again today, I can see 
that here all the themes of my later theology are really already sounded: the eschatological 
horizon of history in the kingdom of God; faithfulness to the earth; new partnerships for 
the church in the world; and ‘the narrow wideness of the cross of Christ.’” ExpTh, 91 
(2000). For other expositions and comment, see BP, 78 (2006); van Prooijen, Limping but 
Blessed, 56-63; and Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power: The Theology of 
Jürgen Moltmann, trans. by John Bowden (London: SCM, 2000), 26-39. 
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of his kingdom in order to recover the breadth of the biblical hope. Second, the Blum-
hardts,34 Richard Rothe, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer each in their own ways testify to 
the comprehensive scope of God’s kingdom, one that does not only extend over 
every human being individually but over all the earth. Moltmann summarises their 
contributions, writing, “The kingdom of God has to do not only with human beings, 
but also with circumstances, things, and institutions—not only with personal con-
nections, but also with connections to things, connections which link us in human 
society. The earth in its unabbreviated abundance will enter into the kingdom of God 
when the curse of the earth in Gen 3 is overcome, along with its conditions and its 
fate.”35 
 Moltmann proceeds, in a third section, to draw out the ecclesiological implica-
tions of this position. Turning to the doctrine of the ordinances or “mandates” (Man-
daten)36 he situates the calling of the church within the context of additional worldly 
ordinances instituted by God. These include the state, family, economy, and culture. 
In this context, the church is “an arrabōn of the kingdom.”37 That is, it is not the king-
dom itself, nor will it become the kingdom, but it witnesses to that which is coming. 
 
34 While not attending in detail to various passages in Moltmann’s work, Christian T. Col-
lins Winn and Peter Goodwin Heltzel draw connections between the theology of the 
Blumhardts and Moltmann in “’Before Bloch There Was a Blumhardt’: A Thesis on the Or-
igins of the Theology of Hope,” Scottish Journal of Theology 62:1 (2009): 26-39. 
35 Moltmann, Die Gemeinde, 22. 
36 This is Bonhoeffer’s term. Moltmann explores the concept in “The Lordship of Christ and 
Human Society,” in Jürgen Moltmann and Jürgen Weissbach, Two Studies in the Theology of 
Bonhoeffer, trans. by Reginald H. Fuller and Ilse Fuller (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1967), 21-94 (1959). In the booklet I am discussing presently, Moltmann uses “orders” 
(Ordnungen) and “mandates” almost interchangeably, perhaps because Bonhoeffer’s alter-
native does not appear to him to be substantially different—despite such a difference be-
ing Bonhoeffer’s intention in adopting the term. Indeed, just one year later, in HP, 115-18, 
Moltmann is critical of all approaches to the orders of creation—Bonhoeffer’s mandates in-
cluded—because they inevitably obscure the historical character of reality. Alluding to 
Bonhoeffer’s innovation, Moltmann writes, “It is relatively unimportant whether a theol-
ogy of ordinances develops from a doctrine of ordinances of creation or from a christologi-
cal foundation.” HP, 112. I attend to this essay below, in the following subsection (2.2.2.). 
37 Moltmann, Die Gemeinde, 25. The word arrabōn, NRSV “first installment” (2 Cor 1:22), 
“guarantee” (2 Cor 5:5), and “pledge” (Eph 1:14), is used exclusively of the Holy Spirit in 
the NT. Here Moltmann extends the meaning to that of the church. Just as the Spirit is 
given as a guarantee that the full payment will come in future, with the consummation of 
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Conversely, this means that the other ordinances have a positive role to play as 
“site[s] for the fulfilment of the commandments.”38 The church does not hold a mo-
nopoly over obedience to the commandments because God not only seeks to redeem 
the church but, with it, the whole of creation. 
Finally, Moltmann turns to address “courage for worldly preaching,” which 
more directly relates to his doctrine of Scripture.39 Preaching is not only engaged 
with “meditation and concentration on the word of the Bible.” But, “with equal in-
tensity, mediation on and exegesis of the hearer must be undertaken.”40 Without this 
connection to its hearers, preaching is simply an “orthodox and biblically correct 
speaking in tongues,” one which is at the same time a “mercilessness” and an “illu-
sion.”41 Such a rigid focus on being biblically correct at the expense of addressing the 
hearers in their particular circumstances is thus a disservice to Christ and his king-
dom. And while Moltmann does not name any theologians or preachers who advo-
cate such a principle—information which might aid in comprehending his alterna-
tive more precisely—something of his doctrine of Scripture can nonetheless be dis-
cerned in his following comments. 
In particular, Moltmann is concerned with “the form of communicating the 
gospel that is everywhere common to us today,” namely, that which is “oriented to 
the familial, domestic, and private sphere of human beings. This is a dangerous re-
treat.”42 Here, preaching addresses only one mandate, that of the family. It cannot 
grasp the breadth of Christ’s lordship over all the domains of human life. As such, 
the other ordinances are both excused from the responsibility of obedience to the 
commandments and lose out on the liberating power of the gospel. Significantly, 
domesticised, individualised preaching overlooks the historical character of the gos-
 
the kingdom, so, too, is the church not the final payment but a guarantee that God is work-
ing to redeem the whole of creation. 
38 Moltmann, Die Gemeinde, 30. 
39 Moltmann, Die Gemeinde, 30. 
40 Moltmann, Die Gemeinde, 31. 
41 Moltmann, Die Gemeinde, 31. 
42 Moltmann, Die Gemeinde, 31. 
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pel, insofar as it is directed to maintenance of the way things are and does not chal-
lenge them. But, for Moltmann, “the gospel has entered into history (John 1:14). It 
exists historically. This does not mean that it adapts itself to the respective fashions 
of different periods, but that it will mould the present period of time.”43 Preaching 
must seek ever and again to speak the word into history. The way in which the word 
was spoken yesterday will not suffice for today. 
These probings into the universal significance and historical nature of the 
word will receive fuller expression in Moltmann’s subsequent theology. Above all, 
this reclamation of the future horizon of Scripture and preaching will become in-
creasingly important for Moltmann as he develops a sturdier foundation for the his-
torical character and eschatological orientation of theology. At this point, though, the 
building blocks are already beginning to appear. Theology concerns itself not only 
with Christ, but Christ in the context of his coming kingdom, a kingdom in which 
the whole world will be redeemed. In the light of this universal horizon, it is not only 
the church but the other mandates too that are to listen to the word and respond in 
obedience. And yet, this universal vision leads to a homiletics that is sorely deficient 
if focussed exclusively on the exegesis of Scripture and not that of the audience as 
well. Christ’s kingdom claims both Scripture and audience. Moreover, this means 
that preaching should endeavour to address human existence in its entirety, and not 
just in the domestic sphere. It needs to take into account the historical character of 
the word and seek to speak it in such a way as it will be heard and understood in the 
present. 
2.2.2. 1960: “The Understanding of History in Christian Social Ethics” 
Moltmann’s theology of Scripture continues to develop into the sixties, not least in 
this article attending to the relationship between theology and sociology. Notably, 
in the space of a year, he makes an about-turn on the ordinances and mandates, tak-
ing a stance that has important consequences for the role of Scripture in theology. 
 
43 Moltmann, Die Gemeinde, 32. 
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Key to this change of direction is Moltmann’s engagement with the sociology 
of his day, something which he thought could not be justifiably ignored by theology. 
Thus, “theology will always have to start from the fact that it speaks about the very 
reality of man that also confronts sociology. Were this not the case, the statements of 
theology would only be the arbitrary and non-binding agreements of a religious 
group.”44 This is not to say that theology need uncritically accept all sociological con-
clusions on the nature of being human. But it is to say that there should be some 
degree of continuity between the sociological and theological, seeing as they do not 
inhabit absolutely distinct spheres in terms of subject matter. “If theology speaks at 
all about ‘the true man’, destiny, justification, the demands made on man and his 
destiny, then its statements ought to be valid apart from faith.”45 Moltmann also dis-
covers a connection between theology and sociology in their common search for a 
horizon. Sociology has sought to rid itself of ideological presuppositions in order to 
approach history as history, which begins to fade when observers attempt to fit it 
into a static conceptual framework. Conversely, however, endeavouring to view his-
tory simply as history prevents any meaningful interpretation of the facts. Theology 
and sociology alike seek a horizon against which to interpret historical facts, though 
one that would not interfere with the historical character of these facts. 
Moltmann proceeds to address this theological interest in history in more de-
tail. He advances the programmatic statement: “For a biblical, Israelite Christian the-
ology, the reality of man is understood through an eschatological disclosure to be 
‘history’. The course of history is determined and directed by a once-for-all, radical, 
unique, unrepeatable event [Geschehen].”46 That is not to say, however, that the whole 
of history derives from just one event. Indeed, Moltmann refers to “event” in the 
plural a few sentences later.47 History is propelled through multiple events, such as 
 
44 HP, 101. 
45 HP, 101. 
46 HP, 103-4; PTh, 151-52. 
47 Israel “recognized and expected the coming of God with the incalculable events [Ges-
chehnissen] themselves.” HP, 104; PTh, 152. Moreover, unlike the English “event,” which 
tends to designate a single, discrete incident—perhaps more akin to the German Ereignis—
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the exodus, the giving of the law, the resurrection, and Pentecost. Anthropologically, 
this means that “man does not have a nature but a history.”48 Nonetheless, neither 
does this result in a loss of constancy. Such constancy is afforded through God’s 
faithfulness to the promise, despite the changing circumstances of history. 
Importantly, the seeds for the sharp contrast that Moltmann later sets up be-
tween Greek and biblical thought, essential to his argument throughout TH, appear 
here already at this earlier point in his career.49 Christian faith does not only hold a 
unique, historicist outlook. It must also reclaim this in light of the pervasive Hellen-
isation of the Christian tradition. If theology follows Scripture, Moltmann here con-
tends, then “God’s action is not seen in that which is repeatable or which remains 
the same, or in that which is taken from time and history, as for example in the eter-
nal laws and regularity of nature. Rather, it is seen in the unique and unrepeatable 
quality of temporal contingency.”50 Theology would be thinking in Greek terms if it 
understood the revelation of God in Scripture not as a new event on the way to an 
as of yet unrealised goal but as the appearance in time of that which is always already 
eternally realised. Thus, “the Greek man stands in ‘the epiphany of the eternal pre-
sent’; the Israelite-Christian man stands in the ‘apocalypse of that which is com-
ing.’”51 The Greek man awaits the disclosure of that which has already taken place 
in eternity, whereas a biblical view of reality “expects truth to come out of the future 
 
the word Geschehen in the previous citation is more fluid and can denote a process, or even 
a sequence of events.  
48 “Der Mensch hat keine Natur, sondern Geschichte.” HP, 105; PTh, 153. Moltmann sets this 
phrase in quotation marks but does not provide a source. It comes from José Ortega y Gas-
set, whom he attributes another phrase to on p.107. See José Ortega y Gasset, History as a 
System: And Other Essays toward a Philosophy of History, trans. by Helene Weyl (New York: 
W. W. Norton & Company, 1941), 217, where this ET reads, “Man, in a word, has no na-
ture; what he has is … history” (ellipsis original). 
49 See, similarly, Moltmann, “Eternity,” Listening: Journal of Religion and Culture 3 (1968): 89-
95. Wakefield suspects this is a translation of an earlier essay, which I can confirm. See 
Moltmann, “Ewigkeit,” in Theologie für Nichttheologen, vol. 1, Abendmahl - Gewissen, ed. 
Hans Jürgen Schultz, 104-10 (Stuttgart: Kreuz, 1963). 
50 HP, 104. 




of God.”52 Such statements seem to require a robust ontology—something which 
Moltmann does not develop at this point. The concern is evident in later texts, which 
I address in the following chapter.53 Here, his concern is primarily with the historical 
character of experienced reality. An unchanging eternity veiled in the present pre-
cludes the possibility of changing this present in view of an alternative future. In-
stead, the status quo remains. The present is to always return to the same point in 
seeking correspondence to the eternal. 
Significantly, this key biblical insight has not been completely buried in the 
text until now. Moltmann points to Luther, for example, who, commenting on Rom 
8:19, wrote, “The philosophers so direct their gaze at the present state of things that 
they speculate only about what things are and what quality they have, but the apos-
tle… directs us to their future state.”54 Yet the beginning of theology’s turn to the 
historical only starts to materialise with “Hegel and the philosophical school which 
followed him in the nineteenth century.”55 What is more, however, “only now has 
knowledge of the biblical disclosure of reality as history… established a new direc-
tion in Protestant theology.”56 Moltmann is likely referring to the work of Wolfhart 
 
52 HP, 104. 
53 See 3.3.2. 
54 Martin Luther, Luther’s Works, vol. 25, Lectures on Romans: Glosses and Scholia, ed. Hilton C. 
Oswald (Saint Louis, MO: Concordia, 1972), 360. Latin cited in HP, 104; cf. 127 nn. 12-13. 
Moltmann cites this passage twice again in TH, 35, 290 (1964). Note however, that this 
“was not realized either by himself [Luther] or by Protestant philosophy.” TH, 35. And, “it 
would surely be an abstraction that would not do justice to the Old Testament hope, if we 
were to describe this hope as spes purissima in Deum purissimum. Hope, where it holds to 
the promises, hopes that the coming God will bring it also ‘this and that’—namely, his re-
deeming and restoring lordship in all things.” TH, 119. The Latin comes from Luther, 
which Moltmann’s translator, Leitch, renders as “purely hope purely in God.” For Lu-
ther’s influence on Moltmann see 5.1.1. 
55 HP, 105. Moltmann does not provide any citations at this point though. He attends to the 
modern development of historicism and historical criticism in greater detail in HP, 56-60 
(1962); and TH, 230-72 (1964). 
56 HP, 105. 
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Pannenberg, Mircea Eliade, and Georg Picht, which he cites earlier in the article.57 I 
will attend to these influences in the following chapter.58 
In the second section of this essay, Moltmann draws connections between 
sociological analysis and the theology of the ordinances. According to the first, soci-
ety is increasingly historicised in the “rapid transition from an agricultural to an in-
dustrial society.”59 The communities that previously provided people with stability 
and a sense of permanence give way as the world in which they exist brings acceler-
ated change. “All ordinances become unstable and lack both certainty and driving 
force.”60 With these observations in mind, alongside his earlier claims in regard to 
the historicist character of Christian faith, Moltmann advances to the theology of the 
ordinances—the “mandates” in Bonhoeffer’s adapted concept—derived from Lu-
ther. These might include, for example, the ordinances of church, state, economy, 
and marriage. Moltmann proceeds to conduct a short survey of the doctrine in the 
theologies of Paul Althaus, Emil Brunner, Walter Künneth, Helmut Thielicke, Die-
trich Bonhoeffer, and in the 1956 theses from the Commission for Church Law. He is 
immediately critical. “One can always stumble upon a timeless foundation under the 
quicksand of history which is to give a foundation to the house of human society. 
The question of stable orders in an unstable world can never be answered by denying 
their historicity in small points.”61 For Moltmann, sociological and theological his-
toricism precludes the possibility of the doctrine of the ordinances holding a central 
 
57 HP, 126-27n.9. This trend, however, goes far beyond these three figures. See the work of 
Karl Löwith, whom Moltmann mentions in the same place: Meaning in History: The Theo-
logical Implications of the Philosophy of History (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1949); 
and the literature cited in Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, vol. 2, trans. by D. M. 
G. Stalker (New York: Harper & Row, 1962-4), 99 n. 1. It should be noted that Löwith’s 
own views of Judeo-Christian history are not wholly positive, and nor are his views of 
classical thought wholly negative. See Berthold P. Riesterer, Karl Löwith’s View of History: A 
Critical Appraisal of Historicism (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), 56-78; CoG, 41-44 
(1995). 
58 See 3.1. 
59 HP, 109. 
60 HP, 109. 
61 HP, 117-18. 
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place in modern theology. Negatively, this also means taking into account the al-
leged influence of Greek thought on the doctrine. Moltmann argues, “The concept of 
order which is both presupposed and sought for is, as such, rooted in the Greek 
structure of thought and logically always leads to unhistorical, naturalistic concep-
tions.”62 In contrast, “the New Testament offers no metaphysical doctrine of ordi-
nances.”63 
Finally, having rejected the doctrine of the ordinances, Moltmann proceeds 
to address the converse side of the problem of history for sociology and theology. In 
his first section, he had pointed to sociology’s difficulty with interpreting historical 
facts without inadvertently dehistoricising them by attempting to fit them into a 
fixed conceptual framework. A similar problem arises in theology. With the rejection 
of ahistorical ordinances, faith’s relationship to God’s commandments is also called 
into question. Moltmann summarises one position,64 in which God’s commandments 
are no longer to be read as “expressions of timelessly valid norms for all men… but 
rather as the historical will of God at particular points in history.”65 Because “all com-
mandments and instructions in the Bible are determined by the particular situation,” 
the Bible “abandons” the theologian “at that point where a ‘translation into our sit-
uation’ is demanded.”66 There is no “constancy of divine spheres in history” but only 
the utter particularity of every historical moment, so that no connection can be 
drawn between the commandment of the biblical text and any contemporary situa-
tion.67 Today must speak for itself. Here, however, lurks the spectre of “individual-
istic decisionism.”68 Any degree of ethical continuity throughout history is forfeit. 
Other options will therefore need to be entertained. 
 
62 HP, 112. 
63 HP, 112. 
64 Moltmann’s target here is not completely clear. At one point he cites Rudolph Bultmann’s 
“Gedanken über die gegenwärtige theologische Situation,” in Glauben und Verstehen, vol. 3 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1960), 190-196. But the exact connection between this text and 
Moltmann’s criticism is ambiguous. 
65 HP, 119. 
66 HP, 119. 
67 HP, 119. 
68 HP, 118. 
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 A potential alternative to both ahistorical mandates and super-historical deci-
sionism is provided by Barth.69 For him, it is not the constancy of the created orders 
but the constancy of God’s guiding sovereignty over history that the commandment 
consists in. Moreover, despite different actions, it is the same human being that acts. 
This allows for both constancy and history. Moltmann summarises, “Man, in the 
time given him, keeps choosing a new possibility determined on the way and in this 
possibility he chooses and realizes himself in a new and different way.”70 And it is 
the God that remains constant in a wholly other way who brings these new historical 
particularities to life as human beings run their course. Yet, Moltmann is uncon-
vinced that Barth’s ethics here can address the problem. This, Moltmann alleges, is 
because Barth’s focus is on the obedience of the individual in response to God, so 
that “the social context with the continuities and consistencies of human activity in 
history remains unclear.”71 
 Moltmann thus proposes his own solution. Decisionism can be avoided insofar 
as ethics in differing situations share a common, eschatological horizon. Indeed, it is 
hope directed to the future, Moltmann argues, that establishes history as history in 
the first place. And this has important implications for hermeneutics. On the one 
hand, “all biblical commandments are related to a historical fact, to God’s covenant 
at Sinai, to the coming of Jesus, to the coming of faith, to the historical event of bap-
tism, etc. They therefore do not express timeless and eternal norms; rather, the inten-
tion of God’s covenant is expressed in them.”72 On the other hand, however, the com-
mandments are not lost to their respective historical particularities. Rather, each 
commandment takes place in “a historical event which points beyond itself into the 
future.”73 That is, the commandments cannot be abstracted from the context of prom-
ise in which they occur, the latter which is oriented to a universal future. Moreover, 
through the commandments, people and groups “are ripped out of their previous 
 
69 Moltmann discusses Barth, CD III/4, §52 in this connection. 
70 HP, 121. 
71 HP, 122, translation adjusted; PTh, 169. 
72 HP, 123. 
73 HP, 123. 
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attachment to home, nation, habit, etc. and are placed in a new historical process, 
namely, in the history of the promise.”74 It is in this way that the promise actually 
establishes history. And this is particularly important because it is only through this 
that human beings find the road to an alternative future, one ordained by God and 
not by human fears or fancies. 
 In this article, Moltmann has drawn on sociological insights in order to ad-
vance the conversation in theology. Conversely, he has also developed his own the-
ological historicism and eschatology in order to inform sociology—even if this other 
side of the relationship is more implied than explicitly stated in his argumentation. 
In the context of this dissertation, the theological claims are particularly important. 
Not only does the universal, eschatological horizon of Christ’s lordship require a 
broader preaching schedule, but it also encourages preaching to remain faithful to 
the word of God and frees it from any boundedness to the historical circumstances 
of Scripture, in order that it may preach this same word today. First, that is, insofar 
as preaching orients itself to the eschatological horizon to which the historical facts 
of Scripture look, it remains faithful to the word’s intent to arrive at this horizon 
through history. Second, precisely because redemption takes place in history, it must 
make itself real to the present. As such, for the word to be heard today, the circum-
stances of yesterday do not need to be replicated exactly—though their replication is 
not necessarily a hindrance to this either. Rather, in encountering new historical cir-
cumstances the word also forges a new history, directing the present to a new obe-
dience in line with the promised future. While Moltmann had attempted to make 
such claims in regard to historico-eschatological character of Christian faith just a 
year earlier in The Church Community against the Horizon of Christ’s Lordship,75 it is here 
that his rationale for this begins to become clear as he reflects further on the place of 
the eschatological horizon in Christian theology. 
 
74 HP, 123. 
75 See the previous subsection (2.2.1.).  
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 Here, too, for the first time in any significant way, Moltmann’s contrastive par-
adigm appears, separating Greek and biblical outlooks. This will be a fundamental 
feature of his argumentation in TH. 
I have related the theme of this 1961 essay more directly to Scripture than 
Moltmann himself does. Nonetheless, he takes such a path in subsequent pieces, 
which I will address shortly. Before doing so, however, I turn to an essay from the 
following year, in which Moltmann looks once more at the ecclesiological implica-
tions of historicism and eschatology. 
2.2.3. 1961: “The ‘Rose in the Cross of the Present’: Towards an Understanding of 
the Church in Modern Society” 
In this essay, Moltmann continues to develop his historicist theology, returning to 
the area of ecclesiology. He wants to think of the church not only in spatial terms, as 
a house or a place, for example, but in historical terms. Thus Christianity is neither 
“the process of the church growing out of the depositum fidei [i.e., deposit of faith], 
like a growing tree, little by little filling history and the earth (the romantic picture 
of church history),” nor “a series of unrelated situations, each new.”76 That is, Molt-
mann wants to reject both an ecclesiology that sees the church as the outworking of 
the eternal and unchanging in history, as well as an ecclesiology that emphasises 
historical particularity at the expense of continuity through history. Rather, the 
church witnesses to the resurrection of Christ, a claim which can only be answered 
with either faith or unbelief. That is, the claim presupposes a concrete history. It is 
independent of both ancient and modern worldviews. Nonetheless, the church also 
professes an eschatological horizon not merely for itself but for the whole world, too. 
There is indeed truth and falsehood, but, whereas the tradition would assert this on 
the basis of eternity’s having come into time, such a reality derives not from that 
which is already there but from the universal future that the church shares as a hori-
zon with the rest of creation. 
 
76 HP, 143. Moltmann uses a similar metaphor in HP, 87 (1962). 
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 The constancy of the church, then, is not located in its institutional nature but 
in its hope. Although an institution might claim constancy on the basis of tradition, 
the church has “no lasting city” but looks for “the city that is to come” (Heb 13:14). 
Insofar as the church invokes continuity through its institutional nature, it has for-
gotten this hope, just as others did earlier when they looked to the earthly Jerusalem 
or Rome. “Christianity has continuity in history as far as it, through hope, reaches 
out beyond itself. Not in self-preservation but in self-abandonment does Christianity 
acquire continuance in that which it abandons and in which it trusts.”77 Moltmann 
connects this to the Protestant motto of ecclesia semper reformanda: the church must 
always be reforming. The church takes on different shapes in history as it continually 
conforms to the goal of its hope. Significantly, this is a process of sanctification that 
transpires in the context of suffering. And in suffering, the church witnesses to its 
future because the Spirit of the resurrection who is at work within it “gives the mir-
acle of endurance.”78 
 The theme of the horizon of Christ’s lordship thus continues to develop in 
Moltmann’s theology, this time returning to the church to remind it of its provisional 
nature. Again, Moltmann demonstrates a strong interest in thinking through the im-
plications of Christian historicism and eschatology for other areas in theology. As I 
will show in the following section, this will become particularly important as Molt-
mann turns to reflect on Scripture directly in this light. 
2.3. Horizon and Exegesis 
In this final section I proceed to explore two later essays where Moltmann applies 
his broadening eschatology to hermeneutical questions. In the first essay, the herme-
neutical assumptions of Barth, Bultmann, and historical criticism are reviewed and 
found wanting, so that an alternative hermeneutic oriented to Christ’s coming lord-
ship is forwarded in their stead. In the second essay, Moltmann further scrutinises 
 
77 HP, 147. 
78 HP, 150. 
41 
 
existential theology and historical criticism, this time with more of a focus on preach-
ing. Unlike Moltmann’s alternative, neither of these frameworks allow for adequate 
acknowledgement of history as history. 
2.3.1. 1962: “Exegesis and the Eschatology of History” 
In this piece, Moltmann again attends explicitly to Scripture, reflecting on the rela-
tionship between faith and historical criticism.79 Much of his argumentation here fol-
lows Pannenberg’s two articles on the same theme, which are cited in the middle of 
the essay.80 
Moltmann introduces his study with some comments on historical criticism 
in connection to tradition. Historical criticism has its origin in the increasingly fragile 
state of traditions, particularly Christian ones, in the seventeenth century. That is, 
where the claims of older institutions such as the Protestant churches could no longer 
be generally accepted due to the growing distance between them and the experiences 
of contemporary life, historical inquiry arose to examine the origins of these tradi-
tions and establish their present relevance. Yet, in doing so, “history [took] the place 
of tradition.”81 The firm foundation of tradition suddenly slipped into the ever-
changing current of history. Moreover, in reclaiming the past, human beings were 
emancipated from tradition’s bounds so that they no longer had to dismiss their own 
needs and ends in favour of institutional convention. The new constant was neither 
tradition nor its origins but the present good of human beings, which itself, nonethe-
less, was and remains always in flux. 
 
79 Edgar Krentz comments on this essay in the context of other post-war approaches to his-
torical-criticism. See his The Historical-Critical Method (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1975), 82-
84. Cf. also Moltmann’s 1963 essay dealing with similar themes, “Theology in the World of 
Modern Science,” in HP, 200-223. 
80 Published as a single essay in English. See Wolfhart Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theol-
ogy, vol. 1, trans. by George H. Kehm (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1970) 15-80, cited in HP, 
94n.23. 
81 HP, 57. 
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 Moltmann proceeds to identify what he understands to be the key methodo-
logical principles of historical criticism at the time of writing this essay. First, histor-
ical investigation is a science. It is not analogous to art or poetry, for example. It seeks 
the adaequatio rei et intellectus, the correspondence between reality and intellect. Sec-
ond, historical accuracy is controllable through the adherence to the right sources 
and correct use of the critical method for the interpretation of those sources. Third, 
this presupposes the reconstructible character of historical events. Yet these assump-
tions also lead to an “objectification” of the past, decried by certain critics. That is, in 
objectifying historical data, making them available to all times, such principles over-
look the place of the interpreter as a human subject, threatening to “ignore and neu-
tralize man’s own historicity and the historical conditions of his standpoint.”82 Ad-
ditionally, that which has been objectified becomes dehistoricised itself so that it, too, 
now stands outside of history. 
 The objectification of historical data is made possible by yet another presuppo-
sition: that of history as a “closed nexus of effects.”83 Here it is cause and effect that 
govern individual historical events. But this also results in a new search for meaning, 
as human beings become increasingly isolated from their once living history. It is 
thus that existential approaches develop: “This objectification of history then gives 
rise to the abstract subjectification of the human being, and the well-known separa-
tion of subject and object in man’s relationship to the world and history is the conse-
quence…. Historicism and existentialism are two sides of the same process.”84 More-
over, for theology this means that faith can no longer be grounded in the historical 
person of Jesus, who is now part of a causal framework that is “inviolable (even for 
God, if there is one).”85 In regard to exegesis, historical criticism remains a scientifi-
cally viable approach to the historical person of Jesus, albeit a theologically bankrupt 
one. The theological value of exegesis must then instead be found in “a supernatu-
 
82 HP, 63. 
83 HP, 63. 
84 HP, 64. 
85 HP, 64. 
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ralism of the Holy Spirit, or inner experience, a spiritual dissolution, personal en-
counter.”86 Because God and history are forced apart, each can only be understood 
here in separation from the other. 
 For Moltmann, two solutions proposed by theology are of particular note in 
this connection. First, in his commentary on Romans, Barth argued that historical 
criticism and theological interpretation of Scripture exercise complementary func-
tions. “The historical-critical method of Biblical investigation has its rightful place; it 
is concerned with the preparation of the intelligence—and this can never be super-
fluous…. The doctrine of Inspiration is concerned with the labour of apprehending, 
without which no technical equipment, however complete, is of any use whatever. 
Fortunately, I am not compelled to choose between the two.”87 In a later preface, 
Barth further contends that biblical commentary must not be written about Paul but 
with him, and that it should share his “concern” (Sache), regardless of the breadth of 
the historical ditch that separates the latter from the present.88 Moltmann responds, 
however, that, despite his attempts at balancing these apparently complementary 
approaches, Barth’s characterisation nonetheless lends itself to an inevitable dichot-
omisation of history and the theological subject matter, the Sache. “The question still 
remains open as to whether the hypothetical character of the faithful relationship 
which is to be entered into,” that is, the shared relationship of the reader and the 
original text to its common subject matter, “must not always demand historical-crit-
ical distancing as a corrective.”89 While there may be a danger of losing sight of the 
Sache through the undisciplined use of historical criticism—this being Barth’s con-
cern—without  historical criticism occupying a central place in the task of theological 
interpretation there is the opposite danger of projecting onto the text the reader’s a 
priori idea of what constitutes its subject matter. 
 
86 HP, 65. 
87 Karl Barth, Romans, trans. by Edwyn C. Hoskyns (London: Oxford University Press, 
1933), 1, cited in HP, 67. 
88 Barth, Romans, 7, cited in HP, 67; PTh, 69. 
89 HP, 68, translation adjusted; PTh, 69. 
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 A second solution is proposed by Rudolf Bultmann. For him, against historical-
critical convention, the role of the observer must be taken into account, as the reader 
who objectifies history does not stand outside of it but within it. No neutral interpre-
tation of the text is therefore possible. Rather, subject and text are interrelated in the 
act of interpretation. Moltmann summarises, “The interpretation of history is the in-
terpretation of self and the self-interpretation of existence occurs in the interpretation 
of history.”90 Yet Moltmann takes issue with the assumption that human beings do 
not stand over but within history. Surely both claims are true, he contends, distin-
guishing between being and having. In the same way that human beings are both 
bodies and have bodies, so too do they participate in history and have a history. 
Moltmann’s argument becomes clearer in his response to Bultmann’s claim that ex-
istence cannot be objectified. Using the example of a human promise, Moltmann re-
plies that a person “makes himself reliable and also calculable. He objectifies him-
self.”91 This is because the promiser establishes a concrete connection between their 
present and future selves. They are thus objectified beyond the radical subjectivity 
of the fleeting moment. But neither does this kind of objectification work to dehu-
manise—or completely desubjectivise—the promiser. “Without a certain amount of 
objectification, personal relationships find no permanence.”92 Against Bultmann, 
then, a theological anthropology is required that affirms both the subjective and ob-
jective aspects of human being. 
Other existentialist theologians like Wilhelm Herrmann and Gerhard Ebeling 
take similar approaches to that of Bultmann They focus on Jesus’ relationship to his-
tory, which can be entered into by the reader of Scripture, and they reject investiga-
tion into the objective reality of the events of Jesus’ life as irrelevant.93 In 
 
90 HP, 69. 
91 HP, 71. 
92 HP, 71. 
93 Moltmann’s relationship to Heidegger has been given little attention. Nicholas Ansell dis-
covers affinities between the two on time in Moltmann’s later work. Nicholas Ansell, The 
Annihilation of Hell: Universal Salvation and the Redemption of Time in the Eschatology of Jürgen 
Moltmann (Milton Keynes, UK: Paternoster, 2013), 218-28. It is unclear to what extent this 
is a genetic relationship, however. 
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Heideggerian terms, it is not the actuality of Jesus’ existence that is of primary im-
portance but the possibility inherent within it, one which the reader apprehends in 
existential encounter. But, Moltmann objects, there cannot be an either–or between 
dismissing modern subjectivity for the sake of cold, hard facts, and rejecting the facts 
in favour of “the whirlpool of modern subjectivity.”94 The gospel both reflects an 
actual state of affairs in Christ’s lordship and demands individual response in con-
fession. Thus, “this modern dualism is alien to the New Testament, although it stems 
from the confrontation of Christianity with Greek thought.”95 To state this positively, 
Moltmann turns to eschatology. “The characteristic quality of the biblical statements 
of proclamation is that they reach out, beyond the historical situation in which they 
were spoken and heard, into the universal.”96 And this universality is located in the 
eschatological horizon of Christ’s return, shared by all human beings. Contra 
Heidegger and the existentialist theologians who appropriate him, such a connection 
instead indicates the ontological priority of the actual to the possible. That which is 
possible derives from the actual state of affairs that is Christ’s lordship over the earth. 
Moltmann will develop his own position in more detail towards the end of this arti-
cle. 
Having addressed the solutions proposed by Barth and existentialist theol-
ogy, Moltmann proceeds to offer an appraisal of the underlying assumptions of the 
historical method.97 “Does the method which historicizes reality into a series of facts 
correspond to the reality that is questioned by it?”98 First, Moltmann points out that 
the historical method is never concerned with the facts as such but only with those 
which are accessible and which the method perceives to be significant. In addition, 
an individual fact cannot speak alone but only in relation to other facts. Put differ-
ently, the special interest in the facts means that the historical method is always al-
ready implicitly directed to the facts in their relationship to other facts, and never in 
 
94 HP, 75. 
95 HP, 75. 
96 HP, 76, slightly adjusted. 
97 Cf. TH, 230-61 (1964). 
98 HP, 78. 
46 
 
isolation. Second, the historical method, insofar as it perceives the facts in a particu-
lar relationship—whether, for example, in relationship to a certain process or devel-
opment, or as part of a category such as philosophy, art, or religion—also suspends 
history by subjecting it to ahistorical structures which themselves are not subject to 
history. That is, it presupposes an unchanging idea or substance that lies behind his-
tory, to which it is related and against which it is made comprehensible.  
Continuing his appraisal of the historical method, third, Moltmann probes 
an alternative to the projection of ahistorical structures onto the objects of historical 
investigation. The reason that history and idea depart is that history has not yet 
reached its end. In the present, the idea moves with and is shaped by history. Until 
that end has come, its definition and substance are open to dispute. Similarly, hu-
manity has not yet acquired a fixed form, instead remaining open to its future. 
Where, against this, humanity is defined in a fixed way, these definitions, intention-
ally or not, are eschatological. That is, they presuppose a final, set human essence 
that has not yet come about. This affirmation of the eschatological provisionality of 
present existence entails that, in the context of religion, Christianity is only “abso-
lute” insofar as it proclaims an eschatological horizon for history. In contrast, “the 
historical-positivistic fetishism of facts understands how things stand and lie, but 
does not understand in what direction they are moving.”99 This does not mean, 
though, that nothing at all can be said in the present. Theology, while yet being un-
able to advance absolute claims—that is, claims dependent on eschatological perfec-
tion—speaks of history in anticipation of its end. 
Neither, however, is such a provisional view of reality primarily cognitive. 
For theology, faith must seek to recognise that God has acted in Christ and thus is 
acting in history. In attesting this, proclamation spurs human beings on to engage 
with the transformation of the present in light of its eschatological goal. As Molt-
mann puts it, “Eschatological proclamation effects and provokes the experience of 
reality as history.”100 The difference between the coming end and the experienced 
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present leads to the historicisation of the latter, subjecting it to ongoing, radical 
change. The anticipatory character of eschatological knowledge lies precisely in the 
fact that human beings are called to live in accordance with a reality that is still com-
ing and not yet realised. 
At this point Moltmann distinguishes his own position from Bultmann’s. For 
the latter, the question of the end of history as a whole is no longer relevant in the 
modern era. What is relevant is the end of history in the individual, in whose exis-
tential encounter “historical phenomena show themselves for what they really 
are.”101 But if this were the case then the phenomena that faith meets would no longer 
be historical and “faith would be synonymous with perfection.”102 Rather, biblical 
faith looks to the as of yet outstanding future of Christ, in which the confession, 
“Christ is Lord,” corresponds completely with the reality faith finds itself in. Neither 
is the believer’s present, then, that of the absolute. It is instead one that anticipates 
the eschatological coming of the absolute. In this vein, the historical method, at least 
from a theological perspective, must turn to the past for “the hope that is remem-
bered with it,” a hope found, namely, in the promises of God.103 And it is these prom-
ises that continually confront the eschatological presuppositions of the historical 
method, defying its hasty ahistoricisations in its application of static concepts, and 
directing it to live presently in accordance with and for the sake of that which is yet 
future. 
Moltmann directly addresses the interpretation of Scripture at a number of 
points throughout this article. Historical criticism poses a significant problem for 
theology as it separates God and the historical process. God cannot interfere with the 
latter, which is, implicitly, a “closed nexus of effects.”104 Barth’s solution in his vari-
ous prefaces to his commentary on Romans, a solution which attempts to bridge his-
torical distance between the NT and today through looking at the latter’s subject 
matter (Sache), namely God, falls short in both accepting the fissure between God 
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and history, and insulating theology from historical criticism by assuming a fixed 
Sache. This Sache is decided a priori and isolated from the disciplinary work of histor-
ical criticism. Bultmann’s solution also flounders in Moltmann’s view. In seeking a 
meaningful exegesis that also takes seriously historical criticism’s findings, Bult-
mann descends into a subjectivism detached from the real workings and real future 
of history. Finally, historical criticism runs into its own problems insofar as it neces-
sarily assumes the explanatory value of fixed categories when applied to history. In 
doing so, it inevitably forfeits the open character of history—and therefore history 
itself—to an ahistorical conceptual structure. Against these three paths, Moltmann 
suggests one that moves in yet another direction, locating the substance of history in 
its future, which is anticipated in the biblical promises of God, above all as they are 
brought together in Christ’s resurrection. Here exegesis devotes itself to the promises 
in order to perceive this future and live presently in accordance with it, rather than 
in accordance with the substance and meaning of a present derived from elsewhere 
and ignorant of this eschatological goal. 
2.3.2. 1963: “Proclamation as the Problem of Exegesis” 
In this article,105 Moltmann attends to the relationship between exegesis and its right-
ful end in proclamation. He begins, “Exegesis cannot exhaust itself in saying what is 
said, how it is meant and understood, but must give an answer to the question of why 
this must be preached.”106 And exegesis reveals that it is the word of Scripture itself 
that provides such a ground, commanding the preacher to preach. If exegesis does 
not attend to the question of why, the authority to preach is derived from elsewhere, 
such as the church, or the preacher’s individual inspiration. But where this is the 
case, preaching also fails, as it must fabricate the text’s relevance for today, getting 
into “the well-known dilemma of wanting to make a matter up-to-date, where the 
 
105 Originally “Verkündigung als Problem der Exegese.” 
106 PTh, 113, emphasis original. 
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exegesis has just shown,” focussing only on the questions of what and how, “that the 
matter is not up-to-date.”107 
 Moltmann proceeds to delineate the differing approaches of the preacher and 
the historian to the biblical text. In contrast to tradition, for which the past remains 
relevant to the present, the historical method, at least in the abstract, is concerned 
exclusively with the past as past. The first task of the historical method is to date 
historical objects. Historical distance from the subject matter is necessary in order to 
ensure objectivity in method. As such, the method inevitably alienates the past. But, 
seen positively, this also means that human beings experience present liberation 
from their traditions. The questionable nature of the latter’s claims is revealed by 
historical criticism. Conversely, however, and not without irony, in alienating the 
past from the present the historical method “constantly destroys its own presuppo-
sition: historical memory and the living, present interest in history.”108 Tradition and 
historical method both uphold and undo each other. 
This in turn leads to a dichotomisation of historical exegesis and theological 
interpretation, such as that found in seventeenth century mysticism, eighteenth cen-
tury Pietism, and nineteenth and twentieth century existentialism. Complementing 
these movements, which, each individually, depart from the continuity between the 
past and the present attested in earlier traditions, is that which is responsible for their 
separation in the first place, historical positivism. In this context, preaching is partic-
ularly difficult, since the text it is based upon, the text of the past, has been shown to 
bear no relationship to the present moment, due to the historical particularity of the 
former. In his exegesis of OT texts, for example, Gerhard von Rad had contended 
that the pictures of ancient Israel given by both historical criticism and theological 
interpretation were each valid in their own way. “We must reconcile ourselves to 
both of them. It would be stupid to dispute the right of the one or the other to ex-
ist.”109 Moltmann counters, however, “Both pictures hardly allow a coexistence but 
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109 Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, vol. 1, trans. by D. M. G. Stalker (Edinburgh: 
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are in conflict with one another over the truth, which is one.”110 Similarly, in NT schol-
arship since David Friedrich Strauss, various thinkers have advocated for a comple-
mentary relationship between history’s Jesus and faith’s Christ. 
Moltmann follows this with a comment on the solutions proposed by 
Heidegger and Bultmann. Heidegger understands the task of the historical method 
as determining the existential understanding that is latent in past objects. The goal is 
neither to perceive the objects in abstraction from the present, nor to connect to them 
via a shared matter that concerns both them and other objects in the present. Rather, 
the historian is to seek the existential possibilities inherent in the past which are also 
available to the individual today. Bultmann, Moltmann claims, follows similar sign-
posts, though along a theological path.111 While he does not go into detail, Molt-
mann’s main concern here is that Bultmann and Heidegger assume that human be-
ings constitute the subject of history. But this is to obscure the meta-anthropic char-
acter of history as one that is still open and does not come to an end in human deci-
sion. 
As argued in an earlier essay,112 it is the divine promise through which his-
tory is perceived as historical. In contrast to the historical method, which removes 
the rug from under its own feet in exiling from the present any data from the past 
that may be of contemporary significance, theological exegesis seeks to remember 
the past for the sake of the present. In particular, the past is of interest insofar as it is 
a source of both guilt and hope in the present, guilt for past wrongs and hope in past 
promises.113 Moreover, the past’s significance is a matter of contemporary dispute, 
as guilt is not yet resolved nor hope yet fulfilled. Moltmann cites the example of the 
lives of Jesus, historiographical attempts at reconstructing Jesus’ life. These are never 
conducted purely out of a desire to detach the past as past from the present but rather 
 
110 PTh, 117, emphasis original. 
111 In a recent article, David W. Congdon argues that the connection between Heidegger and 
Bultmann is often overstated, though he also acknowledges Bultmann’s friendship with 
Heidegger and Bultmann’s usage of certain concepts developed by the latter. See “Is Bult-
mann a Heideggerian Theologian?” Scottish Journal of Theology 70:1 (2017): 19-38. 
112 See 2.2.1. 
113 This claim is developed in more detail in TH, 265-70 (1964).  
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to find a Jesus who addresses contemporary concerns. For Moltmann, though, the 
most promising connection between the past and the present is in the biblical hope 
for an alternative future. Here he adopts Hans-Georg Gadamer’s notion of horizon, 
writing of the historical events attested in Scripture, “Only in the ‘horizon’ of prom-
ise and hope are these historical events. Abstracted from this, they become a collec-
tion of dead facts that are calculated, or a gallery of existential decisions that can be 
answered.”114 Nor can it be simply said that this worldview has been superseded by 
science. Such a claim is itself eschatological and stymies imagination for alternative 
futures to the present state of affairs. 
Although having much in common thematically with the essay I addressed 
in the previous subsection (2.3.1.), this latter piece is of note for its orientation to 
preaching. In the context of sermon preparation, the answer to the question of the 
circumstances that compelled the original text is to be found in the divine promise. 
It is not merely a matter of identifying situations in the biblical texts and contempo-
rary life that roughly correspond, such as being persecuted, an example Moltmann 
suggests. History as history precludes the idea of corresponding situations and the 
phenomenology that it presupposes. That which biblical history and life today have 
in common is to be found rather in the shared horizon afforded by the divine prom-
ise. Here, too, preaching finds its justification. The promise compels the preacher to 
proclaim the hope it offers. Accordingly, “the faith that this sermon generates is not 
a historiographical judgement providing its findings, but a judgement of approval 
in regard to the promissio which lies in this event, and a judgement of condemnation 
in regard to every reality which does not yet correspond to the promissio.”115 A her-
meneutic of promise, in contrast to the claims of historical positivism and existential 
 
114 PTh, 123-24. Gadamer’s work was first published in 1960. It appears in English as Hans 
Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 
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cept from Friedrich Nietzsche and Edmund Husserl. See Truth and Method, 210-11, 261-64. 
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Im Gespräch mit Ernst Bloch: eine theologische Wegbegleitung (Munich: Kaiser, 1976), 22-23, 27 
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theology, affirms the historical as historical, propels the people of today into action 
that makes history, and recognises the distance between past and present in the cur-
rent of history, as well as their kinship in sharing a common future. 
2.4. Summary 
Already in the few years leading up to the publication of TH, then, Moltmann 
demonstrated a definite interest in the problems of Scripture in modern theology. 
This tied in with the development of his overarching eschatological project and a 
pastoral concern for the relationship between preaching and a biblical text that the 
church was increasingly isolated from through historical criticism. 
From the start, Moltmann seeks to situate the Bible in the broader divine 
economy, resisting attempts to see it in abstraction from this. Scripture must there-
fore be understood as a witness to Christ, and a witness not secured through argu-
ments in support of an independent, supernatural status—such as might be found 
in the excesses of the doctrine of verbal inspiration—but secured only through the 
Holy Spirit, who confirms its testimony internally to human beings. Already at this 
point, then, Moltmann sets up a distinction between the words of Scripture and that 
to which they point—Christ. The utility of this distinction is in affirming the ques-
tions of those outside the church, such questions as arise from the fruits of historical 
criticism, science, and ethical discussion, yet without compromising the essence of 
Christian faith. That the Bible remains necessary and not a mere accessory to its core 
content becomes clear in Moltmann’s affirmation of the doctrine of verbal inspira-
tion, following Barth. Moltmann writes, “It is intended to ensure that precisely in 
hearing the words of this and no other text we really hear the words of the eternal 
God’s own address to us human beings.”116 But this openness to questioning also has 
a positive basis in the fact that the Bible is not only given by the Holy Spirit but is a 
thoroughly and truly human text as well. 
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Also in this early period, Moltmann emphasises to his contemporaries in the 
German Reformed Church the need to continually reread and reassess tradition in 
light of Scripture—a trait that historically distinguished the Reformed and Lutheran 
Churches in Germany. At this point, the important theme of Scripture’s eschatolog-
ical horizon begins to emerge as well. But neither is this interest simply eschatologi-
cal. Its root is christological. That is, Christ is the centre that determines meaning of 
Scripture and the ongoing reformation of the church. But “there is no middle without 
a horizon, no centre without a perimeter…, no Christ without his royal lordship in 
the worldly, incarnate life, without the eschatological horizon of the new world, and 
the redemption of the creature in the new heaven and new earth.”117 Moreover, such 
a universal vision has implications for preaching. The extent of Christ’s lordship re-
quires that preaching not merely address individual and domestic life but the whole 
of existence, as does Scripture. 
 Perhaps even more significantly, this discovery of an eschatological horizon 
has important implications for doing theology in a world that has become increas-
ingly aware of its compromised location in history—a history where nothing is stable 
and everything is subject to decay. But if theology is directed to the one horizon of 
Christ’s eschatological lordship, it need not resist history with the imposition of fixed 
concepts and theoretical frameworks. Rather, it accepts its place in history and looks 
instead to the horizon shared by all people, regardless of their place in history. With 
these commitments though, Moltmann also departs from Barthian and Bultmannian 
orthodoxies, as well as some of the central tenets of historical criticism. He de-
nounces Barth for deciding on a fixed Sache of Scripture, ahead of what further exe-
gesis might indicate to be the case. This Sache has not yet been determined com-
pletely, as history is still in motion. And Moltmann criticises Bultmann for abstract-
ing individual existential encounter from the broader context of world history, which 
does not come to an end in the individual. Historical criticism is at fault, too, insofar 
as its conceptual categories are closed to continual revision with the flow of history. 
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It thus loses sight of its subject matter. Theological exegesis would seek instead to 
recognise the significance of the coming horizon for the present, rather than attempt 
to hold anything as determined ahead of its future. 
 Through his ground-breaking 1964 Theology of Hope, Moltmann will continue 
to reflect on and develop the basic insights of this early period, particularly in con-
nection with the relationship between history and eschatology. This will be the 





3. Scripture and Epiphany in Theology of Hope 
The ideas appearing in outline in Moltmann’s early essays are developed in detail in 
his 1964 Theology of Hope.1 In particular, the claim that Christian faith is thoroughly 
historical and eschatological is given lengthy treatment in his discussions of the 
promise in the OT and its relationship to Christ’s resurrection and future kingdom 
in the NT. The implications of this outlook for practice and mission also receive ex-
tended attention in the final chapter of TH. This book, Moltmann’s first major work 
in his “great trilogy,”2 provides an abundance of material relevant to the current 
study. Notably, throughout TH, Moltmann employs a contrastive paradigm, sharply 
distinguishing between what he understands to be the biblical theme of promise and 
the extra-biblical, predominantly Greek view of the relationship between time and 
eternity. Whereas the former sees reality as unfinished and open to the fulfilment of 
the divine promise in historical events, the latter sees reality as operating according 
to laws that are always already fixed in eternity and thus closed off to anything new. 
I have already placed this in the context of Moltmann’s broader project in my intro-
duction, above.3 
In order to better understand the nature and function of this paradigm, I 
begin by exploring similar notions taken up by others whom Moltmann draws upon. 
 
1 On this work, see Christopher Morse, The Logic of Promise in Moltmann’s Theology (Philadel-
phia, PA: Fortress, 1979); Richard Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the Making 
(Hants, UK: Marshall Morgan and Scott, 1987), 23-41; idem, The Theology of Jürgen Molt-
mann (London: T&T Clark, 1995), 29-46; Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the 
Power: The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, trans. by John Bowden (London: SCM, 2000), 40-
61. 
2 Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology, 1. This “trilogy,” not originally planned as such 
by Moltmann, also consists of CG (1972) and CPS (1975), and is followed by his six “sys-
tematic contributions to theology,” beginning with TKG (1980). The latter is Moltmann’s 
term. See TKG, xi. Nonetheless, TH was not Moltmann’s first full-length monograph. He 
had earlier published Christoph Pezel (1539-1604) und der Calvinismus in Bremen (Bremen: 
Einkehr, 1958); and Prädestination und Perseveranz: Geschichte und Bedeutung der reformierten 
Lehre “de perseverantia sanctorum” (Neukirchen: Neukirchener, 1961). Other earlier works 
are rightly listed as books because they are independent publications, but they are only ar-
ticle-length and thus do not constitute monographs. 
3 See 1.2. 
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In the second section of this chapter I turn to the contrastive paradigm itself. I start 
by detailing that which Moltmann rejects as unbiblical under the heading of “the 
epiphany of the eternal present,” tracing this from its archetype, the thought of Par-
menides, into the modern theology of Barth, Bultmann, and Pannenberg. In a third, 
related section, I expound the positive content of Moltmann’s theology of hope, 
which he forwards as a biblical alternative to the conclusions of these other theolo-
gians. I include a subsection on Moltmann’s implicit ontology of hope, where I con-
sider what his theology of promise might mean for Godself. Finally, in the fourth 
section, I address four different hermeneutical features that are notable throughout 
TH. These include the relationship between historical criticism and theology, the na-
ture of Scripture as a witness, the role of the biblical canon, and continuity and dis-
continuity between the two Testaments. 
3.1. History and Futurity: Key Influences 
In this section I will outline contributions from some of the key figures who influ-
enced the development of Moltmann’s historicism and eschatology.4 Three of these, 
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Mircea Eliade, and Georg Picht, inform Moltmann’s analysis 
from at least 1960 and into TH.5 Around the same time, the philosophy of Ernst Bloch 
becomes increasingly important for Moltmann, and he treats Bloch as a central theme 
in at least three essays before 1964.6 Though playing a less prominent role in the pre-
TH essays, the works of Gerhard von Rad and Ernst Käsemann also significantly 
 
4 For a concise summary of influences on TH, see ExpTh, 87-93 (2000); BP, 97 (2006). An ear-
lier, extended study is provided by M. Douglas Meeks as Origins of the Theology of Hope 
(Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1974). The shorter treatment by Randall E. Otto is also very in-
formative. See his The God of Hope: The Trinitarian Vision of Jürgen Moltmann (Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 1991), 13-62. Finally, for less direct influences, see Morse, 
Logic of Promise, 3-16. 
5 HP, 126-27 n. 9. 
6 See the essays reprinted in Moltmann, Im Gespräch mit Ernst Bloch: eine theologische 
Wegbegleitung (Munich: Kaiser, 1976), 13-31 (1960), 32-48 (1962); and RRF, 148-76. Wake-
field records the latter as a translation of the 1965 appendix to the third German edition of 
TH. This is true, but the appendix itself is a slightly revised version of “Das ‘Prinzip 
Hoffnung’ und die christliche Zuversicht: ein Gespräch mit Ernst Bloch,” Evangelische The-





contribute to Moltmann’s theology in TH. For want of space, I have focussed on these 
six individuals, whom I think exercise the greatest influence on the development of 
Moltmann’s contrastive methodology.7 
3.1.1. Wolfhart Pannenberg 
In 1959, Pannenberg published two articles in which he argued that “history is the 
most comprehensive horizon of Christian theology.”8 Thus, “all theological ques-
tions and answers are meaningful only within the framework of the history… the 
history moving toward a future still hidden from the world but already revealed in 
Jesus Christ.”9 These articles are cited by Moltmann in 1960 and 1962.10 As Moltmann 
will go on to do in TH, Pannenberg establishes his position in opposition to Bultmann 
 
7 Some other key influences include premodern Reformed theology, Hegel, Dietrich Bon-
hoeffer, A. A. van Ruler, and Walther Zimmerli, many of which are treated throughout 
Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope. For Hegel and Bonhoeffer, see 4.2.4. and the intro-
ductory note in 5.1., respectively. Moltmann’s background in Reformed theology is also 
addressed in Charles S. McCoy, “God’s Faithfulness: Federalism and the Future of Theol-
ogy,” in Love: The Foundation of Hope – The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann and Elisabeth Molt-
mann-Wendel, ed. Frederic B. Burnham, Charles S. McCoy, and M. Douglas Meeks, 94-110 
(San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988); Meine Veldman, “Secrets of Moltmann’s Tacit Tradi-
tion: Via Covenant Theology to Promise Theology,” Journal of Reformed Theology 4:3 (2010): 
208-39; and Nigel G. Wright, “Predestination and Perseverance in the Early Theology of 
Jürgen Moltmann,” Evangelical Quarterly 83:4 (2011): 330-345. A brief treatment of Molt-
mann’s use of van Ruler and van Ruler’s responses to Moltmann is provided by Hen-
drikus Berkhof in “Moltmann zwischen zwei Niederländern,” in Gottes Zukunft – Zukunft 
der Welt: Festschrift für Jürgen Moltmann zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Hermann Deuser et al., 469-
80 (Munich: Kaiser, 1986). 
8 These are printed as a single article in English. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Basic Questions in 
Theology, vol. 1, trans. by George H. Kehm (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1970), 15. On Molt-
mann’s relationship to Pannenberg, see Moltmann, “Personal Recollections of Wolfhart 
Pannenberg,” trans. by Steffen Lösel, Theology Today 72:1 (2015): 11-14; Meeks, Origins of 
the Theology of Hope, 64-80; Christiaan Mostert, God and the Future: Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Es-
chatological Doctrine of God (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2002), 14-25; and Michael Gilbertson, 
God and History in the Book of Revelation: New Testament Studies in Dialogue with Pannenberg 
and Moltmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), esp. 11-19. Notably, in 1990 
Moltmann reveals, “I think now that my criticisms of Pannenberg in The Theology of Hope 
were a bit one-sided. I might have been able to invite him into the movement of theologi-
cal hope if I had not distanced him by overstressing his theology of history.” See Michael 
Bauman and Jürgen Moltmann, “Jürgen Moltmann,” in Michael Bauman, Roundtable: Con-
versations with European Theologians, 31-42 (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1990), 35. 
9 Pannenberg, Basic Questions, 1:15. 
10 HP, 126 n. 9, 94 n. 23. 
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and Barth, though he also addresses Friedrich Gogarten and Martin Kähler. For Pan-
nenberg, Bultmann and Gogarten prioritise human historicity over the historical re-
ality in which humans are situated, and Kähler and Barth understand faith to be 
fundamentally suprahistorical. He attributes the beginnings of both positions to an 
attempt to insulate theology from historical investigation, where it was feared that 
the latter would rule out the possibility of redemptive events. 
Pannenberg begins by summarising recent research on Israel’s uniquely his-
torical worldview, claiming, “The certainty that God again and again performs new 
acts… forms the basis for Israel’s understanding of reality as a linear history moving 
toward a goal.”11 As this historicism developed, it eventually found expression in 
apocalyptic, where history spanned not only recent events but the creation of the 
world to the eschaton.12 As such, Israel “finally drew the whole of creation into his-
tory. History is reality in its totality.”13 Bultmann, in contrast, centres history in the 
historicity of the human being and finds the eschaton already present in Christ, in 
such a way that history is abolished in him. But this undermines the historical nature 
of reality, overlooking that which takes place outside the individual, and mistakes 
what should be an anticipation of the end in Christ for the end of history within 
history. Conversely, neither do the suprahistorical assumptions of Kähler and Barth, 
in which the history that the Bible witnesses to cannot be penetrated by secular his-
torical investigation, do justice to Israel’s historicism that is evident in Scripture. If 
faith is based in God’s work in history then the nature of that work must be open to 
historical investigation. Indeed, historical criticism enriches theology’s understand-
ing of its subject matter in that it reveals more about the history which is governed 
by the Father of Christ, the God of Israel, and thus says something of the nature of 
his revelation in Christ. 
 
11 Pannenberg, Basic Questions, 1:18. 
12 Moltmann follows Pannenberg in this regard in TH, 133-38. 





Although Moltmann’s early essays demonstrate a clear dependence on Pan-
nenberg, by the time of the publication of TH Moltmann has found his own voice. I 
will explore his departure from Pannenberg in more detail below.14 
3.1.2. Mircea Eliade 
Moltmann’s theology of history is also informed by the historian of religion, Mircea 
Eliade, as is that of Pannenberg.15 In his Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal 
Return, Eliade develops his claim that for the most part ancient societies conceived 
of time cyclically. 16 Through various rituals, these societies attempted both to abolish 
the history that had taken place up until that point and to redeem it on the basis of 
some primordial archetype, free of the corruptive change that history brings. In con-
trast, relatively few ancient societies developed a consciousness of history, against 
the prevailing myths of cyclical time. In various ways, nonetheless, ancient Babylon, 
Egypt, and Iran demonstrated the beginnings of a historical consciousness. But Eli-
ade shows particular interest in Israel’s prophets, whose outlook paved the way for 
modern historicism. For the prophets, “They [the events] not only acquired a mean-
ing… but they also revealed their hidden coherence by proving to be the concrete 
expression of the same single divine will. Thus, for the first time, the prophets placed 
a value on history, succeeded in transcending the traditional vision of the cycle (the 
conception that ensures all things will be repeated forever), and discovered a one-
 
14 See 3.2.2., 3.3.2. 
15 For Eliade in Moltmann’s work, see HP, 126-27 nn. 9, 11 (1960); TH, 98, 100, 295; cf. the 
later references in CG, 43 (1972); CPS, 265-6 (1975); FC, 117 (1976); GC, 104 (1985); CoG, 263 
(1995). Moltmann also draws upon other aspects of Eliade’s research in GC, 142, 302. The 
relationship between Moltmann and Eliade has received little attention, but see Cameron 
Coombe, “Another Origin of the Theology of Hope? Moltmann’s Dependence on Mircea Eli-
ade,” Pacifica 30:1 (2017): 88-101. Moltmann wrote to me on 6 October, 2018, in regard to 
this article, clarifying, “I have all of the works of Eliade in my library, but I did not study 
the science of religions. I took one idea of his to confirm what I had learned from Gerhard 
von Rad and the Prophetic traditions of the OT. Eliade is not a first-hand ‘origin’ of my 
‘Theology of Hope’, but at most a second-hand origin.” Pannenberg draws upon Eliade in 
Basic Questions, 1:16-17 n. 1. 
16 Mircea Eliade, Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return, trans. by Willard R. 
Trask (New York: Harper & Row, 1959). 
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way time.”17 Elsewhere Eliade writes, “With the exception of Judaism, no other pre-
Christian religion has set a value on history as a direct and irreversible manifestation 
of God in the world.”18 Israelite historicism was further developed in Christianity 
with its concept of the incarnation. In his early essays and in TH, Moltmann takes for 
granted the strong distinction that Eliade erects between Israelite-Christian histori-
cism and the anti-historicism of Israel’s neighbours and of Greek thought. 
3.1.3. Georg Picht 
In his 1960 essay, Moltmann also draws upon Georg Picht, from whom he takes his 
concept of “the epiphany of the eternal present.”19 For Picht, the question as to the 
meaning of history is to be answered in the sphere of human experience (Erfahrung). 
But experience, as it has been conceived from Aristotle’s empeiria, through modern 
science’s empiricism (Erfahrungswissenschaft), to Kant’s epistemology, provides inad-
equate access to the meaning of history. Each of these configurations inevitably refers 
experience to that which is eternal. Although experience (empeiria) takes place in 
time, according to Aristotle it becomes a craft (technē) when human beings discover 
in individual experiences a consistent pattern from which they can generalise. But 
this generalisation requires that experiences be consistent with that which it is pos-
sible to know. And for knowledge to be knowledge and not a fantasy, it must corre-
spond to the necessary. “The domain of knowledge that limits the domain of expe-
rience is therefore the domain of the immutable, the uncreated and imperishable, the 
eternal.”20 Modern science basically followed Aristotle, but it applied logic (logos) to 
 
17 Eliade, Cosmos, 104. 
18 Mircea Eliade, Myths, Dreams and Mysteries: The Encounter between Contemporary Faiths and 
Archaic Realities, trans. by Philip Mairet (London: Harvill, 1960), 29. 
19 Georg Picht, Die Erfahrung der Geschichte (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1958), cited in 
HP, 127 nn. 9, 10, 15. Cf. Moltmann’s other references to Picht’s Erfahrung in TH, 28, 41; 
HP, 198 n.4 (1966); GC, 111 (1985); WJC, 371 n. 34 (1989); CoG, 357 n. 10 (1995). Moltmann’s 
references to Picht’s other works are too many to list here, but see esp. the indices in CoG 
and Moltmann, Science and Wisdom, trans. by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 
2003). As with Eliade, the relationship between Moltmann and Picht has been largely ne-
glected in the literature, but see Morse, Logic of Promise, 55-57, 86-87. 





experience in order to discover that which is universally true in experience. This, 
however, did violence to the nature of experience, insofar as the latter was exposed 
to “the indeterminate endlessness of diverse circumstances,”21 which cannot be eas-
ily harmonised with an ahistorical logos. Kant, too, maintained the theological affir-
mation of divine immutability and timelessness, though now applying it to reason 
instead. According to Picht, here the philosopher assumed the Parmenidean notion 
of being, where only that which corresponds to being, to that which is immutable 
and eternal, is truth. This is “the epiphany of the eternal present of being,” which 
“distorts to this day the eschatological revelation of God.”22 In TH, Moltmann will 
take this opportunity to offer what he understands to be a biblical alternative to Hel-
lenistic epiphany thinking. 
3.1.4. Ernst Bloch 
It was in 1960, while holidaying in Switzerland, that Moltmann first read Ernst 
Bloch’s The Principle of Hope.23 “So engrossed was I in the book that the beauty of the 
Swiss mountains passed me by unnoticed.”24 Moltmann was struck with the hope 
that Bloch saw in Scripture: “I by no means had the impression that we are aware of 
this biblical message or that this forward hope is something in which we can find 
ourselves. So I set out to search for a theology of hope…. What I was looking for was 
a theological parallel act to his atheistic principle of hope on the basis of the promis-
sory history of the old covenant and the resurrection history of the new.”25 It was 
thus that Moltmann proceeded to develop a theology of hope. Because of the cen-
trality of Bloch to Moltmann’s early theology, this subsection will be longer than 
those dealing with other influences on his thought. 
 
21 Picht, Erfahrung, 17. 
22 Picht, Erfahrung, 42, cited in TH, 41, trans. by Moltmann’s translator, Leitch. 
23 Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope, 3 vols., trans. by Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul 
Knight (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986). 
24 TH, 9 (1990 preface). 
25 BP, 79 (2006). 
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The significance of Moltmann’s relationship to Bloch is evidenced by the 
number of studies which address it.26 While some have noted the distinctiveness of 
Moltmann’s theological approach to hope, however, others have restated something 
to the effect of Barth’s critical comments on TH: “To put it pointedly, does your the-
ology of hope really differ at all from the baptized principle of hope of Mr. Bloch?”27 
Years later, Moltmann has finally been able to offer a comeback: “I suspect that he 
[Barth] had in fact never read a word of Bloch’s.”28 But Moltmann has been critical 
of Bloch where critique is due, as can be seen in his 1963 conversation with Bloch, 
published in an appendix to the third edition of TH in German.29 Moltmann has else-
where continued to offer critical comment, as well as expressing his indebtedness to 
 
26 E.g., Francis P. Fiorenza, “Dialectical Theology and Hope, I,” Heythrop 9:2 (1968): 143-63; 
Gerald O’Collins, “The Principle and Theology of Hope,” Scottish Journal of Theology 21:2 
(1968): 129-144; Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope, 16-9, 80-89, 106-18; Marko Matić, 
Jürgen Moltmanns Theologie in Auseinandersetzung mit Ernst Bloch (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 
1983); Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology, 7-22; Bosco Puthur, From the Principle of 
Hope to the Theology of Hope (Kerala, India: Pontifical Institute Publications, 1987). A more 
complete bibliography of relevant works up to 1987 can be found in Bauckham, Moltmann: 
Messianic Theology, 146 n. 18. Finally, though, note Ryan Neal’s observation: “While it is 
perhaps true that without Bloch the school of hope would not exist, it should not be for-
gotten that Moltmann’s decision to begin theology with eschatology was made prior to 
reading Bloch’s magnum opus.” Ryan A. Neal, Theology as Hope: On the Ground and Implica-
tions of Jürgen Moltmann’s Doctrine of Hope (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2008), 4. 
27 Karl Barth, Letters 1961-1968, ed. Jürgen Fangemeier and Hinrich Stoevesandt, trans. and 
ed. by Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1981), 175, emphasis original. 
Barth’s critical question has since acquired legendary status, such that someone outside of 
theology can characterise TH as a “CliffsNotes version of Ernst Bloch’s The Principle of 
Hope”! Mark Lilla, “A Response,” Perspectives on Political Science 38:1 (2009): 22-23, at 22. 
28 BP, 110 (2006). 
29 ET in RRF, 148-76. First, Moltmann argues that Bloch presents a dualistic future of all or 
nothing for humanity, appropriated from apocalyptic literature. Unfortunately, whereas 
the literature has God as judge as the mediating factor between these, so that humanity 
may partake in either a future fullness of life or in annihilation, in Bloch the dualism is ab-
stracted from this context and therefore cannot function in the same way. Second, whereas 
Marxism offers hopes beyond hunger and injustice, for example, it cannot offer hopes be-
yond such existential threats as boredom and absurdity. Third, Bloch seeks to overcome 
death by interpreting transience as a positive feature of human existence. Only in transi-
ence is hope for something better possible and in this hope human beings are connected to 
the future and become, in a sense, intransient. But Bloch’s approach cannot affirm “the 
deadliness of death” (168). Christian hope over death is not spiritualist but holistic. It 
hopes for new bodies and a new earth. Finally, Bloch differentiates between hope and con-
fidence, the latter which he attributes to Christian theology. Whereas the future of hope is 





Bloch’s thought.30 His observation in an introduction to Bloch’s work should also be 
taken autobiographically: “The reactions so far evoked by Bloch’s philosophy indi-
cate that instead of turning into Blochians, theologians feel encouraged to go their 
own way.”31 As M. Douglas Meeks writes, “The spirits of Barth and Bloch keep com-
pelling Moltmann’s theological odyssey. But he takes their spirits too seriously to be 
a disciple of either.”32 
Importantly, like Moltmann, Bloch believes that the Jewish and Christian 
Scriptures are unique in their historicist outlook. Indeed, this connection with Bloch 
is highlighted by Moltmann in one of his citations: “It is surprising that for a very 
long time among the Jews the final fear was not considered or dreamt over. This race 
 
with this, contending that Bloch confuses Christian hope with the Constantinian hope, 
where the latter assumes the validity of the status quo and only promises a better future in 
spiritualised form. Christian hope, however, contradicts the present reality and its status 
quo. Bauckham has explored Moltmann’s critique of Bloch in greater detail. See his Molt-
mann: Messianic Theology, 14-22.  
30 E.g., EH, 30-43 (1966); introduction to Ernst Bloch, Man on His Own: Essays in the Philoso-
phy of Religion, trans. by E. B. Ashton, 19-29 (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970); EH, 15-
29 (1970); “The Arrangement, Character and Purpose of Ernst Bloch’s ‘The Principle of 
Hope’,” trans. by Dieter Freundlieb, and “In Gratitude to Ernst Bloch,” trans. by Wayne 
Hudson, both in The Sources of Hope, ed. Ross Fitzgerald, 159-61 and 162-6 (Rushcutters 
Bay, Australia: Pergamon, 1979); “Messianic Atheism,” in Leroy S. Rouner, ed., Knowing 
Religiously, 192-206 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985); GC, 42-45, 
178-81 (1985); HTG, 143-55 (1986); CoG, 30-33, 63-65 (1995); Moltmann, The Living God and 
the Fullness of Life, trans. by Margaret Kohl (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2015), 
177-82 (2014). An earlier, 1975 version of “Messianic Atheism” appears in Moltmann, On 
Human Dignity: Political Theology and Ethics, trans. by M. Douglas Meeks (Philadelphia, PA: 
Fortress, 1984), 173-87. The original German, not noted by Wakefield, can be found in Im 
Gespräch, 73-89. 
31 Moltmann, “Introduction,” in Bloch, Man on His Own, 27. 
32 Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope, 19. So Moltmann himself: “Whoever wants to speak 
about him needs to engage with his concerns and—in order to honour him—debate with 
him.” Moltmann, Im Gespräch, 63 (1970). 
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was as this-worldly as the Greeks, but its life was directed incomparably more to-
wards future things, towards goals.”33 A short exploration of Bloch’s philosophy will 
help to situate this quote in context.34 
Bloch introduces the Principle of Hope with his theory of the Not-Yet-Con-
scious. Modern psychoanalysis, represented by Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung, de-
fines the unconscious and conscious in regressive terms. That is, the unconscious and 
conscious are understood to be oriented exclusively to what has been, leaving no 
room for the new. Bloch, however, contends that this denies “expectant emotions (like 
anxiety, fear, hope, belief), … those whose drive-intention is long-term, whose drive-
object does not yet lie ready.”35 Moreover, the theories of Freud and Jung reflect pre-
dominantly middle-class concerns. In Freud’s treatment of the conscious, for exam-
ple, the libido is fundamental. But this ignores the priority of hunger over sexual 
desire in human beings, a priority overlooked because Freud and his middle-class 
clients hardly needed to worry about their next meal. Bloch proceeds to explore hu-
man daydreaming, which also springs from a conscious that looks forward to that 
which is to come. 
But it is not only the conscious in which Bloch’s philosophy of the future is 
grounded. Bloch’s exploration of the psychological Not-Yet-Conscious leads him to 
reflection on a corresponding ontology, the Not-Yet-Become of matter: “Nothing 
would circulate inwardly either if the outward were completely solid. Outside, how-
ever, life is just as little finished as in the ego which is working on this outside. No 
thing could be altered in accordance with wishes if the world were closed, full of 
fixed, even perfected facts.”36 Unfortunately, the history of Western philosophy bears 
little witness to the open-endedness of the world. As Bloch writes in his introduction, 
 
33 Bloch, The Principle of Hope, 3:1125. Moltmann cites the German, which is translated by his 
translator, Leitch, in TH, 208. He also quotes this passage again much later in CoG (1995), 
351 n. 62. 
34 For lengthier treatments, see Richard H. Roberts, Hope and Its Hieroglyph: A Critical Deci-
pherment of Ernst Bloch’s Principle of Hope (Atlanta, GA: Scholars, 1990); and Vincent Ge-
oghegan, Ernst Bloch (London: Routledge, 1996), esp. 27-45. 
35 Bloch, The Principle of Hope, 1:44. 





“The Not-Yet-Conscious, Not-Yet-Become, although it fulfils the meaning of all men 
and the horizon of all being, has not even broken through as a word, let alone as a 
concept. This blossoming field of questions lies almost speechless in previous phi-
losophy.”37 Moreover, where philosophy has concerned itself with the Not-Yet-Be-
come, it has demonstrated little interest in a real future, the genuinely new. Its own 
vision consists only in a future that provides a space for human beings to retrieve, 
relive, or reconstruct the past. These concerns are thus not with the Not-Yet-Become 
but rather with that which was. 
For Bloch, the chief culprit in setting the direction for the Western philosoph-
ical approach to being as “Been-ness” is Plato.38 From him comes anamnesis, “the 
doctrine that all knowledge is simply re-remembering.”39 And such a doctrine, with 
its orientation to the past, persisted in philosophy after Plato. It “kept out and, in a 
contemplative antiquarian fashion, closed off previous philosophy, including Hegel, 
from the seriousness of the Front and the Novum.”40 Interestingly, however, Bloch 
demonstrates a keen interest in Aristotle’s theory of matter. For Aristotle, matter is 
understood according to both its objective and its real possibility. Bloch goes so far 
as to say that, without Aristotle, Marx would not have developed a philosophy of 
the Not-Yet-Become after Hegel. Nonetheless, Aristotle requires supplementation 
from Marx if his philosophy is to properly affirm the possible. 
Bloch also provides important comment on the biblical tradition in his treat-
ment of the Ultimum, which is related to the Novum as “the highest newness” or “a 
total leap out of everything that previously existed.”41 The Ultimum has received 
more attention than the Novum in the history of Western thought, whereas the 
Novum, which is essential to the Ultimum, “was as good as absent.” That is, “in the 
 
37 Bloch, The Principle of Hope, 1:6. 
38 Not Parmenides, as Meeks implies in Origins of the Theology of Hope, 82. Parmenides is not 
a target of Bloch’s but of Moltmann’s, following the likes of Picht and Eliade. TH, 28-32. 
Bloch hardly mentions Parmenides, and, if Bloch is critical of him, he is overshadowed by 
the later sins of Platonic anamnesis. Bloch, The Principle of Hope, 2:864. 
39 Bloch, The Principle of Hope, 1:8; cf. Geoghegan, Ernst Bloch, 37-8. 
40 Bloch, The Principle of Hope, 1:18.  
41 Bloch, The Principle of Hope, 1:203. 
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whole of Judaeo-Christian philosophy, from Philo and Augustine to Hegel, the Ulti-
mum relates exclusively to a Primum and not to a Novum; consequently the Last 
Thing appears simply as the attained return of an already completed First Thing 
which has been lost or relinquished.”42 Jewish and Christian thinkers failed to grasp 
the Novum that properly belonged to the Ultimum, reverting to an implicitly cyclical 
understanding of time. Thus, in understanding reality as it really is, considering its 
Front in that which is Not-Yet-Become, “only anti-re-remembering, anti-Augustine, 
anti-Hegel is philosophically appropriate, anti-circle and denial of the ring-princi-
ple.”43 
Apparently, Bloch later reveals, quite a different tradition is attested in parts 
of the Bible.44 Yahweh reveals the divine name to Moses, declaring, “I will be what I 
will be.”45 This name “places even at the threshold of the Yahweh phenomenon a 
god of the end days, with futurum as mode of being [mit Futurum als Seinsbeschaffen-
heit]. This end- and omega-god would have been a folly in Delphi, as in every reli-
gion where the god is not one of exodus.”46 Yahweh is unique amid other ancient 
 
42 Bloch, The Principle of Hope, 1:203. 
43 Bloch, The Principle of Hope, 1:204. 
44 On Bloch’s exegesis, see Walther Zimmerli, Man and His Hope in the Old Testament (Lon-
don: SCM, 1971), 151-65; Geoghegan, Ernst Bloch, 83-103; Roland Boer, On Marxism and 
Theology, vol. 1, Criticism of Heaven, (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2007), 1-56. 
45 Exodus 3:14 (NRSV note). See further, for example, William H. C. Propp, Exodus 1-18: A 
New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1999), 204-5, 224-6. 
46 Bloch, The Principle of Hope, 3:1236, translation altered; Ger., Das Prinzip Hoffnung, 2 vols. 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1959), 2:1458. In the English TH, 16, this phrase is trans-
lated as “future as his essential nature.” Cf. TH, 30, 141. Catharine Diehl translates it as 
“future as the determination of his being” in “The Demand for an End: Kant and the Nega-
tive Conception of History,” in Messianic Thought outside Theology, ed. Anna Glazova and 
Paul North, 107-23 (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), 255 n. 10. As can be seen 
above, there is no determiner in the German so there is some ambiguity as to the nature of 
the relationship between God and this Seinsbeschaffenheit. This is recognised by Frederick 
Herzog in FH, 13, where he translates the phrase without any determiner as “futurum as 
mode of being.” I have chosen to use this translation when discussing the phrase through-
out this dissertation as I think it better reflects the German, or, at least Moltmann’s under-
standing of it (!), than that which the English translators of Bloch’s Prinzip supply: “fu-





religions. Only the God of the exodus is related to the future in such a way.47 None-
theless, Bloch is again careful to stress the uniqueness of the discovery of the Not-
Yet-Become by Marx. “Whether the concept of the future… of the ancient Israelite 
prophets… coincides with that which has developed since Augustine” is open to 
question. But “the experience of time has certainly undergone many changes, the 
Futurum above all has only recently been augmented by the Novum and become 
charged with it.”48 
Bloch, then, perhaps the greatest influence on Moltmann’s TH, argues that 
Western philosophy, including Christian theology, has almost completely over-
looked reality’s shape as one of Not-Yet-Become. This omission is largely owing to 
the influence of Platonic anamnesis. Thus, where Christian theology might have 
found the new, in eschatology, it found only the old. It is really just the God of the 
exodus and, surprisingly, Aristotle, who alone stand out as significant predecessors 
to Marx’s discovery of the Not-Yet-Become. Moltmann will find other enemies, such 
as Parmenides, and give Bloch’s analysis further application in his discussion of Bult-
mann and Barth. Moreover, he will be less enthusiastic in regard to Aristotle. Signif-
icantly, it will be the God of promise for Moltmann, rather than Marx, from whom 
humanity properly discovers hope and the future. 
 
47 Later, in his discussion of atheism and religion, Bloch also singles out the Judeo-Christian 
tradition for its uniquely humanistic approach to the transcendent, an approach that ulti-
mately leads to the atheism that he commends. He writes, “Although the name of Or-
pheus, and also the names of natural-mythic orderer-founders, right up to the cosmomor-
phic Confucius, even Zoroaster, the messiah of astral light, are mentioned together with 
the gods, they nonetheless remain behind them, relate externally to them. The Dionysian 
founder turns to froth before his nature god, the astral-mythic founder fades before him, 
and even Buddha, the great self-redemption, sinks at the end into the acosmos of nirvana. 
Moses, on the other hand, forces his god to go with him, makes him into the exodus-light of his peo-
ple; Jesus pervades the transcendent as a human tribune, utopianizes it into the kingdom.” Bloch, 
The Principle of Hope, 3:1191, emphasis original. 




3.1.5. Gerhard von Rad 
While Pannenberg, Eliade, Picht, and Bloch allowed Moltmann to see the rough out-
lines of biblical historicism against the anti-historicist elements of Greek thought, it 
was Gerhard von Rad who provided the substantial content of this historicism. Re-
cently, reflecting on what he had in common with Pannenberg’s theological project, 
Moltmann recalled, “Through Gerhard von Rad’s Theology of the Old Testament, 
which appeared successively in 1958 and 1960, we became engaged in the areas of 
history in memories and eschatological hopes. This theology of the Old Testament 
was the biblical alternative to both existential hermeneutics and church dogmat-
ics.”49 Significantly, Moltmann attributes his and Pannenberg’s departure from both 
Bultmann and Barth to von Rad’s work in biblical studies. It was von Rad above all 
who made the distinctly historicist worldview of ancient Israel apparent on biblical 
grounds. 
Amid rising anti-Semitism in Germany under National Socialism, von Rad 
was uniquely placed to come to terms with the distinct shape of OT theology. 
Whereas the neo-Marcionite German Christians sought to wrest Jesus out of his OT 
context, von Rad defended the necessity of studying the OT for a proper understand-
ing of who Jesus was. He published lectures such as Das Alte Testament: Gottes Wort 
für die Deutschen! (The Old Testament: God’s Word for the Germans),50 and preached to 
and taught members of the Confessing Church, formally joining it himself in 1939.51 
 
49 Moltmann, “Personal Recollections,” 12; cf. Moltmann’s reliance on von Rad throughout 
TH, esp. 95-138; and his comments in BP, 97, 101 (2006). In the secondary literature, this re-
lationship has been treated by John Aubrey Miller in “The Eschatological Ontology of Jür-
gen Moltmann,” Ph.D. diss. (Emory University, 1972), 35-46; and Meeks, Origins of the The-
ology of Hope, 64-76. For the influence of von Rad on Pannenberg, see Pannenberg, Basic 
Questions, 1:16 n. 1; and his “An Intellectual Pilgrimage,” Kerygma and Dogma 54:3 (2008): 
149-158, at 153. See also the index in TH for the many citations and mentions of von Rad. 
Before TH, Moltmann cites von Rad in PTh, 117 n. 5, 123 n. 19 (1963), though the latter’s 
influence surely goes beyond explicit citations. 
50 Gerhard von Rad, Das Alte Testament: Gottes Wort für die Deutschen! (Berlin: Ostwerk-Ver-
lag, 1937). 
51 Rudolf Smend, From Astruc to Zimmerli: Old Testament Scholarship in Three Centuries, trans. 
by Margaret Kohl (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 180; see further, Bernard M. Levinson, 
“Reading the Bible in Nazi Germany: Gerhard von Rad’s Attempt to Reclaim the Old Tes-





Specifically, von Rad contended that revelation in the OT was inseparable from his-
torical events. These events, such as the promise to the patriarchs, the exodus, the 
conquest of Canaan, and the covenant with David, together formed a narrative of 
Yahweh’s work in history to establish the nation of Israel as his chosen people. Is-
rael’s insight is unique: “Looked at from the point of view of comparative religion, 
this idea of history made a radical division between Israel and her environment. 
While it is possible to recognise in her cultic celebration of the saving acts, which 
followed the rhythm of the year, certain continuing lines of connexion with ideas 
which belonged to neighbouring religions of the ancient east, with her idea of saving 
history she completely parted company with these religions. Not one of them under-
stood the dimension of history in the way that Israel did!”52 
For von Rad, the religions of Canaan and the Ancient Near East were more 
interested in cyclical time. This interest derived from their observations of the 
rhythms of nature, which have a cyclical character. So, too, then, were their gods a 
part of the cosmic order that sustains life. Yahweh differed in that although he sus-
tained a cosmological order, he was not identified with it and therefore had freedom 
to go beyond it. As von Rad notes in his Ritschl-esque meditation on Exod 3:14, 
“Nothing is farther from what is envisaged in this etymology of the name of Jahweh 
than a definition of his nature in the sense of a philosophical statement about his 
being.”53 Rather, Yahweh’s name points to his future with Israel. Importantly, an-
cient Israel’s historicism is without parallel: “The only other people in the ancient 
world who also wrote history, though of course in an entirely different way, were 
the Greeks.”54 Even contemporary historicist thought stands in stark contrast to that 
 
is important to stress the extent to which this was an intra-Christian debate. The defense of 
the OT was not a defense of Judaism. Von Rad was constrained by the theological catego-
ries he inherited. He took for granted the stereotypes about Judaism and never challenged 
them.” Ibid., 247. 
52 Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, 2 vols., trans. by D. M. G. Stalker (Edinburgh: 
Oliver and Boyd; New York: Harper & Row, 1962-1965), 2:110. On this aspect of von Rad’s 
theology, cf. Smend, Astruc to Zimmerli, 177, 188-90. 
53 Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, 1:180. 
54 Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, 2:107-8. 
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which the OT presupposes.55 The sharp distinction between Greek and biblical 
thought, then, is further consolidated for Moltmann in von Rad, who provides a 
more precise articulation of Israel’s historicism in its biblical and historical context. 
3.1.6. Ernst Käsemann 
As in von Rad he found the historicist outlook of ancient Israel, so in NT scholarship 
Moltmann found “the post-Bultmann apocalyptic with which Ernst Käsemann had 
moved Christ’s parousia… into the main thrust of the New Testament.”56 Käse-
mann’s essays “profoundly influenced my Theology of Hope.”57 The biblical scholar 
completed his dissertation under Bultmann in 1931 and then began work as a pas-
tor.58 He also became increasingly embroiled in political controversy. Following his 
application of Isa 26:13 to the political situation in Germany at the time—“O Lord 
our God, other lords besides you have ruled over us, but we acknowledge your name 
alone”—the Gestapo arrested Käsemann in 1937. Much later, he was buried with the 
verse on his gravestone, a verse, Moltmann writes, “that characterizes his theology 
of resistance in the Babylonian captivity of Christianity in this world, in its alienation 
from God.”59 Something more of Käsemann’s character can be seen in his 1939 mon-
ograph on Hebrews, Das wandernde Gottesvolk, which was not simply an exegetical 
study but contained a “coded message,” criticising the German Christians of the 
time.60 He even resigned from the Westfalian Confessing Church because of the soft 
stance it took on German Christians.61  
 
55 Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, 2:99-100. 
56 BP, 97 (2006); cf. Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope, 76-77, 99-104. 
57 WJC, 379 n. 3 (1989). Moltmann is referring in particular to “The Beginnings of Christian 
Theology” and “On the Subjective of Primitive Christian Apocalyptic,” both in Ernst Käse-
mann, New Testament Questions of Today, trans. by W. J. Montague and Wilfred F. Bunge, 
82-107, 108-37 (London: SCM, 1969). 
58 For the following, see David Way, The Lordship of Christ: Ernst Käsemann’s Interpretation of 
Paul’s Theology (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), 1-4. 
59 BP, 150 (2006). 
60 Way, The Lordship of Christ, 3. Das wandernde Gottesvolk appears in English as Ernst Käse-
mann, The Wandering People of God: An Investigation of the Letter to the Hebrews (Minneap-
olis, MN: Augsburg, 1984). 





Besides Käsemann’s influence on Moltmann’s early theology, the two both 
worked at Tübingen and developed a friendship, though their relationship grew in-
creasingly fragile with time. An example of this early friendship goes back to 1967, 
when Moltmann was looking into the chair for systematic theology in Tübingen. 
Käsemann “had pushed forward the invitation… and he now came and appealed to 
my heart in prophetic tones, and to my conscience with threatening apocalyptic 
warnings”!62 On a more serious note, when the military junta of Argentina murdered 
Käsemann’s daughter in 1977, it was Moltmann who officiated the funeral.63 Yet, “for 
truth’s sake,” Käsemann later broke off his friendship with Moltmann, as he had 
done with Bultmann, Ernst Fuchs, and Gerhard Ebeling, “because he did not like my 
dialogue with Judaism.”64 
Beyond Käsemann’s personal life and his relationship to Moltmann, the bib-
lical scholar was also an important intellectual influence on Moltmann. In his 1962 
essay, “On the Subject of Primitive Christian Apocalyptic,”65 Käsemann explores 
Paul’s response in 1 Corinthians to the “eschatological enthusiasm” of the Corinthian 
church.66 Against Paul’s “apocalyptic expectation of an imminent End” in Christ’s 
coming, “the dominant group in Corinth believed themselves to have reached the 
goal of salvation already… and Christian existence here on earth meant for them 
solely the temporal representation of heavenly being.”67 Christ’s reign is no longer 
hidden in the present while its future culmination remains outstanding, but it is al-
ready realised. This is evidenced, for example, by the gift of the Spirit and the rapid 
spread and reception of the gospel. Significantly, Käsemann consistently applies the 
 
62 BP, 147. 
63 BP, 147, cf. 223. 
64 BP, 149. Moltmann writes in the same place, “The maxim of his life was the old pirate say-
ing: ‘the friend of God and the enemy of the whole world.’” 
65 Cited in TH, 156 n. 1, 158 nn. 1-2, 160 nn. 1 and 3, 161 n. 1, 214 n. 1. The influence of this 
essay especially, but also other essays by Käsemann, is certainly broader than the explicit 
citations will allow. As Moltmann’s comment indicates in TH, 155 n. 1, “I am here follow-
ing E. Käsemann’s studies in exegetical theology.” For citations of Käsemann before TH, 
see HP, 96 nn. 56-57 (1962); PTh, 124 n. 21 (1963). 
66 Käsemann, New Testament Questions, 125. 
67 Käsemann, New Testament Questions, 125. 
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terminology of “Hellenism” to characterise the departure of the Corinthians and 
other early Christians from Jewish apocalyptic.68 Moreover, whereas Bultmann’s in-
terpretation of Paul would require the latter to be placed among these Hellenists, 
Käsemann finds in Paul both the work of redemption in the present as well as a still 
outstanding future.69 For example, according to Paul, the resurrection of believers 
does not take place at baptism, as the Hellenists would have had it, but in baptism 
believers anticipate their future sharing in Christ’s resurrection. Nor is the believer’s 
participation in the resurrection merely a redemption open to the individual in the 
present, as Bultmann would have it, but Paul locates the hope of the individual in 
the broader context of the still outstanding victory over the powers hostile to God (1 
Cor 15:20-28). 
These six different figures each influenced Moltmann in different ways and 
to various extents. What is perhaps most notable here is that a systematic theologian, 
a historian of religion, a Christian philosopher, a Marxist philosopher, an OT scholar, 
and a NT scholar each in their own manner differentiated what they understood to 
be biblical outlooks from non-biblical ones, often with a particular interest in distin-
guishing the biblical from the Greek. As can be seen in the foregoing, nonetheless, 
their influence on Moltmann is not limited to the development of his contrastive par-
adigm. But such a paradigm was clearly well-established and in the air when Molt-
mann began writing TH. 
3.2. The Nature of Epiphanic Thought and Its Influence on Christian Theology 
Throughout TH, Moltmann sets his presentation of the promissory history of Israel 
and the church against the background of “Greek” thought in its ancient and modern 
 
68 Cf. Käsemann, New Testament Questions, 130, where this is connected to the biblical use of 
the term in Acts 6:1. 
69 Käsemann is critical but appreciative: “Bultmann’s fascinating interpretation of Paul is 
determined by its resolute placing of the apostle’s present eschatology at the controlling 
centre of his thought. There is no reason not to admit that this interpretation is not merely 
tenable, but enables vital elements of Pauline theology to be unforgettably impressed on 





manifestations. Right from the very start, Christian eschato-logy is threatened by 
Greek concepts, insofar as it is a logos of the eschaton. This threat arises from the fact 
that “the Greek term logos refers to a reality which is there, now and always.” Such 
a framework leaves no room for theology to speak of something genuinely new, 
which would be to the Greeks “an evil out of Pandora’s box.”70 In negative terms, 
then, Moltmann will distinguish the theology of history from the understandings of 
time and history offered by the religions of ancient Palestine and the various repre-
sentatives of ancient Greek thought. He will also proceed to scrutinise later Christian 
theology, which, as he sees it, largely yielded to these non-biblical influences in its 
theology of history and its eschatology. Thus Bultmann, Barth, and even Pannen-
berg, despite the latter’s best efforts, have all fallen prey in various ways to Greek 
constructions of history and reality. Similarly, the Greek spirit informs secular ap-
proaches to history too—in the methodology of historical criticism. The positive al-
ternative to these is in the God of promise and of hope in the OT and in the consum-
mation of promise in Christ’s resurrection, which points to an as of yet unfulfilled 
future. Although Moltmann treats this latter, positive side throughout TH, I have 
decided to address the two elements separately, in order that the implementation of 
his contrastive paradigm may become all the more clear. 
I begin with what Moltmann rejects as belonging to Greek thought under the 
heading of “the epiphany of the eternal present,” a term which I will shortly define. 
I then turn to modern theology and historical criticism. Moltmann enters into critical 
dialogue with both, arguing that major representatives in each discipline remain be-
holden to Greek rather than biblical ways of thinking. 
3.2.1. Epiphanic Thought and Practice in the Ancient World 
Moltmann does not define epiphany at any point in TH.71 In his comprehensive and 
influential 1924 article on the topic, Friedrich Pfister uses the concept of epiphany, 
“following probably the most common usage for us, which is somewhat narrower 
 
70 TH, 17. Moltmann’s explains this connection in EH, 16 (1970). 
71 On epiphany in TH, see Morse, Logic of Promise, 31-36. 
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than the Greek epiphaneia, namely, for that form of divine revelation in which the 
superhuman being—a God, a hero, a spirit of death—appears in a personal and vis-
ible way among human beings.”72 Similar definitions, albeit broader ones, are given 
in contemporary scholarship.73 But none of these explain Moltmann’s antagonism. 
The work of the NT scholar, Elpidius Pax, which Moltmann cites in TH, pro-
vides some hints in this direction.74 For Pax, the phenomenon of epiphany is attested 
throughout the ancient world, including in ancient Israel, Judaism, and the church. 
But while he departs from Moltmann in finding epiphany to be central to ancient 
Israelite religion, the two are united in their appreciation for the distinctiveness of 
the latter. Pax writes, “Whereas in the Ancient Orient, for the most part, the regular 
return or at least the foreseeable arrival of individual natural processes and the ap-
pearances of God bound up with these constitute a characteristic of epiphany, their 
possible absence being considered a disaster, the sudden and unexpected thunder-
storm, bursting forth with lightning, thunder, storm and dark clouds, has always 
been the essential type of epiphany for Israel.”75 Accordingly, in contrast to Mediter-
ranean, Egyptian, Babylonian, and Assyrian experiences of epiphany, the ancient Is-
raelites knew epiphany to be fundamentally “eschatological epiphany” with a “his-
torical character.”76 
 
72 Friedrich Pfister, “Epiphanie,” in Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft: Sup-
plementband 4, ed. Wilhelm Krohl, 277-323 (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche, 1924), 282. 
73 See Georgia Petridou, Divine Epiphany in Greek Literature and Culture (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2015), 2-11. Nonetheless, this overlooks the quite different history of this 
term in biblical studies and theology. Wolfgang Elpidius Pax provides a short summary of 
the scholarship up until 1955 in his ΕΠΙΦΑΝΕΙΑ: ein religionsgeschichtlicher Beitrag zur bib-
lischen Theologie (Munich: Zink, 1955), 3-5. A more recent treatment of epiphany in the con-
text of biblical studies is provided by Andrew Lau, though his discussion of previous 
scholarship is quite limited in scope. See Andrew Y. Lau, Manifest in the Flesh: The Epiphany 
Christology of the Pastoral Epistles (Mohr Siebeck: Tübingen, 1996), 179-259. 
74 TH, 144 n. 2, 155 n. 2. 
75 Pax, ΕΠΙΦΑΝΕΙΑ, 107. 





Another publication that Moltmann cites in TH is Hannelis Schulte’s work on 
revelation in the NT, where the latter devotes a short chapter to the relationship be-
tween revelation and epiphany.77 He presents a distinction that perhaps underlies 
Moltmann’s antagonistic use of the term “epiphany” in TH. For Schulte, “we have to 
differentiate between the usage of epiphaneia/epiphanēnai and the portrayal of epiph-
anies.”78 He continues, “The word and the thing have nothing to do with one an-
other!”79 Although, through verbal similarity, the NT employs terms bearing an os-
tensible relationship to the concept of epiphany, revelation in the NT is an entirely 
different matter. 
With Schulte, Moltmann’s negative use of the term “epiphany” to denote a 
largely non-biblical form of divine disclosure contrasts with the more neutral sense 
accorded it by scholars such as Pax and Pfister. The influence of Picht cannot be over-
looked here either.80 Interestingly, Moltmann’s use of the concept of epiphany ap-
pears to be very much tied to the spirit of the TH period. The term does not appear 
at all in CG (1972), and in his later eschatology it is only used approvingly.81 
Moltmann’s rejection of epiphanic thought begins with the pre-Socratic phi-
losopher, Parmenides, who epitomises Greek anti-historicism. As the latter claimed, 
“Being, it is ungenerated, indestructible, / Complete, single-born, untrembling and 
unending. / And was not, nor will it be at some time, since it is now, together, whole, 
/ One, continuous.”82 That is, Moltmann glosses, being “has no extension in time, its 
 
77 Hannelis Schulte, Der Begriff der Offenbarung im Neuen Testament (Munich: Kaiser, 1949), 
54-66. See TH, 139 n. 1, 144 n. 2. 
78 Schulte, Der Begriff der Offenbarung, 62. 
79 Schulte, Der Begriff der Offenbarung, 62. 
80 See 3.1.3. 
81 “For the first side of this revelation we have the expressions of epiphany: the risen Christ 
is ‘revealed’ and lets himself ‘be seen’; the strength of his life is experienced in the Holy 
Spirit.” CoG, 136-37 (1995). “As epiphany of the kingdom of God in history, the church 
frames the vision of the world's future.” CoG, 165.  
82 Parmenides, fr. D8.8-11, in André Laks and Glenn W. Most, Early Greek Philosophy, vol. 5, 
Western Greek Thinkers Part 2, trans. by André Laks and Glenn W. Most (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2016), 43-5. Moltmann cites only D8.10 (B8.5), with the transla-
tion, “Das eine Sein war niemals, niemals wird es sein, denn jetzt Ist es zumal als Ganzes.” 
That is, “The unity that is being never was, never will be, for now it Is all at once as a 
whole.” TH, 28; Ger. 23. Hermann Diels, whom Moltmann cites here, has, “Es war nie und 
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truth stands on the ‘now’, its eternity is present [Gegenwart].”83 But such a claim 
would be of little import unless it could be related to human experience. Its signifi-
cance is found in the fact that, despite the gains, undulations, and negations of life, 
existence stands on the unchanging foundation of being. This is why Moltmann con-
stantly refers to “the epiphany of the eternal present of being” in TH, adopting 
Picht’s term.84 It is not so much the claims about being itself—though Moltmann will 
depart from these too—but the way in which being appears or is made manifest to the 
human being in order to secure their eternal existence in the midst of a world that is 
continually degrading into non-being. That is, Moltmann’s interest throughout TH 
is predominantly phenomenological, rather than ontological.85  
 In the epiphany of the eternal, “the times in which life rises and passes fade 
away to mere phenomena in which we have a mixture of being and non-being.”86 
And yet, “in the present of being, in the eternal Today, man is immortal, invulnerable 
and inviolable.”87 Moltmann’s exposition of Parmenides is not an appreciative one. 
For the theologian, Parmenidean being negates history and as such is completely 
opposed to a biblical understanding of reality. Other figures, such as Plato and Aris-
totle, as well as systems like Neoplatonism, represent further developments in Greek 
anti-historicism.88 As Moltmann contends in a later chapter, “’History’ was funda-
mentally foreign to Greek thought.”89 
 
wird nicht sein, weil es allzusammen nur im Jetzt vorhanden ist, eins und unteilbar.” Par-
menides Lehrgedicht: griechisch und deutsch (Berlin: Reimar, 1897), 37. This differs also from 
the Picht’s paraphrase in Erfahrung, 42, whom Moltmann is following. The translation that 
Moltmann provides then is likely his own, relying on Diels’s Greek text. 
83 TH, 28; Ger. 23. Alternatively, “its eternity is presence.” 
84 Picht, Erfahrung, 42. The term appears without citation in TH, 28. 
85 Thus Joy McDougall describes the work as a “prolegomena to a doctrine of God.” She ex-
plains, “Although Theology of Hope clarifies much about God’s mode of being in history as 
eschatological promise, the nature of the God of hope and of his coming eschatological 
kingdom remains quite opaque.” Joy Ann McDougall, Pilgrimage of Love: Moltmann on the 
Trinity and Christian Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 36. I comment on 
what can nonetheless be said of Moltmann’s doctrine of God in TH below, in 3.3.2.  
86 TH, 28. 
87 TH, 28. 
88 E.g., TH, 29, 51, 141, 247, 250, 279, 281. 
89 TH, 259. This includes the Greek historiographers, of whom it is Thucydides that Molt-





 After Parmenides, Moltmann turns to Kant, Barth, Bultmann, and Pannenberg. 
The argument of TH, then, takes the shape of ancient and modern precedent of epi-
phanic thought in Parmenides and Kant; the unsuccessfulness of modern theology 
in overcoming this, namely, in the work of Barth, Bultmann, and Pannenberg; and, 
lastly, in the following two chapters, a return to the ancient world in the conflict 
between epiphany religion and biblical promissory history. A fourth chapter dealing 
largely with historical criticism reads somewhat like an excursus, ahead of the final 
chapter on the church in light of the promise. In treating the biblical material mostly 
after that of modern theology, Moltmann constructs his argument somewhat in re-
verse: These are the reasons we reject the conclusions of Barth, Bultmann, and Pan-
nenberg, and, by the way, we can find further support for this in Scripture. I do not 
have any objections to the way that Moltmann has structured his argument here, 
however. I only draw attention to this because I will be addressing his discussions 
of the biblical material first. The conclusions made in these discussions certainly in-
form Moltmann’s polemics against modern theology, even if on a structural level 
they appear after these polemics. 
In his studies of the biblical material, Moltmann begins with the ahistorical 
substance of the religions of ancient Palestine. These, too, entertain the epiphany of 
the eternal present in order to secure finite existence. They are thus “epiphany reli-
gions.”90 Moltmann follows Viktor Maag’s distinction between Israelite nomadic and 
semi-nomadic religion, on the one hand, and Canaanite agrarian religion on the 
other: “The gods of the nations are locally bound. To go to a god means to visit its 
sanctuary…. The transmigration God of the nomads, however, is not bound territo-
 
men and forces and their typical features, but he, too, searches for what is abiding and un-
changing in this war.” TH, 259. 
90 TH, 95. 
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rially and locally. He journeys along with them, is himself on the move, and is pre-
sent, wherever he wants to extend his protection.”91 To develop this contrast, Molt-
mann again turns to the works of Eliade. Through epiphany, or “hierophany”—Eli-
ade’s term for “a manifestation [phainein] of the sacred [hieros] in the mental world 
of those who believed in it”92—in the religions of ancient Palestine, the deity sancti-
fies the place or time at which or in which it appears. Subsequently, by recalling the 
epiphany through visiting the sacred place or participating in the sacred time, the 
individual can escape the destructive power of history and participate in that which 
history cannot touch. Here, “man’s being comes into congruence with the eternal 
being.”93 Moreover, this epiphany religion was widespread at that time, extending 
beyond Palestine to the rest of the ancient world. As such, Moltmann concludes, 
“Epiphany religion forms the presupposition and abiding foundation of the natural 
theology of Greek philosophy of religion, and of oriental philosophies of religion.”94 
 Before proceeding, some comment is required in regard to Moltmann’s gener-
alised use of the characterisation, “epiphany religion.” At the outset of his short re-
view of Canaanite agrarian religion, he admits, “Our task is not to take the various 
religious ideas and forms of belief and subsume them under a general concept of 
religion.”95 Moreover, the study of Maag’s that he depends on “no doubt… contains 
typical ideal elements, but it does make intelligible the tension in which Israel found 
itself.”96 That is, Moltmann’s interest in epiphany religion derives not from a desire 
to understand the nature of this religion itself. Rather, “the contours of what is meant 
by promise and hope stand out most clearly in face of other religions and forms of 
 
91 Viktor Maag, “Malkût Jhwh,” Supplements to the Vetus Testamentum 7 (1960): 129-53, at 
139-40, cited in TH, 96-7. I have extended the cited passage and provided my own transla-
tion of the extra phrases. 
92 Mircea Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, trans. by Rosemary Sheed (London: Sheed 
and Ward, 1958), 10. Moltmann seems to use the two words interchangeably—epiphany 
and hierophany. The latter occurs in TH, 98, 198. 
93 TH, 99. 
94 TH, 99. 
95 TH, 95. 





belief which are grappled with and contested, and for that reason can best be illu-
mined in comparison and contrast.”97 But it is not only the different elements of an-
cient Palestinian religions that are subsumed under a single heading in order to high-
light the distinctness of biblical hope. These religions stand together with Greek 
thought insofar as both seek to secure human life against the threats of history by 
anchoring it in eternal, unchanging being. Notably, the implication of this is that any 
elements of the Christian tradition believed to have derived from Greek epiphanic 
thinking are automatically subject to the same criticism directed towards Israel’s 
neighbours throughout the OT. The riches of Greek thought employed by theology 
are no longer church’s bounty from having “plundered the Egyptians” (Exod 
12:36),98 but are rather “the gods that your ancestors served beyond the River and in 
Egypt” (Josh 24:14). Regardless of whether Moltmann intended this connection or 
not, it functions throughout TH to further delegitimise Christian theology that re-
mains wedded to an epiphanic paradigm. 
 Moltmann returns to Greek epiphany religion in discussing the surrounding 
context of the NT. This collection of texts, while not completely insulated from epiph-
any religion, nonetheless, remained at its core a witness to the Christ who was yet to 
come, as its central interests lay not in epiphany but in promise. Moltmann quotes 
Hannelis Schulte approvingly: “Thus although Christianity stands in the midst of 
the religious life of its time, epiphany faith can influence it in the first instance only 
as a formal element in its presentation. For it stands under the protection of the Old 
Testament thought of God, which expects God to act uniquely and comprehensively 
upon the world.”99 But this began to change as the gospel spread beyond the Jewish 
world of promise to the Hellenistic world of epiphany religion. Moltmann turns to 
 
97 TH, 95. 
98 A theme employed allegorically by ancient authors such as Origen to explain Christian 
use of pagan ideas. See Joel S. Allen, The Despoliation of Egypt in Pre-Rabbinic, Rabbinic and 
Patristic Traditions (Leiden: Brill, 2008), e.g., 14-15, 211-33, 247-260. 
99 Schulte, Der Begriff der Offenbarung, 66, cited in TH, 144, translated by Moltmann’s transla-
tor, Leitch. So Morse: “Moltmann’s thesis is not a denial that such ‘epiphanic’ elements are 
there [in Scripture], but the contention that they occur within a more all-embracing bound-
ary of apocalyptic expectation.” Morse, Logic of Promise, 152 n. 44, slightly altered. 
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the first century Corinthian church in order to further elucidate this conflict. “The 
Christ event here can be understood in a wholly non-eschatological way as epiphany 
of the eternal present.”100 The resurrection of the dead had already taken place, and, 
as such, believers already participated in it. There was no further future to be ex-
pected of Christ. Everything was already fulfilled. The Corinthians were living in the 
presence of eternity. 
 Subsequently, the epiphanic paradigm held by the Corinthians, even if they 
themselves had afterwards heeded Paul’s message, only grew stronger as Christian-
ity spread throughout the Greco-Roman world and communities replaced expecta-
tion of Christ’s imminent coming with “an ecstasy of fulfilment” and “the presence 
of eternity.”101 Everything has been made complete in Christ. Present suffering does 
not refute this either. The sufferer has already been delivered from their ordeal in 
eternity, so that all that is required is for them to take hold of this in through the 
epiphany of the eternal. Moreover, this form of the gospel retains an eschatology, 
albeit a severely dampened one. “The eschatological expectation of what has ‘not 
yet’ happened becomes a noetic expectation of the universal disclosure and glorifi-
cation of what has already happened in heaven.”102 The historical working and the 
eschatological future of the God of Israel and Christ is thus largely obscured. 
3.2.2. The Persistence of Epiphanic Thought in Modern Theology and Historical Criti-
cism 
The rediscovery of the centrality of eschatology to the NT in biblical scholarship at 
the end of the nineteenth century played an important role in destabilising the cen-
turies-long hold of epiphanic thinking in the Christian tradition. Ironically, however, 
this scholarship was for the most part neglected by theology. As Moltmann puts it, 
“The so-called ‘consistent eschatology’ was never really consistent.”103 Even Johan-
nes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer, key figures in this rediscovery, recognised the alien 
 
100 TH, 155. 
101 TH, 157. 
102 TH, 159. 





nature of Jesus’ preaching but could not take the next step and integrate the find into 
their wider theological thinking. At that time, the new exegetical insights functioned 
to isolate liberal Protestantism from its basis in Scripture as modern christology 
could not be reconciled to the Christ of the NT. In contrast, for Moltmann, in line 
with his earlier work, this eschatological context of Jesus’ preaching, along with that 
of the whole Bible, is fundamental. Indeed, it is precisely this context that justifies 
theological interest in the words of Scripture and connects the history of the church 
and Israel to the present. But Moltmann’s main interest is in Barth and Bultmann, 
perhaps still the two most popular modern theologians in Germany at the time of 
writing TH. These two figures locate God or the human subject in the present, rather 
than in a genuinely new future in the future of Christ. Such a standpoint therefore 
lacks “any future that would be greater than itself.”104 And it replicates “the thought 
forms of the Greek mind,” through Kant, and, ultimately, Parmenides, rather than 
taking its lead from Scripture.105 
Having already attended to the views of the ancient philosopher, Moltmann 
proceeds to discuss Parmenides’ afterlife in the much later eschatology of Kant.106 In 
a short treatise on eschatology, Kant had argued that the last things “lie wholly be-
yond our field of vision.”107 And yet, “although they are transcendent for speculative 
cognition, they are not to be taken as empty, but with a practical intent they are made 
available to us.”108 For Moltman, this means not only a reduction of eschatology to 
ethics, but, as a result of this ethico-existential orientation, the last things become the 
“eternal, transcendental conditions for the possibility of experiencing oneself in a 
 
104 TH, 46. 
105 TH, 40. For the following, cf. A. J. Conyers, God, Hope, and History: Jürgen Moltmann and 
the Christian Concept of History (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1988), 62-70. 
106 Despite Moltmann’s criticisms of the Enlightenment philosopher, Otto has argued that 
Moltmann’s theology owes much to Kant. See Otto, God of Hope, 13-16. 
107 Immanuel Kant, The End of All Things, in Religion and Rational Theology, ed. Allen W. 
Wood and George Di Giovanni, 217-31 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
225-6. Moltmann cites the German, which is translated by his translator, Leitch, in TH, 47 
n. 1. 
108 Kant, End of All Things, 225-6. German cited in TH, 47 n. 1. 
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practical way.”109 Eschatology after Kant is the human subject’s individual end in 
right moral action, rather than the goal of the world in the coming of Christ. 
Moltmann goes on to trace this Parmenidean-Kantian legacy, mediated 
through Wilhelm Herrmann, to the theologies of Barth and Bultmann. Barth’s posi-
tion initially shows promise, writing in the second edition of Der Römerbrief, “If 
Christianity be not altogether and unreservedly eschatology, there remains in it no 
relationship whatever to Christ.”110 But, Moltmann responds, Barth’s understanding 
of eschatology hardly conforms to that of the biblical testimonies. It lacks a historical 
shape. As Barth claims, “Of the real end of history it may be said at any time: The 
end is near!”111 This is not due to an apocalyptic sense of the future breaking into the 
present, however. Rather, the end is identified with eternity, which everywhere and 
always underpins the present moment. But this also means that there can be no sense 
of an end that brings something genuinely new. For Barth, God does not bring about 
anything that is not already actual in eternity. As he writes elsewhere, “What is the 
future bringing? Not once more a turning point in history, but the revelation of that 
which is.”112 Moltmann is not surprised, then, when Barth attributes the development 
of his eschatology between the first and second editions of the Römerbrief to “better 
acquaintance with the real orientation of the ideas of Plato and Kant.”113 
Kant’s Parmenidean epiphany of the eternal present appears yet again in 
Bultmann’s theology.114 In contrast to Barth, the future is not already actualised in 
the eternity of God but in the potential of the human subject. “The mythological pic-
tures of hope,” the resurrection of the dead in the NT or the ascent of the soul in 
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Gnosticism, for example, can be demythologised in such a way “that they speak 
about God’s future as of the realization of human life.”115 But in relocating eschatol-
ogy to the sphere of the individual, an alternative future for the world is lost. “It is 
therefore just as impossible for Bultmann as for Kant that eschatology should pro-
vide a doctrine of the last things.”116 As Meeks puts it, for Moltmann “Bultmann’s 
existentialist view of revelation not only robbed the Christ event of its peculiar his-
torical basis,” that is, in God’s dealings with Israel and the crucifixion and resurrec-
tion of Christ, “but also faith of its universal expectation.”117 
Interestingly, the work of Pannenberg, a figure who played a significant role 
in the development of Moltmann’s historicism and eschatology, is also subjected to 
criticism here. Seeking to establish a new understanding of the relationship between 
theology and history after Bultmann and Barth, Pannenberg and the biblical scholars 
associated with him published Revelation as History in 1961.118 For them, the whole of 
history is the sphere of God’s revelation. In each historical event God is revealed in 
part. At the end of history, God will be revealed in full. Yet God is revealed prolep-
tically in the resurrection because it is in this event that the end of history has already 
taken place. For Moltmann, however, Pannenberg’s project rests on a subtle modifi-
cation of the Greek concept of God, a concept which has its starting point in the na-
ture of the cosmos, rather than in the God who drives history. Moltman alleges that, 
here, “the place of the cosmological proof of God, which argued from ‘reality as cos-
mos’ to the one divine arche… is taken by a theology of history which argues back in 
the same way from the unity of ‘reality as history’ to the one God of history.”119 That 
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is, whereas Greek cosmological thought secured the unity of reality through the un-
changing being that lay behind it, Pannenberg again seeks to secure the unity of re-
ality, this time through according it an eschatological goal. 
At this point, Moltmann’s criticism of Pannenberg appears to apply to his 
own claims as well. Indeed, as E. Frank Tupper charges, “In Theology of Hope, Molt-
mann strained to distinguish himself from Pannenberg, for he not only emphasized 
actual points of disagreement but also constructed illusory differences between him-
self and Pannenberg.”120 Thus, the allegation that Pannenberg secures the unity of 
reality as history through reference to its eschatological goal might just as well be 
extended to Moltmann’s developing theology of the horizon of Christ’s eschatologi-
cal lordship, a major theme of my previous chapter. But there is yet more to Molt-
mann’s criticism. For him, reality as history in Pannenberg’s thought functions as the 
new site of the divine epiphany. “The world will one day be theophany, indirect self-
revelation of God in toto.”121 Moltmann continues, “As long as this theology of his-
tory regards ‘God’ as the object that is in question when we enquire about the unity 
and wholeness of reality, then its starting point is obviously different from that of 
the question about God and his faithfulness to his promises in history—a question 
which first arises only in the context of promise and expectation, as in the Old Tes-
tament.”122 Thus, Moltmann differentiates his own position from that of Pannen-
berg’s insofar as he perceives the latter to be interested in the revelation of God’s 
being—in some way analogous to the appearance of the divine in epiphany reli-
gion—rather than the confirmation of God’s faithfulness to the promise. 
That Moltmann understands the relationship between his position and Pan-
nenberg’s in this way is further consolidated with his allusion to Marx. Moltmann 
writes of Pannenberg, “The theologian is not concerned merely to supply a different 
interpretation of the world, of history and of human nature, but to transform them in 
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expectation of a divine transformation.”123 This is a paraphrase of Marx’s eleventh 
thesis on Feuerbach.124 The implication is that Pannenberg’s project exhibits a pre-
dominantly intellectual concern with history, obscuring the missiological impetus 
central to a truly biblical epistemology. As Moltmann writes later on in TH, “The 
future horizon about which the present asks cannot be understood as a horizon 
within which to interpret the hitherto existing reality of the world… but only as a 
horizon of promise and mission.”125 Additionally, revelation equated with the his-
tory of present society overlooks the strength of atheistic claims regarding the basic 
godlessness of history. What is instead needed is a promissory history that calls hu-
man beings out of the godlessness of the present and into the future lordship of God, 
a history that has not already been determined but one that remains unfinished and 
thus in which believers are called to action. 
Finally, it is not only the Christian tradition which has ensured the persis-
tence of epiphany religion in modern theology. Secular historicist thought is, accord-
ing to Moltmann, fraught with various ahistorical presuppositions derived from 
Greek categories. This can be seen, for example, in the work of Ernst Troeltsch, who 
argued at the end of the nineteenth century that the method of historical criticism 
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relies on the principle that historical phenomena are understood analogically in re-
lation to modern society’s experience of phenomena: “Agreement with normal, cus-
tomary, or at least frequently attested happenings and conditions as we have expe-
rienced them is the criterion of the probability for all events that historical criticism 
can recognize as having actually or possibly happened.”126 For Moltmann, however, 
this methodological commitment entails a certain ahistorical ontology. Like the 
Greek view of the cosmos, in this ontology historical events are accidental to the es-
sential core that constitutes all existence. Such a core is necessitated by the analogical 
principle because both historical and presently experienced phenomena are mani-
festations of one and the same reality. 
Moreover, modern historical thinking, which has its roots in the Enlighten-
ment, is driven by a sense of crisis. Not only does modern life consist in “infinitely 
new and overwhelming possibilities,” but these “are always experienced in the first 
instance as the crisis and collapse of the hitherto known and familiar possibilities 
with their traditional institutions and ways of life and methods of coping with it.”127 
In reaction to crisis, however, historical thinking failed to become truly historical. 
Rather, its aim was to generate a philosophy of history in an attempt to understand 
and thus control history, bolstering human beings against the horror of crisis. It 
formed historical concepts on the basis of reality as it currently stands, instead of an 
anticipatory knowledge that remains open to change in light of future possibilities. 
From Leopold von Ranke’s claim that the fullness of the spirit which gives life to 
history is expressed in the totality of epochs standing side by side, to Heidegger’s 
grounding of history in Dasein, the potential of finding the genuinely historical is lost 
to the suprahistorical: “The definition, comprehension and understanding of history 
inevitably brings about at the same time an abrogation, a negation and annihilation 
of history. When the primary question is that of the origin, substance and essence of 
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history, then the concrete movements, changes, crises and revolutions which consti-
tute history are related to some factor that does not change, always exists and has 
equal validity at all times.”128 Whereas Moltmann had earlier expressed similar crit-
icisms of modern historicism,129 these criticisms here also give his rejection of epiph-
any religion a broader scope and thus support his contrastive paradigm. Thus, “the 
science and philosophy of history are here striving to combine the Greek logos with 
our modern experiences of reality.”130 
In this section I have explored the negative side of Moltmann’s contrastive 
paradigm. I began with the Greek philosopher Parmenides, the archetypical figure 
of epiphanic thought. This was followed by the epiphany religion that Israel encoun-
tered in Canaanite agrarian society, and which Paul encountered in a different way 
in Corinth. I then turned to Moltmann’s criticisms of epiphanic thinking in modern 
theology and historical criticism. What becomes clear throughout all of this is that, 
for Moltmann, the church and its theology more closely approximate the outlooks of 
the ancient Canaanites in OT times and the Gentiles in NT times than the biblical 
theology of promise. 
3.3. Promissory History and the Theology of Hope 
Throughout his critical surveys of the Grecian inheritance of modern theology and 
thought, Moltmann advances a theology of hope that aims to take seriously the his-
torical character of the biblical outlook. In this section, first, I will explore this biblical 
outlook, which Moltmann addresses from the standpoint of promise. I will then turn 
to Moltmann’s ontological statements—statements concerning God’s being—that 
are present though mostly undeveloped at this stage in his career. This latter endeav-
our is important because it reveals some of the broader theological assumptions that 
underpin Moltmann’s hermeneutic. 
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3.3.1. The Biblical Theme of Promise 
Moltmann’s interest in hope stems first from the OT phenomenon of promise.131 Rev-
elation in the OT is accompanied by promise and each promise “announces the com-
ing of a reality that does not yet exist.”132 Because this promise is a divine promise, 
its content is not restricted to the limits set by reality as it currently stands. Hearers 
of the promise are thus brought into the unique history that is initiated by the prom-
ise, in which the present reality begins to give way to a future alternative reality, one 
that is given by God. Moreover, the future of the promise is not only unrestricted by 
this present reality. It also contradicts it. Hearers of the promise partake in the ten-
sion between the reality that is passing away and that which is coming. They have a 
degree of freedom in which they can live in accordance or discordance with the com-
ing reality. And there is an even greater freedom on God’s part to fulfil the promise—
often in surprising ways, too: “The God who is recognized in his promises remains 
superior to any fulfilment that can be experienced, because in every fulfilment the 
promise, and what is still contained in it, does not yet become wholly congruent with 
reality and thus there always remains an overspill.”133 Nonetheless, this does not 
mean that a new fatalism arises, now derived from the future. The freedom of God, 
and the freedom of human beings in light of this freedom, prevents such a course. 
Significantly, the divine promise was the source of Israel’s experience of his-
tory. Israel lives between the memory of the given promise and the expectation of its 
fulfilment. In this context, events become historicised. This means that they must be 
seen as provisional because their future has not yet come about. Put negatively, “the 
facts of history can never be regarded as processes complete in themselves which 
 
131 “In Theology of Hope the biblical hermeneutical key is Moltmann’s model of revelation as 
a divine word of promise in both the Old and New Testaments.” McDougall, Pilgrimage of 
Love, 32. For Moltmann’s concept of promise from TH leading up to CG (1972), see Morse, 
Logic of Promise, esp. 27-59. 
132 TH, 103. Moltmann is here following Walther Zimmerli, “Promise and Fulfilment,” trans. 
by James Wharton, in Claus Westermann, ed., Essays on Old Testament Interpretation, 89-122 
(London: SCM, 1963). Cf. Morse, Logic of Promise, 52-4; Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic 
Theology, 30. 





have had their day and can manifest their own truth by themselves.”134 Thus, in read-
ing of Israel’s past as it is narrated in the OT, we no longer seek to live in accordance 
with reality as we know it, but in accordance with the future of Israel’s past, a future 
which is given to us in the promises of the God of Israel. Promise is essential to the 
experience of history. Moreover, revelation must be understood in the context of 
promise. God is revealed through faithfulness to the promise. But because the prom-
ised future yet remains incongruent with the present, knowledge of God has a his-
torical nature. “The truth of the promise lies not in any demonstrable correspond-
ence with the reality which was or which is.”135 God cannot be known in the present 
reality because there is not yet a reality that corresponds to the fulfilled promise. 
Rather, God is only known in an anticipatory manner, on the way to the future. And, 
yet, this is real knowledge because it derives not only from expectation but from the 
memory of God’s past faithfulness. 
In Israel’s later history, the concept of promise was developed in the escha-
tological messages of the prophets, and then in apocalyptic theology. In the prophets, 
the dissolution of Israel’s previous life in the land at the hands of the empires of 
Assyria, Babylon, and Persia allowed Israel to see itself in the context of world his-
tory. As such, Israel saw the promises extended to the Gentile nations. But the nation 
also began to see death itself as a limit to the fulfilment of promise. This conflicted 
with the fact that Yahweh could not be limited by anything, let alone death. It was 
thus that the ultimate negation of death also fell into the sphere of expectation. In 
apocalyptic theology, moreover, a third important innovation in promissory history 
developed. While Moltmann rejects the deterministic presuppositions of this later 
outlook, he affirms the extension of Yahweh’s sovereignty over the nations and 
death to now include the whole cosmos. Notably, such a view of sovereignty brings 
with it the historicist framework of earlier promissory theology: “The ‘universe’ is 
no longer, as in pagan cosmology, a thing to be interpreted in astro-mythical or pan-
theistic or mechanistic terms as the sum total of the world and of our satisfaction 
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with it. Instead, it splits into aeons in the apocalyptic process—into a world that is 
coming and one that is passing away.”136 
Having demonstrated the centre of Israel’s historical consciousness in the OT 
theology of promise, Moltmann moves on to the NT, in which promise acquires a 
new centre in the crucified and risen Christ. This can be seen in 1 Cor, for example, 
where Paul expounds what Moltmann terms an “eschatologia crucis,” an eschatology 
of the cross.137 That is, first, the fulfilment of the promise remains eschatologically 
outstanding in Christ. The believer lives in anticipation of Christ’s future, which has 
not yet come about. Second, the believer’s expectation of this future is expressed in 
participating in the cross, through faith, “taking upon it the trials and struggles of 
obedience in the body and surrendering itself to the pain of love.”138 Importantly, as 
with the OT theology of promise, the future of Christ is a future that is not possible 
as a simple continuation of reality as it currently stands. “It is therefore out of the 
question to classify the resurrection event among the events of world history and 
apocalyptic and to give a date for his future or his coming again…. The return of 
Christ does not come ‘of itself’, like the year 1965, but comes from himself, when and 
as God wills it, according to his promise.”139 
This orientation of the NT to the future can also be seen in the missionary 
experience that arises from the promise. “In the front-line of present mission new 
possibilities for history are grasped and inadequate realities in history left behind.”140 
It is thus through mission that human beings properly experience history because 
they partake in that which arises from and tends towards the promise. Moreover, in 
the call to mission, a call directed in the NT to both Jews and Gentiles, human beings 
are not restricted by current human limitations, bound as they are by sin, but are 
called in light of their future. And only in light of this future is their mission possible. 
This entails a correspondent historicising of the world, as the one who is called is 
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called to a new world that is in contradiction to the old, but the world will nonethe-
less be brought out of the old through the power and freedom of God. 
Importantly, the Christian tradition is not so estranged from biblical thought 
so as to have completely overlooked the historicism that the former exhibits. Thus 
Moltmann also draws upon the Reformers to state his case. Opening his book with 
an appeal to Calvin’s hope, Moltmann attempts to convince his readers of the cen-
trality of hope not just to Scripture but to the spirit of the Reformation.141 Luther, too, 
had already seen that Christian hope probably required a new ontology that differed 
from that of the philosophers.142 
The positive content yielded by Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm in TH, 
then, begins with a retrieval of the OT theology of promise. Through promise, real 
history is brought into motion in that a coming future which contradicts present re-
ality also opens up new possibilities for it. It is thus that present existence moves 
towards a hitherto unactualised reality. Knowledge of God, too, takes the form of 
anticipation because the reality in which God will be known has not yet come about. 
Moltmann proceeds to prophetic and apocalyptic eschatologies, where the former 
saw the promises universalised, so that they extended to the nations, and intensified, 
so that the overcoming of death came within the sphere of expectation. Later, apoc-
alyptic eschatology saw the promises extended to the whole cosmos, simultaneously 
historicising this cosmos so that it was open to an alternative future. Finally, in the 
NT the promises meet their consummation in Christ. In him the promises acquire a 
new future as his future, and believers suffer and hope as they join with him—suf-
fering in his crucifixion and hoping as they are transformed in missionary calling. 
3.3.2. Ontological Murmurings 
Although he appears to show little interest in the inner life of God in TH, focussing 
his attention on the biblical phenomenon of promise, there are nonetheless certain 
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indications that Moltmann does not want to leave such a question unaddressed ei-
ther. His polemics in TH, for example, as shown above, constantly focus on his tar-
gets’ assumptions about divine being, even if his theology of hope, stated positively, 
appears to have a more soteriological or missiological content. Still, an important 
source remains for tracing the development of Moltmann’s interest in the futurity of 
God in TH and his subsequent theology: his analysis and rejection of theologies that 
proceed by way of “proofs of God,” following Hans Joachim Iwand.143 The greater 
part of modern theology no longer begins with the task of proving God, whether by 
reference to the cosmos, human existence, or ontologically, from Godself. Rather, 
modern theology proceeds from the biblical witness. And yet, the methodological 
starting point in the proof of God’s existence has not been abandoned but rather 
transfigured. That is, the proofs of God “recur in all their conceivable forms in the 
hermeneutic reflections in which the anterior understanding and the terms of refer-
ence for the exposition and preaching of the biblical witness to God and his actions 
are formulated today.”144 Framing the discussion as a debate over hermeneutics, 
Moltmann’s contribution here will also reveal something of his own hermeneutical 
assumptions—this being clearly of interest for the current study. My concern in the 
following, however, will be to draw out the ontological assumptions informing Molt-
mann’s criticisms. Finally, the meaning of the somewhat misleading term “proof” 
(Beweis), while not immediately obvious, will become clear through the following 
exposition. 
First,145 Moltmann addresses Bultmann’s existentialist hermeneutics, which 
is made intelligible against the background of the proof of God from human exist-
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ence. Here, the exegete does not primarily seek to reconstruct the historical circum-
stances of a text but rather recover the possibilities of human existence that lie within 
it, in order to realise these in the present. They grasp the historicity of their own 
existence and are thus led through faith to grasp the existence of God. Put otherwise, 
because the proof of God from the cosmos is nowadays generally rejected, it can only 
be known in the sphere of human decision, decision which is ultimately motivated 
by God. Moltmann protests, however, that Bultmann has misunderstood the direc-
tion of the relationship between humanity and God. “It is only in the light of the 
biblical understanding of God that human existence experiences itself as being 
moved by the question of God.”146 
Second, in Pannenberg’s theology the ancient proof of God from the cosmos 
returns to the theological scene. “’God’ is here what is asked about in the question of 
the one origin, the unity and wholeness of all reality.”147 But whereas the earlier ver-
sion of this proof could not make contingency meaningful, proceeding from the 
Greek concept of a static cosmos, Pannenberg proceeds instead from reality as his-
tory, where the contingent is meaningful, albeit a meaning that will only become 
completely clear at the end of history. On the exegetical level, this results in consid-
ering the texts in light of the whole of history, as stages on the way to the end of time. 
Yet, while this bears obvious similarities to Moltmann’s eschatologically-oriented 
hermeneutic, Pannenberg also departs from him precisely in this way.148 For Molt-
mann, Pannenberg does not adequately comprehend the disjunction between the 
present world and the coming reign of God. The latter “is a new reality, which does 
not put the finishing touch to the reality of history up to then, but so to speak rolls it 
up.”149 
 
for God, likely because he views the former as a product of the ancient world and the lat-
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Finally, Anselm’s ontological proof of God, though rejected by Kant, was 
taken up again in new forms by Hegel and Barth. This proof proceeds neither from 
human existence nor the cosmos but from Godself, insofar as “whoever conceives of 
God must necessarily also conceive of his existence.”150 Moltmann’s discussion of 
Barth’s thought here indicates that he finds this proof most amenable to his own 
theological project. For Moltmann, Barth’s hermeneutic, proceeding from the self-
revelation of God, orientates itself to preaching and thus mission, the latter which 
Moltmann goes on to address in the following section of TH. Mission is essential to 
Moltmann’s understanding of promissory history, which calls human beings into 
God’s future rather than simply revealing the historicity of their own existence or 
the historical nature of reality. Barth, too, however, in implicitly relying on a proof 
of God, overlooks the necessarily eschatological nature of any definitive knowledge 
of God that the proofs assume.151 For Moltmann, “that God is God accordingly can-
not be the eternal source and background of the proclamation of Christ, but must be 
the promised, but as yet unattained, future goal of Christian proclamation.”152 It is 
not merely that human beings do not yet know God, but that God has not yet become 
“all in all” (1 Cor 15:28). What human beings do know of God, they know in a prom-
issory manner through which they are called to partake in God’s bringing the prom-
ise to fulfilment. As such, “we shall have to turn the proofs of God the other way 
around and not demonstrate God from the world but the world from God.”153 This 
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criticism is similar to Moltmann’s earlier allegation, namely, that Barth reads Scrip-
ture with a predetermined notion of the biblical Sache and cuts himself off from re-
visions of this Sache on the basis of data produced by historical criticism.154 
With his response to Barth it becomes clear why Moltmann has characterised 
the methodological presuppositions of different theologians in this manner. It is not 
that Bultmann, Pannenberg, and Barth have all naively set out to prove God, but that 
in attempting to articulate the reality of God none of their methodologies adequately 
take into account the provisionality of anthropic being, reality, or even God’s being, 
all of which await the eschaton and therefore can only be loosely presupposed. “The 
hermeneutical principles developed from them take the presence of God which can 
be demonstrated, experienced or perceived,” that is, from their respective starting 
points, “and make it the point of reference for the exposition and appropriation of 
the historic witness of the Bible.”155 Moltmann’s alternative is a hermeneutic that is 
oriented to the future through the church’s present missionary work. He writes, “The 
question as to the correct exposition of the Old and New Testament scriptures cannot 
be addressed to the ‘heart of scripture’. The biblical scriptures are not a closed or-
ganism with a heart, or a closed circle with a centre. On the contrary, all the biblical 
scriptures are open towards the future fulfilment of the divine promise whose his-
tory they relate,” namely, Christ’s coming.156 
It nonetheless remains unclear at this point just what Moltmann intends to 
communicate with his invocation of 1 Cor 15:28. Christopher Morse introduces his 
section on Moltmann’s ontology with the comment, “We should not expect to find 
in Moltmann’s initial proposals concerning promissory revelation a comprehensive 
outline of an eschatological ontology.”157 Indeed, Moltmann provides little detail at 
 
154 See above, 2.3.1. 
155 TH, 282. 
156 TH, 283. Moltmann treats this same insight in the context of different approaches to 
Scripture between the different Christian traditions in “Schrift, Tradition, Traditionen: Ber-
icht über die Arbeit der Sektion II,” Ökumenische Rundschau 13 (1964): 104-11, at 106. 
157 Morse, Logic of Promise, 109, cf. 41-7, 109-32. Daniel Castelo makes a similar claim: “Even 
in Theology of Hope, however, ontology is not given its due. Although not strictly Blochian 
or Hegelian, Moltmann’s project in TH can be viewed as a ‘foundation’ for an ontology, 
but by no means is this effort fully developed.” Daniel Castelo, The Apathetic God: Exploring 
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this stage, seeming almost to reject the terms of the question altogether. Consider, 
for example, this asymmetrical contrast he sets up between Parmenides and Paul: 
“God is not he who ‘never was nor will be, because he now Is all at once as a whole’, 
but God is he ‘who maketh the dead alive and calleth into being the things that are 
not.’”158 Perhaps this can be accounted for by Moltmann’s later theology, where he 
cautions against speculative investigation into the being of God for its potential to 
detract from the economy of salvation.159 Still, elsewhere in TH he provides state-
ments with more explicitly ontological content: “The essence and the identity of the 
God of promise lies not in his absoluteness over and beyond history, but in the con-
stancy of his freely chosen relation to his creatures.”160 And: “God is not somewhere 
in the Beyond, but he is coming and as the coming One he is present.”161 God’s prom-
ises “tell us who he will be.”162 Also relevant here is the pregnant statement of Bloch’s 
that Moltmann cites three times in TH. The God of Israel is a God “with futurum as 
his mode of being.”163 But these are still only glimpses into what a more robust, on-
tological foundation for Moltmann’s theology of promise might look like. He himself 
does not enter into detailed discussion of this in TH. 
In this section I began by detailing Moltmann’s theology of promise, which 
he forwards as an alternative to epiphanic categories in modern theology and 
thought. The contrastive paradigm apparent in this distinction is fundamental to the 
role that Scripture plays in his theology. Throughout TH, the implication is that the 
church has forgotten its biblical hope. Reclaiming this is nothing less than seeing 
 
the Contemporary Relevance of Divine Impassibility (Milton Keynes, UK: Wipf and Stock, 
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God’s work continue today, that of reforming the church in light of Scripture. I then 
turned to consider Moltmann’s ontology, which I thought necessary due to Molt-
mann’s criticisms of Barth, Bultmann, and Pannenberg that extended in various 
ways to their doctrines of God. While I found Moltmann’s own doctrine of God in 
TH to be somewhat undeveloped in this sense, I nonetheless discovered statements 
suggestive of an alternative doctrine of God that might attend a more comprehensive 
theology of hope. 
3.4. Other Biblical Issues 
Having addressed the central hermeneutical logic for the major claims that Molt-
mann makes in TH, I can now consider some of the more peripheral comments and 
assumptions which will help form a more complete picture of the role that Scripture 
plays in his theology. In the following I will look at how Moltmann conceives the 
relationship between historical criticism and theology, the nature of Scripture as a 
witness, the role of the biblical canon, and the continuity and discontinuity between 
the two Testaments. 
3.4.1. Historical-Critical Exegesis and Theological Interpretation 
When considering the role of Scripture in his theology, what is immediately notable 
throughout TH is Moltmann’s free use of the fruits of historical-critical exegesis.164 In 
his second chapter, exploring the theme of promise in the OT, Moltmann begins by 
taking up Viktor Maag’s claims regarding the syncretistic nature of the biblical texts. 
“Israel achieved a syncretism between the religion of the nomad and of the Canaan-
ite peasant. It is through this syncretism that it became what it was in classical 
times.”165 This syncretism consisted in a struggle between the nomadic, historicist 
outlook of Israel, and the agrarian, epiphanic outlook of the Canaanites.  
 
164 For an account of Moltmann’s relationship to historical criticism in and around TH, see 
Ben Wiebe, “Interpretation and Historical Criticism: Jürgen Moltmann,” Restoration Quar-
terly 24:3 (1981): 155-166. 
165 Maag, “Malkût Jhwh,” 137, cited in TH, 96, translated by Moltmann’s translator, Leith. 
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But an immediate difficulty arises with regard to Moltmann’s appropriation 
of Maag. The God of the Israelites here does not appear to be the sovereign Yahweh 
who leads and guides an ancient people. Rather, this God is presented here anthro-
pocentrically, even atheistically—as a result of the historical circumstances of the an-
cient Israelite worldview. Moltmann himself seems to go down this path, writing, 
“The Israelite tribes took the wilderness God of promise with them from the wilderness 
along with the corresponding understanding of existence and the world.”166 Yet, it is 
certainly not Moltmann’s intention to reduce Yahweh to a human concept. This will 
become clear in the following.  
A particularly significant feature of Moltmann’s treatment of historical criti-
cism in TH is found in his theology of the resurrection.167 His interest in the question 
first of all derives from the apparent distance between the centrality of the NT wit-
ness to the event and the confusion with which it has been handled in modern the-
ology, the latter having attempted to do justice to the principles and presuppositions 
of the historical method. This, in turn, originates from the experience of the “death 
of God” in modern European thought. In response, Moltmann aims to demonstrate 
that the God known to be dead, the God who has become “partly superfluous, partly 
optional,”168 is indeed the same God who raised Christ from the dead. That is, this 
dead God is not simply a fantasy of modern atheism but the God of the gospel, hav-
ing died in Christ on the cross. Insofar as atheism perceives the pervasive godless-
ness of the world, then, it surpasses even traditional theology, “theism.”169 Nonethe-
less, such a God remains essentially lost on atheism so long as the reality of the res-
urrection is overlooked. 
That the question of the resurrection cannot be straightforwardly relocated 
from the sphere of history to that of faith or practice—the temptation that has faced 
 
166 TH, 97, emphasis mine. Otto claims that “Moltmann refuses to take the biblical accounts 
as intended, but rather feels compelled by the autonomy of reason to reject supernatural-
ism.” Otto, God of Hope, 74. In the following, however, I contend that Moltmann does quite 
the opposite, even if he is not completely consistent. 
167 Cf. the essay, “Resurrection as Hope,” in RRF, 42-62, esp. 49-55 (1968). 
168 TH, 168. 





modern theology since the onset of historical criticism—is evident from the start, in 
the nature of the testimonies themselves. “Their statements contain not only existen-
tial certainty in the sense of saying, ‘I am certain,’ but also and together with this 
objective certainty in the sense of saying, ‘It is certain.’”170 Further, Moltmann cau-
tions against confusing the first century controversy with the modern one. Whereas 
the early witnesses to the resurrection contended that Israel’s God did indeed raise 
Christ from the dead against those who rejected this, namely dissenting Jews—who 
believed that God could have done so but in fact did not do so—the modern dispute 
is concerned with the historical possibility or probability of the resurrection. 
The historian’s first objection to the resurrection accounts deriving from a 
historical reality is made on the basis of Troeltsch’s analogical principle, namely, that 
the historical reality of an event can be determined with considerable accuracy on 
the basis of analogous events known to human beings.171 This would rule out the 
resurrection, as no analogy can be found for it. But, Moltmann responds, because 
such a principle depends on an ahistorical metaphysic—that of the closed, recurring 
world—it is inadmissible for theology. The resurrection is an act of new creation and 
therefore one that cannot be accounted for at all in terms of that which already is. A 
commitment to the historical method’s analogical principal a priori precludes the 
possibility of God acting in genuinely new ways. This does not mean, however, that 
the resurrection becomes an alternative, Christianised principle of analogy that 
merely replaces the scientific one or provides a competing account of what is histor-
ically possible. Rather, the resurrection is an event analogous with the future being of 
the world, and, as such, functions in an anticipatory manner. Nonetheless, it is in this 
anticipation that human beings live differently, in accordance with their future. The 
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means by resurrection is therefore only symbolically understood as that which will occur in 
the course of human history as God identifies with the poor and they rise up in revolt 
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historicality of the resurrection, then, consists primarily in its effect on history, spur-
ring the latter on, through hope, to an alternative tomorrow. 
These two very different features of Moltmann’s thought in TH—his adop-
tion of Maag’s insights and his challenge to the principle of analogy in regard to the 
resurrection—demonstrate the complexity of his relationship to historical criticism 
at this stage in his career. On the one hand, Moltmann appears quite happy to em-
ploy the fruits of historical-critical exegesis in regard to the origins of promissory 
history, even going so far as to imitate language which assumes this to be a human 
rather than divine development. On the other hand, Moltmann takes a firm stand 
against this inherently atheistic methodology in his theology of the resurrection. But 
it is the concern expressed in this latter movement that appears to be the dominant 
one. Moltmann shows no interest in viewing the resurrection as merely the result of 
human interpretation—so that the real event was nothing more than the realisation 
of Jesus’ significance for the future of humanity, for example. For him, rather, the 
resurrection is an act of new creation that only the God of promise can bring about. 
In this light, Maag’s insights are serviceable to Moltmann’s project insofar as they 
aid in elucidating the history of promise. Indeed, they fulfil this function in demon-
strating the uniqueness of Israel’s outlook in contrast with that of the Canaanites. 
Maag highlights the distinctive nature of the history of promise using the tools of 
historical criticism, though without altogether ruling out the reality of this history. 
Historical criticism remains valuable, even if it is hope in the God of promise that 
ultimately determines the direction of the hermeneutical task. 
3.4.2. Scripture as Witness 
Moltmann’s engagement with historical criticism raises another question, namely 
that of the relationship between the events that Scripture attests and the words of 
Scripture itself. For him, it is not simply Scripture but the whole history of Israel and 
Christ that should inform theology. The words of Scripture cannot be straightfor-
wardly abstracted from the concrete historical circumstances in which they arose. It 





example.172 He writes, “What the New Testament understands by revelation is thus 
again not to be learned from the original content of the words employed, but only 
from the event to which they are here applied.”173 As the exposition of Moltmann’s 
earlier work in my previous chapter shows, for him, reading Scripture means iden-
tifying the hopes of ancient people expressed there and finding that we, too, live life 
against the same eschatological horizon that these hopes seek, the horizon of Christ’s 
lordship over the world. As such, “even where the historic tradition passes over into 
legendary tradition,” that is, where Scripture’s accounts of historical events appear 
to be embellished, or, yet still, to depart completely from the historical reality, “the 
peculiarly Israelite tradition is still dominated by the hopes and expectations kindled 
by Yahweh’s promise.”174 The truth of Scripture’s witness to God’s work in history 
is not to be measured by modern concerns over accurate representation of the events 
as they transpired. Rather, its truth is found in the extent to which it communicates 
the hope that is given to Israel and the church through God’s creative action. 
 Further insight into Moltmann’s understanding of the relationship between 
the biblical texts and the events behind them can be gleaned from his comments on 
the emerging discipline of form criticism. As he understands it, in distinction from 
historical criticism, “the form-critical approach no longer asks about the historically 
accessible events which the accounts relate…, but it enquires into the kerygmatic 
motives which shaped the accounts, and examines their place in the life and conduct 
of specific societies.”175 Already, then, Moltmann departs from form criticism on the 
methodological level, finding not only the texts but the events attested by them to be 
theologically significant. And although form criticism has indeed “brought out an 
abundance of new insights,” its linguistic orientation represents a “decisive shift in 
the centre of the researcher’s interest.”176 This is especially the case where the original 
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historical reality is no longer relevant for the believing form critic. Such an orienta-
tion, as Moltmann has consistently maintained, reduces to the individual faith of the 
interpreter and overlooks the universal horizon shared by the present and past. It is 
thus neither, strictly speaking, the words of the text, nor the situation of the human 
writer or community that should be primarily of interest when reading Scripture. 
The purpose of reading is to be found, rather, in discerning the reality to which Scrip-
ture witnesses—here the God of promise and the future hope that sets history in 
motion. 
3.4.3. The Canon of Promise 
Turning to Moltmann’s exegesis in general, it becomes evident that he leaves himself 
open to the charge of subsuming the biblical texts under the single heading of the 
theology of promise. Similar criticisms were made by Moltmann’s earliest readers.177 
He summarises these, writing, “The first and most common charge against the ‘the-
ology of hope’ pertains to ‘one-sidedness’; the futurist aspect of eschatology is one-
sidedly emphasised against the presentist one, as is hope against faith.”178 But it is 
not only Moltmann’s broader theological conclusions that need to be considered 
here. The exegesis itself is conducted in such a way so as to give preference to voices 
in Scripture where this theme is predominant, sidelining those voices that depart 
from it. Naturally, Moltmann understands the theme of promise to be a pervasive 
one. For the biblical writers, “the stories of Israelite history—the histories of the pa-
triarchs, of the wilderness, of David—are treated as themes pregnant with his-
tory.”179 And it was in Yahweh’s promises, “in the constant recalling of which and 
the ever new embracing and interpretation of which Israel consequently found its 
identity and community. These include not only the ‘basic promises’ of Exodus and 
the Sinaitic covenant—‘I am the Lord thy God’—but for example also the promises 
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to Abraham.”180 Other texts, however, appear to resist integration into the schema of 
promise.181 
Ecclesiastes, for example, shows no interest in the promise of something new. 
It is much more at home in epiphany religion, where “historic events belong within 
the sphere of transience. They are then… transient and relative events that reflect the 
eternal intransience of the Deity. Then there can in principle be ‘nothing new under 
the sun’” (cf. Eccl 1:9).182 Apocalyptic literature, which includes the Book of Daniel,183 
departs from the promissory outlook of the prophets, particularly in its “determin-
istic view of history.”184 A fatalism like this, where the destinies of the elect and rep-
robate have already been fixed, threatens to undermine the divine freedom for new 
creation, or even interest in the world at all: “Like the eighteenth century theology 
of saving history, apocalyptic contains perceptible traces of the distant God of de-
ism.”185 Nonetheless, apocalyptic remains relevant in extending the scope of pro-
phetic promise to include not only human history but the entire cosmos. Interest-
ingly, the Gospel of John does not appear in TH at all, apart from one allusion.186 As 
Moltmann later writes, “Only with the Trinity and the Kingdom (1980) does John’s 
Gospel begin to appear in the indexes of biblical references for my books. The list of 
references to John grows longer and longer with each volume…. The Fourth Gospel 
is no longer for me a book closed ‘with seven seals,’ suspect in Marburg of a certain 
gnostic heresy.”187 He continues, writing of theology in the sixties, “My generation 
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tried to break out of the narrows of the personalist and existentialist thinking of Mar-
tin Heidegger and Rudolf Bultmann, with the latter’s reference to the Gospel of 
John’s ‘present eschatology.’”188 Thus, still in 1975, Moltmann remained suspicious 
of the book’s “unworldly hope.”189 It was only later when he realised the need for 
theological treatment of space, presence, and ecology, alongside time, history, and 
eschatology, that he began to show interest in John. Even John, then, falls by the 
wayside in TH, in order to make way for the theology of promise. 
Therefore, while it becomes apparent that Moltmann’s canon in TH is not as 
broad as his thoroughgoing exploration of the biblical promise might suggest, there 
is nonetheless a logic to his “one-sidedness,” which he expounds in response to his 
critics. TH is “a contribution to an open dialogue that forgoes any unrealistic attempt 
at all-sidedness and is therefore not intended to operate in a totalitarian manner.”190 
As Moltmann writes in his 1990 preface, “The person who is caught up in a discus-
sion, who wants to speak to a particular situation, cannot be complete and harmoni-
ously balanced. In standing up for one’s own concern one must over-emphasize.”191 
In this context, though he himself does not make this connection, Moltmann’s focus 
on particular texts to the exclusion of others can be understood as an endeavour to 
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hear and consider what the theme of promise has to say, ahead of entertaining criti-
cism of it. Nonetheless, Moltmann does not offer a detailed discussion of canon at 
this point and, as such, remains open to criticism. 
3.4.4. The Continuity between the Two Testaments 
A significant feature of Moltmann’s hermeneutics in TH is his approach to the rela-
tionship between the OT and NT. Whereas orthodox christology allegedly sets out 
from the universal God of Greek metaphysics, and liberal Protestant christology 
from a universal concept of human existence, neither of them require the OT for their 
respective projects. “Their way does not necessarily lie through it,” that is.192 For 
Moltmann, “the approach of Jesus to all men, however, has the Old Testament with 
its law and its promise as a necessary presupposition.”193 In theology proper it is 
Yahweh who is the Father of Christ, so that God’s being is bound up with the future 
of promise, and in anthropology it is the Jews of whom Jesus is a part, so that Jesus’ 
story must be seen in the broader context of Israel’s. These explain why Moltmann 
treats the OT theology of promise ahead of the resurrection. It is only in understand-
ing the roots and development of the promise that its culmination in the resurrection 
and future fulfilment in the coming kingdom can be rightly understood. To further 
flesh out this connection, Moltmann wades into a debate between Ulrich Wilckens 
and Günter Klein on the continuity of the OT and NT in Rom 4.194 For Wilckens, the 
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194 See Ulrich Wilckens, “Die Rechtfertigung Abrahams nach Römer 4,” in Studien zur Theol-
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Christ-event is only comprehensible against the background of the promise made to 
Abraham. For Klein, however, history is the sphere of the law, which faith breaks 
out of. He “takes ‘history’ out of the light of the promise and sets it in the light of the 
law.”195 History is not the realm of faith but is rather opposed to it. Thus here it is the 
believer’s faith that creates interest in the figure of Abraham, not the shared history 
of promise that encompasses them. 
Yet, Moltmann responds, “Paul does not use the figure of Abraham merely 
to illustrate his own view of righteousness by faith, but enters into a dispute with 
Jews and Jewish Christians over the inheritance of Abraham.”196 The direct implica-
tion of Klein’s argument is that Christian faith is antithetical to the OT. The latter has 
no inherently positive importance, apart from its appropriation by the individual 
subject. But this would mean that “it becomes as impossible to say what is ‘new’ in 
the New Testament as to say what is ‘new’ in Gnosticism.”197 Both forgo their con-
crete foundation in the history of promise. 
But neither is Christ’s coming simply to be seen in terms of fulfilment—the 
implication of Wilckens’s thesis. “His [Paul’s] gospel does not derive by necessity 
from the essence of the history of election.”198 Rather, for Moltmann, the Christ-event 
transpires in both continuity and discontinuity with the OT theology of promise. 
Christian faith finds continuity with the OT insofar as it, too, takes place in the his-
tory of promise. But it also finds discontinuity insofar as it is the Christ-event in par-
ticular that is the fulfilment of the OT promise and anticipation of the future, rather 
than present faith that defers to obedience to Torah and the election of Israel in place 
of faith in Christ. 
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 Moltmann briefly expands on this theme in a 1967 essay, addressing the sig-
nificance of Marcion for theology. In the second century, the figure, broadly consid-
ered a heretic, attempted to wrest the NT from the OT, and, in doing so, presented 
the church with the problem of reconciling the two testaments in such a way that 
had never been encountered before. Moltmann is particularly interested in the ec-
stasy of the new that underpins Marcion’s theology. “For Marcion the new of Christ 
is without analogy. Everything which existed hitherto and was known becomes bad, 
evil, and pernicious in the face of the new thing which now comes.”199 Yet, in positing 
a new God in Christ, in distinction from the God of Israel, Marcion’s enthusiasm was 
misplaced. Nonetheless, Moltmann claims, not unprovocatively, “When the univer-
sal church excluded Marcion as a heretic, it lost for itself the category of the new.”200 
That is, where the church responded to Marcion in emphasising the continuity be-
tween Christ and the God of Israel, at the same time it forfeited the rightly grounded 
(wrongly executed) messianic passion with which he had read Paul. The OT, for 
Moltmann, attests the history of the promise, the presupposition of the resurrection, 
whereas the NT attests new life in Christ, a new life that does not merely restore 
humanity to what it once was but ushers it into the kingdom that is yet coming. 
 In summary, a number of important peripheral aspects of Moltmann’s theol-
ogy of Scripture are developed in TH. First, Moltmann’s relationship to historical-
critical exegesis becomes clearer in freely adopting those of its insights he thinks bet-
ter illuminate Scripture’s theology of promise. Some tension arises here in regard to 
the secular register of such claims, though this is not a major problem when the wider 
context of TH is considered. A second tension arises when it becomes apparent that 
Moltmann finds both the words of Scripture and the events they attest to be theolog-
ically significant but does not provide any in-depth exploration of the relationship 
between these. Importantly, he contends that historical criticism is limited in its prin-
ciple of analogy, which would exclude the resurrection a priori. Third, an implicit 
canon of promise appears in TH, where it is notable that Ecclesiastes, Daniel, and 
 
199 HP, 13. 
200 HP, 14. 
108 
 
John are excluded in different ways. Finally, Moltmann addresses the question of 
continuity between the OT and NT, finding a necessary continuity in the history of 
promise but also a discontinuity in faith in Christ. 
3.5. Summary 
My aim in this chapter has been to give a detailed picture of the role that Scripture 
plays in TH. I have focussed the majority of the discussion on Moltmann’s contras-
tive paradigm, in which he differentiates between a Greek outlook, characterised by 
epiphany and ahistoricism, and the biblical outlook of hope and promissory history. 
This paradigm was clearly in the air at the time of writing of TH, as the exposition of 
six different influences on the work demonstrates. Nonetheless, Moltmann goes on 
to make it his own, drawing a line from Parmenides, through Kant, to Barth, Bult-
mann, Pannenberg, and historical criticism. Each of these in their own way proceed 
from presuppositions that Moltmann judges to be ultimately Greek in origin, rather 
than biblical. For Barth, all times are equal before the eternal God. The end will not 
bring something genuinely new but only reveal what already is. Barth’s eschatology 
is fundamentally Hellenistic in this sense. In yet another way, for Bultmann, escha-
tology is flattened and made to fit the shape of the individual human life. That which 
takes place outside the individual, in the future of the world, is effectively inconse-
quential. And Pannenberg, despite his innovations, is found to be at fault for his 
Greek, noetic approach to history, where history’s value is seen in its being the realm 
of God’s revelation, rather than the realm in which the people of God wait in expec-
tation for the fulfilment of the promises. Later in TH, it is historical criticism, here 
represented by Ernst Troeltsch, which also falters in this regard because it attempts 
to control history through the imposition of ahistorical principles such as that of 
analogy. 
 Throughout TH, though, Moltmann develops a theology of promise, a pro-
gramme he frames as a retrieval of the biblical material, as an alternative to Hellen-
istic goings astray. In promise, God proclaims a new, future reality to the people, one 





whose life took the shape of a history, archetypically in the exodus event. With the 
prophets, the Gentile nations, too, begin to come within the ambit of the promise, 
and the power of the latter intensifies, looking forward to the ultimate defeat of 
death. With apocalyptic, the breadth of promise expands even more, now encom-
passing the entire cosmos. This development continues into the NT, where the prom-
ise culminates in God’s faithfulness to Christ, and looks still further forward to our 
resurrection with him. Significantly, this biblical model entails an ever-changing pre-
sent, as believers are called not to live in accordance with that which already is but 
with that which one day will be. Whatever important role they may have had at the 
time—though Moltmann’s interest here is in polemical supersession rather than re-
construction—the theologies of Barth, Bultmann, and Pannenberg all ultimately sur-
render this radically historical character of the biblical witness. 
 In relation to this, hints of a new ontology, an alternative understanding of the 
divine being, appear throughout TH. This is particularly clear in Moltmann’s discus-
sion of the proofs of God. Each proof, implicit in the work of Barth, Bultmann, and 
Pannenberg, presupposes a particular ontology in which God’s being is complete 
and not open to the future. While he does not set up a competing ontology—some-
thing that appears to be all but absent in his retrieval of the biblical theme of prom-
ise—Moltmann nonetheless offers nudges in that direction, implying that the com-
pletion of God’s being is to be found in the future. The question of Moltmann’s on-
tology is significant for this investigation because it asks to what extent Moltmann’s 
theology of hope can provide not only an alternative phenomenology but an alter-
native doctrine of God. Because the question cannot be answered on the basis of TH 
alone, however, a more complete account of this ontology will be offered in my next 
chapter, drawing on works where Moltmann treats this theme in greater detail. 
 Nonetheless, the role of Scripture in TH is not exhausted in Moltmann’s con-
trastive paradigm. In addition to this, four features in particular are of note. These 
are: Moltmann’s adoption of the conclusions relating to his subject matter that were 
reached through historical-critical exegesis conducted by others; the emphasis on the 
events to which Scripture witnesses as the main sources of theological authority; the 
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implicit formation of a canon of promise, privileging texts that advance the theology 
of hope; and the different sites of continuity and discontinuity between the two Tes-
taments. 
Despite my interest in the centrality of Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm to 
his use of Scripture in TH, then, these other features demonstrate a broader array of 
assumptions and motivations that are at work under the surface of the book. Molt-
mann is not simply interested in advancing a biblically-driven programme against 
those compromised by their Hellenistic commitments. That is, it is not the Bible alone 
that demands such a confrontation. Rather, it is the very God of Scripture, the God 
of the promise, who lies at the centre of the text and enflames Moltmann’s imagina-
tion. It is thus that not only the recent, human endeavours in historical criticism are 
both radically relativised in light of the promise and taken up to serve its dissemina-
tion again today. It is thus that even the words of Scripture are to step aside for the 
yet more primary fact of the events that gave birth to the promise—that even the 
canon is not an all-equalising ocean in which texts are simply texts each for their 
identical role in attesting Christ, but a landscape with its own peaks and plains, 
where some features speak more readily of the history of promise. 
 Moltmann’s next major work, The Crucified God, will not appear for another 
eight years. In the meantime, in the fertile period following TH, he will further de-
velop some of the key insights of this work, as well as play an important role in the 





4. A Political Bible: With and after Hope 
In the fertile period between the publication of his first two major works, Theology of 
Hope (1964) and The Crucified God (1972), Moltmann continues to reflect on the rele-
vance of the Bible in modern theology. Additionally, other more general develop-
ments in this period are also notable for the context they provide in order to better 
understand the role of Scripture in his theology. This chapter is divided into two 
sections. First, I attend to just some of the numerous developments in Moltmann’s 
theology at this time, many directly concerning his theology of Scripture. Second, I 
draw connections between his promissory theology and the theology of the cross in 
CG, which will prepare the way for the following chapter on that work. 
4.1. With Hope: The Various Legacies of Theology of Hope 
In this section I will address some of the many pieces published in this period, fo-
cussing on Moltmann’s use of Scripture and the assumptions he holds about it. While 
much of the discussion will focus on seemingly miscellaneous aspects relating to this 
subject, most, if not all, directly concern his theology of Scripture as it has been de-
veloped up until this point in his early essays and in TH (1964). Besides these, how-
ever, I have tried to centre the exposition around two main themes. The first is Molt-
mann’s eschatological ontology. His contributions to this area in the years immedi-
ately following TH are important both for filling in some of the gaps from this earlier 
period, and for considering the relationship of this to his later, more sophisticated, 
trinitarian doctrine of God. The second theme is political theology. I would have ad-
dressed this at least in passing anyway, seeing as it is fundamental to understanding 
Moltmann’s theological development. Here, though, it is particularly important to 
explore the comments Moltmann makes in this area in regard to Scripture. 
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4.1.1. 1965. “The Word of God and Language” 
In this essay,1 Moltmann begins with the premise that churches need to be clear 
about what they mean by the “word of God.” Despite the wonderful grace given to 
the preacher in the opportunity to preach the very word of God, this person must 
recognise that even such a task as this “is also always bound to the misery of the 
word in this time,” because “preaching always employs the language of its time.”2 
Moltmann is referring to the problem of language in his day, which contemporary 
philosophical and sociological discussion had identified. In particular, preaching 
needs to come to terms with the increasingly indefinite character of the language it 
employs. Moltmann cites one scholar who claims that, in the mid-sixties, as a result 
of the mass media, the average German person knew “roughly fifty thousand words, 
and if all the technical terms and product names, compounds and abbreviations are 
added in, the entire inventory of words could be almost ten times as large. The esti-
mates range between three and five hundred thousand.”3 This is in contrast to people 
just sixty years earlier, who are said to have known around eight thousand words. 
The result of these language changes is that, first, misunderstanding becomes 
more frequent because there is more material to deal with, and, second, the extent of 
ever-new words and word formations means that the average person becomes less 
and less an active participant in developing language’s meaning, and more and more 
a passive recipient of meanings already fixed in advance. New media, with a focus 
on the dissemination of fresh information, such as radio and television, has further 
contributed to this increasing passivity. Moltmann discovers a cognate phenomenon 
in the inability to speak after the atomic bomb. No words can appropriately convey 
such an event. Conversely, attendant to the rapid proliferation of new kinds of media 
come innumerable new contexts in which words are spoken and torn from the real-
ities they attest: “The difference between word and reality grows the greater the 
 
1 Originally “Wort Gottes und Sprache.” 
2 PTh, 93. 
3 Karl Markus Michel, “Unmenschliches von A bis Z,” review of Aus dem Wörterbuch des Un-
menschen, by Dolf Sternberger, Gerhard Stortz, and W. E. Süßkind, and of Sprache in der 





knowledge of various times, languages, and cultures becomes. This makes the hu-
man being richer in the multitude of views on reality and likewise makes them 
poorer in certainty and truth.”4 Language itself has become its own, secondary real-
ity, abstracted from its destination. 
The preacher must not misunderstand the problem. It is not simply a ques-
tion of “whether and how modern transmissions of language, images, and experi-
ence are to be ‘responsibly’ employed.”5 This would be to speak an esoteric “Chris-
tianese.”6 Rather, preaching must contest this disjunction between word and reality, 
instead of simply resigning itself to it. This is because it proclaims the kingdom in-
augurated in Christ, a kingdom in which the fulfilment of the promises is already 
taking place. Importantly, such fulfilment is the perfect realisation of the intended 
correspondence between word and referent, signifier and signified. Therefore, de-
spite its present alienation, “language can find its truth and success in the preaching 
of this word.”7 
 Moltmann proceeds to explore Barth’s claims that “there is no concept of the 
Word of God apart from the name of God,” and “in God’s revelation God’s Word is 
identical with God Himself.”8 Thus where Scripture speaks in God’s name it is God-
self who speaks. And while preaching itself does not function in this way, Moltmann 
summarises, it takes as its starting point the assumption that “God has spoken and 
will speak.”9 Nonetheless, though it is not accorded the same prestige as Scripture, 
Barth can still affirm that “human speech attains an indirect identity with the word 
of God.”10 God’s word is not diminished in any way when God freely and graciously 
 
4 PTh, 96-97. 
5 PTh, 96. 
6 Admittedly, this word is not one employed by Moltmann. Nonetheless, it maps in part 
onto his analysis, and his analysis and criticism could also be a potentially valuable contri-
bution in understanding and, where desirable, combating the phenomenon it designates. 
7 PTh, 98. 
8 Karl Barth, CD, I/1, 159, 304. See idem, Die kirchliche Dogmatik I/1 (Munich: Kaiser, 1932), 
164, 321, cited in PTh, 99. Moltmann’s discussion of Barth in regard to this theme is here 
limited to CD I/1. 
9 PTh, 99. 
10 PTh, 100. 
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allows it to be proclaimed through human beings. In response to Barth, Moltmann 
first acknowledges that the great theologian’s claims are, on a fundamental level, 
“non-negotiable.”11 But he cannot accept a justification for preaching that takes a pre-
dominantly retrospective point of reference. For Moltmann, “this word must not 
only be understood incarnationally, but must first be understood eschatologically.”12 
The tension that is the disparity between the present time and Christ’s future is au-
tomatically overridden in Barth’s theological framework, where Christ is equally 
present in all times, though principally revealed in his life, death, and resurrection—
the heart of proclamation. Pushing back on this, Moltmann contends that the 
preacher’s words do not have a primarily reportative function but a transformative 
one. They seek congruence not with that which has been but with that which will be. 
Bultmann, too, runs into similar problems, albeit in his focus on the nature of 
the word of preaching as address to human beings.13 For him, the believer can find 
new being in the present through the decision of faith made in response to the word 
that addresses them. But, in reply, Moltmann again invokes the provisional state of 
affairs in which human beings find themselves: “The ‘amen’ that faith speaks to the 
word does not yet yield an anthropology of the redeemed person,” contra Bultmann, 
“but first a hope for the future which God will bring about.”14 Importantly, Molt-
mann wants to affirm what Barth and Bultmann claim about the word but to situate 
it in a broader eschatological context. Thus theirs “is not an overestimation of the 
word but an underestimation of the breadth and freedom into which the word wants 
to lead the transformation of the whole of reality.”15 
 Detailing his proposed alternative, Moltmann returns to the relationship be-
tween preaching and language. On the one hand, the language of preaching can 
 
11 PTh, 101. 
12 PTh, 102. 
13 Moltmann discusses Bultmann’s “Der Begriff des Wortes Gottes im Neuen Testament,” in 
Glauben und Verstehen, vol. 1 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1933), 268-93, cited in PTh, 104. For 
the English, see Bultmann, “The Concept of the Word of God in the New Testament,” in 
Faith and Understanding, vol. 1, ed. Robert W. Funk, trans. by Louise Pettibone Smith, 286-
312 (London: SCM, 1966).  
14 PTh, 107. 





never be a special Christian language that bears little if any connection to the lan-
guage of the day. On the other hand, however, neither can the language of preaching 
simply be assimilated to that of the world. Rather, it both takes place within the 
sphere of human language and impels this language towards a future in which word 
and reality correspond: “The word precedes the new reality. It does not illuminate 
the situation but introduces a new future. It calls that which it promises into present 
being out of the Not-Yet-Being of the future.”16 
 Although Moltmann’s main focus in this essay is on the task of preaching and 
its relationship to contemporary language, his treatment of these themes also pro-
vides a more complete picture of the assumptions he holds about the nature of Scrip-
ture and its function in the church (some fundamental connection between preaching 
and Scripture, if not already apparent, is at least touched on in Moltmann’s discus-
sion of Barth’s doctrine of revelation). Significantly, the promissory character of the 
word and its role in pointing to a future that contradicts present reality, claims al-
ready ubiquitous in Moltmann’s theology prior to the publication of this essay, are 
here transposed into the context of preaching and human language. This yields a 
concrete application for Scripture, with Moltmann seeking to persuade preachers 
that the value of the biblical promises will be better recognised if they do not surren-
der themselves to the problem of language—the disjunction between sign and signi-
fier—attempting to bypass it in a Christian fantasy realm where this does not apply. 
Rather, they must acknowledge the problem and confront it with the proclamation 
of a new, coming reality, which God’s word, spoken from the pulpit, attests, thus 
stimulating the call to active and creative obedience.  
4.1.2. 1966: “Trends in Eschatology” 
Central to this essay is the question: “Does the present determine the future, or does 
the future determine the present?”17 Moltmann’s response to this will provide a more 
definite picture of the relationship between history and the future, as well as of his 
 
16 PTh, 109. 
17 FC, 20, capitalisation adjusted. 
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ontology—the latter especially being a helpful addition, considering its ambiguity in 
TH (1964).18  
Moltmann begins by noting that eschatological thinking in first half of the 
twentieth century became polarised around the question of whether the Parousia 
brings to light what has already been achieved in Christ or whether that which has 
been achieved in Christ anticipates the coming Parousia. In his theology, Paul Al-
thaus firmly maintained the former. But, Moltmann responds, this left little room for 
the claim “that the future of Christ is a universal future.”19 Rather, if Althaus is to be 
followed, “it merely becomes the perfected future of believers.”20 That is, such think-
ing leads to a future that is restricted by the particularity of the present experience 
of salvation, as opposed to a future for the whole cosmos, where the particularity of 
the present derives from the in-breaking of a universal future—not vice versa. Molt-
mann also claims that Althaus’s position makes it difficult to account for the gap 
experienced between present salvation and its future, insofar as the former looks to 
the coming reign of God from within the experience of suffering. 
Althaus understood his own point of view to be in opposition to that of Barth. 
But, Moltmann contends, read in the context of his whole theology, for Barth, too, 
“the future of Christ contains no new event in the creative sense, but… is now a 
merely noetic event.”21 This interpretation of Barth’s eschatology is largely the same 
as that of TH,22 though here Moltmann admits that a careful reading will allow for 
some nuance.23 Moltmann proceeds to apply Käsemann’s exegesis of 1 Cor to Barth’s 
theology, drawing a connection between the eschatology of the great dogmatician 
and the presentist eschatology that Paul constantly sought to counter.24 Contra Barth, 
 
18 See 3.3.2. 
19 FC, 22. 
20 FC, 22. As Moltmann writes a little later, “The expectation of the Parousia of Christ is like-
wise something other than the expectation that the church will reach its head and fill the 
world.” DTH, 216 (1967). 
21 FC, 23. 
22 TH, 50-58. See 3.2.2. 
23 Moltmann discusses passages from CD IV/3 and III/2. 
24 Moltmann cites Ernst Käsemann, New Testament Questions of Today, trans. by W. J. Monta-





Paul “certainly let Christians participate in the cross in the present, but not directly 
in the glory of the resurrection; and he moved statements about the universal lord-
ship of Christ not only into present hiddenness, but out of the perfect and present 
into the future (1 Cor 15:28).”25 
For Moltmann, Barth’s theology of time also runs into problems. Barth argues 
that the NT “confesses the One who was and is as the One who comes, who will 
come at the end of this time and all times, at the last day. But it does not deduce this 
statement from any general insight or truth. The resurrection of Jesus Christ gives us 
the insight that He is the Lord of time.”26 But while Barth’s christological rationale is 
to be commended, Greek rather than biblical categories still inform his theology at 
this point: “The temporal concept of eternity”—that is, the claim that God is equally 
present to all times—“as we know it from Platonism, is called upon in order to depict 
eschatology as being essentially a development of God’s sovereignty.”27 In contrast, 
Moltmann responds, a biblical notion of time does not assume past, present, and 
future to be equidistant from eternity. He cites Rev 1:4: “Grace to you and peace from 
him who is and who was and who is to come.” Moltmann reflects, “The third of these 
temporal modes is not so expressed in Rev 1:4. There this ontological concept of eter-
nity is broken through by the expression ‘who is to come.’”28 There is an asymmetry 
between God’s past and present presence, on the one hand, and God’s future pres-
ence, on the other. In the following year Moltmann will provide further support for 
the contrastive paradigm that constitutes part of this argument, pointing to the an-
cient geographer, Pausanias. The latter records a song at Dodona, which proclaimed 
that “Zeus was, and is, and shall be.”29 But in the biblical confession, the expected 
“shall be” is absent and replaced with the anticipation of God’s coming.  
 
25 FC, 25. 
26 Barth, CD IV/1, 324, cited in part in FC, 26. 
27 FC, 26. 
28 FC, 26. 
29 Pausanias 10.12.5, in Pausanias, Guide to Greece, trans. by Peter Levi, vol. 1, Central Greece, 
rev. ed. (London: Penguin, 1979), 438. An unspecified edition is quoted in Moltmann, 
DTH, 216 (1967). 
118 
 
This grammatical quirk is pregnant with theological significance for Molt-
mann. Alongside his brief exegesis, he speaks generally of “the Old Testament ex-
pectation of the unique and final coming of God and his glory on earth,” by which 
“the ‘future’ gained the upper hand in the New Testament as well.”30 This can also 
be seen in the fact that the NT word parousia is only ever used in conjunction with 
Christ’s future coming. It is “never used for the coming of Christ in the flesh” and 
“never has the sense of return.”31 Instead, the NT anticipation of the Parousia looks 
forward to an entirely new reality, one that is not merely an answer to the gap be-
tween time and eternity in the present. Throughout the witness of the whole Bible, 
then, God’s being in the past and the present “is determined in the light of God’s 
coming in his divinity.”32 And “the future… is the mode of his being that is dominant 
in history.”33 
Nonetheless, despite his criticisms of Althaus and Barth, Moltmann argues 
that a mediating position is yet possible. The German word Zukunft, designating in 
German what future designates in English, has a different sense when read according 
to its etymology. Etymologically, Zukunft means a coming to, a literal translation of 
the Latin word adventus: “The ‘arrival’ or ‘coming’ of something other, something 
new and transforming, which had not yet been present in that form and is still not 
present as yet.”34 Moltmann finds that the Greek parousia also corresponds in mean-
ing quite closely to adventus, thus tracing a line from the German all the way back to 
the world of the Bible, where the NT parousia finds its home among the prophetic 
traditions of the OT. Conversely, the contemporary sense of Zukunft corresponds 
 
30 FC, 26. 
31 Gerhard Friedrich and Geoffrey Bromiley, ed. Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, 
trans. by Geoffrey W. Bromiley, vol. 5, Ξ-Πα (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1967), 858-71, 
at 865, cited in FC, 178 n. 36. 
32 FC, 26. 
33 FC, 27. 





more closely to the Latin futurum , which is related etymologically to the Greek phy-
sis.35 It denotes that which is going to be, arising out of that which already is. “Eve-
rything that is capable of becoming is inherently there in the basis of physis, as primal 
potentiality.”36 If the world had only a futurum then there could be no hope of a life 
beyond sin and death because the future would only be the realisation of the possi-
bilities inherent in the present. This distinction between adventus and futurum is im-
portant because it demonstrates to what extent the concepts that theology has at 
hand are, according to Moltmann, already conditioned by non-biblical, Greek think-
ing, which does not allow any room for that which is new. To introduce the Latin 
distinction into German, Moltmann employs Zukunft for adventus and the grammat-
ical term, Futur, for futurum. These are maintained in the English translation. 
But neither is the future as futurum set aside in reclaiming the advenient char-
acter of the Zukunft. The adventus that has broken into history through Christ’s res-
urrection “becomes the germ of what is to come and gains a Futur which corresponds 
to this Zukunft.”37 That is, the anticipated adventus changes the course of the futurum, 
not only directing the present to its own possibilities that it may have overlooked, 
but also opening up new, previously unattainable possibilities. More specifically, the 
 
35 From this point onwards, Moltmann also begins to adjust Bloch’s claim that God has “fu-
turum as mode of being.” Because he had not yet made the distinction between futurum 
and adventus in TH, Moltmann earlier implicitly read Bloch’s statement as pertaining to an 
advenient future. Now, however, he realises that Bloch has only said so much and that his 
approach lacks the Christian hope of a coming reality that is not already inherent in the 
world. See FC 180 n. 53; Moltmann in FH, 12-13 (1968). I discussed Moltmann’s quotations 
of this phrase in TH in 3.1.4. The apparent contradiction that Ryan Neal sees here is likely 
an accident of language and has little bearing on the content of Moltmann’s appropriation 
of Bloch’s claim. See Ryan A. Neal, Theology as Hope: On the Ground and Implications of Jür-
gen Moltmann’s Doctrine of Hope (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2008), 25-32. In his close study of 
Moltmann’s doctrine of time, Nicholas Ansell points out that there is no sense of adventus 
in Bloch’s work. Such a concept, which Moltmann originally adapts from Emil Brunner, is 
found instead in Franz Rosenzweig and Walter Benjamin. “The Jewish neo-Marxist atheist 
[i.e., Bloch] whose work is often taken to have decisively shaped Moltmann’s theology is 
read here—as elsewhere—as holding to a view of the future that falls entirely within the 
confines of Moltmann’s futurum.” Nicholas Ansell, The Annihilation of Hell: Universal Salva-
tion and the Redemption of Time in the Eschatology of Jürgen Moltmann (Milton Keynes, UK: 
Paternoster, 2013), 215. 
36 FC, 30. 
37 FC, 30. 
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adventus is the goal of God’s present work of justification and reconciliation. Not only 
does it come from the future, but the present moves towards it, in the same way that 
the present would otherwise move towards a materialistic futurum. Moltmann finds 
an analogous dual approach in Paul. First, in 1 Cor 15, the resurrection and Christ’s 
provisional reign derive from the eschatological reign of God the Father. They are 
what the complete, eschatological reign of God the Father looks like in the present—
in a world where God has not yet become all in all. Conversely, Paul’s argument 
from Rom 5 onwards “deduce[s] the power of Christ’s resurrection from the power 
of his passion in justification and the reconciliation of man.”38 The former anticipates 
that which is coming while the latter extrapolates from that which is experienced in 
the present. 
Finally, it is important to note that Moltmann still wants to assign some pri-
ority to the “descent from the future to the present,”39 that is, to the adventus over the 
futurum. The two kinds of future are not of equal weight. Although the nature of this 
relationship is still somewhat ambiguous at this stage, however, it will become in-
creasingly clear in Moltmann’s subsequent theology. Indeed, he addresses it in a 
piece from the following year, to which I now turn. 
4.1.3. 1967: “Response to the Criticism of Theology of Hope” 
In this essay, Moltmann responds to various criticisms made of TH (1964). Here he 
also clarifies his comments on the debate in eschatology as to whether the future or 
the present has ontological priority. In a telling comment, he notes that the debate 
has proceeded along similar lines as that which took place in post-Reformation the-
ology: “At that time the Calvinists said, ‘Only the one who is chosen believes,’ and 
were correct ontologically. The Philippists said, ‘Only the one who believes is cho-
sen,’ and were correct noetically.”40 In eschatology, simply put, the power of the 
Christ-event derives ontologically from God’s future reign, but the knowledge of this 
 
38 FC, 30. 
39 FC, 31. 





future, informing the church of life in accordance with it, begins with the Christ-
event and the present experience of salvation. “God looks at the goal first and then 
the way; human beings experience the way first and then the goal.”41 This is why 
Moltmann had said in TH that “faith has the priority [Prius], but hope the primacy 
[Primat].”42 As such, Moltmann’s earlier distinction between futurum and adventus is 
not simply a distinction between two different concepts of the future—concepts open 
to further revision in light of Scripture and theological reflection. Rather, it is a dis-
tinction between how human beings see this future and how God sees it. 
Also relevant here is Moltmann’s defence of his methodology in TH. Against 
accusations of one-sidedness—in regard to his allegedly one-sided emphasis on es-
chatology at the expense of the present—Moltmann maintains that a theological em-
phasis on the future is not one-sided but biblical. “History, then, is not the experience 
of transience,” as would be the case if created time were just a shadow of timeless 
eternity, but it is “the experience of change through the new of the future,” the new 
that God alone can bring.43 Here, to speak of the present is to speak of the intersection 
between the world as it is and the reality that is coming. In this present that is passing 
away, human beings seek the eschatological present of the future that is “eternally, 
purely, and wholly present.”44 The past, too, gains a new theological significance 
here. It has not evanesced into God’s eternal being, but the promises that were spo-
ken in Israel’s history become real for the whole world in the Christ-event. Con-
versely, the overplus of the fulfilment of the promises in Christ is retrojected onto 
past promises so that that which has passed away will now find new life in the future 
resurrection of the dead. 
This short exposition of some of Moltmann’s response to his critics indicates 
more clearly the nature of the future in his thought. Here the future begins to take 
 
41 Moltmann in DTH, 214. 
42 TH, 20; Ger. 16. In the present text Moltmann explains this, writing, “Faith is the priority 
[Prius] (as it is the first thing that, with us, on the ground of the cross, corresponds to the 
future), but hope has the primacy [Primat] (as everything in this faith is about that future 
in which God is God and all being is renewed).” Moltmann in DTH, 229.  
43 Moltmann in DTH, 217. 
44 Moltmann in DTH, 218. 
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on a position of priority in relationship to the present and the past. Perhaps there is 
an association between this and Moltmann’s earlier interest in the futurist being of 
God, scatteredly expressed in TH. But I will attend to that in the following subsec-
tion. Relatedly, in his response Moltmann defended his allegedly one-sided empha-
sis on the future, claiming that such an emphasis reflects the concerns of Scripture 
itself. 
4.1.4. 1968: “Theology as Eschatology” 
In this conference paper, Moltmann presents the most sophisticated and comprehen-
sive account of his futurist doctrine of God to date.45 After 1968, as Moltmann’s the-
ology begins to take a more cruciform and trinitarian shape, this futurist accent be-
gins to fade, even if it never completely disappears. 
 For Moltmann, God’s transcendence and immanence are best represented in 
temporal rather than spatial terms: “God is not ‘beyond us’ or ‘in us’, but ahead of 
us in the horizons of the future opened to us in his promises. Thus the ‘future’ must 
be considered as mode of God’s being.”46 Moltmann believes that this view also al-
lows for a way beyond the deadlock between theism and atheism over God’s exist-
ence in the present. “Eschatological theology, relativizing these antitheses”—the an-
titheses of being and non-being—“and taking them up, can say: God’s being is com-
ing.”47 Moreover, Moltmann can speak of “the ontological priority of the Zukunft 
over other modes of time,”48 a priority which does not come about naturally but 
 
45 For an incisive criticism and illuminating response, see Langdon Gilkey’s piece in the 
same volume, FH, 81-109. Gilkey argues that Moltmann’s preference for God’s future pres-
ence over present presence faces internal contradictions and relies on secular philosophy—
chiefly Bloch—rather than biblical exegesis. Moltmann’s response can be found in FH, 157-
60. 
46 Moltmann in FH, 10. The second sentence is a paraphrase of Ernst Bloch, The Principle of 
Hope, 3 vols., trans. by Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1986), 1236. 
47 Moltmann in FH, 10. 
48 Moltmann in FH, 13. Note that Moltmann paraphrases Bloch here, replacing futurum with 
Zukunft. It was Wolfhart Pannenberg who first wrote of Scripture’s witness to “the onto-
logical primacy of the future” in 1965. See Wolfhart Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theol-





which is possible “only if it [i.e., the Zukunft] is understood as mode of God’s be-
ing.”49 Although this seems already to be an implication of Moltmann’s distinction 
between adventus and futurum, a distinction which largely mirrors that between di-
vine and human action, it is significant here that he goes one step further and explic-
itly situates God in an alternative future that has ontological priority precisely be-
cause it is the mode of the divine being. 
Here Moltmann also develops in considerable detail his understanding of the 
relationship between Christ’s provisional reign through the resurrection and the 
reign of God that is yet to come. Following Käsemann, he observes that Paul desig-
nates Jesus as Lord, Kyrios, on account of his resurrection, and the Father as God, 
Theos. Jesus as Kyrios has a provisional role until his eschatological victory over his 
enemies, at which time he will hand over his kingdom to the Father (1 Cor 15:24-28). 
His resurrection accords him a provisional reign until the general resurrection of the 
dead. Such is the case that even “the New Testament titles of Christ characterize 
functions and are not yet qualifications of being.”50 Jesus functions as Lord, even if 
his lordship has not yet reached its eschatological completeness. That is, it has not 
yet been fully ontologised. But this “eschatological subordinationism”—Jesus being 
subordinate in terms of his ultimately conferring the kingdom to the Father—is only 
one side of the picture, deriving Christ’s future from his present.51 If the reign of 
Christ is instead interpreted from the vantage point of his sonship, then the coming 
reign of God is not one in which the mediating Kyrios is swallowed up but one in 
which Christ shares, not because he is the risen one but because he is the Son. His 
role as mediator, too, then, does not primarily derive from his being the forerunner 
of the reign of God. Rather, it is on account of his willing obedience as the Son that 
he takes up the provisional reign and then hands it over to his Father. Conversely, 
 
acknowledges his dependence on this essay in the current conference paper, though else-
where in discussing the futurity of God he rarely gives credit to Pannenberg. See Molt-
mann in FH, 9 n. 11. 
49 Moltmann in FH, 16. 
50 Moltmann in FH, 26; cf. TH, 202-3 (1964). 
51 Moltmann in FH, 26. 
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because this is the reign of the Father’s Son, this requires that Christ’s present, medi-
atory reign also be seen as the reign of God the Father through the Son. Seen from 
this perspective, “he is not only the forerunner of the future but also its realization.”52 
This same paper provides a glimpse into the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s 
theology at this time. Considering the relationship between the two Testaments, for 
example, he contends, “In the history of Christian theology… conscious grasp of his-
tory and of eschatology was arrived at only whenever one became conscious of the 
presence of the Old Testament and of Israel as a partner of the church, while explicit 
or implicit rejection of the Old Testament and Israel always brought Christianity to 
an uneschatological and unhistorical self-understanding.”53 This is because the OT 
attests the history in which the church is still located. To deny or overlook this is to 
lose the storied nature of Christian faith and thus, also, the eschatological hope for 
an alternative future. Moltmann quotes the Mishnah in support of this claim: “In 
each single generation a man is obliged to think of himself as though he had left 
Egypt.”54 
 At this point, too, the distinction between the text and the events it attests be-
comes even more pronounced and a theory of Scripture’s origins appears. Following 
Gerhard von Rad, it is first of all the event of the exodus that impels ancient Israel to 
develop a tradition. “Around the Exodus event and within the medium of the iden-
tification process, tradition grouped further acts of God.”55 But these further acts did 
not emerge out of thin air. First, on the basis of the promises made to Abraham, Isaac, 
and Jacob, Israel found continuity between El of Abraham and Yahweh of the exo-
dus. “In the beginning were placed the stories of the patriarchs which identified the 
 
52 Moltmann in FH, 27. 
53 Moltmann in FH, 16. 
54 m. Pesaḥ. 116b, cited and translated in FH, 17. 
55 Moltmann in FH, 17. For a later, more literary approach, beginning with Abraham, see 
ExpTh, 96-98 (2000). Earlier in the same volume he writes, “All God’s words and every-
thing God says when he speaks to a man or woman have the character of promise. When 
the words are positive, they evoke trust, and through the trust lead those addressed to set 
out into a new, unknown future. For this the exodus of Abraham and Sarah is the proto-





God of the fathers… with the Exodus-and-covenant God.”56 Next, this tradition de-
veloped forwards as the promise of freedom from slavery sought further fulfilment 
in the land of Canaan. “There followed the stories of the conquest of the promised 
land, of the judges and kings, stories which report the testing and the fulfillment of 
this hope.”57 The liberative action of God for Israel in Egypt thus extends both back-
wards, illuminating the traditions of the fathers which would later be relayed in 
Scripture, and forwards, igniting hopes and inciting action for a new history, that of 
life in the new land, a history which itself would later be incorporated into the bibli-
cal story of promise. 
But Israel’s traditions did not stop there either. “Within the medium of the 
Exodus tradition, Israel projected the protological universal horizon in which the 
Exodus God was understood as the creator of the world from darkness, flood, and 
chaos.”58 The Yahweh whom Israel met in the exodus, on account of his power, could 
be none other than the Creator of the world. As Moltmann writes in 1976, “The Isra-
elite belief in creation developed out of Israel’s historical experience of God—the 
exodus, the covenant, the occupation of the promised land—and is moulded by this 
experience.”59 The development of this protological boundary on the basis of the ex-
odus also extends forward to the eschatological. Moltmann had already explored the 
origins of eschatology in TH (1964), locating it in Israel’s prophets and tracing its 
maturation through to the later apocalyptic texts, though the connection to the exo-
dus was overlooked. In TH, “the new historic action of Yahweh in the history of the 
nations… is seen by them [the prophets] as being on the same level as, and even 
competing with, the historic acts of Yahweh in their own past as remembered in the 
cultus and the festivals.”60 Past fulfilment of promise is superseded by the prospect 
of yet greater action on the part of Yahweh. As such, hope for all nations now falls 
within the compass of Yahweh’s future action, as does hope for overcoming death, 
 
56 Moltmann in FH, 17. 
57 Moltmann in FH, 17. 
58 Moltmann in FH, 17-18. 
59 Moltmann in FC, 118; repeated in TKG, 100 (1980). 
60 TH, 127. 
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and, with apocalyptic, for the renewal of the entire cosmos. In the context of the ex-
odus, the sixth century BCE destruction of Jerusalem “negated the whole event of 
the conquest of Canaan and, as it were, threw Israel back behind the Exodus.”61 
Nonetheless, the exodus is not wholly negated. The God found there is the same God 
“who will bring forth a new Exodus.”62 
Moltmann thus moves decisively from any kind of continuity based in the 
connections between different historical events to a continuity grounded in the God 
of promise. The historical memory of these events remains, but not in order for hu-
man action to build upon these and achieve its own utopia. Indeed, new exiles and—
still freshly branded in Moltmann’s mind—the Holocaust forcefully demonstrate the 
hopelessness of such a road. Rather, the memory of these events remains in order to 
remind human beings of the promises given within history and orientate them to an 
alternative future. “The memories of salvation history no longer control the present, 
but they become prefigurations of the future which has put itself in contradiction to 
the present.”63 
Another point of interest in regard to Moltmann’s theology of Scripture con-
cerns the place of God in connection to the Bible. While Moltmann does not here 
attend to the relationship between God and the words of Scripture, that is, in the 
doctrine of inspiration, it is clear that it is God who is the subject of the history that 
Scripture attests. “History existed for Israel at first only to the extent that God had 
led the way and had gone along with his people in his promises and deeds.”64 What 
is striking here, however, is that it is Yahweh acting in the event of the exodus that 
consolidates the unity of the OT around the theme of promise. Light from this event 
of liberation shoots backwards, re-illuminating and taking up El’s promises to the 
fathers, and disclosing the work of creation. So, too, it pushes ahead of Israel, lighting 
the path to the future of promise. In turn, when this history is recorded in Scripture, 
it is the exodus that forms the centre. 
 
61 Moltmann in FH, 18. 
62 Moltmann in FH, 19.  
63 Moltmann in FH, 19. 





Moltmann concludes his paper with a section on the relationship between 
human action and the coming reign of God. From very early on, political interests 
have driven his theological project.65 Indeed, life under the Third Reich and the leg-
acy of the Confessing Church demonstrated the need for an ongoing, politically con-
scious theology. Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel, whom Moltmann met in 1949 and 
married in 1952,66 was central to this development. Her parents had been part of the 
Confessing Church and she herself joined when she was sixteen, developing an in-
creasing interest in political matters.67 She writes in her autobiography, “His [Molt-
mann's] background was in Kierkegaard and his inward-looking philosophical tra-
dition. I brought in my social views, and we had the feeling that both our works 
would be expanded by such fruitful differences.”68 Politically motivated theologians 
like Barth and Bonhoeffer, as well as non-Christian political thinkers like Bloch, 
surely also informed Moltmann here. But Moltmann’s convictions began to take con-
crete shape at the beginning of the sixties when he joined the German-Polish society, 
the aim of which was to reconcile and unite Germans and Poles.69 In the mid-sixties, 
Moltmann continued further along this path as he participated in the Christian-
Marxist dialogues of the time.70 As the sixties progressed, Johann Baptist Metz and 
Dorothee Sölle, alongside Moltmann, emerged as figureheads in the new movement 
 
65 “This political horizon has been planted in Moltmann's theology from the beginning.” 
Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power: The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 
trans. by John Bowden (London: SCM, 2000), 24. On the development of Moltmann’s polit-
ical theology, see Richard Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann (London: T&T Clark, 
1995), 99-108. 
66 BP, 43, 52 (2006). 
67 Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel, Autobiography, trans. by John Bowden (London: SCM, 1997), 
12. 
68 Moltmann-Wendel, Autobiography, 33. In Moltmann’s own words: “She freed me from my 
existentialist Kierkegaard phase and we worked together on our theological theses.” 
ExpTh, 269 (2000). For Kierkegaard in Moltmann’s broader theology, see Curtis L. Thomp-
son, “Jürgen Moltmann: Taking a Moment for Trinitarian Eschatology,” in Kierkegaard’s In-
fluence on Theology, tome 1, German Protestant Theology, ed. Jon Stewart, 185-218 (Farnham, 
UK: Ashgate, 2012). 
69 BP, 82 (2006). 
70 BP, 119-30 (2006); cf. Moltmann, God for a Secular Society: The Public Relevance of Theology, 
trans. by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1999), 50 (1991). 
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of political theology.71 Notably, though not completely within Moltmann’s purview 
at this time, the black theology for which James Cone would later be known was 
under development in the US, while the formation of liberation theology was taking 
place in Latin America. Against this background, it is 1968 especially that sees an 
explosion of essays from Moltmann that take up political themes.72 These are inter-
woven with Moltmann’s developing theology of Scripture. 
In the paper I am discussing presently, Moltmann proposes, “Cosmological 
theology must now be replaced by political theology.”73 The former likely refers to that 
characterised as a cosmological proof of God in TH.74 As Moltmann writes at the 
beginning of his paper, “The cosmological proofs for God’s existence which related 
God’s divinity to world experience accessible to everyone have lost their convicting 
power, ever since man has no longer understood himself as a part of a world striving 
towards God, but has placed the world over against himself as material of his 
knowledge and technology.”75 It was this exchange that allowed for the development 
of existentialist theology, centring on the human subject as the maker of its own des-
tiny. But Moltmann uncovers an important theodical impetus in the old cosmologi-
cal worldview. In appropriating chaos to the created and order to the divine, this 
 
71 For Moltmann’s own accounts of these beginnings, see Moltmann, God for a Secular Soci-
ety, 46-59 (1991); Moltmann, “Political Theology in Germany after Auschwitz,” trans. by 
Margaret Kohl, in Public Theology for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Duncan B. For-
rester, ed. William F. Storrar and Andrew R. Morton, 37-43 (London: T&T Clark, 2004); BP, 
156-64 (2006); Moltmann, “European Political Theology,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Christian Political Theology, ed. Craig Hovey and Elizabeth Phillips, 3-22 (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2015). Secondary accounts tend to take a thematic approach and 
deal with developments in Moltmann’s later theology as well. See Arne Rasmusson, The 
Church as Polis. From Political Theology to Theological Politics as Exemplified by Jürgen Molt-
mann and Stanley Hauerwas (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 11-16, 
42-173; Nicholas Adams, “Jürgen Moltmann,” in The Blackwell Companion to Political Theol-
ogy, ed. Peter Scott and William T. Cavanaugh, 227-40 (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004); Da-
vid H. McIlroy, A Trinitarian Theology of Law: In Conversation with Jürgen Moltmann, Oliver 
O’Donovan, and Thomas Aquinas (Milton Keynes, UK: Paternoster, 2009), 22-86. 
72 See especially, “Religion, Revolution, and the Future,” in RRF, 19-41; “The Revolution of 
Freedom: Christians and Marxists Struggle for Freedom,” in RRF, 63-82; “God in Revolu-
tion,” in RRF, 129-47; and “Hope and History,” in RRF, 200-220. 
73 Moltmann in FH, 47, emphasis original. On this section cf. RRF, 203-7 (1968). 
74 See 3.3.2. 





worldview attempted to distinguish God from evil, and, moreover, in being 
grounded in such a God, secured human immortality. While this framework has 
now become obsolete, however, the question of evil has not, and existentialist theol-
ogy does not offer anything helpful in this regard: “The question of God’s righteous-
ness in the world cannot be reduced to an existential category and thus also proves 
unanswerable by an attitude of man.”76 
Neither does political theology, of course, offer an adequate solution to the 
theodicy problem. But, in the context of a theology of hope, it provides a significant 
advance in this direction. “In political theology the future of God is mediated in the 
world-changing powers of man, so that today this future makes these powers and 
possibilities of man legitimate in their use.”77 At this point, the theodical objection to 
cosmological theology—that God cannot exist because there is evil in the world—
although it is not answered, is addressed through political theology’s “battle against 
human misery.”78 The future as futurum becomes possible in this way because the 
power of the adventus has come into the present and propels the present forward 
through the current actions of human beings. As such, however, “the real future is 
not identical with the successes of our activity,” the latter which is still prone to sin 
and therefore awaits the divine reign to be brought about on God’s own terms. As 
Moltmann writes elsewhere in the same year, “All historical realizations of the future 
of being are ambiguous because they both realize and hinder this future of being. 
Possibilities are realized and at the same time also forfeited. Every historical reality 
has in itself the intention to be an enduring, eternal reality…. But no historical reality 
is already that prevailing eschatological reality.”79 Nonetheless, the point Moltmann 
is making is that real changes can take place in the present because the present is 
being thrust into the future of God’s promise through the present fulfilment of the 
promise in the Christ-event. 
 
76 Moltmann in FH, 4 n. 6. 
77 Moltmann in FH, 47, slightly adjusted. 
78 Moltmann in FH, 47. 
79 RRF, 216. 
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 This paper provides the most extensive overview of Moltmann’s main theo-
logical concerns in the late sixties. I began with his comments on God’s relationship 
to future. As the culmination of his gestures in this direction since TH, Moltmann at 
last expressly situates God’s being in the future, following Pannenberg in assigning 
ontological priority to the latter. The logic for Jesus’ post-resurrection reign, for ex-
ample, derives from his coming, eschatological reign with God the Father. Next, I 
proceeded to explore the assumptions Moltmann holds about the nature of Scripture 
in this paper. He points to the necessity of the OT for the church, contending that 
without the OT faith quickly becomes uneschatological. Also of note here was Molt-
mann’s adoption of von Rad’s thesis that the event of the exodus constitutes the cen-
tre of the OT, not only bringing hope for the future fulfilment of promise but extend-
ing backwards to encompass the creation of the world. Finally, although appearing 
at this stage only in outline, Moltmann’s comments on political theology in this pa-
per are worth reflecting on here as they help situate this new concept within his 
broader theology, demonstrating especially the connections to his early eschatology. 
At this stage, Moltmann simply advocates for a political theology on the basis of the 
need for an adequate theodicy. But there is much more to his political theology than 
this. In another essay from the same year, for example, Moltmann reflects on what a 
political hermeneutic might consist in. This relates more directly to the role of Scrip-
ture in his theology, and I turn to it now. 
4.1.5. 1968: “Towards a Political Hermeneutic of the Gospel” 
This essay, a particularly significant piece from this period, explicitly treats the issue 
of biblical interpretation.80 The theme addressed in Moltmann’s 1963 essay, “Procla-
mation as the Problem of Exegesis,” is revisited here.81 Again, he asks, “Why dia-
logue precisely with these texts and with this past?”82 But this time a different line of 
 
80 For an in-depth, appreciative treatment of this essay, see Daniel L. Migliore, “Biblical Es-
chatology and Political Hermeneutics,” Theology Today 26:2 (1969): 116-32. 
81 See 2.3.2. 





response is pursued. Moltmann begins with a discussion of Wilhelm Dilthey’s the-
ory of history. For the latter, historical texts are accessible on the basis of the reality 
they have in common with us, that of life. But life itself has a historical character. It 
cannot be grasped apart from the extreme multiplicity of experiences that it consists 
in, experiences spanning from the beginning to the end of time. This does not mean, 
however, that the historian must stand at the consummation of history in order to 
first comprehend the reality of life and then, finally, to be able to properly under-
stand a single text. Rather, Dilthey’s theory is useful, Moltmann contends, precisely 
because it assumes the interconnectedness of all historical phenomena. In their rela-
tionship to the theoretical whole, these phenomena each have their individual sig-
nificances for the future. A hermeneutic can work to identify some of these for theo-
logical ends. 
 Moltmann proceeds to discuss existentialist hermeneutics, turning to Kierke-
gaard, Heidegger, and Bultmann. In contrast to Dilthey, for these figures “the total-
ization of all particular moments and parts of history is therefore not to be sought in 
a future end of world history, but is to be decided in one’s historical ability to be 
integral in the face of death [in dem geschichtlichen Ganzseinkönnen des Daseins an-
gesichts des Todes entschieden].”83 But Moltmann rehearses the now-familiar response 
that this is to exchange the concrete history in which the individual is situated for 
the life of the individual itself. Nonetheless, he also discovers a more sympathetic 
reading at this point. The existentialist interest in the individual’s search for meaning 
does not need to be done away with if it is resituated within the wider context of 
world history. “Participation in history is participation in the history of mankind, in 
political, social, and scientific-technical history.”84 
 In order to develop an informed political hermeneutic, Moltmann proceeds to 
explore Karl Marx’s comments on religion.85 Whereas Feuerbach had attempted to 
 
83 RRF, 89; PTh, 132. 
84 RRF, 92. 
85 According to Randall Otto, in this essay, “Moltmann thus sees the aims and hopes of 
Marxism and Christianity as one.” Randall E. Otto, The God of Hope: The Trinitarian Vision of 
Jürgen Moltmann (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991), 28. But while there is 
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develop an Enlightenment Christianity, updating it to meet the needs of a new age, 
Marx sought to direct Christianity to revolution. For him, religion offered human 
beings a fantasy to endure their oppression rather than the tools to overcome it. But, 
Moltmann argues, this need not require that religion itself be done away with. Ra-
ther, these fantasies contain revolutionary potential insofar as they suggest an alter-
native reality to the one at hand. The material circumstances of the oppressed and 
the visionary force of religion mutually criticise one another, so that the suffering are 
called to hope and the hopeful called to co-suffering in working for a better tomor-
row.  
Moltmann’s reading of Marx also has important hermeneutical implications. 
This becomes particularly clear when considering Bultmann’s hermeneutics in light 
of Marx’s criticism of religion: “As long as mythical conceptions are considered to be 
simply ‘expressions’ of human self-understanding and not agonizing protests 
against real misery, demythologizing interpretation remains in the dimension of the 
 
certainly some overlap with Marx in Moltmann’s thought, Otto overstates the case in sup-
port of his polemical conclusion: “Despite his stated concern for the identity and relevance 
of the Christian faith, Moltmann’s reformulation of Christianity succumbs completely to 
the reformulation intended by Marxism, making Christianity and Marxism one.” Ibid., 
230. Rasmusson provides a much more measured assessment, writing, “Although strongly 
influenced by Marxism, … Moltmann has never been a Marxist and never accepted the 
specific Marxist understanding of history. Rather than using a specific social and historical 
theory, he instead merely reasoned inside the general climate that the New Left of the 
1960s, so strongly influenced by Marxism, created. He developed a theology that showed 
parallels and was relevant to this general mood of thinking, for the purpose of helping 
Christians and Marxists to cooperate in the struggle for a new society.” Rasmusson, Church 
as Polis, 58-59, cf. 123-35. Around the same time, Jodey Derouin wrote a chapter on Molt-
mann and Marx, introducing it with these words: “Moltmann spends a great deal of time 
in conflict with Marx. In the case of Moltmann, he is neither entirely Marx's friend or foe. 
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logical Encounters with Marx: An Examination of Jürgen Moltmann’s and Juan Luis Se-
gundo’s Dialogues with Marx” (master’s thesis, McMaster University, 1994), 33. Other 
helpful treatments include Gordon Clarke Chapman, “Jürgen Moltmann and the Christian 
Dialogue with Marxism,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 18:3 (1981): 435-50; and Daniel E. 
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‘fantastic’ and does not approach the messianic kernel of the Christian proclama-
tion.”86 That is, despite his demythologisation project, Bultmann remains subject to 
Marx’s criticism. He simply does away with myth, overlooking its revolutionary po-
tential. Moreover, reading the biblical texts in this manner requires that Bultmann’s 
locus in the individual human subject be exchanged for a broader, social framework. 
Indeed, the biblical texts themselves assume this framework, even if, according to 
Moltmann, the accent is placed on freedom from subjection to religious idols rather 
than political ones. The eschatological freedom anticipated in Scripture will never be 
fully realised unless it is realised in all spheres, including the political. 
 Proceeding to explore this thesis in greater depth, Moltmann offers some re-
vealing comments on the nature of hermeneutics. He writes, “Christian hermeneutic 
cannot concern itself exclusively with proclamation and language because they 
themselves stand in the larger political and social forum of public life.”87 Where the 
political contexts of proclamation and language are overlooked, the church under-
states the breadth of the gospel. Here, Dilthey’s theory of history is supplemented 
with Moltmann’s Marx-inspired model. All historical experiences are connected, yes, 
within the wider context of the reality of life, but this reality itself is has a socio-
political constitution. Dilthey’s theory, then, via Marx, also requires “understanding 
all historical expressions of life within their political context.”88 
As such, the preacher must draw on an alternative hermeneutical process—
one that goes beyond the circles of text and preaching: “Preaching needs the text as 
its basis and the dialogue of the congregation as a check. Obedience and love need 
the discipleship committed to Jesus as their ground and the working-out of present 
experience as a control. This is a hermeneutical process which encompasses the 
whole history of Christianity.”89 Moltmann’s proposal is further developed in three 
theses, detailing the role of the text, the relationship between the text and the present, 
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87 RRF, 101. 
88 RRF, 102. 
89 RRF, 102. 
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and the role of the present—the latter which is designated “the dialogue of the con-
gregation” in the prior quote. First, throughout history’s changes, that which re-
mains “constant” is Christian faith’s basis in the crucified Christ. The “content and 
manner of proclaimed and lived freedom must be legitimized by reflections on their 
ground in the crucified Christ.”90 Notably, it is not the biblical text itself that provides 
this constant but the historical person of Jesus, to whom it witnesses. The tension 
between theologising on the basis of the texts or the events they attest is beginning 
to be resolved here in favour of the events, and the single event of the crucifixion in 
particular. The central hermeneutical value of the crucifixion will become even 
clearer in Moltmann’s 1972 CG. Second, that which is “invariable”91 is the present 
orientation to Christ’s future coming, the “fantasy,” in Marxist terms, which either 
reinforces the status quo or anticipates a radical alternative. Third, hermeneutics 
finds its variables in its exegesis and the practical consequences it draws from this. 
Though Moltmann does not state why this is the case, it is presumably because the 
reader of the biblical texts seeks to speak into the problems of their time, and because 
the action required by exegesis changes depending on differing historical circum-
stances. 
Questions of course remain. Moltmann’s developing political hermeneutic is 
at this stage highly theoretical, lacking concrete examples of just what kind of action 
such a hermeneutic would require and how other approaches would overlook or 
even stifle such initiatives—a Bultmannian one seems to be the most obvious choice 
considering the vast amount of attention already given to this in the essay. This 
ground is already well-worn in the secondary literature on Moltmann, however.92 
 
90 RRF, 102. 
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This essay is important for Moltmann’s hermeneutical considerations of his 
new political theology. He draws on the different hermeneutical traditions of 
Dilthey, Bultmann, and Marx in order to develop a political hermeneutic suitable for 
reading Christian Scripture. Marx prevails, even if Moltmann’s creative interpreta-
tion results in a Marxist hermeneutic that recognises the revolutionary potential of 
the biblical text. But Moltmann’s appropriation is not derived from Marx himself. It 
is a development of his earlier promissory theology, in dialogue with Marx. Most 
significantly, the biblical promises must be understood in the broadest possible way, 
and this means, not least, that they extend to liberation from political oppression in 
the present through the anticipation of an alternative, free future. 
4.1.6. 1968: Review of Ernst Bloch’s Atheism in Christianity  
Another 1968 piece from Moltmann is of note here. Published in the popular news 
magazine, Der Spiegel, under the title, “Jürgen Moltmann über Ernst Bloch: ‘Athe-
ismus im Christentum’ und die Bibel ist doch links” (Jürgen Moltmann on Ernst 
Bloch: Atheism in Christianity and the Bible Being Leftist), the review contains im-
portant comments reflecting Moltmann’s understanding of Scripture.93 
Moltmann begins by pointing out that just as it is not only Marxists reading 
Marx but Christians as well, so also Christians should realise that they are not the 
 
decades after TH. See Moltmann, Ethics of Hope, trans. by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, 
MN: Fortress, 2012). Nonetheless, concrete ethical reflection emerges at different points 
throughout his corpus, and Ethics of Hope draws on much of this. See Moltmann, “Fore-
word,” in Joy Ann McDougall, Pilgrimage of Love: Moltmann on the Trinity and Christian Life 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), xi-xiv, at xiii-xiv. Just a few years before the 
publication of Ethics of Hope (German 2010), Timothy Harvie began work on such a simil-
iar project in Jürgen Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope: Eschatological Possibilities for Moral Action 
(Farnham, England: Ashgate, 2009). 
93 Moltmann, “Jürgen Moltmann über Ernst Bloch: ‘Atheismus im Christentum’ und die 
Bibel ist doch links,” review of Atheismus im Christentum: Zur Religion des Exodus und des 
Reichs, by Ernst Bloch, Der Spiegel, September 30, 1968, 172-75. Also later as “Hat die 
Schlange doch recht?” (Was the Snake Right?) in Moltmann, Im Gespräch mit Ernst Bloch: 
Eine theologische Wegbegleitung, 49-54 (Munich: Kaiser, 1976). The difference in titles sug-
gests that the former was supplied by Der Spiegel. For the subject of the review, see Ernst 
Bloch, Atheismus im Christentum: Zur Religion des Exodus und des Reichs (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1968); ET: Ernst Bloch, Atheism in Christianity: The Religion of the Exodus and the 
Kingdom, trans. by J. T. Swann (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972). 
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only ones reading the Bible. Bloch’s new work is just the latest example of this. Molt-
mann observes, “The stories of God and sinful human beings disappear, and stories 
of grumbling, bickering, defiant human beings and their fickle God emerge. In this 
way, the Bible is a subversive and revolutionary book that can no longer live harmo-
niously with church authority or Christian state power.”94 But not all of these gems 
that Bloch discovers are to be found simply floating on the surface of the text. The 
philosopher “chases down the ambiguous slave language in the texts redacted by 
priests, finding among the words of comfort from above the primordial groans and 
murmurs from below, within the religious ideologies of rulers the mysterious desires 
of the ruled.”95 
 Moltmann’s first explicitly critical comment is made in regard to Bloch’s “one-
sidedness,” a symptom of the latter’s distinctly Marxist reading of the text. But Molt-
mann is quick to add that “the question should be asked as to whether such a one-
sidedness might be necessary, at least on this earth,” having undergone a similar 
criticism in regard to his own work.96 Instead of providing a set of criteria for what 
constitutes good one-sidedness and what constitutes bad, however, Moltmann pro-
ceeds to Bloch’s exegesis. For Bloch, the Bible needs to be read with the “promise” of 
the snake from the Garden of Eden in mind: “You will be like God” (Gen 3:5). This 
has its consummation in the Son of Man, who, for the atheist, attains homoousious 
with God. For Bloch though, “the formula no longer denotes God really becoming 
human, but human beings becoming fully God”!97 Moltmann’s comments are sym-
pathetic yet critical. He shares with Bloch the desire to uncover Scripture’s forgotten 
promises, though just what these promises are remains a matter of dispute. The two 
also depart when it comes to the reality of God. “Must God, too, fall with the em-
peror, the God who, according to Psalm 2:4, already scoffs at those who lust for 
power? Admittedly, the ‘Father in heaven’ has been distorted by the pater patriae but 
 
94 Moltmann, “Moltmann über Bloch,” 172. 
95 Moltmann, “Moltmann über Bloch,” 172. 
96 Moltmann, “Moltmann über Bloch,” 172. 





he was also worshipped as mystery by the One whom Rome crucified.”98 Indeed, for 
Moltmann, this God is the source of the promise and the guarantee of its fulfilment, 
a fulfilment that goes far beyond the parameters imagined by Bloch. But Moltmann 
prefers to focus on the constructive features of Bloch’s text, perhaps because he can 
see the value that the Bible holds even for atheists, something which the title given 
by Der Spiegel surely also attempts to convey. “For Bloch, Job’s hard questions outlast 
shallow atheism too.”99 In the context of Moltmann’s own hermeneutics, this review 
is of particular interest. Bloch and Moltmann, though departing on the question of 
God, both find that the Bible can be an important source for politically-motivated 
readers. 
 Moltmann’s interest in Bloch’s ongoing work thus remains, demonstrating for 
Christian readers how non-Christian interpretation of Scripture might fruitfully con-
tribute to the hermeneutical conversation. The theme of political hermeneutics again 
takes centre stage, with Moltmann agreeing with Bloch on the subversive subtext of 
Scripture. Not surprisingly, Moltmann maintains the importance of recognising this 
theologically, rather than simply atheistically, as the God of Scripture cannot be so 
readily abstracted from the Bible’s politics. 
4.1.7. 1970: “Introduction to the ‘Theology of Hope’”  
Some years after TH (1964), Moltmann penned a retrospective introduction to the 
book, one that includes important insights into his understanding of the Bible. He 
opens with a distinction between the “context” and the “text” of the work. Regarding 
the first, TH was written in the context of the speeding technological development 
that the sixties saw and the new ecclesiastical and political hopes being realised at 
 
98 Moltmann, “Moltmann über Bloch,” 173-74. 
99 Moltmann, “Moltmann über Bloch,” 172. A few years later, writing about Bloch, Molt-
mann points out, “God’s defenders are not necessarily closer to God than God’s accusers. 
It is not Job’s theological friends who are justified but Job himself.” Moltmann, “Introduc-
tion,” in Ernst Bloch, Man on His Own: Essays in the Philosophy of Religion, trans. by E. B. 
Ashton, 19-30 (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 28. 
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the time in such events as Vatican II and John F. Kennedy’s presidency. But, Molt-
mann cautions, “The context is not yet the text itself.”100 The context changes 
throughout history. A completely different set of happenings, for example, sur-
rounds Moltmann’s next book, CG. But the text is that which remains constant. It is 
that which remains relevant to those reading TH just six years later—though already 
with new concerns. “For that reason,” Moltmann proceeds, “I am not speaking about 
the context, but about the text of the theology of hope, namely, the Bible.”101 
 It is this foundation in the Bible that sets true theology apart from secular 
thought-forms. Moltmann’s project “is not a theology about hope, but a theology 
growing out of hope in God.”102 It does not seek to delineate the nature of hope but 
to speak with hope and infect its hearers with a passion for God’s future. This is 
followed by a threefold claim: “[1.] The basis for this hope does not lie in the ups and 
downs of the moods of the time, but in the promise of the coming God. [2.] These 
promises of God have been incarnated in the promissory history of Israel and in the 
promissory history of Jesus of Nazareth. [3.] The writings in the Old and New Tes-
taments comprise the history book of God’s promises.”103 Due to the succinctness of 
this claim, swiftly advancing from God to the Bible, it is easy to overlook the under-
lying assumptions here. A short comment will therefore aid in elucidating these. 
First of all, the promise that TH attests is grounded in the reality of the God who 
promises. Second, these promises have a concrete referent, having been realised in 
an anticipatory manner in the history of Israel and Christ. Third, it is in the Bible that 
this promissory history is found, though again some kind of relationship between 
the text and its referent, God’s action in history, is assumed without being further 
explained. 
 
100 EH, 44, emphasis original. 
101 EH, 44-45. This theme is repeated and briefly elaborated fifteen years later: TH “was 
about the connection between the ‘theology of the Old Testament’ as presented by Ger-
hard von Rad, Walther Zimmerli, Hans-Walter Wolff, Hans-Joachim Kraus and others, 
and the ‘theology of the New Testament’ which had been pioneered by Rudolf Bultmann 
and corrected and developed further above all by Ernst Käsemann.” HTG, 168 (1985). 
102 EH, 45, emphasis original. 





 Finally, Moltmann attends to the relationship between promise and fulfilment 
in the context of the Bible. “Some day the biblical theology of ‘it is written’ will be-
come an ontology of ‘it has taken place.’”104 Scripture here is not a text fixed in time 
but a component of the yet unfulfilled history of promise. It is thus neither “a docu-
ment of an ancient religion but still has its time ahead of it.”105 Significantly, Molt-
mann’s language here is stronger than that used in TH, revealing the new, explicitly 
political direction his theology took since its publication. Precisely because the Bible 
directs human beings to an alternative future, “it is a highly revolutionary and sub-
versive book.”106 That is, it opposes the lives of comfort enjoyed at the expense of 
others, lives thus lived in contradiction to God’s future. The Bible, rather, “is valid 
for the hopeless and not for optimists. It is valid for the poor and not for the rich.”107 
 This essay is particularly important for Moltmann’s affirmation of the Bible as 
the text of TH. Although the latter certainly reflects the concerns and spirit of the 
time in which it was written, Moltmann contends that its importance remains insofar 
as it is read in light of its originary text, the Bible. He also comments on the relation-
ship between Scripture and the present, the two being bound together in sharing the 
promissory history that will be consummated with the coming of the kingdom. 
4.1.8. 1971: “Christian Theology and Its Problems Today” 
In the midst of his developing political theology and maturing theology of promise, 
Moltmann remains interested in simple questions such as the role of the Bible in 
church practice. In this essay, he opens with the thesis that “Christian theology must 
be biblical theology.”108 But whereas the Bible appears to be at the front and centre 
of newer churches, perhaps reflecting “the surprises of a ‘love at first sight,’” older 
 
104 EH, 45. This is an unattributed quote or paraphrase of Hans Joachim Iwand. See PTh, 108. 
105 EH, 46. 
106 EH, 46. 
107 EH, 46. 
108 EH, 6. 
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churches, according to Moltmann, tend to be more interested in “philosophical the-
ology, sociology of religion, and anthropology.”109 He continues, though, suggesting 
that this is not because the older churches are familiar with Scripture. The neglect “is 
based rather on a Christian tradition that leads men to expect nothing new from the 
Bible.”110 And yet there is indeed newness, a newness which derives from Scripture’s 
witness to the promises of God: “Every text in the Bible narrates the past in order to 
announce the future.”111 
 Notably, Moltmann’s interests here are again acutely political. “It is difficult to 
wage a revolution without the Bible (Ernst Bloch). It is even more difficult not to 
bring about a revolution with the Bible.”112 He proceeds to cite Acts 17:6: “These peo-
ple who have been turning the world upside down have come here also.” This is 
because the Bible does not belong to the ruling class but to “the poor, the oppressed, 
and the hopeless.”113 As such, its purpose is to be found in the liberation of human 
beings, and not least a political liberation. Moltmann concludes with a provocative 
claim: “It was not without design that the reading of the Bible was forbidden to the 
simple folk by pagan lords and a lordly Christian church. Have such prohibitions 
perhaps become unnecessary today because the church and theology have done their 
best to render the Bible harmless?”114 
 Also of note here are Moltmann’s brief comments on the relationship between 
the two Testaments. First, “the Bible itself is not a perfectly uniform book or revela-
tion, but rather contains the antithesis between the Old and the New Testaments.”115 
Moltmann had explored this in some detail in TH.116 Such an “antithesis” is ongoing 
as Christian faith not only looks to the OT for its promises but also looks with the OT 
beyond the OT to the NT and beyond the NT, too, to the future coming of Christ. 
 
109 EH, 6-7. 
110 EH, 7. 
111 EH, 7. 
112 EH, 6. 
113 EH, 7. 
114 EH, 8. 
115 EH, 9. 





Where this antithesis is ignored, however, faith quickly descends into legalism. “The 
law remains in effect; the Old Testament dominates the New and is interpreted ac-
cording to legal principles…. Then a person is a Christian insofar as certain moral 
restrictions are placed upon his behaviour. But what a Christian should do posi-
tively, no one any longer knows.”117 Morality, that is, accordance with pre-estab-
lished ethical principles, becomes the centre so that faith forgets how to look for-
wards and live instead in accordance with its future. Although Moltmann does not 
equate the OT with law at this point, however, this close association, repeated in 
another way in CG (1972), will later result in some exegetical problems.118 
 Moltmann’s ongoing admiration of Scripture is evident in this essay, advocat-
ing that the churches, especially older ones, do not forget to read it. Again, the Bible 
aligns with his political theology, inasmuch as it is written, in particular, for the op-
pressed. Finally, he returns to the OT, contrasting legalistic and promissory faiths. I 
will return at the end of this chapter to briefly summarise and further reflect on some 
of the many aspects of the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology between TH and 
CG, covered in this section. But before moving on to CG it will be helpful to examine 
this intermediate period through quite a different lens. 
4.2. After Hope: Remembering the Crucifixion 
The eight-year period between the publication of TH and CG is significant for an-
other reason too. It marks a transition in Moltmann’s thought from a theology of 
hope to a theology of the cross. Some of this interest in the latter has been noted in 
the foregoing. But in order to gain a better understanding of just what Moltmann is 
doing in CG and how it relates to his previous theology, in this section I will illustrate 
this transition in detail. This discussion has an additional purpose, however. Re-
cently, Ryan Neal has argued that this transition is not so much an organic develop-
ment in Moltmann’s theology but a corrective to blind spots in his earlier thought. 
 
117 EH, 10. 
118 See 5.3.3.  
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Yet, there are a number of problems with Neal’s thesis, which will naturally be made 
clear in the discussion of Moltmann’s work in this period. First, therefore, I will out-
line Neal’s thesis, and then, in the rest of this section, I will provide a thorough dis-
cussion of the nature of this transition. 
4.2.1. Ryan Neal on the Turn to a Theology of the Cross 
Ever since the publication of CG (1972), major interpreters of Moltmann’s thought 
have generally understood the book’s theology to be basically continuous with that 
of TH (1964).119 As Richard Bauckham observes, “The dialectic of cross and resurrec-
tion in an eschatological perspective remains the determining centre of Moltmann’s 
theology in both books.”120 And as Moltmann himself writes in a 1990 preface to CG, 
“After publishing Theology of Hope, the logic of my theological approach led me to 
work more deeply on the remembrance of the crucified Christ. Hope without re-
membrance leads to illusion, just as, conversely, remembrance without hope can re-
sult in resignation.”121 This widely accepted thesis has, however, been recently dis-
puted by Ryan Neal. Of CG he writes, “The turn to the cross is most accurately de-
scribed as a corrective manoeuvre, and indeed a qualification, of the earlier period 
and therefore cannot be characterized as merely a subtle shift in emphasis, still fully 
complementary to his earlier hope theology.”122 Neal bases his claim on two grounds. 
 
119 See Otto’s summary of the essays in DGG: “The prevalent opinion is that The Crucified 
God constitutes a deepening and expansion of certain emphases in Theology of Hope and 
that the two works should be considered a unity.” Otto, God of Hope, 8. Numerous other 
assenting scholars are listed by Ryan A. Neal in “Minority Report: Reconsidering Jürgen 
Moltmann’s Turn to a Theology of the Cross,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 
14:1 (2012): 26-43, at 33-34 nn. 45-46. 
120 Richard Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the Making (Basingstoke, UK: Mar-
shall Pickering, 1987), 53. He continues, “Once this is understood, the shift from a focus on 
the resurrection of the crucified Christ to a focus on the cross of the risen Christ (CG 5) is 
not only intelligible, but evidently an inner necessity of Moltmann’s theological develop-
ment.” Ibid., 53-54. 
121 CG, ix. Nonetheless, while Moltmann makes claims such as these that suggest continuity 
between the two works, Neal provides a number of examples demonstrating Moltmann’s 
understanding of a more complex relationship between the two works, an understanding 
that the secondary literature does not seem to have identified. Neal, “Minority Report,” 
38-40. 





First, Moltmann’s choice to bring the cross into the centre of his project in CG sug-
gests that this was not the case in TH. However much the cross informed his earlier 
work, it was not a major feature of it.123 Second, Neal points to the international po-
litical disappointments of the late sixties as playing a formative role in Moltmann’s 
theology, directing him to an understanding of the cross that was not already inher-
ent in the trajectory of TH. This leads Neal to conclude that “Moltmann has made 
two arguments which are not continuous and coterminous, but rather contradic-
tory.”124 While this is not a criticism per se—Moltmann inherits a dialectical tradition 
that relishes in contradiction—for Neal the relationship between these contradictory 
aims is not sufficiently clarified by Moltmann in CG.125 Testing Neal’s claims will 
help to further elucidate the relationship between TH and CG. 
4.2.2. Early Interest in the Suffering God 
As early as 1960 Moltmann wrote of “the world in which God has suffered.” Allud-
ing to Bonhoeffer, he continues, “Only the cross makes it possible to accept it in its 
total worldliness, through self-abandonment and sacrifice.”126 But it is not until 1966 
that these statements begin to approach the theology of CG. Here, Moltmann writes, 
“In Jesus’ cross and resurrection God not only acts as the Lord, but also suffers as 
Father in offering up his Son.”127 This notion continues to take shape so that in 1968 
we read: “In Jesus’ suffering God suffers; in his death, God himself tastes of damna-
tion and death…. In the crucified one he withdraws from power and lordship and 
humiliates himself to the point of death.”128 And: “In the crucified one, we found 
 
123 Neal provides further support for this claim in his Theology as Hope, 19-23, 37-40. 
124 Neal, “Minority Report,” 41. 
125 Perhaps some kind of resolution can be found in Moltmann’s subsequent theology. Thus, 
“CPS [1975] largely maintains the dialectic presented in TH and CG.” And, “overcoming 
the one-sidedness of TH and CG, Moltmann’s ecclesiology [in CPS] is determined by 
both.” Neal, Theology as Hope, 69 n. 1 and p. 84. Nonetheless, Neal also criticises Molt-
mann’s later CoG (1995) for a reversion to TH where the cross allegedly does not play a 
major role. Neal, Theology as Hope, 217-25. 
126 HP, 106. 
127 Moltmann in FH, 28. 
128 HP, 43. 
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God forsaking God and God overcoming for men the agony of God in himself.”129 
Comments such as these in Moltmann’s early theology illustrate a subtle trajectory 
that later flowered into the theology of trinitarian suffering found in CG. Yet while 
there is little indication before 1970 of a more fully developed theology of the cross 
besides scattered comments such as these,130 important engagements with Bloch, He-
gel, and Feuerbach in his earlier theology suggest that Moltmann’s thought at this 
stage does not exclude the possibility of this. I will attend to these engagements in 
the following subsections. 
4.2.3. The Crucifixion in the Dispute with Ernst Bloch 
Moltmann’s first critical engagement with Bloch’s thought appears in a 1960 review 
of The Principle of Hope.131 Although he does not yet at this point approach the cross 
in the central way that he does in CG, here Moltmann nonetheless starts off on a 
trajectory in this direction. He writes of Bloch, “If his ‘grasped’ hope is no more than 
a Marxism reinterpreted by way of the philosophy of history, then his own bitter 
realisation applies to him as well: ‘The jaws of death grind everything and the maw 
 
129 HP, 51. 
130 For the material in this period, besides CG, see Moltmann, “Gott im Kreuz Jesu,” in idem, 
Umkehr zur Zukunft, 133-47 (Munich: Kaiser, 1970); Moltmann, “The Cross and Civil Reli-
gion,” trans. by Thomas Hughson and Paul Rigby, in Moltmann et al., Religion and Political 
Society, ed. The Institute of Christian Thought, 14-47 (New York: Harper & Row, 1974 [Ger. 
1970]); EH, 69-84 (1972); Moltmann, “The ‘Crucified God’: God and the Trinity Today,” 
trans. by David Smith, in Johann-Baptist Metz and Jürgen Moltmann, Faith and the Future: 
Essays on Theology, Solidarity, and Modernity, 89-99 (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1995 [Ger. article 
1972]); FC, 59-79 (1973). 
131 For this subsection, cf. Bauckham’s comments on Bloch’s influence on Moltmann’s theod-





of corruption devours every teleology [Moltmann: theology].”132 Continuing, Molt-
mann reveals, “Only resurrection faith overcomes this.”133 A similar response is 
given two years later in a review of Bloch’s 1961 Natural Law and Human Dignity.134 
Significantly, this criticism is further developed and reappears in a 1963 article ad-
dressing the claims of The Principle of Hope in the context of Bloch’s wider thought, 
from 1965 included as an appendix to later German editions of TH in slightly revised 
and extended form.135 
 Writing in 1963, Moltmann notes that Bloch’s atheistically conceived utopia 
seeks to overcome the nihil (negative) in human existence through the surmounting 
of class and its attendant oppressions. But, here, the negative nonetheless remains. 
“It no longer encounters us in identifiable form as hunger, misery, and injustice, but 
in the intangible form of boredom, of life at an ebb, and of feelings of absurdity.”136 
That is, without “the earnestness, the pain, the patience, and the labor caused by the 
negative,” people are deprived of the opposition that would otherwise provide them 
meaning.137 In other words, the human being “drowns in infinite possibilities be-
cause he nowhere finds necessity.”138 It is the role of Christian eschatology, then, to 
maintain a hope for a purposeful future beyond boredom. But if this is the case then 
 
132 Moltmann, Im Gespräch, 30, citing Ernst Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 1959), 2:1301. I have taken the quote of Bloch from the ET: Ernst Bloch, 
The Principle of Hope, 3 vols., trans. by Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 3:1107. Intriguingly, Moltmann replaces Teleologie with 
Theologie, though this may simply be a typographical error. Little difference in meaning is 
acquired with the substitution, as theology, too, seeks to overcome death through teleol-
ogy—only that Moltmann’s text would suggest a more decisively atheistic agenda on 
Bloch’s part, which, indeed, is a completely uncontroversial claim. 
133 Moltmann, Im Gespräch, 30. 
134 Ernst Bloch, Naturrecht und menschliche Würde (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1961); ET: 
Ernst Bloch, Natural Law and Human Dignity, trans. by Dennis J. Schmidt (Cambridge, MS: 
MIT Press, 1986). For the criticism I am referring to, see Moltmann, Im Gespräch, 46-48. 
135 Moltmann, “Das ‘Prinzip Hoffnung’ und die christliche Zuversicht: ein Gespräch mit 
Ernst Bloch,” Evangelische Theologie 23:10 (1963): 537-57; TH, Ger. 313-34 (1965). An ET of 
the latter is available in RRF, 148-76. In the following I will indicate the material that is 
original or exclusive to the 1963 text, as well as that which only appears in the 1965 revi-
sion. 
136 RRF, 161-62; Moltmann, “Das ‘Prinzip Hoffnung’,” 546. 
137 RRF, 162; only in the revised text, TH, Ger. 324. 
138 RRF, 162; Moltmann, “Das ‘Prinzip Hoffnung’,” 547. 
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the Christian also hopes for something beyond the humanly possible. They hope for 
victory over death as well. Such a vision, Moltmann reflects, goes beyond the mate-
rialist Marxist tradition that Bloch is a part of and is much more at home in Hegel’s 
idealism.139 This claim will be particularly relevant to the discussion in the following 
subsection, below, where I attend to Moltmann’s engagement with Hegel in TH. 
 The primary relevance of this text to this study, however, lies in Moltmann’s 
interest in not dissolving the “deadliness of death” in philosophical and theological 
discourse.140 He summarises Bloch’s response to the problem of death, observing 
that, for Bloch, death can touch the “husk” but not the “core” of existence.141 This is 
because death only attacks that which is. It cannot reach that which has not yet be-
come. “This driving, developing core of existence is therefore not subject to transi-
ence, since it itself constitutes the process of ‘dying and becoming.’”142 But, for Molt-
mann, such a claim is simply the old doctrine of the immortality of the soul, newly 
clothed in the language of hope. Bloch’s revision still entails that the soul “deny his-
tory and death by projecting itself into the realm of not yet and regarding the reality 
of life as a mere ‘husk’ which it abandons to death.”143 
Still, elsewhere Bloch takes a different approach to death.144 He affirms with 
Hegel that negative which resists dialectical sublation. Its negativity is so absurd, so 
abyssal that there is no positive within it that could allow the possibility of its own, 
consequent negation and thus sublation. This, Moltmann writes, is “in Hegel’s terms, 
the absurdity of the Peloponnesian War and the Thirty Years’ War, today that of the 
 
139 RRF, 164-65; Moltmann, “Das ‘Prinzip Hoffnung’,” 549. 
140 RRF, 165; Moltmann, “Das ‘Prinzip Hoffnung’,” 549. 
141 RRF, 166; Moltmann, “Das ‘Prinzip Hoffnung’,” 550. See Bloch, Prinzip, 2:1391; ET: Bloch, 
The Principle of Hope, 3:1182, where Schale (RRF: “husk”) is translated instead as “shell.” 
142 RRF, 166; Moltmann, “Das ‘Prinzip Hoffnung’,” 549. 
143 RRF, 168; Moltmann, “Das ‘Prinzip Hoffnung’,” 551. 
144 Moltmann cites Ernst Bloch, Zur Ontologie des Noch-Nicht-Seins: ein Vortrag und zwei Ab-
handlungen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1961), 41-63, in RRF, 168 n. 48; Moltmann, 





Fascist death camps and the atom-bombed cities.”145 And yet, affirming this only cre-
ates further difficulties for Bloch. The problem remains. “Hegel’s panlogism and 
general faith in providence (‘who knows what good it might serve’) does not remain 
standing in Majdanek.”146 In response, Moltmann offers the theological proposition, 
cut from the revised text: “But the crucified Christ and the fellowship of suffering 
with him [does remain standing].”147 In the revised text, nonetheless, the examples 
provided by Hegel and Bloch are compared with biblical events: “The sacrifice of 
Isaac and the desolation of Job, the end of Jesus on the cross and his being swallowed 
up in eternal death and hell, contain within them no dialectical positive.”148 For Molt-
mann, there seems to be some analogy between the nihilism of Majdanek and that of 
the crucifixion. Neither of these hells can be diminished by integrating them into a 
broader metaphysic. Interestingly, in the revised text, Moltmann also offers a reply 
along the lines of biblical hope. For Jews and Christians, “creatio and novum ex nihilo 
is suddenly and unexpectedly there.”149 That is, the event arrives from elsewhere. It 
does not have an organic connection to the absurd and irretrievably negative. Molt-
mann continues, “Majdanek and Hiroshima find no soothing dialectical answer, but 
the ‘earnest expectation of the creature’ (Rom 8:18ff.) becomes a cry to God in hope 
that the creator ex nihilo, who raised the forsaken Christ, will make such ends the start 
of his beginning.”150 It would be a mistake to understand these claims as contradic-
tory, however—at least within the context of Moltmann’s own thought. This same 
 
145 RRF, 168 n. 48; only in the revised text, TH, Ger. 328 n. 48. The original reads, “As for He-
gel, the ‘solely negative,’ the Peloponnesian War, the Thirty Years’ War, etc., cannot in any 
way fall under the productive powers of corruption, so for Bloch neither can the incinera-
tors of Majdanek.” Moltmann, “Das ‘Prinzip Hoffnung’,” 551 n. 44. 
146 Moltmann, “Das ‘Prinzip Hoffnung’,” 551 n. 44; this sentence does not appear in the re-
vised text. 
147 Moltmann, “Das ‘Prinzip Hoffnung’,” 551 n. 44. This sentence lacks a verb in German. 
148 RRF, 168 n. 48; TH, Ger. 328 n. 48. 
149 RRF, 168 n. 48; TH, Ger. 328 n. 48. 
150 RRF, 168 n. 48, slightly adjusted; TH, Ger. 328-29 n. 48. 
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approach is taken in CG, if only more comprehensively.151 Despite their absolute af-
front to all that is good and true, an alternative to these ruptures can still be hoped 
for in the future kingdom of God. 
 The theme of suffering continues through the text as Moltmann introduces a—
perhaps somewhat overstated—criticism of Bloch’s Christian sources: “The Chris-
tian heretics and fanatics whom Bloch likes to quote among the ancestors of his 
thinking—such as Marcion, Montanus, Joachim di Fiore and Thomas Münzer—were 
all encratites, despisers of the body and the earth…. [T]hey did not know the love 
which accepts the earth’s pain and the suffering of obedience in love because it finds 
hope for the earth and for the body.”152 Moltmann proceeds to cite Luther’s cross-
inspired words on the incarnation, contrasted with Münzer’s emphasis on the rela-
tionship of the incarnation to the deification of believers: “By the power of his hu-
manity or (as the apostle says) of his flesh, which is exercised in faith, he conforms 
us to himself and crucifies us, making us no longer proud and unhappy gods, but 
true men, that is, miserable sinners.”153 Luther will become an important source of 
Moltmann’s theology in CG.154 Here already, nonetheless, his theology of the cross 
informs the criticism of Bloch. And if Luther’s doctrine of justification is to be fol-
lowed, Moltmann observes, the individual is “drawn into the fellowship of suffering 
between the crucified one and the suffering of the whole sorry creation.”155 
 Long before the publication of CG, then, and even prior to the publication of 
TH, Moltmann’s dispute with Bloch over the deadliness of death leads him to the 
beginnings of a theology of the cross. Although in TH the emphasis will certainly be 
 
151 See 5.5.2. 
152 RRF, 171; Moltmann, “Das ‘Prinzip Hoffnung’,” 553. 
153 Martin Luther, Weimar Ausgabe V, 128, cited in RRF, 171 n. 52; Moltmann, “Das ‘Prinzip 
Hoffnung’,” 553-54 n. 47. Moltmann only cites the Latin in the two editions of his essay, 
and this work of Luther’s has not yet been translated into English. The Latin and M. Doug-
las Meeks’s English translation, the latter which I have quoted above, are both supplied in 
RRF. 
154 See 5.1.1. 
155 RRF, 172; only in the revised text, TH, Ger. 332. According to the original, the individual 
would be “drawn into the fellowship of suffering of the crucified one.” Moltmann, “Das 





on the future of Christ that is breaking into the present, neither does this mean that 
the theology of the cross found in CG is an innovation, let alone a “corrective.” In-
deed, as the above exposition shows, Moltmann is well aware that no meaning or 
purpose is to be ascribed to various irruptions of evil in the historical record. An 
alternative tomorrow can be hoped for, yes, but this hope cannot retrospectively jus-
tify or even explain such evils. It is only Christ, with his horrid end on the cross, and 
the community that suffers with him that are permitted not explanation but camara-
derie. 
4.2.4. Hegel, Negation, and the Negation of the Negative 
In addition to the theology of the cross that begins to emerge in dispute with Bloch, 
the voices of Hegel and Feuerbach, especially in TH, also provide theological source 
material and counterpoints in this regard for Moltmann. Indeed, Hegel’s name had 
already arisen in the discussion of the shortcomings of Bloch’s philosophy of hope. 
It is this same aspect of Hegel’s thought, the role of the negative in the dialectic, that 
Moltmann addresses in TH, though he also draws on some of Hegel’s other contri-
butions.156 
 
156 E.g., TH, 27, 48-50, 231, 307-11. On Moltmann’s relationship to Hegel, cf. Francis P. Fio-
renza, “Dialectical Theology and Hope, I,” Heythrop Journal 9:2 (1968): 143-63; M. Douglas 
Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1974), 35-38; A. J. Co-
nyers, God, Hope, and History: Jürgen Moltmann and the Christian Concept of History (Macon, 
GA: Mercer University Press, 1988), 114-20; Otto, God of Hope, 17-21; Brian John Spence, 
“Von Balthasar and Moltmann: Two Responses to Hegel on the Subject of the Incarnation 
and the ‘Death of God,” Ph.D. diss. (St. Michael’s College, University of Toronto, 1996); 
idem, “The Hegelian Element in von Balthasar’s and Moltmann’s Understanding of the 
Suffering of God,” Toronto Journal of Theology 14:1 (1998): 45-60; John Michael Bechtold, 
“Tragic Creation – Hope for the Future: Moltmann's Creative (Mis)reading of Hegel's Phi-
losophy,” Ph.D. diss. (University of Denver, CO, 2018). Allegedly, “there can be no ques-
tion that the most prevalent criticism of Moltmann is his affinity with Hegel.” Otto, God of 
Hope, 19. But while this is surely a prevalent criticism, it is important to note that Molt-
mann does not uncritically appropriate Hegel—as Otto acknowledges—and that criticisms 
are predominantly directed against Moltmann’s methodology and conclusions, rather than 
his intellectual influences. 
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 Moltmann’s engagement with Hegel in this regard depends largely on a short 
passage at the end of the latter’s Faith and Knowledge.157 Here, Hegel calls for “the 
pure concept or infinity as the abyss of nothingness in which all being is engulfed” 
to “signify the infinite grief [of the finite] purely as a moment of the supreme Idea, 
and no more than a moment.”158 This means that nothingness and negation are to be 
philosophically incorporated into the Idea, rather than being treated separately, re-
sulting in an unresolved dualism. To conclude, Hegel depicts the project that lies 
ahead using biblical imagery: “Thereby it must re-establish for philosophy the Idea 
of absolute freedom and along with it the absolute Passion, the speculative Good 
Friday in place of the historic Good Friday. Good Friday must be speculatively re-
established in the whole truth and harshness of its Godforsakenness…. [T]he highest 
totality can and must achieve its resurrection solely from this harsh consciousness of 
loss, encompassing everything, and ascending in all its earnestness and out of its 
deepest ground to the most serene freedom of its shape.”159 That is to say, for Hegel, 
philosophy faces the task of translating Christ’s death, up until this point restricted 
to the historical, into the metaphysical, so that the Idea would undergo complete 
negation. It is only from this negation that the Idea finds “resurrection” and therefore 
“absolute freedom.” Because of the relative impenetrability of these short statements 
of Hegel’s, it will be helpful to explore them in the context of his wider thought. 
It is in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion that Hegel presents his unique 
approach to the being of God in detail. It should be noted that although Moltmann 
himself does not cite the Lectures, they nonetheless provide a more complete picture 
of the concept of God that Hegel assumes elsewhere in his oeuvre. In the Lectures, 
Hegel begins with “the Idea of God In and For Itself,”160 loosely corresponding, in 
 
157 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Faith & Knowledge, trans. by Walter Cerf and H. S. Harris 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1977), 189-91. Moltmann cites the Ger-
man version in TH, 84, 169. 
158 Hegel, Faith & Knowledge, 190, brackets supplied by editors. 
159 Hegel, Faith & Knowledge, 191. 
160 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, vol. 3, The Consum-
mate Religion, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, trans. by R. F. Brown, et al. (Berkeley: University of 





traditional theology, to the church’s doctrine of the immanent Trinity. Here God is 
considered apart from creation, which is finite. Godself, conversely, is infinite and 
universal. Nonetheless, God’s infinitude already encompasses the movement to-
wards finitude and particularisation in the begetting of the Son, as this constitutes 
an eternal distinction within the Idea. Reflection of God’s being therefore cannot 
overlook this distinction. And yet, in the Son’s being begotten, the distinction be-
tween Father and Son is also “sublated” in the Spirit. That is, the distinction is over-
come in a higher unity that upholds the distinctness of both Father and Son, as well 
as their oneness in their being the same God. God, already in eternity, is the move-
ment from unity, to distinction, to distinction in unity. 
For God to be truly infinite, however, an infinite that is not only in opposition 
to the finite, as is allegedly the case in conventional pre-Hegelian metaphysics, but 
one that contains the reality of the finite within it, finitude must become actual. The 
differentiation of the Son from the Father “is only a movement, a play of love with 
itself, which does not arrive at the seriousness of other-being, of separation and rup-
ture.”161 Rather, this other-being, finitude, becomes actual in the creation of the 
world. This is the second aspect of Hegel’s concept of God: finitude and the world. 
For the infinite to be truly infinite, the finite must be actualised in the creation of the 
world and the infinite must participate in the finite to the extent that the infinite “ar-
rives at its most extreme [mode of] being-outside-itself.”162 Thus, not only does God 
create the world but God participates in the finite being of the world in becoming 
incarnate in the Son. It is through this latter phase of the movement, “the most ex-
treme estrangement and the pinnacle of divestment,”163 that the movement is com-
plete and God arrives at death. Importantly, this is not simply death in general but 
the death of a criminal—for Hegel, the most finite mode of being possible. In this, 
then, the being of God is negated. Although, as I am about to show, this is not the 
 
Christian Theology: A Reading of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005).  
161 Hegel, Lectures, 292. 
162 Hegel, Lectures, 91, brackets supplied by editor. 
163 Hegel, Lectures, 91. 
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end of God, its starkness for Hegel cannot be overlooked. The taking up of death 
upon Godself “is a monstrous, fearful picture, which brings before the imagination 
the deepest abyss of cleavage.”164 
The third aspect concerns the movement of the Holy Spirit, in which the first 
two movements are sublated into a higher unity. For Hegel this is the community, 
that is, something like the church, which is the concrete counterpart to the abstract 
sublation of the distinction between Father and Son in the Idea in and for Itself. What 
takes place concretely corresponds to that which has already taken place eternally, 
apart from the creation of the world: the Holy Spirit’s uniting of the Father and Son 
in their distinction. In regard to the concrete sublation, Hegel draws attention to 
Christ’s resurrection. This event is understood as a negation of negation, insofar as 
it negates the original negation that was God’s entering into finitude and death. 
“Christ has risen. Negation is thereby overcome, and the negation of negation is thus 
a moment of the divine nature.”165 
Although Hegel’s main focus in expounding the third movement in the Lec-
tures seems to be on how this sublation takes shape in the community, he also com-
ments on its meaning for God’s being. And this is where Moltmann has taken interest 
in his thought. Significantly, in sublation the first two movements are not negated 
absolutely. While “Spirit is the negativity of finite and infinite,” this negation does 
not leave either element completely behind. Rather, the two aspects are “conjoined… 
still as conflicting elements; if there were no longer any conflict, there would be no 
anguish. Spirit is the absolute power to endure this anguish, i.e., to unite the two and 
to be in this way, in this oneness.”166 Or, more simply, “Spirit is spirit only as the 
negation of the negative, which thus contains the negative within itself.”167 The neg-
ative is negated. God does not remain dead. And yet, in having died, the negative, 
 
164 Hegel, Lectures, 125. Cf. the quote above from Faith & Knowledge: “Good Friday must be 
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death, remains a part of God’s being because God is the infinite that is not simply 
opposed to the finite but, as concretely actualised in the third movement of the divine 
being, God is the sublation by the Spirit of infinite and finite into a higher unity and 
thus contains the depths of finitude within Itself. 
Having briefly outlined the role of the negative in connection to God in He-
gel’s thought, I return to TH in order to determine more precisely the relationship of 
this to Moltmann’s theology. The first significant discussion of Hegel in this regard 
can be seen in the connection Moltmann draws between modern atheism and the 
“nihilistic discovery” of Hegel and Nietzsche—that God is dead.168 Such a connection 
needs to be recognised if theology is to have anything useful to say. In response to 
this discovery, Moltmann proposes a “theology of the resurrection,” namely, “an es-
chatology of the resurrection in the sense of the future of the crucified Lord.”169 This 
theology, Moltmann continues, “must accept the ‘cross of the present’ (Hegel), its 
godlessness and godforsakenness, and there give theoretical and practical proof of 
the ‘Spirit of the resurrection.’”170 Hegel’s project is particularly relevant because it 
affirms the godforsakenness that modern society everywhere experiences, a godfor-
sakenness that might otherwise be overlooked by theology. Importantly, Moltmann 
points to the future of the crucified Christ as the appropriate course for theology, one 
admittedly not necessitated by Hegel but perhaps one that would have been forgot-
ten in some quarters without his reminders. Moltmann’s formulation, emerging 
from his engagement with Hegel, not only points believers to the source and goal of 
biblical hope, Christ, but situates this hope in relation to the negation that is Christ’s 
crucifixion. 
A few pages on, Moltmann conveys the biblical call to discipleship in Hege-
lian idiom: “If revelation encounters him,” that is, the recipient of revelation, “then 
 
168 TH, 84. 
169 TH, 84. 
170 TH, 84, slightly adjusted. The phrase attributed to Hegel can be found in Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. by H. B. 
Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 22. Moltmann also uses it else-
where, such as in TH, 334; and in the title of his essay, “The ‘Rose in the Cross of the Pre-
sent’: Towards an Understanding of the Church in Modern Society,” in HP, 130-154 (1961). 
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it does not identify him by disregarding what is negative, but opens him to pain, 
patience and the ‘dreadful power of the negative’, as Hegel has said. It makes him 
ready to take the pain of love and of self-emptying upon himself in the Spirit of him 
who raised Jesus from the dead and who quickens the dead.”171 This develops Molt-
mann’s previous plea for theology to hear atheism’s witness to the world’s godfor-
sakenness. Believers are called not out of but in the midst of suffering and the nega-
tion that is death. In calling, they accept this death, as Christ has done before them, 
and only then do they look to the future which hope directs them to. 
But it is in his discussion of the origin and history of the concept of the death 
of God that Moltmann provides his clearest statements on the relationship between 
his theology and Hegel’s philosophy. Quoting at length the passage from Faith & 
Knowledge, which I briefly expounded at the beginning of this subsection, Moltmann 
summarises, “If the modern a-theistic world thus comes to stand in the shadow of 
Good Friday, and Good Friday is conceived by it as the abyss of nothingness that 
engulfs all being, then there arises on the other hand the possibility of conceiving 
this foundering world in theological terms as an element in the process of the now 
all-embracing and universal revelation of God in the cross and resurrection of real-
ity.”172 But while Moltmann wants to affirm with Hegel the reality of the negative in 
the present, he is reluctant at this point to transpose this onto the divine being—at 
least in the same way as Hegel does: “The god-forsakenness of the cross cannot, as 
in Hegel, be made into an element belonging to the divine process and thus imma-
nent in God.”173 Moltmann’s reasoning here is telling. Hegel’s formulation is “only a 
modification of the dialectical epiphany of the eternal as subject,” thus “doing away 
with the historicity of the event of revelation.”174 For Moltmann, conversely, the cross 
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does not reveal the eternally negative within God. Rather, “the cross is the mark of 
an eschatological openness which is not yet closed by the resurrection of Christ and 
the Spirit of the Church, but remains open beyond both of these until the future of 
God and the annihilation of death.”175 Death will be no more. It will not remain eter-
nally in God to perpetuate the dialectic between the infinite, the finite, and their unity 
in distinction. Neither is this to say, though, that such a hope already negates the 
negative that is death. While death does not remain for eternity, it is still a feature of 
present experience. And although Moltmann’s main focus TH is not contemporary 
suffering, this does not mean that he wants to deny its reality. 
Moltmann’s engagement with Hegel in TH is particularly important for un-
derstanding his latent theology of the cross at this stage in his career. The theology 
of hope is hamstrung if it does not first recognise the universal Good Friday implicit 
in atheistic assumptions about the world and existence. This is because it promises a 
future for the crucified Christ, the Christ who has entered into and taken on godless-
ness. In taking up Christ’s cross, believers, too, enter into this godlessness. That is, 
they are not immediately translated into a blissful eternity forgetful of earthly nega-
tions, as might be the case in epiphany religion. Nor can there be any metaphysical 
of theological rationale for such a state of affairs. It simply is, Christ enters into it, 
and believers follow him. Nonetheless, Moltmann explicitly departs from Hegel in 
the latter’s situating of negation in the eternal being of God, in such a way that it 
would never be fully negated but remain an essential constituent of the divine pro-
cess. Moltmann will indeed situate negation within the trinitarian being of God in 
CG, but his emphasis will be on the eschatological victory over death, suffering, and 
evil, so that these do not remain eternally. That this move is not made already in TH 
likely has more to do with Moltmann’s focus on the phenomenon of promise rather 
than the being of God, as can already be seen in the then-underdeveloped aspects of 
his futurist doctrine of God.176 Even so, neither does Moltmann completely avoid 
such logic, as can be seen in his conflict with Feuerbach. 
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4.2.5. Feuerbach’s a priori 
In the same place that he discusses Hegel on the death of God, Moltmann addresses 
Feuerbach’s criticism of religion. According to Feuerbach, the Christian concept of 
God is merely a negative projection of human experience. The philosopher writes, 
“The divine being is nothing else than the human being, or, rather, the human nature 
purified, freed from the limits of the individual man, made objective…. All the at-
tributes of the divine nature are, therefore, attributes of the human nature.”177 And, 
“God is and has exactly what man is not and has not. Whatever is attributed to God 
is denied to man, and contrariwise whatever one gives to man one takes from 
God.”178 Thus, “God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man imper-
fect; God eternal, man temporal; God almighty, man weak; God holy, man sinful. 
God and man are extremes: God is the absolutely positive, the sum of all realities; 
man is absolutely negative, the sum of all negations.”179 For Feuerbach, Christianity’s 
concept of God is the negation of human negations, that is, of human sin, suffering, 
and finitude. Christianity must move forward in holding to that which with the one 
hand it implicitly affirms in regard to the human being in its concept of God, but 
which with the other it explicitly denies by predicating it of God rather than human 
beings. Notably, Bloch, too, takes up some of Feuerbach’s polemic, perhaps further 
encouraging Moltmann’s reply.180 
With Feuerbach, Moltmann affirms that Scripture expresses the hope of the 
resurrection in the sense of the negation of the negative, with texts such as Rev 21:4: 
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“He will wipe every tear from their eyes. Death will be no more; mourning and cry-
ing and pain will be no more.”181 Nonetheless, Christian hope cannot be reduced to 
this movement. Thus, against the christology that Feuerbach attributes to the church, 
Moltmann writes in TH that “his [Christ’s] attributes cannot be expressed by nega-
tion of the sphere of the earthly, human, mortal and transient, but only in recalling 
and recounting the history of his promise.”182 A couple years later, Moltmann artic-
ulates this relationship more clearly: “The question of God is not asked out of the 
universal questionability of all transitory things,” but rather out of “the concrete, 
contingent and special history of Israel and of Jesus Christ. This question, however, 
directs itself to the world and to the existence of every man.”183 And, “just as justifi-
cation cannot be based on sin, so eschatology cannot be derived from present misery. 
Christian eschatology must have a theological foundation.”184 The identity of God is 
much more than simply the negation of human negation, despite the negation of the 
negative being a necessary step for creation to enter into its future.185 Nonetheless, as 
long as the negation of the limitations of human experience forms the core basis for 
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Christianity’s concept of God, as Moltmann alleges is the case in much of the 
church’s traditional theology, then it is subject to Feuerbach’s critique.186 As he writes 
in TH, Moltmann rejects traditional theologies in which “the divinity of God is seen 
in his unchangeableness, immutability, impassibility and unity.”187 Feuerbach is at 
work in the background here. This God is the one “for whom all men are seeking on 
the ground of their experience of reality.”188 
For Moltmann, then, Feuerbach’s critique, while relevant, loses its force when 
the proper content of theological reflection, Christ, is restored to view. Christ is not 
the negation of human limitedness but the positive content that is the fulfilment of 
divine promise. Conversely, Feuerbach’s critique is itself limited by assumptions of 
what is theologically or philosophically coherent when predicated of God. While the 
dominant Christian tradition found its concept of God by negating the human and 
earthly, others situated these human negations within Godself. So in TH Moltmann 
cites Feuerbach responding to Hegel’s incorporation of negative elements into God, 
namely, matter and atheism. On this the philosopher writes, “The God who is re-
stored from his own negation [is] hardly a true God; he is rather a self-contradictory, 
atheistic God.”189 But, Moltmann responds, “Here it becomes clear that Feuerbach 
knows only the God of dogmatic philosophy and nature religion, for it is only this 
God who in his abstract identity can be reduced to man.”190 Feuerbach’s criticisms 
may indeed apply to the concept of God as traditionally conceived from patristic 
theology onwards, but, Moltmann argues, they do not apply to the Christ of Scrip-
ture, who “is and remains the crucified Christ.”191 
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Considering that it is Hegel whom Feuerbach is criticising here, Moltmann’s 
reply is particularly significant. While Moltmann cannot accept Hegel’s placement 
of an ahistorical, eternal death within Godself, neither can he accept Feuerbach’s a 
priori exclusion of the negative from God. Indeed, Moltmann provides a biblical ra-
tionale, insisting on the permanence of Christ’s crucified body. This is not an eternal 
death, which Moltmann reads in Hegel, but, certainly, neither is it the allocation of 
God and death to two different spheres, a line of argument that Moltmann will pur-
sue in detail in CG.192 But that is why, already in TH, Moltmann can say that “the 
experience of the cross of Jesus means for them [i.e., the disciples] the experience of 
the god-forsakenness of God's ambassador—that is, an absolute nihil embracing also 
God.”193 
 While the odd, almost inconsequential comment gesturing towards divine suf-
fering can be found in Moltmann’s earlier work, then, it is above all various treat-
ments of Bloch, Hegel, and Feuerbach that problematise Neal’s thesis of a measura-
ble disjuncture between the thought of TH and that of CG. These, too, admittedly, as 
far as they concern the problems of suffering and evil, are never at the centre of Molt-
mann’s work in this early period, but this does not mean that they are therefore in-
significant. Rather, I have attempted to demonstrate the important role they played 
in Moltmann’s intellectual formation. The issues he wrestles with peripherally here 
will become the central focus of his next major publication, a piece which was not 
simply a result of a sudden turn in his thinking in the late sixties. 
4.3. Summary 
None of the works penned in this period made quite the same impact as their prede-
cessor, TH, nor that of their successor, CG. And yet, the importance of reading them 
for gaining a better understanding of the development of Moltmann’s theology in 
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193 TH, 198. 
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general, and the role of Scripture in his thought in particular, cannot be denied. Two 
advances from this period are especially notable. 
A first development in this period pertains to Moltmann’s futurist doctrine 
of God. Shortly after the publication of TH, Moltmann discerned a need to formulate 
a more detailed theology of the relationship between the present and the future. The 
basis for this was found in a distinction between the futurum or Futur—that which 
will be, determined through extrapolating from the present—and the adventus or Zu-
kunft—that which is coming and can only be anticipated in the present. Expounding 
this distinction over the course of a number of essays, three of which I have discussed 
in this chapter, it soon becomes clear that Moltmann wants to attribute some kind of 
priority to the adventus. That is, the adventus represents the reality that will one day 
be made manifest with the coming of God’s kingdom. It is in this sense the real, on-
tological future, even if it does not arise organically out of created time because its 
realisation comes only with the work of God. Moreover, as such it can only be antic-
ipated in the present. Conversely, the futurum is a hypothetical future that arises 
from human calculation on the basis of present knowledge. It is not simply secular 
knowledge, however, a knowledge that inspires Christian action in the present, in-
sofar as this more concrete form of the future is controlled by the fragmentary, an-
ticipatory knowledge of the adventus. 
Moltmann’s somewhat sophisticated theological chronology also suggests a 
particular doctrine of God. It is not simply that God knows the future, as might be 
the case in various traditional accounts, but for Moltmann the priority of the adventus 
to the present and, indeed, the past, derives from this future being the site of the 
divine life. The negative proposition that God is not present equally in past, present, 
and future, a proposition forwarded against Barth, Bultmann, and others since be-
fore TH, is here finally coupled with the positive proposition that God’s being is 
properly located in the future. In regard to the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s the-
ology, this is an important point to note, insofar as the promise that Moltmann sees 
as central to Scripture now concerns not only human action and God’s faithfulness 





the future must be interpreted consistently, situated even in relationship to Godself. 
A similar logic, though applied much more overtly, is at work in Moltmann’s theol-
ogy of the cross in CG. Lastly, however, it should be noted that this early enthusiasm 
for all things future both reaches its peak and begins its descent in 1968. With Molt-
mann’s growing interest in the doctrine of the Trinity a more complex chronology 
starts to form.194 
 A second development in this period concerns Moltmann’s entrance into po-
litical theology. Here, the liberating message of Scripture extends to the political re-
alities oppressing people today. In a particularly helpful essay, expounded above, 
Moltmann draws on Dilthey, Bultmann, and Marx to develop a political hermeneu-
tic. The promises of Scripture must not be understood in such a way that they sup-
port the current political status quo, such as through providing people reason and 
purpose in their current suffering. Rather, their revolutionary message must be 
heard in that they point to an alternative future and thus provide a criticism of the 
world as it currently stands. Moltmann agrees with Bloch in this regard, though he 
departs from the atheist philosopher in seeing God, the God of the oppressed, as the 
essential factor in this equation. In other pieces from this time, Moltmann argues 
emphatically that the Bible belongs not to the powerful but the weak, not to the rich 
but the poor. It asks humility and repentance of the former and promises liberation 
to the latter. 
Besides these two major developments, Moltmann’s various comments on 
and discussions of hermeneutics and the nature of Scripture are also of note. He 
draws attention to the increasingly unwieldly and ambiguous character of language, 
imploring the preacher to speak the biblical language of promise, which looks to a 
reality where words will once again correspond to the realities they signify. Molt-
mann also displays a continued interest in negotiating the relationship between the 
OT and NT. On the one hand, Christian faith is in danger of losing its eschatological 
impulse where it neglects the OT. On the other hand, however, it is also in danger of 
 
194 See 6.2.1. 
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descending into legalism where it neglects the NT anticipation of that which is com-
ing. Perhaps most importantly in this regard, however, Moltmann centres the OT 
around the event of the exodus. God’s historical action in various events throughout 
Israel’s life—the exodus above all—is the subject of the OT, so much so that the 
events are primary to the words themselves and determine their meaning where 
conflicts among the witnesses might arise. A similar logic likely informed Molt-
mann’s slightly restricted canon of promise that I explored in the previous chapter.195 
Here, though, Moltmann goes further, stating that it is the revelation of Yahweh in 
the exodus event that retrospectively encompasses the work of El among the fathers 
and the creation of the world, as well as pressing forward to seek the future fulfil-
ment of the promise. 
Significantly, the Bible is the text of TH and it remains, regardless of the 
changing contexts in which it is read. Moltmann supports this claim with a further 
reflection on the economy of promise. The Bible does not declare what is so much as 
what will be. In this sense, it shares in common with the present an orientation to a 
universal future which encompasses all times. But although he demonstrates an in-
terest in this period in somewhat limiting the Bible’s role and resisting absolutisation 
through subordinating it to its subject matter and situating it within the broader con-
text of salvation history, Moltmann remains keenly interested in the relevance of the 
Bible today and throughout time. It is here that the divine promise is heard. It is the 
stories of Scripture that first anticipate an alternative future and stimulate hearts in 
the present to reject the fates assigned for them under contemporary political orders. 
Churches that have forgotten the Bible have forgotten the hope of God’s ever-new 
work among them and their world. 
 In this chapter I also addressed the relationship between TH and CG. The 
previous near-consensus that CG was a natural development of the claims of TH has 
recently been disputed by Ryan Neal, who argues that the later work should rather 
 





be understood as a corrective in regard to some of the excesses of TH. A few com-
ments from this earlier period, though, suggest that Moltmann was not uninterested 
in the prospect of divine suffering. Moreover, a closer look at some passages in his 
work where he engages with Bloch, Hegel, and Feuerbach demonstrates the open-
ness of his thought at this stage to his later proposals, central to CG. Thus, Moltmann 
can agree with Bloch on the absurdity and nihilism of recent evils, and even criticise 
Bloch for his inconsistency on this point. He can affirm with Hegel the universal 
godlessness of the modern world, albeit departing from him in making negation an 
eternal feature of the divine being. And he can dispute Feuerbach’s overly simplistic 
thesis on the origin of religion in human negation, suggesting that God can indeed 
embrace the negative—though this is not the last word. 
God’s relationship to the negative will of course receive sustained attention 








5. Against Apathetic Exegesis: The Crucified God 
Perhaps his best-known work, The Crucified God is rich with material pertaining to 
the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology.1 From 1970 onwards, Moltmann begins 
to devote sustained attention to the central importance of the cross for Christian the-
ology.2 This endeavour reaches a head in 1972’s CG, where a combined interest in 
what Moltmann understands to be Christianity’s two most essential features, the 
theology of the cross and the doctrine of the Trinity, results in a passionate account 
of the Son who dies for us and the Father who grieves for him. For the purposes of 
this dissertation, numerous features of his argumentation are of note. But the main 
theme of this chapter is Moltmann’s reapplication of his contrastive paradigm to his 
theology of the cross. As with the concept of divine futurity, Moltmann sets what he 
understands to be a biblical witness to divine suffering against theologies ancient 
and modern that cannot move in the same direction due to the restrictions of the 
categories they have inherited from Greek thought. It should be noted before pro-
ceeding, however, that patristic and medieval theology were not completely unin-
terested in the question. While, on the whole, they were extremely hesitant to situate 
suffering in the divine nature, they upheld the reality of God’s human suffering in 
 
1 On this work, see A. J. Conyers, God, Hope, and History: Jürgen Moltmann and the Christian 
Concept of History (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1988), 93-114; Richard Bauckham, 
Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the Making (Hants, UK: Marshall Morgan and Scott, 1987), 
53-90, 96-106; Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power: The Theology of Jürgen 
Moltmann, trans. by John Bowden (London: SCM, 2000), 62-79. 
2 “Gott im Kreuz Jesu,” in Moltmann, Umkehr zur Zukunft, 133-47 (Munich: Christian Kaiser, 
1970); “The Cross and Civil Religion,” in Religion and Political Society, ed. The Institute of 
Christian Thought, trans. by Thomas Hughson and Paul Rigby, 14-47 (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1974 [Ger. 1970]); EH, 69-84 (1972); Moltmann, “The ‘Crucified God’: God and the 
Trinity Today,” trans. by David Smith, in Johann-Baptist Metz and Jürgen Moltmann, Faith 
and the Future: Essays on Theology, Solidarity, and Modernity, 89-99 (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 
1995 [Ger. article 1972]); FC, 59-79 (1973). 
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Christ.3 But, as will become clear in this chapter, for Moltmann such a stance does 
not take seriously the claims of Scripture.4 
 In the first section of this chapter, I attend to key influences on CG, namely 
those of Martin Luther, Karl Barth, and Abraham Heschel, each of whom in their 
own way contrast Greek accounts of the divine with the biblical witness. I then turn, 
second, to Moltmann’s first major proposal, reflected in the first two chapters of CG. 
This is the fundamental and essential significance of the cross to Christian faith, a 
central constituent of Moltmann’s methodology in this work. In my third section, I 
proceed to the next three chapters of CG, demonstrating that the cross is not treated 
in the abstract but for Moltmann takes up its rightful place in the context of christol-
ogy. At this point in the discussion Moltmann also reveals important assumptions 
about the role of Scripture in theology. I discuss these in the latter part of this section. 
Fourth, I arrive at CG’s central, sixth chapter, in which Moltmann makes his main 
proposals. I first attend to the negative side of his argument, detailing his critical 
 
3 See, e.g., Amuluche Gregory Nnamani, The Paradox of a Suffering God: On the Classical, Mod-
ern-Western and Third World Struggles to Harmonise the Incompatible Attributes of the Trinitar-
ian God (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1995), 59-94; Thomas G. Weinandy, Does God Suf-
fer? (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000); Paul L. Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God: 
The Dialectics of Patristic Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Bruce D. Mar-
shall, “The Dereliction of Christ and the Impassibility of God,” in Divine Impassibility and 
the Mystery of Human Suffering, ed. James F. Keating and Thomas Joseph White, 246-98 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009); Michael T. Renihan, James M. Renihan, and Samuel 
Renihan, “Historical Theology Survey of the Doctrine of Divine Impassibility,” in Confess-
ing the Impassible God: The Biblical, Classical, & Confessional Doctrine of Divine Impassibility, 
ed. Ronald S. Baines et al., 225-51 (Palmdale, CA: RBAP, 2015). 
4 Interestingly, since the publication of CG and other theologians who have followed Molt-
mann in this direction, various thinkers have taken up, defended, and reinterpreted patris-
tic, medieval, and Reformation notions of divine impassibility. In addition to some of the 
sources I provided in the previous note, see, e.g., most of the essays in Nigel M. de S. Cam-
eron, ed. The Power and Weakness of God: Impassibility and Orthodoxy (Edinburgh: Rutherford 
House, 1990); David Bentley Hart, “No Shadow of Turning: On Divine Impassibility,” Pro 
Ecclesia 11:2 (2002): 184-206; Daniel Castelo, The Apathetic God: Exploring the Contemporary 
Relevance of Divine Impassibility (Milton Keynes, UK: Wipf and Stock, 2009), 69-110; Kevin 
Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology: Divine Action, Passion, and Authorship (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010); Thomas McCall, The Trinity and the Cross, and Why It 
Matters (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2012), 13-47. Moltmann’s claims have also at-
tracted criticism from fellow passibilists such as Paul S. Fiddes in his The Creative Suffering 





handling of cognate tendencies in modern theology, alongside his dual rejection of 
theism and atheism. In a final section, I explore Moltmann’s positive contribution to 
the subject in his theology of trinitarian suffering. This section concludes with a com-
ment on his explicit treatments of Greek thinking in CG, which are somewhat less 
generalised than those which informed his work in Theology of Hope (1964). 
5.1. Trinitarian Suffering: Key Influences 
In his 1990 preface to CG, Moltmann names Abraham Heschel, Franz Rosenzweig, 
Gershom Scholem,5 Kazoh Kitamori,6 and Dietrich Bonhoeffer7 as key contributors 
 
5 It is possible that this is a mistake as Scholem is not cited at all outside this later preface in 
CG, though it is also possible that Scholem influenced Moltmann but was not cited by him. 
Moltmann engages with Scholem explicitly in TKG, 27-30 (1980). Here and in CG, 272-3, 
Moltmann also demonstrates his dependence on the work of Peter Kuhn. 
6 It is likely that Moltmann is being generous here. Kitamori’s work on this theme was not 
translated from Japanese into German until 1972, the same year that CG was published. 
Kazoh Kitamori, Theologie des Schmerzes Gottes, trans. by Tsuneaki Kato und Paul Schneiss 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoek and Ruprecht, 1972). Nonetheless, Moltmann possibly read the 
English, which was translated from Japanese in 1965. Kazoh Kitamori, Theology of the Pain 
of God, trans. by M. E. Bratcher (Richmond, VA: John Knox, 1965). Only twice, however, 
does Moltmann refer to the work explicitly in CG, on pp.47 and 153 n. 2. The two theologi-
ans met in 1973 and realised that their respective aims were quite different. Moltmann re-
flects that Kitamori “was prepared to let pain touch God only externally, whereas for me it 
goes through God’s very heart.” BP, 177-78 (2006). 
7 Moltmann had read Bonhoeffer’s Discipleship and Life Together in German during his time 
as a prisoner of war. BP, 32 (2006). He also published on Bonhoeffer at the beginning of his 
academic career. Moltmann, “The Lordship of Christ and Human Society,” in Jürgen Molt-
mann and Jürgen Weissbach, Two Studies in the Theology of Bonhoeffer, trans. by Reginald H. 
Fuller and Ilse Fuller, 19-94 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967 [Ger. article 1959]); 
Moltmann, “Die Wirklichkeit der Welt und Gottes konkretes Gebot nach Dietrich Bonhoef-
fer,” in Die mündige Welt, vol. 3, ed. Eberhard Bethge, 42-67 (Munich: Kaiser, 1960). Ap-
proaching the writing of TH, though, Moltmann found that “the eschatological considera-
tion of history had drawn me away from Bonhoeffer’s incarnational thinking.” BP, 78 
(2006). But Bonhoeffer had already made his mark, as the index in CG demonstrates. See 
CG, xi, 16, 28, 47, 55, 63, 146, 290 n. 170, 339 n. 5. This mark is not so clear in TH, however. 
For Moltmann’s later reflections on Bonhoeffer, see BP, 161, 212-4 (2006); “Theologie mit 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Die Gefängnisbriefe,” in Dietrich Bonhoeffers Theologie heute. Ein Weg 
zwischen Fundamentalismus und Säkularismus?, ed. John W. de Gruchy, Stephen Plant, and 
Christiane Tietz, 17-31 (Gütersloh: Gütersloher, 2009). Various secondary sources are also 
of note in this connection. See Gordon Clarke Chapman, “Hope and the Ethics of For-
mation: Moltmann as an Interpreter of Bonhoeffer,” Studies in Religion/Sciences religieuses 
12:4 (1983): 449-60; Randall E. Otto, The God of Hope: The Trinitarian Vision of Jürgen Molt-
mann (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991), 41-47; Ton Van Prooijen, Limping 
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to his theology in CG.8 Others such as Martin Luther, Bernhard Steffen, Adolf Schlat-
ter, Karl Barth, and Eberhard Jüngel are named in his autobiography.9 Moreover, in 
a short literature review at the beginning of chapter six in CG, Moltmann demon-
strates his appreciation for but also critical distance from other passibilist tendencies 
in modern theology. Besides those already mentioned, these include the representa-
tives of the death of God movement that grew to prominence in the sixties, as well 
as Karl Rahner, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Heribert Mühlen, Hans Küng, Paul Althaus, 
and Hans-Georg Geyer.10 Moreover, the theodical aspect of Moltmann’s thought, 
which is essential to understanding his theology of trinitarian suffering, is informed 
first by Moltmann’s personal struggle to think theologically after Auschwitz, second 
by literary sources such as Albert Camus’s The Rebel, Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s The 
Brothers Karamazov, and Elie Wiesel’s Night,11 and third by the Frankfurt School phi-
losophers, Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse.12 Finally, 
in his 1980 TKG, Moltmann demonstrates the pervasiveness of interest in divine suf-
fering throughout the twentieth century. Besides those already mentioned, he ex-
plores the thought of the Anglican J. K. Mozley, Clarence Edwin Rolt, and Geoffrey 
 
but Blessed: Jürgen Moltmann’s Search for a Liberating Anthropology (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
2004), 31-38; Christine Schliesser, “’Love of Life’ – The Impact and Influence of Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer’s Life and Thought on Jürgen Moltmann,” in Engaging Bonhoeffer: The Impact 
and Influence of Bonhoeffer's Life and Thought, ed. Matthew D. Kirkpatrick, 187-200 (Minne-
apolis, MN: Fortress, 2016); and Michael Mawson’s contribution to the forthcoming vol-
ume on Bonhoeffer’s theology, ed. Christiane Tietz and Jens Zimmermann (Peter Lang). 
8 CG, x-xi. 
9 BP, 189, 191-2 (2006). 
10 CG, 200-4; for the literature, see pp. 278-80 nn. 1-18. 
11 CG, 219-27, 273-4; cf. Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology, 76-84; idem, The Theology of 
Jürgen Moltmann (London: T&T Clark, 1995), 71-98; Moltmann, God for a Secular Society: The 
Public Relevance of Theology, trans. by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1999), 
178-80 (1995). Moltmann also engages with some other themes in Dostoyevsky’s writing in 
EH, 85-100 (1973). 
12 CG, 223-5, 283-4 n. 66. Bauckham writes, “Just as Moltmann’s theology of hope had aimed 
to be a Christian parallel to Bloch’s Marxist theory-praxis, so Moltmann’s theology of the 
cross aims to be a Christian parallel to the critical theory of the Frankfurt school.” Bauck-
ham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology, 66-67, emphasis original. Müller-Fahrenholz notes, 
“Other conversation-partners appear in The Crucified God. These are above all Adorno's 
Negative Dialectics, Horkheimer's Critical Theory and Abraham Heschel's understanding of 





A. Studdert Kennedy; the Spanish Catholic Miguel de Unamuno; and the Russian 
Orthodox Nikolai Berdyaev.13 Although the authors discussed there do not directly 
influence Moltmann’s theology in the earlier CG, the possibility of indirect influence 
through shared, perhaps modern concerns, can also be considered. But obviously it 
would go beyond the scope of this dissertation to address every figure Moltmann 
mentions throughout his career in this connection. Because of their importance in 
informing Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm—a preference for what he understands 
to be a biblically derived theology of suffering against the tradition’s affirmation of 
divine suffering—I will focus only on Luther, Barth, and Heschel. 
5.1.1. Martin Luther 
During his early theological education, Moltmann developed an interest in Luther’s 
theology of the cross,14 thanks to the lectures of Hans Joachim Iwand.15 As Moltmann 
writes in his autobiography, “Luther’s theology of the cross, as it was embodied in 
Iwand, touched us profoundly, war-wounded as we were in soul and body.”16 In 
TH, Moltmann cites Luther’s comments on expectation as a theological category in 
Paul, which the Reformer juxtaposes with the philosophical categories at hand, being 
as they are oriented only to the present.17 Luther’s theology of the cross also plays a 
minor role in Moltmann’s criticism of Bloch.18 But it is in CG that Luther begins to 
 
13 TKG, 25-47. 
14 Surprisingly, not much literature in English has devoted in-depth attention to Luther’s in-
fluence on Moltmann. Some may find Burnell Eckardt’s essay on Moltmann and Luther to 
be helpful in showing where the two depart on the theology of the cross, though Eckardt’s 
analysis is unfortunately hindered by the reactionary nature of his argument. Burnell F. 
Eckardt, Jr., “Luther and Moltmann: The Theology of the Cross,” Concordia Theological 
Quarterly 49:1 (1985): 19-28. Anna Madsen treats both Luther’s and Moltmann’s theology 
of the cross in the same work, albeit separately. The Theology of the Cross in Historical Per-
spective (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2007). For other accounts, see Bauckham, Moltmann: Messi-
anic Theology, 65-67; Castelo, The Apathetic God, 78-92. 
15 Cf. M. Douglas Meeks’s comments on Iwand: “Iwand’s theology must be considered the 
most crucial generating force of the theology of hope,” referring not just to TH but to Molt-
mann’s early theology, ending with and inclusive of CG. M. Douglas Meeks, Origins of the 
Theology of Hope (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1974), 34, cf. 30-41, 59-64. 
16 BP, 41 (2006) 
17 Cf. 2.2.2. 
18 See 4.2.3. 
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play a more central role in Moltmann’s theology. Especially relevant in this regard 
is the Heidelberg Disputation. Here Luther claims, “That person does not deserve to 
be called a theologian who looks upon the invisible things of God as though they 
were clearly perceptible in those things which have actually happened. He deserves 
to be called a theologian, however, who comprehends the visible and manifest things 
of God seen through suffering and the cross.”19 Luther is at this point indifferent to 
the theological recognition of divine attributes, a recognition which does not of itself 
bring wisdom or make a person righteous. Indeed, this knowledge is misused for 
evil as theologians become arrogant and exercise an insatiable desire for knowledge 
and power. Such a path is the path of the theology of the glory, which situates God 
in human notions of what is good and elevated. In contrast, Luther is only interested 
in the theology of the cross, as it is here that “God wished again to be recognized in 
suffering, and to condemn wisdom concerning invisible things by means of wisdom 
concerning visible things.”20 
All of this is not to say that Moltmann understands Luther to be advocating 
something like the theology of trinitarian suffering that he presents in CG.21 Yet it is 
to demonstrate something of the centrality of the role that Luther plays in influenc-
ing Moltmann’s theology of the cross in CG, without which Moltmann’s theology of 
trinitarian suffering cannot be fully understood. Moltmann also finds in Luther an 
ally in overturning the Christian tradition’s Greek presuppositions. Following his 
exposition of Luther’s theology of the cross, he writes, perhaps alluding to Pascal, 
“The time has finally come for differentiating the Father of Jesus Christ from the God 
 
19 Martin Luther, Luther’s Works, vol. 31, Career of the Reformer I, ed. Harold J. Grimm (Phila-
delphia, PA: Fortress, 1957), 41, theses 19-20, numbering removed. Moltmann cites another 
edition in CG, 208. See CG, 281 n. 25. 
20 Luther, Luther’s Works 31:52. 
21 But see CG, 232-35. Later, Dennis Ngien argued at length that Luther was not uninter-
ested in such questions. The Suffering of God According to Martin Luther’s ‘Theologia Crucis’ 





of the pagans and the philosophers.”22 In his own contribution, Moltmann will de-
part even further from what he sees as the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic influences 
on the Christian tradition, just as understands Luther to have done in his own time.23 
Luther’s theology of the cross will inform Moltmann’s crucicentric methodology,24 
and the Reformer’s polemic against theologies of glory will find important expres-
sion in Moltmann’s treatment of Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas, addressed 
below.25 
5.1.2. Karl Barth 
Barth has been a major figure in Moltmann’s theology from the very beginning.26 He 
writes of his theological training, “I thought there could be no more theology after 
Barth, because he had said everything and said it so well—just as in the nineteenth 
century it was said that there could be no more philosophy after Hegel.”27 But this 
impression soon began to fade in 1956 as Moltmann read the work of A. A. van Ruler 
and “was freed from this error.”28 So commenced Moltmann’s long battle to establish 
 
22 CG, 215. Pascal famously proclaims, “God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob. / not 
of philosophers and scholars.” Blaise Pascal, Pensées and Other Writings, ed. Anthony Levi, 
trans. by Honor Levi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 178. 
23 In the context of Luther, see CG, 71 (Aristotle), 209 (Stoicism), 215 (Plato). Cf. Moltmann’s 
1995 comment: “The logic of his Christocentrism is the reason why Luther was able to free 
the concept of God from the categories of Greek philosophy.” Moltmann, “Foreword,” in 
Ngien, Suffering of God, xi-xii, at xi. 
24 5.2.2. 
25 5.4.2. 
26 Again, as with Luther, Moltmann’s relationship to Barth is yet to be explored in detail. 
But see Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope, 16-19, 43-44, 59-64, 97-99; Jayne H. Davis, 
“Opening Dialogue: Jürgen Moltmann’s Interaction with the Thought of Karl Barth,” Re-
view and Expositor 100:4 (2003): 695-711. Moltmann’s relationship to Barth in his early theol-
ogy is considered by van Prooijen at various places throughout his second chapter. See 
van Prooijen, Limping but Blessed, 9-117. Moltmann himself later reveals, “Karl Barth, of 
course, has had a large influence upon me, but primarily by means of the critical distance 
from him that I have had to establish, and not by imitation.” Michael Bauman and Jürgen 
Moltmann, “Jürgen Moltmann,” in Michael Bauman, Roundtable: Conversations with Euro-
pean Theologians, 31-41 (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1990), 34. 
27 BP, 47 (2006); cf. HTG, 125-26 (1987). 
28 BP, 47 (2006). In an earlier text, Moltmann locates this turn in the year 1957. Moltmann, 
“Politics and the Practice of Hope,” Christian Century 87:10 (1970): 288-91, at 289. 
172 
 
himself as a counter-voice to Barth, as can be seen in many of his early essays, in-
cluding TH and later work.29 Yet neither is Moltmann wholly critical of Barth. In his 
autobiography he acknowledges, “I had not departed so far from Barth” in TH, even 
if he had then presented his own position as a new beginning.30 And in 1988 Molt-
mann could describe himself as “a nonconformist in that theological school to which 
I owe the most: the Barth school.”31 
 With regard to the writing of CG, Moltmann recalls, “Karl Barth’s doctrine of 
predestination in his Church Dogmatics II/2 is based on a theology of the cross, and it 
made a great impression on me.”32 Introducing Barth’s theology of the cross, Molt-
mann directs his readers to quite a large amount of material, citing CD II/2 and IV/1-
4!33 Throughout the rest of the paragraph, however, all but one of the references point 
to CD II/2.34 In particular, Moltmann is interested in Barth’s claim that “in God's eter-
nal purpose it is God Himself who is rejected in His Son.”35 God “could have re-
mained satisfied with Himself and with the impassible glory and blessedness of His 
own inner life. But He did not do so.”36 Rather, “from all eternity He willed to suffer 
for us.”37 Barth advances these statements in the context of his doctrine of election. 
He discovers the need to speak not only of God’s election of Christ to salvation but 
of his election to suffering and death in crucifixion as well. Of note here, too, is 
Barth’s nod to Harnack’s Hellenisation thesis in CD IV/2: “The presupposition of all 
earlier Christology has suffered from this pride—from the fathers to both Reformed 
 
29 See, e.g., most of the sections in my second chapter, 3.2.2., 3.3.2., 6.3.3., 6.4.1., 6.4.4., and 
7.4.4. 
30 BP, 106 (2006). 
31 Moltmann, “Foreword,” in Conyers, God, Hope, and History, vii-ix, at vii. 
32 BP, 192 (2006); cf. CG, 202-3. Moltmann has recently returned to this and treated it at 
length, opening with the statement: “Karl Barth’s doctrine of predestination is his theology 
of the cross.” Moltmann, “The Election of Grace: Barth on the Doctrine of Predestination,” 
in Reading the Gospels with Karl Barth, ed. Daniel L. Migliore, 1-15 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerd-
mans, 2017), 8, emphasis original. 
33 CG, 279 n. 11. 
34 CG, 202-3, 280 nn. 12, 14, 16. 
35 CD, II/2, 167, cited in CG, 203. 
36 CD, II/2, 166. 





and Lutheran orthodoxy. This presupposition was a Greek conception of God, ac-
cording to which God was far too exalted for His address to man, His incarnation, 
and therefore the reconciliation of the world and Himself, to mean anything at all for 
Himself, or in any way to affect His Godhead. In other words, He was the prisoner 
of His own Godhead.”38 
 Nonetheless, to what extent or in what way God would be affected by creation 
in Barth’s theology is still a matter of debate among Barth scholars.39 Whatever the 
stance that may be taken in these debates, however, it is Moltmann’s understanding 
of Barth that must be considered for the purposes of this investigation. For Molt-
mann in CG, “Barth has consistently drawn the harshness of the cross into his doc-
trine of God.”40 And whether or not Moltmann is correct in his assessment, it is this 
very reading of Barth that will direct his own undertaking in CG—even if he will 
leave a lot less room for difference in interpretation! Finally, Moltmann will also find 
space to criticise Barth in regard to his theology of the cross, but I will return to this 
below.41 
5.1.3. Abraham Heschel 
One of the most important influences on Moltmann in writing CG was Abraham 
Heschel, a Polish rabbi who completed his doctoral dissertation on the prophets of 
 
38 Barth, CD IV/2, 84-85. 
39 For a sampling of the debate, see Michael T. Dempsey, ed. Trinity and Election in Contem-
porary Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011). Perhaps the foremost figure in this 
dispute, Bruce McCormack has also recently written on divine suffering in Barth’s theol-
ogy. While McCormack succeeds in demonstrating that this theme was not unimportant 
for Barth, however, I am not yet convinced that it was a major concern of his. See Bruce L. 
McCormack, “Does God Suffer? Karl Barth’s Contribution to a Growing Theological Con-
troversy,” in Karl Barth als Lehrer der Versöhnung (1950-1968): Vertiefung – Öffnung – 
Hoffnung, ed. Michael Beintker, Georg Plasger, and Michael Trowitzsch, 55-77 (Zurich: 
Theologischer, 2016). Cf. here Paul Molnar’s comments in his Divine Freedom and the Doc-
trine of the Immanent Trinity, 2nd ed. (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2017), 412-14, esp. n. 
121. On Barth’s theology of the cross in general, see Rosalene Bradbury, Cross Theology: The 
Classical Theologia Crucis and Karl Barth’s Modern Theology of the Cross (Cambridge: James 
Clarke & Co., 2012), which also includes a helpful review of some of the secondary litera-
ture in this area on pp. 168-95. 
40 CG, 203. 
41 See 5.4.1. 
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the Hebrew Bible in 1932 Germany. He expanded and published his work as The 
Prophets in 1935, the style and passion of which, bleeding with Hebrew parallelism 
and poetry, suggests a person whose thought is thoroughly immersed in the Scrip-
tures. Notably, one scholar claims that The Prophets “bears primary responsibility for 
the importance that divine pathos has received in biblical and theological studies.”42 
Heschel moved to the US in 1940, developing a growing interest in Judaism’s role in 
the Civil Rights and anti-war movements. He passed away in 1972, the same year 
that CG was published.43 
Moltmann first read The Prophets in 1969 while preparing to write CG. In re-
gard to this he recalls, “[I] felt confirmed in my rejection of the metaphysical apathy 
axiom in the philosophical doctrine of God.”44 In CG, Moltmann introduces 
Heschel’s work with the claim that “it was Abraham Heschel who, in controversy 
with Hellenism and the Jewish philosophy of religion of Judah Halevi, Maimonides 
and Spinoza which was influenced by it, first described the prophets’ proclamation 
of God as pathetic theology.”45 Moltmann continues, “As Abraham Heschel shows, in 
a comparison with Greek philosophy, with Confucianism, Buddhism and Islam, the 
 
42 Matthew R. Schlimm, “Different Perspectives on Divine Pathos: An Examination of Her-
meneutics in Biblical Theology,” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 69:4 (2007): 673-94, at 673. 
Schlimm proceeds to explore Heschel’s influence upon Terence Fretheim and Walter 
Brueggemann. An overview of Heschel’s theology of pathos from Heschel himself can be 
found in Abraham J. Heschel, “The Divine Pathos: The Basic Category of Prophetic Theol-
ogy,” Judaism 2 (1953): 61-67. 
43 For biographical details, see the introduction by his daughter, Susannah Heschel, in Abra-
ham J. Heschel, The Prophets (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), xiii-xx. Lengthier treat-
ments can be found in Edward K. Kaplan and Samuel H. Dresner, Abraham Joshua Heschel: 
Prophetic Witness (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); and Edward K. Kaplan, 
Spiritual Radical: Abraham Joshua Heschel in America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2007). 
44 BP, 270 (2006); cf. CG, x-xi (1990). Moltmann’s relationship to Heschel has received some 
attention. See John Jaeger, “Abraham Heschel and the Theology of Jürgen Moltmann,” Per-
spectives in Religious Studies 24:2 (1997): 167-79; Joseph Harp Britton, Abraham Heschel and 
the Phenomenon of Piety (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2013), 53-54. For other references 
to Heschel in Moltmann’s theology, see EH, 75-78 (1972); FC, 69-71 (1973); and TKG, 25-30 
(1980). Moltmann also draws on Heschel’s reflections on the Sabbath in GC, 276-96 (1985). 





Israelite understanding of the pathos of God is unique.”46 Moltmann is clearly enam-
oured by the antitheses that Heschel erects between the witness of the biblical tradi-
tion and the claims of other religions and philosophies. 
Such antitheses do indeed constitute a major concern of Heschel’s. Through-
out The Prophets, he is determined to emphasise the uniqueness of the God of Israel, 
especially in contrast to traditional Judaism, but also Christianity, that is, in contrast 
to “the God of the philosophers.”47 At the beginning of his book, for example, 
Heschel writes, “A student of philosophy who turns from the discourses of the great 
metaphysicians to the orations of the prophets may feel as if he were going from the 
realm of the sublime to an area of trivialities. Instead of dealing with the timeless 
issues of being and becoming, of matter and form, of definitions and demonstrations, 
he is thrown into orations about widows and orphans, about the corruptions of 
judges and affairs of the market place. Instead of showing us a way through the ele-
gant mansions of the mind, the prophets take us to the slums.”48 It is not, then, that 
Israel’s prophets merely address the philosophical questions and arrive at different 
answers. Rather, their questions and concerns differ from the very start. 
 There is much more to be said about Heschel’s theology, taking into account 
his prolific career.49 But in CG Moltmann only explicitly draws on The Prophets. As 
shown above, he demonstrates a keen interest in Heschel’s attempt to free the inter-
pretation of Scripture from Hellenistic influences, represented by Judah Halevi, Mai-
monides, and Spinoza, following foundational figures such as Philo. But neither is 
Moltmann uncritical of Heschel’s contribution: “Abraham Heschel has developed 
 
46 CG, 271, emphasis original; see Heschel, The Prophets, 299-317. 
47 Heschel, The Prophets, 289. This is the theme of Dennis Ngien, “’The Most Moved Mover’: 
Abraham Heschel’s Theology of Divine Pathos in Response to the ‘Unmoved Mover’ of 
Traditional Theism,” Evangelical Review of Theology 25:2 (2001): 137-53. 
48 Heschel, The Prophets, 3. 
49 Concerning Heschel’s other works, in relation to what I have explored here, see, e.g., Al-
exander Even-Chen, “God’s Omnipotence and Presence in Abraham Joshua Heschel’s Phi-
losophy,” Shofar 26:1 (2007): 41-71; Robert Eisen, “A. J. Heschel's Rabbinic Theology as a 
Response to the Holocaust,” Modern Judaism 23:3 (2003): 211-225. An excellent overview of 
differing interpretations of Heschel’s lengthy and complex corpus can be found in Michael 
Marmur, “In Search of Heschel,” Shofar 26:1 (2007): 9-40. 
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his theology of the divine pathos as a dipolar theology. God is free in himself and at the 
same time interested in his covenant relationship and affected by human history…. 
There is probably a hint here of the idea of a dual personality in God.”50 Moltmann 
does not say much more here, other than that such dipolarity finds its origin in rab-
binic theology, citing Peter Kuhn.51 The key is to be found in an essay from the fol-
lowing year. Here Moltmann writes, “Whereas for Israel the direct presence of God 
is conferred in the covenant, the crucified Jesus, according to the New Testament, 
stands alone, mediating the fatherhood of God and the power of the spirit of sonship 
to sinners and the godless…. Christian theology cannot therefore be dipolar theol-
ogy; it has to become trinitarian.”52 For Moltmann, Christian theology may learn 
from Heschel, particularly in his advocating for the uniqueness of the God of the 
 
50 CG, 272, emphasis original. 
51 Heschel wrote two volumes in Hebrew on rabbinic theology (1962, 1965), though it is un-
likely Moltmann read these as I am not aware of any translation of any volume into Ger-
man. The third volume was published posthumously in 1995. An English translation ap-
peared in 2004 as Heavenly Torah: As Refracted through the Generations, ed. and trans. by 
Gordon Tucker (New York: Continuum, 2004). On dipolarity, cf. Moltmann’s similar char-
acterisation of process theology in CG, 256. 
52 FC, 71 (1973); cf. EH, 78 (1972). This feature of Heschel’s thought is perhaps also what 
Moltmann has in mind when addressing the doctrine of the Shekinah in his autobiog-
raphy. If that is the case, this later comment is much more sympathetic, even appreciative. 
See BP, 290 (2006); but cf. also Moltmann, Sun of Righteousness, Arise! God’s Future for Hu-





prophets, but it cannot simply take him as its point of departure.53 He holds funda-
mentally different presuppositions about the nature of God.54 Indeed, if Christian 
theology is to affirm divine suffering, as Moltmann thinks that it must, then it can 
only do so in an uncompromisingly trinitarian manner.55 
 In this section I have drawn attention to three major influences on Moltmann’s 
work in CG. Luther, Barth, and Heschel, each in their own way, suggest to Moltmann 
the ongoing need to distinguish the God of Israel and of Christ from the God of Greek 
philosophy, here in the context of God’s relationship to suffering. With these and 
other voices in the background, Moltmann proceeds to the founding and centralising 
role of the cross in Christian theology. 
5.2. Crux Probat Omnia: The Critical Theology of the Cross 
Whereas in TH Moltmann had emphasised the revolutionary power of the divine 
promise through which God calls the present into the future, in CG the emphasis is 
on the crucifixion as the historical event before which the truth of all presents and 
futures is measured. This results in a world in flux. Appeal to the crucified Christ, 
necessary to establish the validity of any ecclesiastical or theological claim, is appeal 
 
53 In light of this, Hans Urs von Balthasar’s evaluation of Moltmann’s reliance on Heschel 
makes little sense. “Moltmann has tried to fit Heschel into his system (that is, the identity 
of immanent and economic Trinity), but Heschel explicitly rejects any attempt to interpret 
the prophetic utterances in terms of Western metaphysics…. God’s pathos has nothing 
whatever to do with any mythological suffering, dying and rising God (Tammuz, Osiris, 
and so forth). Rather, it is his ‘moral abhorrence’ of the failure of his people (or of individ-
uals) to respond to his covenant.” Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dra-
matic Theory, vol. 4, The Action, trans. by Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1994), 
344 n. 20. Against this, Moltmann explicitly highlights points of difference between his 
own and Heschel’s project, acknowledging correlations without being bound to the meth-
odological presuppositions of the latter, because Moltmann’s own methodology allows 
him to arrive at similar conclusions. A more sophisticated criticism along these lines is ad-
vanced by Weinandy in Does God Suffer?, 64-68. 
54 Some years later, in his dialogue with Pinchas Lapide, Moltmann will take a much less ex-
clusivist approach to the doctrine of God as it is variously conceived in Judaism. See JM 
(1980). 
55 If my interpretation is correct, then Moltmann rejects this aspect of Heschel’s theology for 
the same reason that he criticises Rahner, Barth, and Luther. Their insufficiently “trinitar-
ian” conceptions of the divine nature, result in paradoxical statements when it comes to 
divine suffering. See 5.4.1. and 5.4.4., below. 
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“to the one who judges them most severely and liberates them most radically from 
lies and vanity, from the struggle for power and from fear.”56 Christ’s cross “is the 
criterion of their truth, and therefore the criticism of their untruth.”57 Moltmann es-
tablishes the fundamental role of the cross in theological methodology in the first 
two chapters of CG. I explore them in this section. 
5.2.1. The Relevance and Identity of the Church 
Moltmann devotes the opening chapter of CG to a practical issue in the churches of 
the late sixties and early seventies. Importantly, this discussion is not inessential to 
the main theses of CG but rather grounds them in reality and demonstrates the need 
for such proposals in the first place.58 Moltmann characterises the practical issue as 
the “double crisis” of the “identity-involvement dilemma”: “The more theology and 
the church attempt to become relevant to the problems of the present day, the more 
deeply they are drawn into the crisis of their own Christian identity. The more they 
attempt to assert their identity in traditional dogmas, rights and moral notions, the 
more irrelevant and unbelievable they become.”59 
Regarding the first side of this dilemma, Moltmann points to the post-war 
generation in Germany. Many Christians found the confines of traditional ecclesias-
tical and theological boundaries too restrictive for the work of the gospel and thus 
felt the need to seek new avenues for the social change they believed they were called 
to, in numerous cases finding themselves not just no longer within the churches but 
 
56 CG, 2. 
57 CG, 2. 
58 As Bauckham writes, “One could have thought of more direct ways into the central issues 
of the book, for example by raising at once the problem of suffering posed by the horrors 
of modern history. But Moltmann’s way-in not only reflects one of the ways by which he 
himself had been led through the issues raised by his own political theology in the 1960s 
into a theology of the cross; it also allows him to move from the actual issues posed by 
contemporary Christian praxis into the central theological discussion of the book and then 
back into issues of praxis in the final chapter.” Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology, 
61. 





in opposition to them too, insofar as the churches obstructed social reform. In mak-
ing such moves, however, these groups ultimately lost that through which they were 
called to this work in the first place, Christ. That is, they identified Christianity with 
a particular politics, but, in doing so, the cross that distinguishes Christian faith from 
all other forms of belief and thought was lost and with that so was their ability “to 
criticize and stand back from the partial historical realities and movements which 
they [had] idolized and made absolute.”60 
While at this stage Moltmann directs his concerns to those who seek Christ 
in a progressive politics, he is careful to state that churches on the opposite end of 
the political spectrum are likewise susceptible to losing Christ because they “associ-
ate themselves with the forces of social and political conservatism.”61 Thus, despite 
their criticism of those who prioritise relevance over Christian identity, these 
churches have also “chosen a particular form of relevance.”62 The new movement 
forgets Christ and his cross in its attempt to express solidarity with those suffering 
outside of the church. But, long before them, the old church had already done so in 
their “traditional solidarity… with authority, law and order in society.”63 This con-
servatism has been confused by its adherents with Christian identity, often leading 
to false alternatives, such as having to choose between political protest and personal 
faith, or between evangelism to individuals and working for social change. But God 
reigns over both the personal and the political. 
All churches are called to conform to the image of the crucified Christ. But, 
citing Luke 17:33, “Those who try to make their life secure will lose it, but those who 
lose their life will keep it,” Moltmann argues that this conformity consists not in 
holding obstinately to a narrow orthodoxy but in laying down one’s identity. This 
results in a new identity which likely looks very different from that which certain 
churches expect, because “trust in the hidden and guaranteed identity with Christ in 
God (Col 3:3) makes possible the self-abandonment, the road into non-identity and 
 
60 CG, 17. 
61 CG, 13. 
62 CG, 13. 
63 CG, 17. 
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unidentifiability.”64 That is, Christian identity, like Christian theology, takes a pro-
cessual rather than static form. Ever again it seeks to follow Christ to the cross in the 
present. In contrast, “a church which cannot change in order to exist for the human-
ity of man in changed circumstances becomes ossified and dies.”65 So long as the 
church keeps its eyes fixed on Christ and his cross, then, it will become relevant 
through conformity to him, rather than through its own efforts, and nor will it stub-
bornly ground itself in an ostensibly Christian identity and thus forsake true iden-
tity, closing its ears to Christ’s call to take up the cross and follow him. In either case, 
it is the cross that stands beyond these dichotomous endeavours and remains in op-
position to them in such a way that the church is called ever anew to conform to the 
image of the crucified Christ. 
5.2.2. The Resistance of the Cross 
Having demonstrated the role of the cross in calling churches to true identity and 
mission in the crucified Christ, in his next chapter Moltmann addresses some of the 
various ways in which the cross has been interpreted throughout history and in the 
present. As he terms it, this is “the resistance [Widerstand] of the cross against its 
interpretations.”66 Here, again, as the personified language of “resistance” demon-
strates, the cross stands beyond all human endeavours, religious or otherwise. Its 
own truth can never be exhausted in any single interpretation, and, as such, it ac-
tively resists these. 
First, Moltmann explores humanistic objections to the association of the cross 
with God or religion. And these are sorely wanting. To the members of Roman high 
society, the cross was “unaesthetic, unrespectable and perverse.”67 This view was 
repeated in various ways throughout history, and Moltmann points to Goethe, Nie-
tzsche, and Marx as examples of figures who recognised the scandal of the cross and 
 
64 CG, 16. 
65 CG, 12. 
66 CG, 32; Ger. 34. 





subsequently criticised Christianity for losing sight of it, unintentionally spurring 
the church on to take the cross seriously once again. 
Second, Moltmann examines “the unbloody repetition of the event that took 
place on Golgotha on the altar of the church,”68 an allusion to the Council of Trent.69 
This repetition was one of the ways in which subsequent Christianity veneered the 
brute, wooden cross. Moltmann attributes it to the church’s being obliged to meet 
“public need for cult and sacrifice,” having superseded and taken over the place that 
the ancient pagan religions held in the Roman Empire.70 While there is some prece-
dent in the NT for understanding the mass as sacrifice, for Moltmann the problem 
here is that Christ’s death becomes the archetype of the sacrifice of mass. The singly 
important aspect of the cross is now the sacrificial character of Christ’s death. As 
such, “what was unique, particular and scandalous in the death of Christ is not re-
tained, but suppressed and destroyed.”71 Moreover, the mass is available only to the 
baptised, in contrast to the godless cross on which the Christ who ate with sinners 
and tax-collectors died, “outside the city gate” (Heb 13:13), “on the boundary of hu-
man society, where it does not matter whether a person is Jew or Gentile, Greek or 
barbarian, master or servant, man or woman.”72 Ironically, the church re-erects hu-
man distinctions which the cross has nullified. And it is the godless in particular who 
recognise this contradiction between the mass and the cross. 
Third, Moltmann addresses “the mysticism of the cross,” the discovery of 
fellowship with Christ in the life of unjust suffering. Notably, from this point on, he 
 
68 CG, 41. 
69 “In this divine sacrifice performed in the mass, the very same Christ is contained and of-
fered in bloodless manner who made a bloody sacrifice of himself once for all on the 
cross.” Council of Trent, Session 22, 17 September 1562, Teaching and Canons of the Most 
Holy Sacrifice of Mass, ch. 2, in Jaroslav Pelikan and Valerie Hotchkiss, ed., Creeds and 
Confessions of the Christian Tradition, vol. 2, Reformation Era (New Haven, CT: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 2003), 862. A few years later Moltmann writes, “Golgotha is not the equivalent 
of the Lord’s supper. The Lord’s supper, which can be repeated, signifies the history of 
Christ which has taken place once and for all and is therefore unrepeatable. Nor does Gol-
gotha become a mere prefiguration of a ‘sacrifice’ continued on the altar.” CPS, 255 (1975). 
70 CG, 42. 
71 CG, 43. 
72 CG, 194. A favourite verse of his, Moltmann alludes to Heb 13:13 throughout CG. See pp. 
40, 43, 44, 194, 249.  
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adopts a more sympathetic analysis, seeking to demonstrate how the following in-
terpretations, which he believes more faithfully witness to the cross, might be theo-
logically valuable, while yet leaving room for the cross to remain the standpoint from 
which their ongoing validity is assessed. Thus, concerning the mysticism of the cross, 
“it is demonstrably the devotion of the poor and sick, the oppressed and crushed.”73 
In the middle ages, as the church began to recognise the desire of the people to know 
the suffering Christ of the cross, “the imperial images of Christ, the judge of the 
world, were supplemented in churches by images of the crucified Christ of the poor, 
in which no realistic detail of pain and torture was omitted.”74 The suffering laity 
who knew this Christ found relief from their sufferings because he too had suffered 
as they did. In modern times, Moltmann discovers a similar emphasis in Negro spir-
ituals and in the popular theology of Latin America.75 Unfortunately, however, such 
a mysticism of the cross is all too easily abused by the representatives of the powers, 
routinely exhorting sufferers to accept their sufferings as their lot, to look forward to 
an otherworldly redemption, and not to dispute the necessity of their present state. 
Luther, for example, “need not have recommended the peasants to accept their suf-
fering as their cross. They already bore the burdens their masters imposed on 
them.”76 Rather, he should have addressed the princes and nobles and called them to 
live a life that was more in accordance with the cross. Finally, the mysticism of the 
cross also falls short if it does not acknowledge the distinctiveness of Jesus’ cross, 
which was not a passive, fateful suffering, but one Christ actively took upon himself. 
Fourth, Moltmann turns to the cruciform life of discipleship. Christ’s call is 
first of all a call to participate in God’s future, inaugurated in his person, but this also 
requires that the disciple actively follow Christ to the cross. Moltmann invokes Bon-
 
73 CG, 45. 
74 CG, 46. 
75 Citing James H. Cone, The Spirituals and the Blues: An Interpretation (New York: Seabury, 
1972); and Hildegard Lüning, Mit Maschinengewehr und Kreuz: oder, Wie kann das Christen-
tum überleben? (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1971). See CG, 47-48, 77 nn. 30-31. 





hoeffer here, who observed, “Even in his suffering Jesus could have been the cele-
brated Christ…. But Jesus is the Christ who was rejected in his suffering. Rejection 
removed all dignity and honor from his suffering.”77 Bonhoeffer rightly understood 
the unrespectable and despicable character of Christ’s suffering. Moreover, while 
this is true in general of the demands of Christian discipleship, the individual disci-
ple’s rejection does not entail the same abandonment by God that Jesus underwent 
on the cross. So, Moltmann writes, “Jesus suffered and died alone. But those who 
follow him suffer and die in fellowship with him.”78 Moltmann will go on to provide 
a more complete account of Jesus’ death later on in CG. 
Lastly, Moltmann attends to what he understands to be the basic significance 
of the cross for Christian faith: the theology of the cross. This, exemplified by Paul’s 
theology in 1 Cor 1, should be the point of departure for all interpretations of the 
cross. Both Jew and Greek, each in his own way, “cannot let God be God, but must 
make himself the unhappy and proud God of his own self, his fellow men, and his 
world.”79 As such, neither of these groups—representative of all humanity—can see 
God in the crucified Christ. Moltmann proceeds to Luther’s 1518 Heidelberg Dispu-
tation, which has its roots in Paul. Just as Luther decried justification by works, so 
he confronted the theologians who sought to replace the message of Christ crucified 
with images of their own gods. Moltmann is not concerned about historical questions 
regarding the accuracy of Luther’s portrayal of his opponents. Rather, Moltmann 
claims, “His theologia crucis is not an attack on medieval catholic theology as such, 
but what he recognized in it, man’s inhuman concern for self-deification through 
knowledge and works.”80 For all humanity, therefore, “the knowledge of the cross 
brings a conflict of interest between God who has become man and man who wishes 
to become God.”81 As Moltmann has been arguing up to this point, the cross resists 
 
77 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, vol. 4, Discipleship, ed. Geffrey B. Kelly and 
John D. Godsey, trans. by Barbara Green and Reinhard Krauss (Minneapolis, MN: For-
tress, 2001), 84-85. 
78 CG, 56. 
79 CG, 70. 
80 CG, 70. 
81 CG, 71. 
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all of its interpretations, standing beyond them and never being identified with 
them. “Because of its subject, the theology of the cross, right down to its method and 
practice, can only be polemical, dialectical, antithetical and critical theory.”82 It is 
through a theology of the cross that Moltmann attempts to bring his own theology 
closer to the cross and speak to that which strays from it. 
Despite something of a continuum from misappropriations and misunder-
standings of the cross to a theology that properly recognises the centrality of the cross 
to all Christian thinking and doing, though, the cross’s ongoing iconoclasm applies 
equally to every possible position on the continuum, however cruciform they may 
already purport or seek to be. In this case, Luther’s own theology of the cross is also 
limited. For example, Luther proposed considerable church reforms, but he largely 
failed to grasp the significance of the cross for wider feudal society, so that the secu-
lar powers remained quite comfortable alongside the emerging Lutheran church. Im-
portantly, this insight also requires that the distinction between the cross and its in-
terpretations applies to Moltmann’s own theology as well. A theology of the cross is 
always self-critical by virtue of its namesake. And although Moltmann does not 
make this claim explicitly at this point, it is required by the path he takes and is, 
indeed, consistent with the rest of his thought. As he writes in his introduction, for 
example, “This book is not meant to bring the discussion to a dogmatic conclusion, 
but to be, like a symbol, an invitation to thought and rethinking.”83 
Finally, although these opening chapters of CG seem to set out with quite 
different purposes when compared to the role of the contrastive paradigm in Molt-
mann’s methodology in TH, the two works nonetheless have much in common in 
this area. For both it is the God of Scripture—whether understood in terms of prom-
ise or crucifixion—who forms the theological centre and thus grounds criticism of 
church and society alike. It is only that in CG the focus is broadened to the distinction 
of the cross not only from Greek contributions in particular to Christian orthodoxy 
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and contemporary systems of thought, but from all of Christian theology—past, pre-
sent, and future—as well as from non-Christian forms of thought such as humanism. 
Moltmann does go on to address specifically Greek influences in the Christian tradi-
tion later on in CG. His current objective, though, is to situate this theology of the 
cross in its broader, christological context. This will be the focus of the following 
section. 
5.3. Solus Christus: Moltmann’s Christological Method 
Moltmann’s thoroughgoing focus on the cross in CG makes him vulnerable to the 
allegation that the cross has become a methodological principle for him, abstracted 
from theology’s proper object, God. But this is not the case. The cross is Christ’s cross 
and it is he who informs Moltmann’s reading of it in CG. Interestingly, Moltmann’s 
later claim when looking back on his career that “up to now these questions about 
method have not greatly interested me” finds an important exception in CG.84 Fol-
lowing his chapters on the identity and relevance dilemma and the cross against its 
interpretations, Moltmann proceeds to delve into the deeper christological basis on 
which his argument has rested up until this point. In his third chapter, he begins 
with the questions asked about Jesus that guide different theological approaches. He 
finds certain presuppositions underpinning these questions that disqualify them for 
the task, pointing to the need to begin with Jesus’ own question about himself. In his 
fourth and fifth chapters, Moltmann reflects on Jesus from both historical and escha-
tological viewpoints, respectively. The one begins with Jesus’ life and proceeds to 
his death. The other starts with the resurrection and turns back to survey Jesus’ life 
in this light. Of chief importance for Moltmann in his argument throughout these 
chapters, however, is the centrality of the person and history of Jesus to the theolog-
ical task. And this is bound with assumptions regarding the role of Scripture in the-
ology. I will detail some of these in the final two subsections of this section, expound-
ing Moltmann’s presentation of Jesus’ relationship to the OT and the NT. 
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5.3.1. The Possibility of Christology  
Moltmann had ended his previous chapter with the questions: “Is this theology of 
the cross in accordance with Jesus who was historically crucified? Does the word of 
the cross, as Paul calls the gospel, absorb the person of Jesus and the event of the 
crucifixion into language?”85 The theology of the cross finds its basis in the context 
of the whole “history” of Jesus. 
 Setting out from this christological centre, then, Moltmann proceeds in his 
third chapter to assess three different lines of approach typically taken in christol-
ogy.86 The first finds its origin in the theology of the early church and has been af-
firmed by Christian orthodoxy throughout the centuries. Here, an a priori concept of 
God constitutes the starting point for discerning the nature and person of Jesus. This 
approach sees Jesus as “the incarnation of eternal, original, unchangeable being in 
the sphere of temporal, decaying, transitory existence.”87 But for Moltmann, such an 
approach is subject to Feuerbach’s criticism that human limitations such as finitude 
and mortality are merely negated and projected onto God.88 Moreover, the divine 
attributes assumed by this approach control its christology from the outset. In the 
early church, for example, working with such presuppositions, it became increas-
ingly difficult “to demonstrate that the Son of God who was of one substance with 
God was Jesus of Nazareth, crucified under Pontius Pilate.”89 A possible solution to 
this problem might be found in German idealism, philosophers of which similarly 
set out from a priori assumptions about God to develop their christologies. Hegel is 
an especially notable example because, in contrast to the theology of the early 
church, he posited finitude and death as necessary to the divine being. Yet this has 
its own problems. Moltmann observes, “The idea of the incarnation of God and even 
the ‘fearful thought’ of the death of God can be thought necessary for the sake of 
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of the “proofs of God.” See 3.3.2. 
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God… but it is difficult to deduce and not particularly easy to reconstruct his incar-
nation in Jesus of Nazareth and his death in the death of Jesus on Golgotha.”90 The 
same problem remains—that of starting out from an a priori concept of God and then 
attempting to reconcile this to the historical person of Jesus. 
 A second approach, popularised by liberal Protestantism, is interested less in 
Jesus’ relationship to God than it is in his relationship to humanity. Historically, this 
basically resulted from a reversal of relationship of human beings to their world. 
With the industrial revolution and the development of modern science, “man is no 
longer dependent upon uncomprehended forces in nature and history, recognizing 
in this dependence his total reliance on the gods or on God. Instead, nature and his-
tory have become increasingly dependent upon man.”91 What guides the christolog-
ical questions of modernity is no longer concern for securing anthropic being in the 
infinite (Feuerbach), but for living out an authentic finite existence. In contrast to 
traditional christology, then, which presupposes a particular notion of God, this ap-
proach presupposes a particular anthropology that the history of Jesus is supposed 
to conform to. Moltmann finds this, too, problematic, however, because it does not 
provide any reason to view Jesus differently from other great historical figures, and, 
significantly, “it becomes intolerable to take into account his abandonment by God 
to death on the cross in all its severity.”92 
 A third approach is provided by the historical context of Jesus’ own life. This 
is particularly amenable to the task of christology because “the expectations and lan-
guage which formed the background to Jesus’ life… do not simply belong to the past, 
but in substance are still a living reality alongside Christianity in Judaism and athe-
istic messianism.”93 The latter movements both seek an answer to their suffering that 
cannot be found in the present but must be sought in the future, a future that Molt-
mann proclaims is promised and anticipated in Jesus. Notably, for Moltmann this 
avoids the issues that arise with an a priori concept of God or humanity: “The divine 
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world does not ascend to earth in him, nor does man, seeking his identity, find him-
self in him. A new future for God, man and the world in their history together is 
being inaugurated.”94 Only this third approach takes seriously the openness of both 
God and humanity to a common future. Moreover, Jesus’ historical particularity is 
thus not inessential to his person. He finds his place in the midst of Israel’s promis-
sory history and the future fulfilment of this in God’s future. 
 Nonetheless, Moltmann does not want to rest even on this point. A final chris-
tological approach considers the question that Jesus himself asks: “Who do you say 
I am?” Moltmann reflects, “If the question of Christ, whatever form it takes, is to do 
justice to Jesus himself, its relationship to him must not be one of questioning, but of 
being questioned.”95 Christology has its beginning in Jesus himself. But, as such, it 
cannot offer any final answers while Jesus’ history is still in process. Rather, it must 
be continually revised in light of his history until it finds its consummation in his 
coming. 
5.3.2. The Task of a Historical and Eschatological Christology 
While Moltmann does not explicitly employ the terms adventus and futurum in CG, 
employed throughout his earlier essays following TH,96 it would be difficult to deny 
that the distinction underpins his project. Indeed, it is unclear why he did not use 
this language, as it also remains a staple of his later theology.97 Nonetheless, the logic 
underpinning this distinction appears in modified form in CG with Moltmann’s dis-
tinction between eschatology and history. He thus introduces his fourth and fifth 
chapters, writing, “The following two chapters deal with the historical and eschato-
logical trial of Jesus. We shall attempt to achieve an understanding of the crucified 
Christ, first of all in the light of his life and ministry, which led to his crucifixion, and 
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then in the light of the eschatological faith which proclaims his resurrection from the 
dead, and in so doing proclaims him as the Christ.”98 History here refers to the events 
as they are seen temporally and chronologically, beginning with Jesus’ ministry and 
ending with his death.99 This is distinguished from eschatology, which works in the 
opposite direction, beginning with Jesus’ future and proceeding to the events of his 
earthly life. 
Despite the considerable difference between historical and eschatological ap-
proaches, the two form a basic unity insofar as theological methodology is con-
cerned. “Both perspectives [historical and eschatological] must be reciprocally re-
lated to one another, if his [Christ’s] truth is to be both perceived and understood. 
Here one cannot separate historical consideration from eschatological understand-
ing, nor put the two things together afterwards. The historical Jesus is not ‘half 
Christ’, nor is the risen Christ the other half of Jesus.”100 Rather, christology is “a 
question of one and the same person and his unique history.”101 As such, Moltmann 
cannot entertain a secular, atheistic view of history. For him, “his [Christ’s] history 
is a theological history.”102 Moltmann’s own faith in the risen Christ and his con-
sistent affirmation of the unity of the historical and eschatological person of Christ 
make it impossible for him to see Jesus’ history apart from Jesus’ relationship to God 
the Father. Additionally, for a yet more simple reason, a theological approach is nec-
essary even before the resurrection comes into consideration, as the earthly Jesus also 
viewed his life theologically: “His life, preaching and ministry, and his death too, 
were in his own mind theologically determined.”103 
Moltmann begins his fourth chapter—that on the historical content of chris-
tology—with a discussion of the relationship between the historical figure of Jesus 
 
98 CG, 112. 
99 “The resurrection of a dead man falls outside the framework of history, which is domi-
nated by death and men’s dying.” CG, 189. 
100 CG, 160; cf. TH, 197-202 (1964). 
101 CG, 160. 
102 CG, 135. 
103 CG, 113. 
190 
 
and the church’s kerygma. What is of particular interest here, however, is the mate-
rial at the end of the chapter on Jesus’ “godforsaken” death.104 In stark contrast to the 
accounts of the deaths of Socrates, and Zealot, Stoic, and Christian martyrs, “Jesus 
clearly died in a different way. His death was not a ‘fine death’.”105 Indeed, under-
stood in the context of his life, in which Jesus assumed a special relationship with 
the God of his ancestors, unprecedented in the whole history of Israel, Jesus himself, 
as well as his followers, “could not regard his being handed over to death on the 
cross as one accursed as a mere mishap, a human misunderstanding or a final trial, 
but was bound to experience it as rejection by the very God whom he dared to call 
‘My Father.’”106 Moltmann goes on to comment on the necessity of following the 
evangelists in interpreting the crucifixion theologically, preparing the way for his 
major chapter on the relationship between the crucifixion and the Trinity. What is 
already clear at this point, though, is that when historical and eschatological ap-
proaches to Christ are treated as a unity, the hope found in Jesus’ resurrection is 
called into question by his crucifixion. History and eschatology form something like 
a dialectic, so that, whereas he had earlier claimed that the adventus comes into the 
present in such a way as to open up new possibilities for history, the implication of 
Moltmann’s proposal in CG is that the path to this new, alternative future is also 
compromised by present suffering. As he writes in a paraphrase of David Friedrich 
Strauss, “The true criticism of faith in the resurrection is the history of the crucified 
Christ.”107 
 The other side of the relationship between Christ’s history and future is eluci-
dated in Moltmann’s fifth chapter, where he approaches the life of Christ from the 
standpoint of eschatological, resurrection faith. Here, Christ’s “future determines 
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and explains his origin and his end his beginning.”108 As such, “Christian faith es-
sentially reads the history of Jesus back to front,”109 so that the NT writers cannot 
approach the meaning of Jesus’s words, miracles, and crucifixion apart from the res-
urrection. Moreover, if Jesus had not been raised from the dead, his memory would 
have been swallowed up by history, “because his message had already been contra-
dicted by his death on the cross.”110 At this point, however, Jesus’ resurrection not 
only ensures the memory and right interpretation of his life on the plane of secular, 
historical existence, but, even more than this, “Jesus was raised into God’s future.”111 
The ontological priority that Moltmann earlier ascribed to God’s future is retained 
here so that Jesus, understood eschatologically, “must be called the incarnation of the 
coming God in our flesh and in his death on the cross.”112 That is, the resurrection 
necessitates that the events of Jesus’ life be understood as descending into the pre-
sent from God’s future. 
But an eschatological christology also raises important questions. If the com-
ing God acted only in Christ’s resurrection, “why did he keep silent over the cross 
of Jesus and his dying cry? Had he forgotten him? Was he absent?”113 To answer this, 
Moltmann turns to 2 Cor 5:19, where Paul claims that “God was in Christ” (KJV). 
Moltmann reflects, “In other words, God not only acted in the crucifixion of Jesus or 
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112 CG, 184, emphasis original. Moltmann makes similar comments in two essays published 
in 1968. The “future of God and man… has become flesh in Jesus, the crucified, and thus 
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sorrowfully allowed it to happen, but was himself active with his own being in the 
dying Jesus and suffered with him.”114 Even in Moltmann’s eschatological approach 
to christology, then, the crucifixion carries significant theological weight, and more 
than it did in TH. The cross requires that the God of the future, whom we come to 
know in Christ’s resurrection, must in some sense be present in the crucifixion. 
5.3.3. Jesus and the Old Testament 
Fundamental assumptions that Moltmann holds about the nature of the Old and 
New Testaments are made especially apparent in these christological chapters. Most 
of the material in this first subsection concerns Moltmann’s claims concerning Jesus’ 
uniqueness in light of the OT. In the following subsection I will attend to Moltmann’s 
handling of NT texts, focussing on what this reveals about the role that historical 
criticism plays in his work. 
In regard to the OT, Moltmann perceives his project here to be in line with 
that of TH (1964), where the figure of Jesus is both in continuity and discontinuity 
with the OT.115 And yet he also goes further than he did in TH, emphasising the 
uniqueness of Jesus among his contemporaries, and thus bringing into sharp relief 
the discontinuity between Jesus and the OT. As the disciples reported to Jesus on 
how he was perceived by others: “Some say John the Baptist, but others Elijah, and 
still others Jeremiah or one of the prophets” (Matt 16:14). For Peter, though, Jesus 
was “the Messiah, the Son of the Living God” (16:16). And it was only God who 
could show this to him. But, somewhat puzzlingly, Moltmann goes on to state, “The 
claim that he [Jesus] made could obviously not be comprehended in one of the titles 
of Israel’s tradition of salvation history.”116 Certainly this is the case when comparing 
Jesus to other historical figures—as a plain reading of the text from Matthew demon-
strates—but Moltmann takes yet another step, rejecting even the titles of Messiah 
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and Son of God. This does not mean, however, that Peter’s confession has no positive 
significance. In asking the question, “Who do people say that the Son of Man is?” 
(Matt 16:13), Moltmann comments, “It is as though he [Jesus] wanted first of all to 
draw out a recognition of himself, as if he depended upon the revelation of himself 
through God and those who believed in him.”117 That is, Peter’s confession rightly 
recognises Jesus for who he is, but it holds no monopoly over his identity. Thus, 
Moltmann continues, “The life, words and actions of the Jesus of the synoptic gospels 
are centred not upon himself, but on the future which is called the ‘kingdom of God’. 
His God and Father is to reveal him as the one who he truly is.”118 Jesus’ identity 
cannot be communicated comprehensively on the basis of the OT texts precisely be-
cause its definition lies primarily in a future that has not yet been realised. 
Moltmann also draws attention to the new grace of God that Jesus demon-
strated in his preaching and ministry: “It is no longer the righteousness of God glo-
rified in the law, but that righteousness revealing itself through prevenient grace.”119 
From a historical perspective, this can be seen in Jesus’ association with “sinners and 
tax collectors” and his forgiveness of sins, demonstrating a grace not yet shown to 
Israel throughout all its history. Similarly, in contrast to the preaching of John the 
Baptist and other contemporaries, Jesus proclaimed a kingdom in which God’s in-
tention was “not to judge but to save.”120 From an eschatological perspective, this 
new grace of God is realised in Jesus’ resurrection as a blasphemer,121 rejected by the 
religious authorities; a rebel,122 crucified by Rome; and a godforsaken man, aban-
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tain what Jewish laws, if any, Jesus broke.” Eugene B. Borowitz, Contemporary Christologies: 
A Jewish Response (New York: Paulist, 1980), 91. But see my next footnote. 
122 Moltmann draws on Oscar Cullmann and Martin Hengel to argue for the politically agi-
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fore to his consequent crucifixion: “The theological conflict between Jesus and the contem-
porary understanding of the law can explain his rejection as a ‘blasphemer’, and in some 
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doned by his Father. Such a resurrection reveals decisively God’s love for the un-
righteous. And it is through this resurrection that Jesus’ Father “becomes God and 
Father of the godless and the godforsaken.”123  
Significantly, Moltmann locates this love towards the godless not in any OT 
promise but in the freedom of God. Indeed, divine freedom exercised a similar func-
tion for Moltmann in TH. In the prophets, for example, “Yahweh not only annuls the 
debts of Israel, but he annuls also the institutions of his own covenant in his unfath-
omable freedom to adopt new ways.”124 So, too, the prevenient grace of God in Jesus’ 
ministry is an exercise of divine sovereignty: “Jesus placed his preaching of God, and 
therefore placed himself, above the authority of Moses and the Torah. The freedom 
of God is unmistakably manifested in the attitude and behaviour of Jesus, in the an-
titheses of the Sermon on the Mount, in the call to follow him and in his sovereign 
transgression of the sabbath commandment.”125 
Another aspect of Jesus’ uniqueness that informs Moltmann’s argument here 
is his addressing God as Father. “This is the expression of a fellowship with God 
which is not mediated through the covenant, the nation and tradition, and must 
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therefore be termed a direct fellowship.”126 This leads Moltmann to adopt a striking 
thesis. He writes concerning Jesus’ words on the cross, which are given as a quote 
from Ps 22:1 in Mark and Matthew: “It is not right to interpret the cry of Jesus in the 
sense of Ps 22, but more proper to interpret the words of the psalm here in the sense 
of the situation of Jesus.”127 Because Jesus is not simply a covenant partner—as is the 
Israelite speaking the psalm—but the Son of God, these words have a completely 
different meaning in this context. The God addressed is not simply the God of Israel 
as known through the OT but the God who has shown an unfathomable, new grace 
to the nation through Jesus’ ministry and, moreover, the one whom Jesus has known 
intimately as his Father. 
Elsewhere, nonetheless, the discontinuity between Jesus and the OT is trans-
ferred to the discontinuity between Jesus and his contemporaries. Moltmann is care-
ful to highlight throughout that Jesus’ conflict is not with the OT itself but with the 
“guardians of the law,”128 or a particular “understanding of the law” (Gesetzverständ-
nis)129 such as a “legalist” (gesetzlich) or “nomist” (nomistisch) one.130 “Thus when we 
have spoken of the conflict into which Jesus came with the ‘law’, this does not refer 
to the Old Testament Torah as instruction in the covenant of promise. The more the 
understanding of the Torah became remote from the promise, the more violent be-
came the conflict with the gospel.”131 On the other hand, however, Moltmann is quite 
happy to speak of Jesus’ divine freedom to go beyond the boundaries set by Moses 
and the Torah, as shown above. Tellingly, he writes, “Jesus’ claim of authority had 
no legitimizing basis in the traditions of Israel, either in the traditions of the rabbis 
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and Pharisees, or in those of the prophets and of apocalyptic.”132 This is due to the orien-
tation of Israel’s traditions, including the OT, to human righteousness. But perhaps 
these twin concerns for Jesus’ conflict with his contemporaries’ understanding of the 
law and his freedom to go beyond the OT need not be contradictory. Certainly this 
must be the case if Moltmann is to place emphasis on both. Indeed, for Moltmann, 
Jesus’ history was chiefly in conflict with the competing interpretations of Scripture 
that were entertained in his day. The promise to Abraham and Paul’s reading of it is 
evidence that other interpretations of the OT more amenable to the person and his-
tory of Jesus are possible and necessary.133 Moreover, it is precisely the OT theology 
of promise which anticipates and finds its true expression in Jesus’ conflict with 
other interpretations in the first place. Such a position on the relationship between 
Jesus and the promise is especially important in Moltmann’s opinion for maintaining 
the shared hope of Israel and the church. 
5.3.4. Jesus and the New Testament 
Moltmann’s handling of Jesus’ relationship to the NT in these chapters of CG is also 
significant. Indeed, the NT both further legitimates Moltmann’s christological crite-
rion and presupposes it, as the NT authors, especially those of the synoptic gospels, 
turned to the history of Jesus for their content. Nonetheless, this does not mean that 
every statement found here is automatically correct by virtue of its intended foun-
dation in the history of Jesus. Moltmann acknowledges the work of historical criti-
cism in challenging the church to scrutinise the relationship between Jesus and Scrip-
ture more closely. He traces a line from the christological criterion of the NT, through 
the Reformation’s sola scriptura, to the quest of the historical Jesus today. This third 
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phase is particularly significant for modern theology. Such a judgement, however, 
does not require that the quest’s presuppositions be accepted without question. 
Moltmann characterises the quest of the historical Jesus as “a direct successor 
of the continuing christological revisionism set in motion by the critical theology of 
the Reformation.”134 The quest was successful in reminding theology of its true cri-
terion, the person and history of Jesus. But it also failed to perceive the real continuity 
between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith. For Moltmann, differences be-
tween Jesus’ preaching and that of Paul, for example, do not chiefly derive from Paul 
having misunderstood Jesus, but from the changed circumstances in which Paul’s 
ministry took place. Thus, “Jesus speaks and acts with respect to the dominion of 
God which is to come and is now coming into being. Paul speaks and acts with re-
gard to the dominion of God which has already been inaugurated in the crucifixion 
and resurrection of Jesus.”135 This continuity between the preaching of Jesus and Paul 
is grounded in the former’s crucifixion and resurrection. His crucifixion shows the 
content of his preaching to be empty, but his resurrection contradicts this yet again, 
demonstrating that the kingdom of God has come and is coming. “The historical and 
hermeneutic question, how Jesus who preached became Christ who is preached, is 
therefore basically the christological question, how the dead Jesus became the liv-
ing.”136 For this reason, as in the quest of the historical Jesus, it is ultimately only 
Jesus’ history that legitimates christology. Yet, the quest is in danger of misunder-
standing this history where the contradiction of Jesus’ preaching  by the cross and 
the contradiction of his cross by the resurrection are overlooked. 
If it was the person and history of Jesus that informed the formation of the 
NT, the Reformation principle of sola scriptura, and the iconoclastic work of modern 
historical criticism, then his person and history remain the fundamental criterion for 
continued reading of the NT today. It is thus that Moltmann can speak generally of 
“the Jesus of the synoptic gospels,”137 implying a distinction between Jesus’ history 
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and how it is reported by the NT authors. This also allows Moltmann to make more 
specific judgements on the historicity of certain details in the gospels. For example, 
he writes, “We have very little interpretation of Jesus’ death by himself; such an in-
terpretation occurs at best in the tentative form of the passion prophecies, if they are 
themselves historical.”138 
The tension between history and subsequent accounts of it comes to a head 
in Moltmann’s discussion of Jesus’ cry on the cross. Moltmann begins, “Because, as 
the Christian tradition developed, this terrible cry of the dying Jesus was gradually 
weakened in the passion narratives and replaced by words of comfort and triumph, 
we can probably rely upon it as a kernel of historical truth.”139 Thus, for Luke, “Jesus 
did not die ‘forsaken by God,’ but as an exemplary martyr.”140 And, “for John Jesus’ 
struggle ends with his victory and glorification on the cross.”141 Later manuscripts of 
Mark, too, provide a “watered down” version of the cry in 15:34.142 Conversely, the 
earlier reading found in Mark is supported by Heb 5:7, as well as Jesus’ distress in 
Gethsemane, which the other synoptics also attest.143 Mark’s rendering of the cry 
with the words of Ps 22:1 is nonetheless “certainly an interpretation of the church 
after Easter,”144 though, as I will show, this particular gap between history and inter-
pretation is of little consequence for Moltmann. I have indicated elsewhere that there 
are some problems with Moltmann’s methodology here, particularly in his overlook-
ing the potential literary or theological motivations of Mark for depicting Jesus this 
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Wayne R. Herman, “Moltmann’s Christology,” Studia Biblica et Theologica 17:1 (1989): 3-31, 
at 28. 





way.145 Interestingly, however, Moltmann finds the words supplied by Mark to com-
plement an otherwise strictly historical account of Jesus’ crucifixion. For Moltmann, 
while it is unlikely that Jesus spoke these exact words, the sense of the citation is true 
to Jesus’ situation. He was indeed “forsaken” by God. Significantly, then, Moltmann 
is not completely dismissive of theologically motivated retellings of Jesus’ history in 
Scripture. On the contrary, Mark’s retelling actually works to helpfully illuminate 
the real situation faced by the Jesus on the cross. 
Moltmann’s presentation of the relationship between the NT and the histori-
cal Jesus is interesting and provocative. Without this methodological groundwork, 
too, his central theses on trinitarian suffering would likely not be as readily consid-
ered by his various readers. But questions also remain. While Moltmann demon-
strates a definite preference for that which he deems to be more historically probable, 
he still shows interest in theological reflection on the historical events—reflection, 
first and foremost, that takes place in Scripture. In TH, the theological value of ahis-
torical biblical sources was justified on the basis of their connection to the history of 
promise. Their truth was located not so much in their correspondence to historical 
reality but in their correspondence to the hopes arising out of this reality. A similar 
logic is at work in CG, where Mark’s reading of the crucifixion is justified insofar as 
it captures the nihilistic force of the event that Moltmann believes to have transpired 
historically. And although a more definite set of criteria is lacking in order to deter-
mine just what biblical interpretations are most valuable in this sense, perhaps Molt-
mann neglects such a task in order to acknowledge that it does not belong to him but 
to the cross, which requires that all such criteria be in continual revision. 
A change in Moltmann’s approach to Scripture is discernible in the move 
from history to eschatology. Commenting on the significance of the resurrection for 
the NT, Moltmann observes, “As the New Testament shows, not only in the epistles 
but also in the gospels, Christian faith essentially reads the history of Jesus back to 
 
145 Cameron Coombe, “Reading Scripture with Moltmann: The Cry of Dereliction and the 
Trinity,” Colloquium 48:2 (2016): 130-45. Moltmann wrote to me in response, explaining, 
“The priority of Mark’s passion narrative was opinio communis among the NT scholars in 
Germany in my time.” 
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front.”146 The resurrection “was the only reason why his words and his story were 
remembered and why people were concerned with him.”147 Specifically, “only it [the 
resurrection] says who really suffered and died here.”148 As such, the NT does not 
soberly recount Jesus’ history in historical-critical terms, in order to present his life 
apart from resurrection hope. This would have been impossible for the early Chris-
tians and, indeed, a misunderstanding of the unity of Jesus’ historical and eschato-
logical person. It is not only the historical underpinnings of Mark’s gospel, then, that 
attract Moltmann to that particular book but the eschatological perspective that per-
vades the Gospel of Mark: “For Paul and Mark, the theological accent is placed en-
tirely on… the transformation of the historical sense of time into an eschatological 
sense of time. The risen Christ is the crucified Christ.”149 The tension between Molt-
mann’s historical and theological interests in Mark, insofar as the latter does not con-
cern the theology of the historical Jesus but that of the post-Easter church, is thus not 
resolved in favour of the one or the other. Mark’s connection to the historical reality 
and his post-resurrection perspective work together to provide a christology that is 
essential for subsequent reflection on Jesus. 
This dual approach also informs Moltmann’s reading of the other gospels. In 
the context of the historical question of what actually happened on the cross, Molt-
mann showed suspicion towards the accounts of Luke and John. Significantly, in his 
eschatological treatment of Jesus, the apparent historical failings of these gospels fall 
by the wayside as he finds their resurrection-inspired commentary to be theologi-
cally valuable. On the one hand, for example, the NT situates God’s glory in the cru-
cifixion, thus closely identifying God with the event. On the other hand, “when John 
stresses that Jesus was glorified on the cross, the converse implication is that the 
glory of God was crucified in him and thus made manifest in this unjust world.”150 
John might not capture the dereliction of the cross as well as Mark, but his interest 
 
146 CG, 162. 
147 CG, 162. 
148 CG, 182, emphasis original. 
149 CG, 184. 





in the relationship between glory and the cross serves a complementary theological 
agenda. Moreover, John 3:16 is an important summary of the gospel message.151 No-
tably, here Moltmann associates the theology of the Fourth Gospel with that of 1 
John, in particular 1 John 4:16, “God is love,” a verse that immediately follows Molt-
mann’s gospel citation and will grow in significance for him throughout his career.152 
Luke, too, provides theologically valuable insights that inform Moltmann’s 
argument. The Emmaus account, for instance, consolidates the identity of the Cruci-
fied and Risen One, in Jesus’ question: “Was it not necessary that the Messiah should 
suffer these things and then enter into his glory?” (24:26).153 In this vein, although 
Moltmann might be charged with the specific crime of setting aside Luke’s and 
John’s accounts of Jesus’ last moments, the more general charge of bypassing these 
voices altogether does not hold up in light of this other evidence. Indeed, Moltmann 
appears to move quite comfortably between the truth of the gospels from an escha-
tological perspective and the necessity of subjecting them to historical criticism. That 
Luke and John draw their readers’ attention away from the horrors of the cross, at 
least when contrasted with Mark’s account, might mean that their accounts are less 
historical here. It does not necessarily mean, however, that their accounts have noth-
ing valuable to say at all at these points. As such, referring to Luke’s passion narra-
tive, Moltmann speaks of “the martyr christology which ever since Luke has repeat-
edly presented Jesus as the archetype or example of faith under temptation.”154 
While, in the immediate context, this appears to be a negative evaluation of the his-
toricity of Luke, it can also be read with Moltmann’s other, appreciative comments 
 
151 CG, 244; cf. CPS, 95 (1975). 
152 See my appendix. Indeed, CG is the first place Moltmann cites 1 John 4:16, at CG, 244, 
247. He also cites 4:17 at CG, 253, though his interest in this verse is comparatively short-
lived. 
153 CG, 180-81. Cf. Moltmann’s affirmative citations of Luke 4:21 on p. 121; 13:32 and 22:25-
27 on p. 138; and 6:24 and 12:16ff. on p. 141. 
154 CG, 148. 
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on martyrdom in CG. The practice has been “the closest form of following the cruci-
fied Christ” throughout history.155 Here, then, although Luke diverges from the his-
torical reality of Jesus’ crucifixion, his presentation of Jesus’ confidence in death has 
functioned to give comfort and encouragement to martyrs all through the centu-
ries.156 
 Finally, Moltmann’s differentiated treatment of the historical and eschatologi-
cal interests of the NT writers raises the question of divine inspiration. Over a decade 
earlier, he was particularly critical of the doctrine’s excesses and seemed to accept it, 
somewhat reluctantly, in modified form.157 But while Moltmann does not discuss the 
doctrine at all in CG, his pneumatology does provide some clues concerning his as-
sumptions. First, though, it should be noted that there is something of a pneumato-
logical deficit in CG. As Moltmann writes in 1985, “In my book [CG], however, I did 
not get further than seeing a binity of God the Father and Jesus the Son of God. 
Where was the Holy Spirit, who according to the Nicene Creed is to be worshipped 
and glorified together with the Father and the Son?”158  
 
155 CG, 57. 
156 Notably, just three years later, it is the christologies of Luke and John that ground Molt-
mann’s friendship christology in CPS, 116-19 (1975). 
157 See 2.1.1. 
158 HTG, 174; cf. CPS, xx-xxi (1975); Moltmann in DGG, 184-85 (1979). Other writers have 
pointed this out as well. See the discussion of Moltmann’s pneumatology in TH and CG, 
with its maturation from the point of TKG (1980) onwards in D. Lyle Dabney, “The Advent 
of the Spirit: The Turn to Pneumatology in the Theology of Jürgen Moltmann,” Asbury The-
ological Journal 48:1 (1993): 81-107. But cf. also the recent, positive assessment by the Pente-
costal theologian, Amos Yong, in “The Coming of Spirit Theology: Moltmann, Pneumatol-
ogy, and Trinitarian Eschatology for the Third Millennium,” in Jürgen Moltmann and the 
Work of Hope: The Future of Christian Theology, ed. M. Douglas Meeks, 53-75 (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington, 2018). As an aside, it is worth noting David McIlroy’s claim that Moltmann’s 
later pneumatology remains deficient on biblical grounds: “One of the surprising things 
about Moltmann’s pneumatology, given the way in which he develops his christology, is 
the limited extent to which Moltmann explores its roots in Jewish messianic expectation. 
Whereas he is rightly insistent on the connection between Jewish messianic hope and Jesus 
Christ, his Old Testament references to the Spirit are to the ruach of God seen in the con-
text of creation or the psalms. The connection of the Spirit of God with the law and with 
righteousness and holiness, to be found in the link between wisdom and Torah, and most 
notably in the new covenant prophecies of Jeremiah and Ezekiel are notable by their almost 





Where Moltmann does speak of the Spirit, it is notable that he quite consist-
ently associates it with the resurrection and the eschatological orientation of the 
event. Jesus’ post-resurrection appearances guaranteed the imminence of the coming 
kingdom to the early church. “In recognizing his ‘resurrection from the dead’, they 
also traced in themselves the ‘Spirit of resurrection’, the ‘Spirit which brings life’ 
(Rom 8:11), and waited in the ‘power of the resurrection’ (Phil 3:10) for the coming 
appearance of Christ in glory.”159 As shown above, for Moltmann this resurrection-
fervour positively impacts the evangelists’ recollection of Jesus’ history, as they read 
it through the lens of eschatological hope. But, Moltmann argues, the church’s post-
resurrection experience of the Spirit is also grounded in and delimited by this his-
tory. “The gospels intentionally direct the gaze of Christians away from the experi-
ences of the risen Christ and the Holy Spirit back to the earthly Jesus and his way to 
the cross.”160 And, “as the gospels were written, the experiences of Christ and the 
Spirit at the present moment were subjected to criticism and linked to the history of 
Jesus himself.”161 This perhaps explains Moltmann’s critical handling of the gospels’ 
historicity. Although the authorial task surely proceeds in the power of the Spirit, 
the fruit of this is subject to the history of Jesus, whose death calls it into question—
just as his death is called into question by his resurrection! It is true that Moltmann 
does not draw a connection between this dialectic and his hermeneutic in CG. None-
theless, this is how his hermeneutic implicitly functions in CG, even if there are some 
biases to one side, namely the cross. The history of Jesus up to his death disciplines 
overly enthusiastic readings of his life in the post-Easter church, and the negation of 
his death in the resurrection disciplines overly cynical readings of his earthly end.162 
 
of Law: In Conversation with Jürgen Moltmann, Oliver O’Donovan, and Thomas Aquinas (Milton 
Keynes, UK: Paternoster, 2009), 30, emphasis original, cf. 45, 85-86. 
159 CG, 178, slightly adjusted. 
160 CG, 54. 
161 CG, 115. 
162 It is true that “for Moltmann, then, the criteria by which one reads and discerns Scripture 
is neither an external ideological framework nor a particular central idea within the Bible, 
a canon within the canon, but it is the history about which it testifies, and which points be-
yond itself.” Poul F. Guttesen, Leaning into the Future: The Kingdom of God in the Theology of 
Jürgen Moltmann and in the Book of Revelation (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2009), 31. Yet this does 
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 In his fourth and fifth chapters, then, Moltmann further develops his theology 
of the cross in a broader christological context. He rejects traditional christologies 
that set out from an a priori concept of God, as well as post-Enlightenment christolo-
gies that set out from an a priori concept of human being, proposing instead a history 
in which both God and human being are ontologically open to their common future. 
This leads Moltmann to advocate two equally necessary and complementary ap-
proaches to the christological task, the historical and the eschatological. Such a de-
velopment is not only significant in regard to Moltmann’s methodological centre—
so that it is not simply the cross but the crucified Christ in historical and eschatolog-
ical perspective that constitutes this centre—but is bound up with key hermeneutical 
commitments. In regard to the OT, the locus of Jesus’ history and identity in his fu-
ture requires that his person cannot be comprehensively derived from the OT, re-
gardless of how precise the hermeneutic might otherwise be. In regard to the NT, 
even here the event of the cross remains the criterion of truth for the words of the 
gospel writers. Nonetheless, the resurrection also illuminates and gives meaning to 
this history, so that the gospels do not simply recount the brute facts of history but 
narrate stories with a deeper, theological purpose. 
5.4. The Theology of the Cross against Theism and Atheism 
The most enduring feature of Moltmann’s contribution to modern theology is to be 
found in CG’s sixth chapter, in which he develops an approach to the Trinity that he 
believes is necessitated by the cross. Following Paul Althaus’s pregnant comment, 
“Jesus died for God before he died for us,”163 Moltmann writes, “A serious fault of 
earlier Protestant theology was that it did not look at the cross in the context of the 
relationship of the Son to the Father, but related it directly to mankind as an expia-
tory death for sin. Later Protestant Jesuology was even worse, as it saw his death 
 
not provide the full picture. Moltmann also finds meaning in the theological reflections 
and assumptions of the biblical writers themselves, and not just the history they attest.  
163 Paul Althaus, Theologische Aufsätze, vol. 1 (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1929), 23, translation 





only as exemplary obedience in suffering and the proof of his faithfulness to his call-
ing.”164 As Moltmann has already argued, the cross holds a central and non-negotia-
ble place in Christian faith and theology. From the doctrine of the Trinity, especially, 
it cannot be excluded. No, “the nucleus of everything that Christian theology says 
about ‘God’ is to be found in this Christ event.”165 I have divided the material per-
taining to this chapter of CG into two sections. In the first section I attend to Molt-
mann’s criticisms of modern theology, traditional theology or “theism,” atheism, 
and Chalcedonian christology. In the second section I will expound Moltmann’s pos-
itive alternative in his trinitarian theology of the cross. 
5.4.1. Modern Theologies of the Cross 
Other modern theologians in their own way have responded to the call implicit in 
Althaus’s observation. Karl Rahner, for example, developed a theology of the cross 
that speaks of God’s death.166 According to Moltmann, however, his formulation is 
insufficiently trinitarian—even if Rahner was a major figure in the trinitarian revival 
of the twentieth century, and even if Moltmann himself will even give this second 
 
164 CG, 201. 
165 CG, 205. 
166 Rahner writes, “Our death [becomes] the death of the immortal God himself.” Karl Rah-
ner, Theological Investigations, vol. 4, More Recent Writings, trans. by Kevin Smyth (Balti-
more: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1966), 113, cited in CG, 201. For Rahner on divine impas-
sibility, see Jeff B. Pool, God’s Wounds: Hermeneutic of the Christian Symbol of Divine Suffer-
ing, vol. 2, Evil and Divine Suffering (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co, 2011), 389 n. 8; Dennis 
W. Jowers, The Trinitarian Axiom of Karl Rahner: The Economic Trinity is the Immanent Trinity 
and Vice Versa (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2006), 114-20. Later, Moltmann quotes 
one of Rahner’s later interviews at length in which he critically differentiates his own posi-
tion from Moltmann’s, writing, “To put it crudely, it does not help me to escape from my 
mess and mix-up and despair if God is in the same predicament.” Karl Rahner, “Ap-
proaches to Theological Thinking,” trans. by Daniel Donovan, in Karl Rahner, Karl Rahner 
in Dialogue: Conversations and Interviews, 1965-1982, ed. Paul Imhof and Hubert Biallowons, 
trans. and ed. by Harvey D. Egan, 123-33 (New York: Crossroads, 1986), 126-27, cited in 
HTG, 123 (1985). Among other things, Moltmann replies that he is “disturbed” and 
“shocked” by the revelations, and the personal nature of the dispute becomes clear in his 
uncharacteristically coarse reply. Ibid. Dennis Marshall’s account of suffering in Rahner’s 
theology, though not addressing all of Moltmann’s concerns, is instructive here. Dennis J. 




aspect of Rahner’s thought a central role in his argument later on in the chapter!167 
But Moltmann’s point is that Rahner was not consistent in his trinitarianism. As he 
writes of Karl Barth’s theology of the cross, and of that of Eberhard Jüngel and H. G. 
Geyer who followed him, such claims start to fall apart when the “simple concept of 
God” which these theologians presuppose results in the paradoxical statement that 
“God is ‘dead’ on the cross and yet is not dead.”168 For Moltmann, the problem here 
is that death and life are at the same time ultimately predicated of the undifferenti-
ated divine nature, rather than of the respective trinitarian persons. Instead, Molt-
mann contends that each person suffers in a different way. But this is bound up with 
assumptions about divine unity, which I will address in detail in my following chap-
ter.169 
Another Catholic theologian, Hans Urs von Balthasar, has also thought 
through the relationship between the cross and the doctrine of God, his approach 
being “more profound” than Rahner’s, and going beyond paradox in giving his ex-
position an explicitly “trinitarian” shape.170 Of course, the paths taken by the afore-
mentioned theologians are also trinitarian—in the plainest sense of the term. For 
Moltmann, though, the designation in this context distinguishes what he believes to 
be an ultimately undifferentiated formulation of the death of God from the more 
persons-centred formulation of von Balthasar. Nonetheless, Moltmann argues, von 
Balthasar fails to give adequate attention to the character of divine mutability, passi-
bility, and “death.”171 These latter aspects have instead been addressed by Heribert 
Mühlen and Hans Küng, though Moltmann does not provide any evaluative com-
ment in regard to their work. Although in much of the book so far Moltmann has 
focussed on the central significance of the cross to Christian faith, here it begins to 
become clear that for him the Trinity, too, must take a central place in the investiga-
tion. 
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5.4.2. Against Theism 
Before developing his trinitarian theology of the cross, Moltmann directs his atten-
tion to various assumptions in the tradition that prevented theologians of former 
generations from recognising what Althaus later recognised.172 Moltmann returns to 
Luther’s Heidelberg Disputation, in which Luther criticised his contemporaries’ nat-
ural theology which derived from Peter Lombard’s Sentences. Yet, the origins of Pe-
ter’s own theology stretch back even further to the Stoics, who saw a divine Logos 
in nature that corresponded to the divine being. The Logos was present in a unique 
way in human beings, who could thus know and become like the divine. Although 
Peter reformulated these principles, departing from Stoic pantheism and affirming 
the Christian Creator–creature distinction, his break with Stoicism was, in Molt-
mann’s opinion, not decisive enough. Peter’s analogia entis brought God and creation 
closely together again, making God “indirectly evident and manifest through his 
works.”173 Moreover, Peter upheld an exalted form of human reason, voiding the 
epistemological limitations that creatureliness would otherwise entail. 
Continuing in the Lombard’s tradition, Thomas Aquinas’s five ways of es-
tablishing the existence of God are especially telling here. Restating the Feuerbachian 
critique of religion that he appropriated in TH (1964),174 Moltmann contends that in 
Thomas’s first argument from motion—that is, that motion derives ultimately from 
a mover that is not itself moved—“God is then not thought of for his own sake but… 
for the sake of finite being. The heuristic interest is that of ‘securing’ God in and for 
finite being.”175 If Thomas’s argument were successful, finite being that is otherwise 
threatened with impending annihilation would now be grounded in the eternal and 
 
172 On this and the following subsection, cf. Willis, Theism, Atheism and the Doctrine of the 
Trinity, 76-115. 
173 CG, 210. 
174 See 4.2.5. 
175 CG, 211. In contrast, the theologian of the cross “does not name them [people] as they 
would wish out of fear of nothingness, but as they are accepted by the boundless suffering 
love of God.” CG, 213. 
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indestructible. But it cannot be successful, because it overlooks the “perverse situa-
tion of man.”176 
For Moltmann, then, a common being shared by creation and God,177 a hu-
man faculty of reason that appears largely untouched by sin, and a theological meth-
odology compromised by its goal to overcome the limits of the finite by grounding 
it in the infinite—all of these demonstrate the failure of Peter and Thomas to take 
seriously the contradiction that is God’s revelation in the cross. Their theology begins 
with humanity’s epistemological ascent to God, but the theology of the cross begins 
with God’s descent to humanity in Christ. God descends “not so that man is divi-
nized, but so that he is dedivinized and given new humanity in the community of 
the crucified Christ.”178 
This is what Moltmann intends to communicate with his dialectical approach 
to knowledge of God, introduced early on in CG.179 The dialectical approach con-
trasts with that of the analogical, Platonic “like is known only by like,”180 which was 
adopted early on in the church. Theology could then claim knowledge of God 
through analogy with creation, history, divine revelation, or the Holy Spirit. But, 
Moltmann argues, if this principle is applied consistently then “the Son of God 
would have had to remain in heaven, because he would be unrecognizable by any-
thing earthly.”181 Analogy thus requires supplementation with dialectic. Following 
Schelling, this is expressed in the proposition that “every essence can only reveal 
itself in its opposite, love only in hate, unity in conflict.”182 Accordingly, God is re-
vealed where there is no God: in the abandonment of Christ on the cross. Human 
beings must therefore surrender their desires for deification and look instead to the 
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177 This is Moltmann’s interpretation of the analogia entis. 
178 CG, 213. 
179 A later, extended discussion of this concept is provided in Moltmann, God for a Secular 
Society, 135-52 (1990). 
180 CG, 26; cf. Moltmann’s discussion of the genealogy of this principle on 30 n. 20. 
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182 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human 
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God who meets and justifies them in the midst of their godlessness. It is only then 
that they know God analogically, because they begin to become like God in being 
sanctified. Finally, Moltmann claims, such a corrective to traditional theological epis-
temology also has important ethical implications. Whereas theologies of glory seek 
their likeness—exalted human beings seeking an exalted God—a theology of the 
cross means that the church is directed to love that which is other, because God’s 
love is not directed to that which is already lovely, but to that which is ugly and 
despised. 
At this point in the discussion, Moltmann introduces the term “theism” to 
designate the natural theology that he has been expounding. Theism “refers to that 
natural knowledge of God which is taken up by the Catholic and Protestant tradition 
in the article ‘De Deo uno’, and then more generally to monotheistic philosophy in its 
political, moral and cosmological significance.”183 The theological epistemology of 
natural theology, then, for Moltmann forms part of a larger structure that includes 
assumptions about divine immutability, impassibility, simplicity, and unity, for ex-
ample, the latter which I will address in the following section of this chapter. Again, 
Moltmann follows Feuerbach in his criticism of theism: “As the nature of divine be-
ing is conceived of for the sake of finite being, it must embrace all the determinations 
of finite being and exclude those determinations which are directed against being.”184 
Death is thus excluded a priori from the infinite. This Feuerbachian character is the-
ism’s most definitive aspect. It provides the negative basis for Moltmann’s doctrine 
of the Trinity in CG, where the cross and the biblical witness to the trinitarian persons 
provide the positive basis. That is, in contrast to theism, it must now be affirmed that 
death is not in contradiction to the infinite. God has taken it on in Christ. Conversely, 
God’s imperviousness to death is now predicable of human beings by virtue of their 
telos in the coming reign of God. But this latter claim differs from that of theism, 
 
183 CG, 281 n. 36. The dichotomy of theism and atheism is not new to CG. See RRF, 208-9 
(1968). For an exploration of the theme in both Barth’s and Moltmann’s theologies, see 
Willis, Theism, Atheism and the Doctrine of the Trinity. 
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which obviously also makes claims of eschatological human redemption. The theol-
ogy of the cross requires that creation is not free from its finite limitations by virtue 
of its discovering its ground in the infinite. Rather, creation is becoming free because 
in the resurrection of the crucified the very structure of finitude has been trans-
formed so that hope for a future that differs from the present has a real, ontological 
ground. Nor does this mean that creation hopes in a newfound, immanent potenti-
ality. Creation continues to hope in the God who alone has defeated death and will 
bring this victory to fulfilment with the Parousia. 
5.4.3. Against Atheism 
It is not only theism, however, that obstructs the way to a properly crucicentric and 
trinitarian doctrine of God. Moltmann goes on to address its converse in atheism. 
Ironically, atheism is closely related to theism in that it, too, proceeds from the finite 
to the infinite, “but it finds no good and righteous God, but a capricious demon, a 
blind destiny, a damning law or an annihilating nothingness.”185 Yet this “protest 
atheism,”186 despite suggestions to the contrary, is hardly as concerned with the ex-
istence of God as it is with seeking an end to the world’s suffering. It arises as a 
reaction to theism’s unconvincing and offensive solutions. Indeed, Moltmann takes 
the polemics of protest atheists to be made in the unconscious hope of provoking 
God to act. And this atheistic rebellion is exacerbated by the fact that theism pro-
claimed an impassible God. It made God “poorer than any man,” because “the one 
who cannot suffer cannot love either.”187  
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Despite its legitimate complaint, protest atheism fails when it replaces the 
infinite God with a divinised subsection of humanity, as the communist parties in 
Eastern Europe did, “saying that it [the party] is immortal, that it is always right, that 
it grants security and authority, etc.”188 Against atheistic confidence in humanity or 
theistic deference to the God beyond, unperturbed by all finite wastings away, how-
ever, stands the Frankfurt School philosopher Max Horkheimer.189 Horkheimer, well 
aware of state abuses committed in the name of Marx, provides a theory that “hovers 
between theism and atheism,” because it rejects the presuppositions of both.190 That 
is, while protest atheism cannot accept God due to suffering, Horkheimer claims that 
suffering, too, should not be accepted, in view of the Wholly Other. This strange, 
apophatic Quality is not to be identified with the God of theism, though. It is the 
placeholder for a future state in which suffering no longer exists. Moltmann’s invo-
cation of Horkheimer here is presented as a challenge to atheism—that it would not 
surrender the ultimate triumph over suffering to human beings, but would remain 
open to that which it does not yet know for the eschatological vindication of the op-
pressed. Of course, for Moltmann the Wholly Other is quite obviously to be identi-
fied with the God whom Scripture attests, even if Horkheimer himself wants to 
maintain a safe distance from the latter. 
This does not mean, however, that the present question of suffering, the the-
odical question, is simply made redundant in the hope for a future without suffering. 
The sufferings of the present are real sufferings. So long as humanity experiences 
present godforsakenness in events like Auschwitz and Hiroshima, Jesus’ question 
on the cross remains unanswered. Rather than attempting to answer the question, a 
 
188 CG, 223. 
189 Moltmann draws on a 1935 essay, which has since been translated as Horkheimer, 
“Thoughts on Religion,” in idem, Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. by Matthew J. 
O’Connell, 129-31 (New York: Continuum, 1999); and a later piece, which does not seem to 
have been translated yet: Horkheimer, Die Sehnsucht nach dem ganz Anderen: ein Interview 
mit Kommentar von Helmut Gumnior (Hamburg: Furche, 1970). 
190 CG, 224. But see Langdon Gilkey’s earlier criticism of Moltmann on this point: “If the di-
chotomy ‘God is’ and ‘God is not’ poses for theology a fatal debate, then that fatality is not 
removed by transposing it into the terms of a God who ‘will be’…. For the future can be 
seen in as atheistic terms as can the present or past.” FH, 84. 
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fault Moltmann attributes to theism and atheism respectively, theology must now 
acknowledge the question’s open-endedness, looking to God’s solidarity with those 
who suffer in having taken on suffering within the divine life.191 
5.4.4. Beyond Chalcedon 
Finding that both atheism and theism are restricted by their seeing God and suffer-
ing to be in contradiction, Moltmann returns to address a particular fruit of theism 
that obstructs theological recognition of God’s suffering in Christ, Chalcedonian 
christology.192 For him, the doctrine that distinguished Christ’s human and divine 
natures was a necessary development in a world that assumed the divine to be im-
mutable and the human to be subject to change and death. More than this, though, 
it was the hope for salvation from death into immortality that drove the doctrine. If 
God had taken part in any suffering, then hope for a salvation from suffering would 
be void. So the early church and subsequent theology located Christ’s suffering in 
his human nature and excluded it from God. But while the church assumed that God 
was not subject to change, this denial nonetheless left room for alternative concep-
tions of change. So, Moltmann argues, although God is not subject to external 
 
191 Though writing in connection to Moltmann’s later theology, Douglas Farrow’s criticism 
of the theodical orientation of his theology is perceptive here: “The problem that is Molt-
mann's own is this: he does not place the passion and the resurrection per se at the centre, 
but the passion and resurrection as an answer to victimization. Here is the something gone 
awry, and it does of course rebound on christology, as on everything else. Theology can-
not be done successfully from the standpoint of the victim.” Douglas B. Farrow, “Review 
Essay: In the End is the Beginning: A Review of Jürgen Moltmann’s Systematic Contribu-
tions,” Modern Theology 14:3 (1998): 425-47, at 442. I imagine Moltmann’s response would 
be that he is not simply reflecting on victimisation in general, however, but that particular 
victim of the crucifixion. And while it would be difficult to disentangle Moltmann’s chris-
tology from the modern horrors of Auschwitz and Hiroshima, it is nonetheless important 
to remind readers that he consistently endeavours to set out from Jesus’ cry of dereliction. 
As Charles Fensham writes in reply to Farrow on this point, “Moltmann does not only re-
spond to theodicy, he also responds to the biblical text.” Charles Fensham, “Sin and Ecol-
ogy: A Conversation with Jürgen Moltmann and the School of René Girard,” Journal of Re-
formed Theology 6:3 (2012): 234-250, at 246 n. 43. 
192 This is my gloss. Moltmann never explicitly refers to Chalcedon in CG. His preferred ter-
minology is “the doctrine of two natures.” CG, 227. For criticism of Moltmann in this con-
nection, see Klaas Runia, The Present-Day Christological Debate (Downers Grove, IL: Inter-





change, God is able to change if this change is undertaken freely. Similarly, God is 
not subject to suffering, but this does not require that God is incapable of suffering 
in freedom, especially if God is to love at all: “If love is the acceptance of the other 
without regard to one’s own well-being, then it contains within itself the possibility 
of sharing in suffering and freedom to suffer as a result of the otherness of the 
other.”193 Finally, if salvation leads to an eschatological life that is merely the nega-
tion of finite negations, such as death and suffering, then that life will be “terrifying 
and boring”194 because that which is already good in finitude cannot be affirmed in 
the present. It must one day be negated. Chalcedonian christology is predicated on 
a particular notion of human nature that resists processual or historical definition, 
here particularly in regard to the relationship between present and eschatological 
humanity. 
 Luther, too, adopted the presuppositions of Chalcedon, albeit with some sig-
nificant boundary pushing. Contra Zwingli and Melanchthon, he claimed that the 
properties of Christ’s divine and human natures were not only predicated of the one 
divine person. Rather, the opposing properties of each nature were communicated 
to the other nature. So, Luther wrote, “It is true to say: This man created the world, 
and this God suffered, died, was buried, etc.”195 As such, Luther came close to over-
coming the Chalcedonian barrier that precluded any suffering from the divine na-
ture. Yet, as Rahner and Barth would later do, Luther fell short of a “trinitarian” 
theology of the cross because he did not consistently maintain the distinction be-
tween the general divine nature and the particular divine nature of the Son, again 
resulting in the paradox of “the God who is dead and yet is not dead.”196 
 Thus Moltmann discovers in modern theology tendencies towards the rejec-
tion of the doctrine of divine impassibility and an alternative in a trinitarian theology 
 
193 CG, 230. 
194 CG, 230. See 4.2.4.-4.2.5. 
195 Martin Luther, “Disputation on the Divinity and Humanity of Christ,” trans. by Christo-
pher B. Brown, accessed 29 April 2019, https://www.iclnet.org/pub/resources/text/witten-
berg/luther/luther-divinity.txt. This is the only English translation I am aware of. Molt-
mann cites the Latin from the Weimar Ausgabe in CG, 233.  
196 CG, 235. 
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of suffering. He faults theism for attributing impassibility to God in order to secure 
human redemption from suffering. And he draws on the theory of Max Horkheimer 
to challenge atheism to look beyond the human for the eschatological vindication of 
those who suffer. Finally, Moltmann returns to theism to address the doctrine of 
Christ’s two natures in one person, affirmed at Chalcedon. He rejects such an ap-
proach for its tendency to preclude change from the divine nature and the unclear 
implications of an eschatological negation of human nature. 
5.5. A Trinitarian Theology of the Cross 
Having addressed what he understands to be the key shortcomings of theologies of 
the cross both ancient and modern, Moltmann can finally present his own contribu-
tion to the topic. He first establishes the non-negotiable, trinitarian shape of Christian 
faith, before exploring just what a theology of the cross might look like in a trinitarian 
framework. This is followed by a comment on the eternal significance of the Son’s 
humanity. In a final subsection I will comment on Moltmann’s criticism of Greek 
influences in Christian theology, comparing this with the contrastive paradigm he 
employed in TH. 
5.5.1. The Relationship between Cross and Trinity: A Methodological Comment 
Moltmann has already established the centrality of the cross to Christian faith. Now 
he also appeals to the centrality of Christianity’s confession of the triune God, “the 
doctrine that marked off Christianity from polytheism, pantheism and monothe-
ism.”197 Islam, for example, set itself apart from Christianity in its claim that God 
“has not begotten, and has not been begotten.”198 Unfortunately, the doctrine does 
not hold such a central place in modern Protestantism. Moltmann highlights the anti-
metaphysical positions of the early Melanchthon and Schleiermacher here as key 
 
197 CG, 235. 
198 Qur’an 112:3, in Arthur J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1964), 667. Moltmann quotes a translation of the Qur’an in CG, 235, but does not 





contributors to this turn. They misunderstood the doctrine as speculative and irrele-
vant. Whereas the Cappadocians and subsequent theologians had distinguished be-
tween the “immanent” Trinity—God’s inner life—and the “economic” Trinity—God 
in relation to creation—Protestant theologians increasingly abandoned the former in 
favour of a theology that focussed solely on the latter.199 Moreover, since Thomas’ 
distinction between natural knowledge of God, under the tractate De Deo Uno, and 
knowledge of God by grace, under the tractate De Deo Trino, theology proper has lost 
its appropriate form, the doctrine of the Trinity. It is for this reason that Moltmann 
takes up Rahner’s proposals: “1. The Trinity is the nature of God and the nature of 
God is the Trinity. 2. The economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity, and the imma-
nent Trinity is the economic Trinity.”200 Theological treatments of the divine nature 
 
199 See the following note on Moltmann’s use of Karl Rahner here. He also takes the terms 
“immanent” and “economic” Trinity from Rahner, now “the conventional terminology of 
modern Trinitarianism.” Fred Sanders, The Triune God (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 
2016), 144. I, too, use the terms throughout this dissertation, following Moltmann, though I 
agree with Sanders’s criticisms: the dichotomous construction “verbally doubles the Trin-
ity.” And “there is something vaguely Kantian in the transcendental perspective assumed 
by this distinction, as if the real point of any inquiry carried out in these terms were to re-
late the phenomenal Trinity to the noumenal Trinity and vice versa.” Sanders’s next criti-
cism, based on the origin of the terminology in the idiosyncratic Johann August Urlsper-
ger, however, is itself subject to the charge of genetic fallacy. See ibid., 144-48. In an earlier 
work, Sanders also rightly points out the confusing nature of the terminology: “’Imma-
nent’ suggests, to anyone with basic theological literacy, God’s presence in the world, and 
is routinely opposed to ‘transcendent.’ In this discussion, however”—and, indeed, in all 
discussions that employ this distinction between immanent and economic—“the Trinity 
considered as transcendent is precisely the immanent Trinity.” Fred Sanders, The Image of 
the Immanent Trinity: Rahner's Rule and the Theological Interpretation of Scripture (New York: 
Peter Lang, 2005), 4.  
200 CG, 240, emphasis original, citing Rahner, Theological Investigations, 4:87-102. The quoted 
words are Moltmann’s summary of Rahner’s essay. While I do not assume that Rahner 
would either accept or reject Moltmann’s reading of him, the closest thing I can find in the 
essay to the first thesis is this: “If the title De Deo Uno is taken seriously, we are not dealing 
merely with the essence and attributes of God, but with the unity of the three divine per-
sons. It is the unity of Father, Son and Spirit and not merely the unicity of the godhead, the 
mediated unity, of which the Trinity is the proper fulfilment, and not the immediate 
unicity of the divine nature which if considered as one numerically is of itself far from 
providing the foundation of the three-fold unity in God. But if one begins with the treatise 
De Deo Uno and not with De Divinitate Una, one is concerned at once with the Father, the 
unoriginated origin of the Son and the Spirit. And it is then strictly speaking impossible to 
place one treatise after the other in the disjointed fashion which is still so common today.” 
Rahner, Theological Investigations, 4:102, emphasis original. Moltmann does not here cite the 
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cannot be undertaken outside of a trinitarian context, and trinitarian theology must 
find its centre in salvation history, specifically in the cross of Christ.201 Moltmann 
thus introduces his own proposal with the thesis: “The material principle of the doc-
trine of the Trinity is the cross of Christ. The formal principle of the knowledge of 
the cross is the doctrine of the Trinity.”202 That is, the cross provides the content for 
a trinitarian theology, whereas the doctrine of the Trinity provides the form of a the-
ology of the cross. One cannot be had without the other. 
5.5.2. The Cross and the Constitution of the Trinity 
To begin, Moltmann turns to Christ’s being handed over to the cross in Paul’s theol-
ogy, drawing attention to the word paradidōmi.203 Paul uses this word as an expres-
sion of God’s wrath on sinful humanity in Rom 1:24, 26, and 28—God hands human-
ity over to their idolatries and, with that, the consequences of their sins. But later on 
in the letter the word is used in a completely different context. God “did not with-
hold his own Son, but gave him up [paradidōmi] for all of us” (Rom 8:32). This same 
theology, Moltmann argues, is presented in stronger terms in 2 Cor 5:21 and Gal 3:13, 
where Jesus is made sin and a curse, respectively.204 He is delivered up to godforsak-
ennness. This has important implications for Moltmann’s doctrine of the Father. 
First, because the Father is Father of the one who is delivered up to godforsakenness, 
 
more well-known work of Rahner’s, published in English as The Trinity, trans. by Joseph 
Donceel (New York: Crossroad, 1997). 
201 Some commentators have pointed out that Moltmann pushes Rahner’s proposals to their 
limit. As Matthias Remenyi summarises their observations, “It appears that Rahner’s the-
sis is understood not only as a corrective in regard to a rigid dichotomy”—in accordance 
with Rahner’s own intention—“but as a categorical condemnation of every form of differ-
entiation between immanent and economic Trinity.” Matthias Remenyi, Um der Hoffnung 
willen: Untersuchungen zur eschatologischen Theologie Jürgen Moltmanns (Regensburg: Frie-
drich Pustet, 2005), 113. 
202 CG, 241. 
203 On Moltmann’s exegesis in CG, see David Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune 
God (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 109-26. Coffey contests almost every exe-
getical move that Moltmann makes. I recommend referring to recent commentaries in or-
der to adjudicate between the two theologians. 
204 Eugene Borowitz disputes the connection between being “hung from a tree” and being 
cursed by God. Borowitz, Contemporary Christologies, 91-92. He does not mention Gal 3:13 





by virtue of Jesus’ abandonment he becomes the Father of human beings who are 
living in godforsakenness. Second, because it is the Father’s “own Son” (Rom 8:32) 
who is abandoned, “in the forsakenness of the Son the Father also forsakes him-
self.”205 But Moltmann is not advocating patripassianism here.206 The Father does not 
die on the cross. Rather, whereas the Son experiences dying,207 the Father experiences 
death, because death is not experienced by the dead but by those who remain. That 
is, it is not that the Father suffers when the Son suffers because their distinction is in 
name only so that the God behind Father and Son undertakes and undergoes the 
actions and passions of both in an undifferentiated way. This is modalism in general 
and patripassianism in particular. For Moltmann, the Father suffers the pain of the 
cross in the manner appropriate to his person—as grief. The Son does not suffer this 
grief, nor does the Father suffer dying. Their sufferings are unique to their respective 
persons.208 
 
205 CG, 243. 
206 Those who charge Moltmann with patripassianism either overlook his careful distinction 
between the sufferings of the Father and the Son or misuse the term, which refers to a form 
of modalism. For the term, see Marcel Sarot, “Patripassianism, Theopaschitism and the 
Suffering of God: Some Historical and Systematic Considerations,” Religious Studies 26:3 
(1990): 363-75, at 369-72. For examples of those who apply the term to Moltmann, see Rah-
ner, “Approaches to Theological Thinking,” 127; Molnar, Divine Freedom, 411-14. 
207 Another problem arises here, however. As Stephen Williams observes, “God can exist as 
trinity or alternatively not exist as trinity, for one who is wholly dead cannot be part of 
trinitarian life.” Stephen N. Williams, “Jürgen Moltmann: A Critical Introduction,” in Get-
ting Your Bearings: Engaging with Contemporary Theologians, ed. Philip Duce and Daniel 
Strange, 75-124 (Leicester: Apollos, 2003), 109. And while it appears that Moltmann may 
have accepted such an implication at the time of writing CG, the implication is inconsistent 
with his later claims concerning the eternality of the Trinity. But two other hermeneutical 
possibilities are available. First, Moltmann could introduce a distinction between Jesus’ di-
vine and human natures, something which he has otherwise been reluctant to do. Or, sec-
ond, Moltmann could distinguish between the creaturely death, which all experience, and 
the christological participation in this death, which in one sense separates Father and Son 
but in another sense does not, insofar as they remain united in the Spirit. Though surely 
not without its problems, I think this second possibility is more consistent with Molt-
mann’s broader theology. 
208 The designation in the book’s title (and in the title of its sixth chapter), “crucified God,” is 
used affirmatively in a few places in CG. See, e.g., CG, 33, 39, 70, 192, 201. The quotation 
marks surrounding Moltmann’s use of the term in many places, however, not only recall 
earlier usage, but suggest that he is not completely satisfied with it. This becomes clear in 
CG, 235, where Luther “arrived at paradoxical distinctions between God and God: be-
tween the God who crucifies and the crucified God.” See 5.4.1. and 5.4.4. below. Klaas 
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 A key verse for Moltmann at this point is Gal 2:20, where it is not the Father 
but now Christ who is the subject of paradidōmi: “the Son of God, who loved me and 
gave himself for me.” This is important because it witnesses to the Son’s willingness 
to go to his death, a willingness in which he is thus united with his Father and his 
Father’s will. Father and Son are united in will and mutual love, “precisely at the 
point of their deepest separation,”209 and, indeed, in spite of it. But there is also an 
excess of unity and love here that transcends and thus overcomes the separation. 
Moltmann expands on this a few pages later: “The fact of this love can be contra-
dicted. It can be crucified, but in crucifixion it finds its fulfilment and becomes love 
of the enemy. Thus its suffering proves to be stronger than hate. Its might is powerful 
in weakness and gains power over its enemies in grief, because it gives life even to 
its enemies and opens up the future to change.”210 Father and Son overcome their 
separation in the greater unity of will that seeks the good of the other and the good 
of godless human beings. Although death has for the meantime overcome their di-
rect, personal connection, it has not overcome their indirect, volitional connection. 
They remain in relationship in their shared will and their shared love for humanity. 
It is in this excess of unity and love beyond personal connection out of which 
the present and eschatological justification of the godless arises. Moreover, such a 
redemption extends not only to individuals but to all the annihilations of human 
 
Runia comments, “It is striking that such expressions as ‘the crucified God’ and ‘the death 
of God’ are entirely absent from Scripture. This is the more striking because the New Tes-
tament writers evidently believed that Jesus was the Son of God in the ontological sense of 
the word. Yet they were apparently of the opinion that all such expressions were to be 
avoided.” Runia, Christological Debate, 43. But this is because “God” (theos) in the NT refers 
to the Father in almost every case. The post-biblical sense that Moltmann is assuming here 
can refer to the whole Trinity or any person specifically. Christian tradition, too, fre-
quently refers to the Son, Spirit, and the whole Trinity as “God,” where the first is rare in 
the NT, the second never explicit, and the third absent completely! D. G. Attfield under-
stands this logic, summarising, “Since Jesus was God and Jesus was crucified, God may be 
called the crucified God.” D. G. Attfield, “Can God be Crucified? A Discussion of J. Molt-
mann,” Scottish Journal of Theology 30:1 (1977): 47-57, at 47. Attfield answers the question of 
his article in the affirmative but rejects much of Moltmann’s approach and many of his 
claims. 
209 CG, 244. 





history, including the Holocaust. The resurrection of the godforsaken man, Jesus, 
provides the ground for the hope that suffering, death, and evil will not have the last 
word. God has taken up human suffering and miraculously transformed it in his 
Son. We now await the transformation of the whole cosmos. The Spirit also makes a 
guest appearance here, being an otherwise minor feature of Moltmann’s theology at 
this still early stage in his career: “What proceeds from this event between Father 
and Son is the Spirit which justifies the godless.”211 And the cross is “an event be-
tween the Father who loves and the Son who is loved in the present Spirit of the love 
that creates life.”212 For Moltmann, then, the Spirit takes on an eschatological role, 
effectuating the love expressed on the cross for all humanity.  
 Notably, the trinitarian persons are so intimately involved in the event of 
Christ’s crucifixion that in it “these persons constitute themselves [sich konstituieren] 
in relationship with each other.”213 The identities of each person are inseparable from 
 
211 CG, 244. 
212 CG, 246, slightly altered. 
213 CG, 245; Ger. 232. The German sich konstituieren maps easily onto the English “constitute” 
and could otherwise be loosely translated as “set themselves up” (gründen), or even “bring 
themselves into being” (ins Leben rufen). See the entry in Duden Online, s.v., “konstitui-
eren,” accessed 29 April, 2019, https://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/konstituieren. 
What is at least clear from the context is that for Moltmann the trinitarian persons undergo 
some kind of formation in their historical relationships to each other. John W. Cooper is 
thus right when he observes that, for Moltmann, “the Trinity is actualized at the cross. 
Without the cross there would be no Trinity.” Panentheism – the Other God of the Philoso-
phers: From Plato to the Present (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), 241. But Bauck-
ham correctly situates this in the context of Moltmann’s wider career: “It seems as though 
in The Crucified God Moltmann meant to say that the Trinity is actually constituted by the 
event of the cross. If so, he quickly retreated from that position to the view that God is 
eternally Trinity.” Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 155. Others have not no-
ticed this, unfortunately. Otto’s criticism of Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity requires 
that Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity does not develop after CG. Randall E. Otto, “Molt-
mann and the Anti-Monotheism Movement,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 3:3 
(2001): 293-308, at 298-301. Stanley Grenz and Roger Olson struggle to answer the question 
they put to Moltmann: “Would God be trinitarian apart from the events of world history?” 
Stanley J. Grenz and Roger E. Olson, 20th Century Theology: God and the World in a Transi-
tional Age (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1992), 182. The authors do not distinguish be-
tween God’s being affected by the world, and God’s being constituted as Trinity. The latter 
takes place at the cross in CG, but in CPS (1975) and later writings the Trinity of persons is 




this historical event. The Father, for example, is first the Father who sends the Son, 
second the Sonless God, and third the Father who justifies the godless in the Spirit 
of a love that is greater than separation. Moltmann is also careful with his use of the 
word “God.” God is not a metaphysical presupposition brought to bear on theolog-
ical interpretation of the cross, but a retrospective concept conducive to speaking of 
the event of Father, Son, and Spirit that was the cross: “In that case, ‘God’ is not 
another nature or a heavenly person or a moral authority, but in fact an ‘event.’”214 
Put simply, “the Trinity is… an eschatological process open for men on earth.”215 
Prayer, for example, is thus not an activity undertaken to God but in God. Following 
the NT, the Father is the one addressed in prayer, made accessible through brother-
hood with Christ and in the power of the Holy Spirit.216 
5.5.3. The Trinity and Eschatology 
A key feature of Moltmann’s theology of the cross is its eschatological aspect. 
Whereas he had treated the relationship between the resurrection and the eschaton 
in TH, here Moltmann turns to the relationship between the crucifixion and the es-
chaton, in conversation with John Calvin,217 A. A. van Ruler, and Dorothee Sölle. 
These three, according to Moltmann, represent a problematic trend towards constru-
ing Christ’s humanity in merely functional terms. Christ becomes human in order to 
remedy human sin, but when, eschatologically, sin becomes no more, the humanity 
of Christ, too, becomes superfluous. He is then present to redeemed humanity solely 
in his divine nature because there is no longer any need for the mediatorial human 
 
214 CG, 247. Moltmann had earlier characterised existentialist concepts of God in the same 
way. HP, 10 (1966). 
215 CG, 249. 
216 So, later: “The Lord’s prayer is in fact directed towards the first Person of the Trinity, not 
the whole Trinity, as Augustine thought.” TKG, 164 (1980). 
217 Richard Muller has successfully shown that Moltmann’s reading of Calvin here, which 
depends on that of Heinrich Quistorp, misrepresents the Reformer’s theology. Richard A. 
Muller, “Christ and the Eschaton: Calvin and Moltmann on the Duration of the Munus Re-
gium,” Harvard Theological Review 74:1 (1981): 31-59. I only note this to draw attention to the 
shortcomings of Moltmann’s exposition. His positive contribution to eschatology in CG 





nature. But for Moltmann the crucified Christ plays a central role in the new creation. 
Redemption does not only restore creation to its original condition. If this were the 
case then the speculative question of when the next Fall would come about exposes 
a legitimate theological problem. No, Christ does not just take away sin; he takes 
away the possibility of sin as well. As such, he is the ground of something new and 
remains that ground through eternity. 
Continuing his criticism, Moltmann provides some exegetical comment on 1 
Cor 15:28, a verse which allegedly led to Calvin’s functional conception of Christ’s 
humanity: “When all things are subjected to him [Christ], then the Son himself will 
also be subjected to the one who put all things in subjection under him, so that God 
may be all in all.” Because he rejects the Chalcedonian distinction between Christ’s 
human and divine natures, for Moltmann Paul here cannot mean that the mediate 
rule of Christ through his humanity gives way to the immediate divine rule of the 
triune God. Rather, the distinction is between the person of the Son and that of the 
Father. Christ’s Sonship, which was negated in the crucifixion and reconstituted in 
the resurrection, looks forward to its perfection in the eschaton. “His Sonship only 
becomes complete as he hands over the kingdom to the Father.”218 That is, the Son’s 
person is historical and remains incomplete as long as there is suffering in the world. 
Likewise, the Father awaits the perfection of his Fatherhood—negated through the 
loss of his Son and also reconstituted in the resurrection—when he will receive the 
kingdom from his Son. 
5.5.4. The Crucified God and Aristotle’s Divine Stone 
As with TH, in CG Moltmann has attempted to rethink Christian theology and its 
categories with a renewed look at the God of Scripture, this time with the crucifixion 
playing a central role in his methodology. But another key difference emerges. In 
TH, it was primarily the God of Parmenides, manifest especially in the projects of 
Barth, Bultmann, and Pannenberg, against whom Moltmann upheld the God of 
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promise. In CG, however, a key culprit is not so easily identifiable. There is the neb-
ulous “theism,” and, though this designation is not treated in detail by Moltmann 
until chapter six, a rereading of CG will show that it is clearly presupposed in the 
polemics of the earlier chapters. Theism is variously defined by its rationalistic ap-
proach to theology and its concern to take hold of a God who makes up for every-
thing that humanity lacks. Such a system also has ethical and political implications 
that run counter to the way of the cross. Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas are its 
chief representatives in CG. Theism’s ethico-political aspect is evident in Moltmann’s 
succinct characterisation of alternatives to the crucified God, “the gods of religion, 
race and class.”219 And then there is protest atheism, represented by Albert Camus 
and Dostoevsky’s Ivan Karamazov. While Moltmann appears to be in full agreement 
with the protests themselves, though, he rejects any implied humanistic alternative, 
such as those of the communist parties of Eastern Europe. 
 Notably, however, the Greeks still make their presence known in Moltmann’s 
expositions and polemics in CG. They consistently fall under the heading of theism. 
Thus Moltmann’s proposal for a dialectical epistemology, based on the epistemolog-
ical logic he discovers in the cross, is offered as an alternative to the Platonic principle 
of analogy, which ultimately derives from Empedocles. Similarly, Peter Lombard’s 
natural theology comes under scrutiny for its connections to Stoicism, which I have 
treated above.220 But it is the Greek witness against divine suffering that demands 
most of Moltmann’s attention. 
Having advanced his proposals in regard to divine suffering, Moltmann re-
flects back: “Since Plato and Aristotle the metaphysical and ethical perfection of God 
has been described as apatheia.”221 This term corresponds to the Latin-derived “im-
passibility,” which is more common in English.222 Moltmann is aware of its broad 
 
219 CG, 201. 
220 See 5.4.2. 
221 CG, 267-68. 
222 See Marcel Sarot’s excellent article on terminology, “Patripassianism, Theopaschitism 
and the Suffering of God.” An earlier, systematic attempt to clarify the terminology can be 
found in Richard E. Creel, Divine Impassibility: An Essay in Philosophical Theology (Cam-





semantic domain: “The word apatheia has many connotations. It means incapable of 
being affected by outside influences, incapable of feeling, as is the case with dead 
things, and the freedom of the spirit from inner needs and external damage.”223 He 
proceeds to treat the thought of Plato and Aristotle together, implying a considerable 
degree of perceived overlap between their positions. If God is perfect then God is 
not in need of anything. This quickly leads to the affirmation of immutability—that 
God does not change, because change indicates deficiency.  
An additional problem arises here in connection to friendship and love. No 
one can be friends with God as God does not require anything of human beings. 
There can be no reciprocity. Moreover, friendship with God is impossible in that God 
cannot love human beings. Aristotle writes, “For friendship, we maintain, exists only 
where there can be a return of affection, but friendship towards god does not admit 
of love being returned, nor at all of loving. For it would be strange if one were to say 
that he loved Zeus. Neither is it possible to have affection returned by lifeless ob-
jects.”224 In excluding undesirable passions, consistency requires Aristotle to exclude 
love from God too. Thus, in an earlier section of the chapter, Moltmann rejected Ar-
istotle’s God as “the beloved who is in love with himself; a Narcissus in a metaphys-
ical degree: Deus incurvatus in se.”225 This God is the ground of human love as well 
as its recipient, in the form of human admiration of his perfection. But such a love is 
not a real love because it cannot be directed outwards to human beings. 
For Moltmann, the inability to love, essential to Aristotle’s God, is also linked 
to the inability to suffer. “For a God who is incapable of suffering is a being who 
 
Creel’s proposals, provides simpler definitions and is better attuned to their historical em-
ployment and development. Sarot also takes Moltmann to task for his use elsewhere of the 
designation, “patricompassianism.” While this coinage might indeed be more trouble than 
it is worth, my focus in this chapter is on the more material aspects of Moltmann’s contri-
bution, which often do not fit easily into the available categories represented by different 
terms. 
223 CG, 267. 
224 Aristotle, Magna Moralia, II, 1208b, in Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised 
Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1984), 2:1913. A different, unspecified edition is quoted by Moltmann in CG, 268. 
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cannot be involved.”226 And, “if love is the acceptance of the other without regard to 
one’s own well-being, then it contains within itself the possibility of sharing in suf-
fering… as a result of the otherness of the other.”227 This reveals a basic problem for 
Aristotle’s God, especially in light of modern protest atheism, because “a God who 
cannot suffer is poorer than any man.”228 Such a God may be omnipotent, but he “is 
in himself an incomplete being, for he cannot experience helplessness and power-
lessness.”229 This last observation, alongside the testimony of Scripture, likely in-
forms Moltmann’s proposal that suffering and God are not mutually exclusive, 
something which theism cannot allow and atheism cannot consider. 
Apatheia also found fruitful expression in the sphere of ethics, especially 
among the Stoics. Human beings were to imitate God, with the goal of being unper-
turbed by bodily or emotional concerns. Moltmann’s analysis is, strikingly, much 
more sympathetic at this point.230 He claims that the ancient ideal of human apatheia 
should not be confused with modern apathy. To its credit, early Christianity inter-
preted apatheia in light of the divine agape, love. Here, God could be impassible in the 
sense of being free from external forces, and this freedom was the ground for the 
 
226 CG, 222. Something of this idea was already present in TH, 208 (1964): “It is only in the 
things a man loves that he can be hurt, and it is only in love that man suffers and recog-
nizes the deadliness of death.” 
227 CG, 230. 
228 CG, 222. 
229 CG, 223. 
230 Paul Gavrilyuk observes that, in contrast to other adherents of “the theory of theology’s 
fall into Hellenistic philosophy,” “Moltmann’s position is not easily classifiable, since he 
rightly recognizes that apatheia for the Greek authors denoted God’s freedom and self-suf-
ficiency, rather than apathy and indifference.” And, “most proponents of the passibilist 
position,” including Moltmann, “admit to different degrees that there are some elements 
of truth in patristic understanding of the [sic] divine impassibility.” Paul L. Gavrilyuk, The 
Suffering of the Impassible God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 178-79. But William Hill claims, “Moltmann appears to view the apathetic 
God of the tradition in terms of Aristotle’s ‘Unmoved Mover,’ without noting the radical 
reconstruction such a concept underwent in medieval theology.” William J. Hill, The Three-
Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery of Salvation (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of 





liberation of human beings through love. “The negation of need, desire and compul-
sion expressed by apatheia was taken up and filled with a new positive content.”231 
Nonetheless, Moltmann continues, this framework remained an obstacle to properly 
perceiving God’s presence in the cross of Christ. 
More generalised rejections of Greek thought in this connection, however, 
resurface in Moltmann’s later work. In TKG he writes, “Christian theology acquired 
Greek philosophy’s ways of thinking in the Hellenistic world; and since that time 
most theologians have simultaneously maintained the passion of Christ, God’s Son, 
and the deity’s essential incapacity for suffering…. But in doing this they have 
simply added together Greek philosophy’s ‘apathy’ axiom and the central state-
ments of the gospel.”232 And in his autobiography Moltmann claims, “It is better for 
Christian theology to take leave of Aristotle’s apathy axiom and to begin with the 
biblical axiom of the living God, and to talk about the suffering of the passionate 
God.”233 While this does not require Moltmann to forsake more nuanced treatments 
of the theme, it demonstrates that he still finds a generalised contrastive rhetoric use-
ful. 
For Moltmann, the Greeks, then, certainly play their part in the church’s early 
forays into and later full embrace of theism. Yet CG also goes beyond TH in its ex-
plicit concern with the more universal tendency, “man’s inhuman concern for self-
deification through knowledge and works.”234 
5.6. Summary 
The main purpose of this chapter has been to trace the development of Moltmann’s 
contrastive paradigm into a new context—that of his trinitarian theology of the cross 
as it is expressed in CG. As in TH, this contrastive paradigm arises from a commit-
ment to the uniqueness of the biblical witness to God, against competing conceptions 
 
231 CG, 269-70. 
232 TKG, 22 (1980). 
233 BP, 193-94 (2006), slightly adjusted. 
234 CG, 70. 
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of God derived from elsewhere. Of course, this is not the only feature of CG pertain-
ing to Moltmann’s theology of Scripture. I have therefore commented on other rele-
vant material, especially in my treatment of Moltmann’s christology. 
 Moltmann takes inspiration from the work of Luther, Barth, and Heschel, who 
each in their own way criticise the Christian or Jewish tradition for overlooking key 
aspects of the biblical witness to God. For Luther and Barth, this concerns the role of 
the cross. For Heschel, it is the prophetic witness to the pathos of God that has been 
brushed aside. 
 In the first two chapters of CG, Moltmann responds to the call to situate the 
cross at the centre of Christian theology. Despite all misunderstandings and misap-
propriations of its message throughout church history, the cross remains as that 
which calls into question every interpretation—including those most faithful to its 
own aims, whether they be that of Luther or of Moltmann himself. But here already 
the scope of the contrastive paradigm is significantly broader when compared to its 
application in TH. The genetic connection to various Greek figures hardly makes an 
appearance at this stage, if at all. It is no longer simply the clash between biblical and 
Hellenistic assumptions and worldviews, but the clash between the biblical witness 
to the cross and all human systems of thought. 
 Importantly, this cross is Christ’s cross. Moltmann is not interested in abstract-
ing the crucifixion from its properly christological—and, in later chapters of CG, trin-
itarian—context. Chapters three to five of CG, then, treat this foundation in christol-
ogy. Here Moltmann rejects christologies both traditional and modern insofar as 
they begin from a priori notions of divine and human being, respectively. A biblical 
christology, rather, sees divine and human being as yet incomplete, defined in light 
of their shared future. Nonetheless, this does not mean that no christological state-
ments can be made at present. Moltmann proposes a dialectical relationship between 
Jesus’ person in history and his person as it comes into the present from the future. 





compromised. Importantly, Moltmann’s focus on the cross in CG means that alt-
hough Jesus’ future life with God requires that the finality of his crucifixion be con-
tested, the horror of his death remains as a contestation of divine victory. 
 Key assumptions that Moltmann holds in regard to the nature and role of the 
OT and NT are also revealed in his christological chapters. Jesus’ uniqueness, for 
example, deriving from his eschatological provenance, requires that his identity is 
not exhausted by OT texts. Essential features of this uniqueness include the grace 
shown to the poor and outcasts through Jesus and Jesus’ addressing God as Father. 
In any case, Moltmann places the accent on Jesus’ departure from how his contem-
poraries understood the law, even if Moltmann’s eschatological orientation leads 
him to also stress the provisionality of the OT witness—one which extends, not least, 
to the NT. In regard to the latter, Moltmann draws attention to its primary function 
in testifying Christ, whose person and history thus remain the criterion of its truth. 
On this basis, however, and with the help of historical criticism, Moltmann disputes 
the Lukan and Johannine accounts of the passion. Both downplay the monstrous na-
ture of Jesus’ last moments. Nonetheless, Moltmann also understands that biblical 
texts do not constitute straightforward, historical recollections of the events they at-
test but are coloured by their missiological aims. An examination of the broader role 
that Luke and John play in CG demonstrates that Moltmann values their important 
role within the canon. 
 In his sixth chapter, Moltmann advances his proposals for a trinitarian theol-
ogy of the cross. He begins with a series of critical discussions on figures in modern 
theology, traditional theology (theism), and atheism. This prepares the way for Molt-
mann’s alternative, informed by its orientation to the cross and shaped by a commit-
ment to the doctrine of the Trinity. Here, the Trinity is compromised in the Son’s 
death and the Father’s grief. But it is also reconstituted in the resurrection, deriving 
from the mutual, overcoming love of Father and Son—closely associated with the 
Spirit—and unifying them in the reign of the risen Son. This is the positive compo-
nent of Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm in CG, founded in the centrality of Jesus’ 
cross and the Trinity to the biblical witness. It is in conflict with all theologies and 
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systems that would oppose this God of the cross—represented in particular by Molt-
mann’s “theism” and “atheism.” Notably, although theism inherits assumptions 
from Greek philosophy, such as divine impassibility, in CG Moltmann’s contrastive 
paradigm has a significantly broader application. Hellenism makes its appearance at 
key points, but it is not the main focus of Moltmann’s criticism. 
 A final notable application of Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm is to what he 
perceives to be a sharp disagreement between the biblical witness and the theological 
tradition on the concept of divine unity. This will be the focus of the following chap-





6. The Story of the Trinity in The Trinity and the Kingdom 
Three years after the publication of The Crucified God (1972), Moltmann’s third major 
work appeared as The Church in the Power of the Spirit (1975). It was followed by his 
fourth major work, The Trinity and the Kingdom (1980). CG set in motion a new project 
for Moltmann—that of knowing God as Trinity. Key contributions to this project are 
offered in CPS, but it is in the book-length work on the theme in TKG that it receives 
full expression. Significantly, as with other major themes in Motlmann’s theology, 
the development of a doctrine of the Trinity is driven by biblical texts and concerns. 
It is the purpose of this chapter to explore them. 
 I have divided the content into four sections. In the first, I attend to traces of 
trinitarian thinking in Moltmann’s earliest theology, proceeding to the first major 
influence on Moltmann in this connection, Erik Peterson. Because in the previous 
chapter I have already attended to Moltmann’s trinitarian theology as it is expressed 
in CG, I revisit this material only briefly, in order to comment on the concept of di-
vine unity latent in the book. In a second section, I explore the important turn to a 
trinitarian history in Moltmann’s thought, developed first in some detail in CPS. This 
work is also significant for the reflections provided on the eschatological unification 
of the trinitarian persons. Here, too, I discuss two 1979 essays that reveal some key 
concerns on Moltmann’s part in regard to trinitarian theology. In the third and fourth 
sections of this chapter, I address just some of the many rich proposals made in TKG. 
I begin with methodological questions in the third section, such as Moltmann’s Or-
thodox influences, his rationale for a new doctrine of the Trinity, and the hermeneu-
tics that informs underpins his project. The fourth section concerns the content of 
Moltmann’s trinitarian theology. I consider the material on trinitarian freedom and 
love, the history of the Trinity, trinitarian action, Moltmann’s polemic against Barth 
and Rahner, trinitarian personhood and unity, the rejection of the filioque clause, and 
the relationship between trinitarian and human community. 
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6.1. The Emerging Call to Trinitarian Theology: Moltmann’s Early Work 
Already long before TKG was a twinkle in his eye, Moltmann began to conceive of a 
new approach to the doctrine of the Trinity. In this first section I attend to the early 
steps that Moltmann takes in this direction. Besides some of the more miscellaneous 
evidence, the influence of Erik Peterson at this stage and the concept of divine unity 
latent in CG are of note. 
6.1.1. Hints of the Trinity 
A hint of the doctrine of trinitarian unity that Moltmann forwards in TKG already 
appears in negative terms in TH (1964).1 Moltmann criticises the identification of the 
Father of Jesus Christ with the God of Greek metaphysics, writing, “If, however, the 
divinity of God is seen in his unchangeableness, immutability, impassibility and 
unity, then the historic working of this God in the Christ event of the cross and res-
urrection becomes as impossible to assert as does his eschatological promise for the 
future.”2 Interestingly, a little later in the book, Moltmann rejects modalism as well.3 
Besides these generalised rejections, however, any positive content is implicit. As 
Richard Bauckham observes, “Moltmann’s doctrine of God in Theology of Hope is not 
explicitly trinitarian.”4 And Donald Claybrook cites a personal conversation with 
Moltmann in which he learnt of the theologian’s early lack of interest in the doctrine 
 
1 For a different approach to the material treated under this subsection, see Thomas R. 
Thompson, “Imitatio Trinitatias: The Trinity as Social Model in the Theologies of Jürgen 
Moltmann and Leonardo Boff” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton Theological Seminary, 1996), 50-57. 
Also instructive here is Richard Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the Making 
(Hants, UK: Marshall Morgan and Scott, 1987), 91-96. 
2 TH, 140, emphasis mine. 
3 TH, 200. 
4 Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology, 91. Contra M. Douglas Meeks: “If we look for a 
basic structure in the development of Moltmann’s theology, we can see clearly its trinitar-
ian nature from the beginning.” M. Douglas Meeks, foreword to EH, xi. Nonetheless, 
Bauckham continues, in TH “the trinitarian truth of God is not given as the disclosure of 
supra-temporal truth; it is the truth of Jesus Christ who still awaits his future, of the Spirit 
which is the power of the resurrection of the dead, and of the God who still waits to be ‘all 
in all’. Theology of Hope points in the direction of a concept of the Trinity as process open to 





of the Trinity. Claybrook writes, “In his early works, viz., Theology of Hope and The 
Crucified God, one could not so much as even ‘glean’ a doctrine of the Holy Spirit! It 
was simply non-existent. In fact, when Theology of Hope was written, he was simply 
not interested in the Trinity, much less the third person of the Trinity, the Holy 
Spirit.”5 
Nonetheless, Moltmann’s early theology was not completely bereft of inter-
est in the Trinity. A clue appears in a 1959 essay, where Moltmann writes, “There is 
a kind of static rigidity about Bonhoeffer’s doctrine of the incarnation, with slight 
overtones of modalism, whereas Barth’s trinitarian thinking gives a new slant to the 
doctrine of the incarnation.”6 A section of a 1960 essay takes on a trinitarian structure, 
beginning with God’s faithfulness through history, proceeding to the godlessness of 
reality as it is revealed in the cross, and concluding with the Spirit’s work in deliver-
ing humanity into God’s future.7 In 1964, commenting on the filioque, Moltmann ob-
serves that there are “dogmatic decisions in the doctrine of the Trinity” that carry 
significant implications for other areas of theology.8 Finally, a positive anticipation 
of his later doctrine of the Trinity can be found as early as 1965: “In the New Testa-
ment, the trinitarian formula does not simply outline the revelation of God but finds 
it in a particular history, namely in the resurrection of the Son by the Father and 
through the Holy Spirit.”9 It is when he begins reading Erik Peterson in the late six-
ties, however, that Moltmann develops a more sustained interest in formulating a 
trinitarian theology. 
 
5 Donald Adrian Claybrook, Sr., “The Emerging Doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the Writings 
of Jürgen Moltmann” (Ph.D. diss., Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1983), 185, em-
phasis original. 
6 Moltmann, “The Lordship of Christ and Human Society,” in Jürgen Moltmann and Jürgen 
Weissbach, Two Studies in the Theology of Bonhoeffer, trans. by Reginald H. Fuller and Ilse 
Fuller, 19-94 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967), 53. 
7 HP, 103-9. This has also been recognised by A. J. Conyers in God, Hope, and History: Jürgen 
Moltmann and the Christian Concept of History (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1988), 
133-35. 
8 Moltmann, “Schrift, Tradition, Traditionen. Bericht über die Arbeit der Sektion II,” Öku-
menische Rundschau 13 (1964): 104-11, at 111. 
9 PTh, 102. 
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6.1.2. Erik Peterson and the Politics of Monotheism 
Reflecting later on the emergence of his trinitarian theology, Moltmann points to Erik 
Peterson’s “Monotheism as Political Problem” as a particularly important text in this 
connection.10 This short book, though largely historical in content, was contemporary 
in intent. In writing it, Peterson wanted to demonstrate how trinitarian orthodoxy 
undermined Reichstheologie, the theology that married the church to the designs of 
the Third Reich.11 A brief exposition will provide some context for the development 
of Moltmann’s theology. 
 Peterson introduces his argument with the claim that “for Christians, political 
involvement can never take place except under the presumption of faith in the triune 
God. This faith transcends Judaism and paganism, ‘monotheism’ and ‘polythe-
ism’.”12 This is not a general monotheism, however, but rather that which ultimately 
derives from Aristotle and through which Christian trinitarian faith has lost its way, 
with dire political consequences.13 So, at the end of Book XII of the Metaphysics, Ar-
istotle claims, “Being refuses to be badly administered. The rule of the many is not 
 
10 ExpTh, 303-4 (2000). See Erik Peterson, “Monotheism as a Political Problem: A Contribu-
tion to the History of Political Theology in the Roman Empire,” in Theological Tractates, ed. 
and trans. by Michael J. Hollerich, 68-105 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011). 
Cf. the citations of this work in German in HP, 27 n. 9 (1966); RRF, 180 n. 3 (1969); and the 
allusion in RRF, 194 (1969). 
11 Michael J. Hollerich, introduction to Peterson, Theological Tractates, xxiv. For an extended 
exposition of the book’s arguments in English, and a discussion of its context against the 
thought of the Catholic Nazi, Carl Schmitt, see György Geréby, “Political Theology versus 
Theological Politics: Erik Peterson and Carl Schmitt,” New German Critique 105, 35:3 (2008): 
7-33. Giuseppe Ruggieri, drawing on other reactions to Peterson’s work, provides some 
brief criticisms. For example, “not only monotheism, but trinitarian belief too has in fact 
been linked to a political theology used to justify the existing political order.” And, “mon-
otheism too has in fact known relationships with the prevailing power that were not justifi-
catory but critical.” Giuseppe Ruggieri, “God and Power: A Political Function of Monothe-
ism?” trans. by Paul Burns, in Monotheism, ed. Claude Geffré, Jean-Pierre Jossua, and Mar-
cus Lefébure, 16-27 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1985), 18-19, emphasis original. These criti-
cisms can also be directed towards corresponding aspects of Moltmann’s theology. 
12 Peterson, “Monotheism as a Political Problem,” 68. 
13 Moltmann’s polemical use of the term “monotheism,” derived from Peterson’s article, has 
invited sharp criticism. Nonetheless, as Stephen Williams explains, “’Monotheism’ in theo-
logical writing usually means ‘one God’ but when Moltmann attacks it he means to attack 





healthy; let there be only one ruler.”14 Following Werner Jaeger, Peterson argues that 
this statement is placed at the end of Book XII—itself originally an individual lec-
ture—in order to serve as a conclusion to Aristotle’s reflections on metaphysical 
unity. In doing this, Aristotle closely associates metaphysical unity with the rule of 
a single principle. Peterson also points to the development of this theme in Philo, for 
whom the one God corresponds with the one divine rule over the cosmos. Conse-
quently, for Philo there is one people of God, who are thus universally significant in 
their priesthood to the nations. Also noted here is Philo’s view of the Hellenistic 
monarchy or the Roman Principate “as the truly authentic image of monarchical or-
der in the cosmos,” established by God in opposition to “ochlocracy” (mob rule).15 
 The influence of Aristotle’s political monotheism continues through early 
Christianity. Peterson finds evidence for this in figures such as Justin, Tatian, The-
ophilus, Irenaeus, and Tertullian. Celsus, too, points to the close connection between 
Christian monotheism and politics in his accusation that Christian rejection of other 
gods undermines the structure of the Empire, as the Empire allows for different peo-
ples to worship their own gods. Significantly, in his reply, Origen argues that not 
only is it true that Christians seek the dissolution of different religious practices in 
the eschatological worship of the one God, but that God unified the Empire under 
the reign of Augustus, during which Jesus was born, to better allow for the spread 
of the gospel. Peterson also attends here to Eusebius, who further developed Ori-
gen’s interpretation. Eusebius, for example, saw in Augustus’s reign the fulfilment 
 
mann: A Critical Introduction,” In Getting Your Bearings: Engaging with Contemporary Theo-
logians, ed. Philip Duce and Daniel Strange, 75-124 (Leicester: Apollos, 2003), 96. Williams 
further notes though that much of the church’s doctrine of the Trinity also falls under the 
banner of monotheism for Moltmann because he views it as insufficiently trinitarian. 
Bauckham suggests that “Moltmann might have been less open to misunderstanding had 
he used the term ‘unitarianism’ rather than ‘monotheism’.” Richard Bauckham, The Theol-
ogy of Jürgen Moltmann (London: T&T Clark, 1995), 172. 
14 Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII, 1076a, in Aristotelis Metaphysica, ed. Werner Jaeger (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1957), 34. Peterson’s citation is translated into English by his translator, Holler-
ich. 
15 Peterson, “Monotheism as a Political Problem,” 74-75. 
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of numerous OT oracles prophesying peace between the nations. Summarising, Pe-
terson writes, “What began in principle with Augustus has become reality in the 
present under Constantine. When Constantine defeated Licinius, political monarchy 
was reestablished and at the same time the divine Monarchy was secured.”16 Euse-
bius was followed by other patristic authors such as Chrysostom, Theodoret, Am-
brose, Jerome, and Orosius, and his political theology also found expression in Ari-
anism. 
 The word “monarchy” soon after largely lost its earthly-political connotations. 
Gregory of Nazianzus, according to Peterson, spoke of a trinitarian monarchy that 
“had no correspondence in the created order.”17 Augustine, too, objected to charac-
terising the reign of Augustus as a peace brought about by God. Indeed, Augustus 
waged his own wars and such war continued into Augustine’s day. Neither could 
the divine monarchy, in view of the doctrine of the Trinity, nor the Christian embrace 
of the pax augusta, in view of eschatology, be sustained. Indeed, “a fundamental 
break was made with every ‘political theology’ that misuses the Christian proclama-
tion for the justification of a political situation.”18 Thus, “the peace that the Christian 
seeks is won by no emperor, but is solely a gift of him who ‘is higher than all under-
standing.’”19 So concluded Peterson in his 1933 book, published against the back-
ground of the rise of the Nazi party. 
 Moltmann’s interest in Peterson can be seen in one 1966 essay, a critical expo-
sition of the cosmological proof of God that is integral to Pannenberg’s theology of 
universal history. Here Moltmann invokes Feuerbach’s critique of religion together 
with Peterson’s critique of monotheism. Not only is the traditional theological ap-
 
16 Peterson, “Monotheism as a Political Problem,” 94. 
17 Peterson, “Monotheism as a Political Problem,” 103. 
18 Peterson, “Monotheism as a Political Problem,” 104. Moltmann argues that “Peterson did 
not mean to dismiss every political theology.” TKG, 248 n. 2 (1980). He cites Peterson, who 
writes, ”For Christians, political involvement can never take place except under the pre-
sumption of faith in the triune God.” Peterson, “Monotheism as a Political Problem,” 68. 





proach to divine unity implicitly constructed in response to the disunity and disor-
der of human existence (Feuerbach),20 but this unity finds expression in a corre-
sponding political reality. “Pax christiana and pax romana, Christ and Augustus, are 
connected in parallel by providence.”21 In another essay, first published in 1969, 
Moltmann takes up Peterson’s critique of Aristotle. If metaphysical unity and meta-
physical monarchy coincide, “this could be understood as the justification of an im-
perialistic peace policy. The hierarchical structure of the metaphysical world was of-
ten interpreted as being the transcendent background of the political world’s hierar-
chical structure. Conversely, the ‘one God’ was represented by the ‘one ruler’, as in 
imperial ideology.”22 That is, this ancient monotheistic metaphysics upholds an im-
perialist politics, and vice versa.23 
It is in CG (1972), though, that Peterson’s influence is most apparent, dove-
tailing with the second major factor influencing Moltmann’s development of his al-
ternative approach to divine unity, the theology of the cross—which I will discuss in 
the next subsection. Moltmann cites “Monotheism as a Political Problem” three times 
in CG,24 and displays a clear interest in Peterson, citing four other essays and works 
of his throughout the book.25 Following Peterson, Moltmann recounts, early Chris-
tian political theology made an apparently natural but ultimately disastrous move. 
Although the powers of Caesar were checked with the claim that the Caesarean at-
tributes belonged principally to God, this also meant that divine authority was for-
mulated “in the image of the Caesars.”26 As such, “the authority of the emperor was 
secured by the idea of unity: one God—one Logos—one Nomos—one emperor—one 
 
20 See 4.2.5. 
21 HP, 6-8. There are no clear allusions to Peterson in Moltmann’s earlier, related critique of 
Pannenberg in TH, 276-79 (1964). 
22 FC, 13, cf. 3, 173 n. 3. 
23 Cf. Moltmann, “The Cross and Civil Religion,” in Religion and Political Society, ed. The In-
stitute of Christian Thought, trans. by Thomas Hughson and Paul Rigby, 14-47 (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1974 [Ger. 1970]), 24-27. 
24 CG, 282 n. 43, 286 n. 109, 339 n. 9. 
25 CG, 31 n. 23, 77-78 nn. 40-41, 290 n. 164. 
26 CG, 250. 
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church—one empire.”27 While earlier having subverted the logic of empire, Christian 
theology soon went in the opposite direction and instead absorbed it. 
Peterson’s influence on the political theology of CG, alongside that of Carl 
Schmitt, Karl Rahner, Alfred North Whitehead, and Hendrikus Berkhof, can also be 
seen in Moltmann’s polemical use of the word “monotheism.”28 Moltmann writes, 
“In the ancient world of religion, the doctrine of the Trinity in the concept of God 
was the doctrine which marked off Christianity from polytheism, pantheism and 
monotheism,”29 and combines this with Rahner’s diagnosis: “The religious concep-
tions of many Christians prove to be no more than a weakly Christianized monothe-
ism.”30 With no apparent irony, though, Rahner, along with Barth, is repudiated for 
his “simple concept of God” that shies away from too strongly distinguishing the 
trinitarian persons,31 and later occasions Moltmann’s accusations of modalism.32 But 
this is more closely related to his theology of the cross. As Moltmann writes in 1979, 
reflecting on the theology of CG, “If God is an indivisible, eternal subject, then he can 
only be either dead or not dead, and because in his unity and eternity he is also im-
mortal, he simply cannot be dead.”33 Nonetheless, although already a dirty word for 
 
27 CG, 325. 
28 CG, 158-59 n. 74, 236, 250, 325-26. But cf. the comments on Schmitt in CG, 339 n. 19; TKG, 
248 n. 2 (1980); ExpTh, 304 (2000). 
29 CG, 235. Moltmann paraphrases Peterson, “Monotheism as a Political Problem,” 68 
(quoted above), but removes the reference to Judaism. 
30 CG, 236. So Karl Rahner: “Christians, for all their orthodox profession of faith in the Trin-
ity, are almost just ‘monotheist’ in their actual religious existence.” Karl Rahner, Theological 
Investigations, vol. 4, More Recent Writings, trans. by Kevin Smyth (London: Darton, Long-
man & Todd, 1974), 79. Moltmann cites this same page later in this paragraph. Cf. the 
other polemical references to monotheism in CG, 215, 246, 265, 281 n. 36, 323, 325. 
31 CG, 203; Ger. 188. This criticism is also made of Eberhard Jüngel, H. G. Geyer, and Martin 
Luther. CG, 203-4, 235. For clarity’s sake, it should be noted that Moltmann’s rejection of 
this einfacher Gottesbegriff does not assume that those who hold to it do so because of the 
doctrine of divine simplicity. Although he is also critical of the latter doctrine, his focus 
here is on theology that prioritises the divine substance as the basis for unity, ahead of the 
unity of persons. 
32 TKG, 139-48 (1980). I will discuss this below. See 6.4.4. 





Moltmann in CG, his critical use of the term “monotheism” is here mostly overshad-
owed by the more general “theism.”34 
6.1.3. Divine Unity in the Crucifixion 
Moltmann’s proposed alternative to the alliance between empire and the Father of 
Christ anticipates the later developments in his theology: “In the doctrine of the Trin-
ity Christian theology describes the essential unity of God the Father with the incar-
nate, crucified Son in the Holy Spirit.”35 The doctrine of the Trinity “speaks of God 
in respect of the incarnation and death of Jesus and in so doing breaks the spell of 
the old philosophical concept of God, at the same time destroying the idols of na-
tional political religions.”36 It is the cross especially that propels Moltmann towards 
a doctrine of God that takes a thoroughly “trinitarian” form. This is why he later 
refers to it as the second major influence on the development of his doctrine of the 
Trinity.37 
As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, for Moltmann it is not merely 
Christ who suffers in his human nature, nor even God who suffers on the cross, but 
it is the Son who experiences dying and the Father who experiences death.38 Thus, 
“it is advisable to abandon the concept of God and to speak of the relationships of 
the Son and the Father and the Spirit at the point at which ‘God’ might be expected 
to be mentioned.”39 And, “the unity of the dialectical history of Father and Son and 
 
34 Conversely, in TKG “theism” seems to disappear altogether: “I am using the term ‘mono-
theism’ where other people”—Moltmann himself included!—“following the ideas of the 
nineteenth century, talk about ‘theism’.” TKG, 240 n. 7 (1980). It should also be noted that 
the epiphany theology rejected by Moltmann in TH (1964) is anachronistically and thus 
misleadingly characterised as “the monotheism of the eternal presence” by Randall E. Otto 
in “Moltmann and the Anti-Monotheism Movement,” International Journal of Systematic 
Theology 3:3 (2001): 293-308, at 296. Moltmann did not begin to use this term polemically 
until he started reading Peterson in the late sixties. But Otto seems to want to attribute a 
single and continuous line of thought to Moltmann, making criticism of his theology a 
much simpler task. 
35 CG, 326. 
36 CG, 215. 
37 ExpTh, 304-6 (2000). 
38 See 5.5.2. 
39 CG, 207. 
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Spirit in the cross of Golgotha… can be described so to speak retrospectively as 
‘God.’”40 Moltmann is attempting to conceive of the doctrine of God in such a way 
that the trinitarian persons, if not completely conceptually prior, at least share con-
ceptual priority with the essential divine unity in some way. Therefore, the unity of 
Father and Son is volitional, though Moltmann’s articulation of this claim is some-
what ambiguous at this point: “In the concepts of earlier systematic theology it is 
possible to talk of a homoousion, in respect of an identity of substance, the community 
of will of the Father and Son on the cross. However, the unity contains not only iden-
tity of substance but also the wholly and utterly different character and inequality of 
the event on the cross. In the cross, Father and Son are most deeply separated in 
forsakenness and at the same time are most inwardly one in their surrender.”41 Else-
where in the same year he writes, “We then understand the homoousious in historical 
terms. It is not God’s essence behind or beyond history but God’s history in the 
Christ-event.”42 Positively, then, the unity of Father and Son consists in their shared 
history and their common will for the salvation of the earth. Moltmann will develop 
this concept of history more clearly in CPS (1975), which I attend to in the following 
subsection. At this stage, however, his programme is still to develop, appearing in 
latent form in claims such as: “The relationships in the Trinity between Father and 
Son are not fixed in static terms once and for all, but are a living history. This history 
of God or this history in God begins with the sending and delivering up of the Son, 
continues with his resurrection and the transference of the rule of God to him, and 
only ends when the Son hands over this will to the Father.”43 
In this context Moltmann also speaks of the Spirit, but only hints at a pneu-
matological basis for divine unity.44 Nonetheless, his scanty comments on the Spirit 
 
40 CG, 247, emphasis mine. As will be seen below, however, already with CPS (1975), pub-
lished just three years later, Moltmann seems to show little—if any—discomfort with us-
ing the word “God.” 
41 CG, 244. 
42 EH, 81 (1972). 
43 CG, 265. 
44 Perhaps this omission is encouraged by Moltmann’s methodological crucicentrism: “The 





point to the latter’s role in redemption, which for Moltmann means the uniting of 
the believer with the Trinity: “What proceeds from this event between Father and 
Son is the Spirit which justifies the godless, fills the forsaken with love and even 
brings the dead alive.”45 Following the crucifixion, the Spirit “opens up the future 
and creates life,”46 so that the believer can be “taken up into the inner life of God.”47 
It follows that “the Trinity is no closed circle [sich geschlossener Kreis] in heaven, but 
an eschatological process open for men on earth.”48 These claims in regard to a trin-
itarian history and process of unification with believers are developed more thor-
oughly in CPS. 
Although the doctrine of the Trinity was not a key feature of Moltmann’s 
theology before CG, the evidence I have provided at the beginning of this section 
suggests that he was not completely disinterested in the doctrine either. But it is with 
his reading of Peterson in the late sixties that this interest begins to take any mean-
ingful root. While it cannot yet be said that Peterson played a formative role in Molt-
mann’s trinitarian hermeneutics, however, his analysis of the relationship between 
concepts of God and support for the political status quo was deeply influential, par-
ticularly with respect to claiming the doctrine of the Trinity as the necessary alterna-
tive. Peterson thus informs Moltmann’s developing contrastive paradigm in regard 
to the Trinity, even if Moltmann has not established a strong connection between 
Scripture and the doctrine of the Trinity at this stage. It is in CG, finally, that Molt-
mann starts to offer his own reflections of the Trinity, placing the doctrine at the 
 
Christ and the Holy Spirit back to the earthly Jesus and his way to the cross.” CG, 54. Molt-
mann makes a more explicit statement later: “The Holy Spirit glorifies Christ in us and us 
in Christ for the glory of God the Father. By bringing this about, he unites us and creation 
with the Son and the Father, as he unites the Son himself with the Father. The Spirit is the 
bond of fellowship and the power of unification. Together with God the Father and 
through God the Son, he is the unifying God. The history of the Spirit is the history of 
these unifications.” FC, 91 (1975); cf. Moltmann in DGG, 185-86 (1979); TKG, 126, 169 
(1980). 
45 CG, 244. 
46 CG, 247. 
47 CG, 249. 
48 CG, 249; Ger. 236, translation adjusted. Kohl has “self-contained group,” but this does not 
reflect Barth’s theology, which Moltmann is alluding to here. See CG, 255. 
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centre of his project, alongside the cross. In the present section I have focussed on 
Moltmann’s work in CG as it concerns his alternative approach to the doctrine of 
divine unity. This alternative becomes particularly important in TKG, where it is 
characterised as the biblical alternative to that which is offered by the tradition. But 
TKG is still some time away. Other significant material can be found in three texts 
written in the intervening years. 
6.2. The Discovery of Trinitarian History 
Having acknowledged the need for a thoroughly trinitarian theology in CG, Molt-
mann’s doctrine of the Trinity finds a yet more central and determinative role in his 
theology in CPS. This is bound up in particular with his concept of trinitarian history, 
where the Trinity is best understood in the context of a history spanning from before 
creation to the coming kingdom. Also notable here are Moltmann’s reflections on the 
eschatological unification of the Trinity, laying important groundwork for his ap-
proach to the doctrine of divine unity in TKG. In two shorter subsections I attend to 
some of the key comments Moltmann makes in regard to the doctrine of the Trinity 
in two pieces from 1979, preparing the way for his book-length treatment in his 1980 
TKG. 
6.2.1. 1975: The Church in the Power of the Spirit 
Moltmann’s third major work, The Church in the Power of the Spirit (1975),49 contains 
important content concerning his developing doctrine of the Trinity.50 Indeed, re-
flecting back on CPS and TKG in 1990, he writes, “Throughout, my purpose was to 
 
49 On CPS in general, see Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 119-50, 157-59; Geiko 
Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power: The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, trans. by 
John Bowden (London: SCM, 2000), 80-106. 
50 For Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity in and around CPS, see Conyers, God, Hope, and 
History, 125-55; and Joy Ann McDougall, Pilgrimage of Love: Moltmann on the Trinity and 
Christian Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 60-67. For Moltmann’s theology 
of trinitarian history in the context of his wider career, see Matthias Remenyi, Um der 
Hoffnung willen: Untersuchungen zur eschatologischen Theologie Jürgen Moltmanns (Regens-





understand the triune God as the God who is community, who calls community into 
life and who invites men and women into sociality with him.”51 But perhaps Molt-
mann makes too much of the benefit of hindsight here, as the language of a divine 
community is almost absent in CPS.52 What is important, nonetheless, is his theology 
of trinitarian history and unification, important steps on the way to a doctrine of the 
social Trinity. 
CPS initiates a transitional phase in Moltmann’s theology. In TH, his focus 
was primarily on the eschatological fulfilment of the promise, attended by a devel-
oping interest in God’s futurity. By the time of CG, the relationship being future and 
present, though still being negotiated, allows more room for history to speak to es-
chatology—particularly in the role that the crucifixion has to play in the dialectic 
between these two. It is in CPS, though, that this incorporation of earthly history and 
eschatological fulfilment is integrated into the wider framework of the “trinitarian 
history of God,” a framework anticipated in CG.53 This transitional phase is largely 
complete with the publication of TKG (1980), the first of the six “systematic contri-
butions to theology,”54 in which Moltmann no longer aims “to look at theology as a 
whole from one particular standpoint.”55 He explains this earlier methodological 
commitment in more detail in his 1990 preface to CPS: “In 1965 [i.e., TH] my focus 
was the hope that is born from the resurrection of Christ; in 1972 [CG] it was the 
suffering in which the fellowship of the crucified One is experienced; and in 1975 
[CPS] the experience of the divine Spirit, the giver of life.”56 
 But while it is certainly true that Moltmann employs this kind of single-stand-
point methodology in TH and CG, both criticised for their “one-sidedness,”57 CPS on 
 
51 CPS, xv. 
52 The only explicit example I have found in CPS is the reference to the trinitarian koinonia 
on p.62, quoted below. Conversely, Moltmann’s comment may refer predominantly to the 
material of CPS, rather than the language. 
53 See the previous subsection (6.1.3.). 
54 TKG, xi. 
55 TKG, xi. 
56 CPS, xiii. TH was originally published in German in 1964 and first translated into English 
in 1967. The quoted year, 1965, is mistaken. 
57 See Moltmann in DTH, 205-9 (1967); and DGG, 165-67 (1979). 
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the whole reads as a much more balanced project.58 And although Moltmann’s pro-
posals here might be seen as radical by certain readers, such as his view on open 
communion,59 it is less apparent that he is “one-sidedly” treating ecclesiology from 
a pneumatological perspective. Indeed, it would be better to say, against his own 
evaluation, that Moltmann’s project at this point has more of a trinitarian focus than 
a predominantly pneumatological one. This finds further development in the sys-
tematic contributions, where he attempts to address various doctrines without suc-
cumbing to a one-sided focus on hope or suffering, for example. Thus Moltmann 
begins the contributions with the doctrine of the Trinity, then proceeds through cre-
ation, christology, pneumatology, eschatology, and theological methodology. That 
the doctrine of the Trinity forms the backbone of these contributions can be seen in 
the subject of his first volume, following Barth,60 and his publishing of a volume each 
on christology and pneumatology. Moltmann’s volumes on creation and eschatology 
also demonstrate a decidedly theocentric—for him: trinitarian—focus, with their re-
spective titles, God in Creation and The Coming of God. Even his volume on theological 
methodology, ExpTh, concludes with a section on the Trinity.61 CPS almost seems to 
be more at home within the systematic contributions, as a trinitarian ecclesiology. As 
A. J. Conyers observes, “The trinitarian process of God,” that is, from CPS onwards, 
“provides an inclusive symbol for the ideas of God’s promise and God’s suffering 
that found expression in Moltmann’s first two major volumes of theology.”62 
 
58 Moltmann himself notes this. CPS “is by comparison [to TH and CG] not so strongly con-
centrated into one perspective, because ecclesiology has to deal with many different 
themes.” Moltmann, “Foreword,” in Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology, vii-x, at ix 
(1986). So, too, Ryan Neal writes, “CPS… is best read as a transitional volume since it takes 
up the central themes of TH and CG, while making way for the ‘contributions.’” Ryan A. 
Neal, Theology as Hope: On the Ground and Implications of Jürgen Moltmann’s Doctrine of Hope 
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2008), 69. Cf. T. David Beck, The Holy Spirit and the Renewal of All 
Things: Pneumatology in Paul and Jürgen Moltmann (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co, 2010), 
95-96. 
59 CPS, 242-60; anticipated in CG, 41-45 (1972). 
60 See Barth, CD I/1, 295-304. 
61 ExpTh, 303-33 (2000). 





 Though obviously not as explicitly trinitarian as the later TKG, in CPS, con-
sistent with his push for a more thoroughly trinitarian theology in CG, Moltmann 
forwards an ecclesiology shaped and informed by a trinitarian programme. This is 
first of all discernible on the structural level. After a short, introductory chapter, he 
sets out from the church in history—which, as he will go on to show, is the church 
situated in the context of the trinitarian history of God—proceeds through the church 
in the context of Christ and the kingdom in two chapters, and only then attends to 
the church in the presence and power of the Spirit in another two chapters. Admit-
tedly, the ecclesiological orientation of CPS cannot be overlooked. But the doctrine 
of the Trinity nonetheless begins to take on an organising role in Moltmann’s theol-
ogy at this point, and, importantly, Moltmann feels unqualified to comment on ec-
clesiological matters without first placing them in their proper trinitarian context. 
Most of the relevant material appears at the end of Moltmann’s chapter on 
the church’s historical character, concluding with a section on the church in the 
framework of the “trinitarian history of God’s dealings with the world.”63 This 
means that the church cannot be “christomonist,” a danger in Reformed theology,64 
and perhaps a tendency of Moltmann’s theology in CG. Indeed, in contrast to his 
project in CG, he is now wary of opposite danger of “the particular work of the Spirit 
[being] subordinated to the work of Christ.”65 On the other hand, then, this means 
that the church cannot become “pneumatomonist,” a danger to which Orthodox the-
ology especially is apparently prone.66 Moltmann seeks to avoid both reductions by 
thinking in as broadly trinitarian terms as possible. He thus introduces his discussion 
of trinitarian history, writing, “Our aim will be to explore the church’s mission and 
its meaning, existence and functions in the comprehensive framework of the history 
of God’s dealings with the world…. [N]o single life can comprehend itself without 
 
63 CPS, 53. On this section in CPS, cf. the similar essay in FC, 80-96 (1975). 
64 CPS, 37. 
65 CPS, 73. 
66 CPS, 37. 
244 
 
comprehending itself in the framework of the whole in which it acquires its signifi-
cance.”67 
 Moltmann begins with the claim that understanding the church within trini-
tarian history first requires attention to the origins of Christ and the Spirit: “Is the 
mission of Jesus a chance historical event or does it find its foundation in God him-
self?”68 Thus, the gospels present the history of Jesus in light of his being sent and 
commissioned by the Father. They begin from the source of his ministry. Mark opens 
with Jesus’ baptism, Matthew and Luke with his conception, and John with the Word 
before creation, “in the eternity of the Father.”69 Since this is the case with Scripture, 
“theological reflection must ask about the origin of and reason for this mission, in 
order to understand the particular appearance of Jesus in the context shown.”70 At 
least on this point, Moltmann is in agreement with the tradition of trinitarian theol-
ogy stretching from Augustine, through Thomas, to Barth: “The missio ad extra re-
veals the missio ad intra. The missio ad intra is the foundation for the missio ad extra.”71 
That is, the missions of the Son and the Spirit in the divine economy constitute the 
epistemological basis for the eternal processions of the Son and the Sprit within the 
Trinity, and the latter constitute the ontological basis for the former. 
 Yet Moltmann also makes an important claim here that distinguishes his own 
position from that of the tradition. He writes, “The Trinity in the sending [Trinität in 
der Sendung] reveals the Trinity in the origin [die Trinität im Ursprung] as being from 
eternity an open Trinity. It is open for its own sending…. It is open for men and for 
all creation.”72 Here, Barth’s “closed circle” as a picture of the Trinity is again re-
jected, “the symbol of perfection and self-sufficiency.”73 Rather, “a Christian doctrine 
of the Trinity which is bound to the history of Christ and the history of the Spirit 
 
67 CPS, 50. 
68 CPS, 53-54. 
69 CPS, 53; for a later discussion of this theme, see TKG, 71-74 (1980). 
70 CPS, 53. 
71 CPS, 54. 
72 CPS, 55; Ger. 72. These terms, which sound somewhat awkward in English, are Molt-
mann’s designations for what he elsewhere refers to as the immanent Trinity and eco-
nomic Trinity. See CG, 240 (1972); Moltmann in DGG, 180-81 (1979); TKG, 158-61 (1980). 





must conceive the Trinity as the Trinity of sending and seeking love of God which is 
open from its very origin.”74 Importantly, this eternal openness would not be a defi-
ciency of God, as has been alleged in the tradition, but that which derives from the 
fullness of love in the trinitarian life. So, too, does the trinitarian history of God de-
rive its historical character from love, rather than being necessitated through encoun-
ter with death. 
 Moltmann’s foray into the originary Trinity at this point is something of a 
change of direction in his theology. In TH, his chief concern was with the eschato-
logical life of God, and in CG it was with the historical and eschatological constitu-
tion of the Trinity. Here, however, Moltmann has gone yet further to contemplate 
the life of the Trinity before the creation of the world. The trinitarian history is that 
which extends from before time to beyond the reconciliation of all things in the es-
chatological unification of God and creation. This does not mean, however, that such 
a history is to be conceived in straightforwardly linear terms. Moltmann’s method-
ology here recalls his earlier comments on the reciprocity of historical and eschato-
logical approaches in christology: “If we come back once again to the contemplation 
of the history of Christ, we discover that this history can be viewed from two sides: 
from its origin and from its future. If our enquiry is directed towards the past, then 
this history is understood in the light of the sending and mission of Christ. If we 
think forwards, then it is seen from the point of view of its goal…. Both perspectives 
belong to a full understanding of the history of Christ.”75 The same applies to the 
origin and goal of the Spirit, and thus to the whole Trinity. It is clear, then, that Molt-
mann intends to broaden but not supersede the eschatological orientation of his ear-
lier theology. Jesus, Moltmann claims, though having demonstrated some interest in 
his eternal origin, is still “’the incarnation of the promise’ of the kingdom,” citing 
 
74 CPS, 56. 
75 CPS, 56. See 5.3.2. 
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Käsemann.76 “As the eschatological future the kingdom has become the power that 
determines the present.”77 
Significantly, it is this dialectical methodology that allows Moltmann to ar-
rive at different conclusions to those reached in the trinitarian orthodoxy of the West-
ern theological tradition, where “there was a one-sided interest in Christ’s origin 
and, casting back from his history, theologians asked about the ground of that his-
tory in time and eternity.”78 
 An important feature of Moltmann’s eschatological investigation are his com-
ments on the doctrine of divine unity. Viewed in light of their origin, the missions of 
the Son and the Spirit presuppose the divine unity from eternity. But, “eschatologi-
cally, the unity of God is therefore linked with the salvation of creation.”79 The es-
chatological picture of the divine life reveals that, out of love, God chooses creation 
to be “necessary to his perfection.”80 The open unity of the Trinity from eternity, 
which finds its completion in the eschatological union with creation, progresses to-
wards perfection in the historical redemption of creation. Here, then, Moltmann pre-
fers talk of God’s “unification” (Vereinigung) to God’s unity (Einheit).81 He admits 
that this formulation might sound odd to some but finds further support for it in 
Franz Rosenzweig’s interpretation of the Shema: “Confessing God’s oneness [Ein-
heit]—the Jew calls it: ‘unifying God [Gott einigen].’ For this oneness, it is because it 
 
76 Ernst Käsemann, New Testament Questions of Today, trans. by W. J. Montague and Wilfred 
F. Bunge (London: SCM, 1969), 122, cited in CPS, 82. 
77 CPS, 192. 
78 CPS, 57. 
79 CPS, 61. In FC, 85-86 (1975), Moltmann appropriates the Dreifaltigkeit, the threefoldness of 
God, to the protological Trinity, and the Dreieinigkeit, the triunity of God, to the eschato-
logical Trinity. “Just as the Trinity in the sending is, from its very origin, open to the world 
and man, because it is the ‘threefoldness’ of seeking love, so the Trinity in the glorification 
is open for the gathering and uniting of men and creation in God, because it is the ‘tri-
unity’ of gathered love.” FC, 91. Moltmann is later critical of Rahner’s use of Dreifaltigkeit 
in place of Dreieinigkeit: “The phrase of his choice is not merely modalistic but also a bad 
German translation of trinitas.” TKG, 146 (1980). 
80 CPS, 62. 
81 CPS, 61; Ger. 77. Vereinigung can also be translated as “union,” as Kohl translates it here. I 
think “unification” better captures the processual nature of Moltmann’s concept, however. 





becomes, it is a becoming of oneness. And this becoming is placed upon man’s soul 
and into his hands. The Jewish man and the Jewish Law—there is played out be-
tween the two no less than the process of Redemption that is inclusive of God, world 
and man.”82 In a similar way, Christians participate in trinitarian unification through 
the Spirit’s glorifying God from within them. Notably, Moltmann’s preference for 
talk of God’s unification presupposes a unity that is socially constituted: “If the unity 
of God were described in the doctrine of the Trinity by koinonia instead of by una 
natura, this idea would not seem so unusual.”83 But this proposal is not developed 
any further at this point. 
 In CPS, a subtle advance on Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity in CG (1972) is 
the anthropological consequences that such an understanding of trinitarian unity en-
tails.84 Thus, “because the fellowship of the table unites [vereinigen] believers with 
the triune God through Christ, it also causes men to unite with one another [die Ver-
einigung der Menschen untereinander] in messianic fellowship.”85 This hearkens back 
to Moltmann’s claims expounded above in regard to the historical and eschatological 
unification of God. In his discussion of the Lord’s Supper, Moltmann also contends 
for an open communion, which is not “preceded by a ‘test’ of the individual’s wor-
thiness or unworthiness.”86 It is an openness grounded in the theology of the cross 
developed in CG and which continues to inform Moltmann’s conclusions in CPS. 
 
82 Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, trans. by Barbara E. Galli (Madison, WI: Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 433. Moltmann cites the German, which Kohl translates 
directly from in CPS, 61. I have quoted an extra sentence to provide further context. For 
the German, see Franz Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung, ed. Albert Raffelt (Freiburg im 
Breisgau: University Library Freiberg, 2002), 456-57, accessed 30 April 2019, https://frei-
dok.uni-freiburg.de/fedora/objects/freidok:310/datastreams/FILE1/content. The original 
German text of Rosenzweig, reproduced in this open access edition, is identical to that 
which Moltmann quotes. 
83 CPS, 62. 
84 Nonetheless, already in CG: “Man develops his manhood always in relationship to the 
Godhead of his God…. Theology and anthropology are involved in reciprocal relation-
ship.” CG, 267. Cf. by far the best study currently available study in English of Moltmann’s 
theological anthropology: Ton van Prooijen, Limping but Blessed: Jürgen Moltmann’s Search 
for a Liberating Anthropology (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004). 
85 CPS, 257; Ger. 283-84. 
86 CPS, 245. 
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Because it is Christ who rises from the dead, the blasphemer, the political rebel, and 
the one forsaken by God, the church cannot impose human prerequisites for partic-
ipation in his meal. The unification of human beings, then, has its foundation in the 
unification of the Father with the crucified Christ through the resurrection. Molt-
mann had earlier polemicised against the alliance between imperial and divine 
unity, following Peterson. The alternative understanding of divine unity that he ad-
vocates here apparently leads to a significantly different politics and anthropology. 
Also potentially relevant here are Moltmann’s comments on the trinitarian 
basis for both the communal and individual callings of Christians—even if this rela-
tionship to the Trinity remains a little ambiguous. If, on the one hand, all Christians 
are called to the same church ministry—Moltmann has the priesthood in mind—
then they lose that which the Spirit has given them alone as individuals. If, on the 
other hand, the call to ministry is usurped by the bishopric and priesthood, then 
Christians in general, all of whom have received the Spirit, are obstructed from re-
sponding to their call. Rather, “it is only the trinitarian understanding of the com-
missioned community and the commissions in the community which is in a position 
to express the dignity, both of the people as a whole, and of its special ministries.”87 
A clue to just what Moltmann might intend by the “trinitarian” form of this alterna-
tive is given in his characterisation of the opposing approaches to ministry. The hi-
erarchy that obstructed the charismatic ministry of the whole church depended on a 
“monarchical justification of the ministry…: one God, one Christ, one bishop, one 
church.”88 But this is thinking “in quite a one-sided way from Christ to the office, 
and from the office to Christian fellowship.”89 Conversely, “the development of the 
monarchical episcopate led to a quenching of the Spirit” so that “Christian spiritual-
ism grew up parallel to it.”90 It is only when the church recognises its place in the 
trinitarian history of God that neither the particular priestly call in Christ nor the 
 
87 CPS, 306. 
88 CPS, 305. 
89 CPS, 305. 





universal call of believers in the Spirit is sidelined.91 But it is only later that Molt-
mann’s anthropology and ecclesiology are grounded in a more explicitly and thor-
oughly trinitarian rationale.92 
6.2.2. 1979: Jewish Monotheism and Christian Trinitarian Doctrine 
Before moving on to TKG (1980), two texts from 1979 are also of note. The first is 
Moltmann’s dialogue with the Orthodox Jewish thinker, Pinchas Lapide, Jewish Mon-
otheism and Christian Trinitarian Doctrine. While increasingly allergic to the term 
“monotheism,” Moltmann here demonstrates some sympathy for its descriptive util-
ity when applied to Judaism or Christianity. Even so, he finds it difficult to disentan-
gle from the “philosophical monotheism,” “monarchism,” and “monism” of Aristo-
tle. Indeed, “the concept of Jews and Christians is to be distinguished from the God 
of Aristotle through the historical experience of the passion and suffering of their 
God.”93 Moltmann supports this claim in repeating from CG (1972) his exposition of 
Abraham Heschel’s The Prophets.94 He adds here, though, following Heschel, that the 
 
91 A similar logic underpins Moltmann’s analysis of the relationship between the doctrine of 
the Trinity and politics in TKG (1980), which might elucidate the passage from CPS dis-
cussed above: “If we take our bearings from the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, personal-
ism and socialism cease to be antitheses and are seen to be derived from a common foun-
dation. The Christian doctrine of the Trinity compels us to develop social personalism or 
personal socialism. For, right down to the present day, the Western cult of the person has 
allied itself with monotheism, whereas the basis of the socialism of the Eastern countries, if 
we look at it from a religious viewpoint, is not so much atheistic as pantheistic…. Today it 
is vitally necessary for the two to converge in the direction of a truly ‘humane’ society; and 
here the Christian doctrine of the Trinity can play a substantial role.” TKG, 200. 
92 See 6.4.7. 
93 JM, 46, emphasis original. This is a rare positive statement from Moltmann on the term 
“monotheism,” suggesting that he could regard his own theology as monotheistic, even if 
largely rejecting the term. Nonetheless, the statement is not representative of his other the-
ology and likely has more to do with the nature of the dialogue as a Jewish-Christian one. 
Others have criticised his general rejection of monotheism in this very connection—con-
cerning Jewish monotheism. See Eugene B. Borowitz, Contemporary Christologies: A Jewish 
Response (New York: Paulist, 1980), 94-95; Otto, “Moltmann and the Anti-Monotheism 
Movement,” 298. 
94 See 5.1.3. 
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Hebrew Bible shows that “every self-communication [of God] presumes a self-dis-
tinction.”95 For further support, Moltmann also appeals to Peter Kuhn, Gershom 
Scholem, and Franz Rosenzweig. He then turns to the self-distinction of God in 
Christianity, though most of the content of this section is already covered in CG and 
CPS. An important comment is of note at this point, though: “The Trinitarian self-
distinction of God in the death of the Son on the cross is so deep and so broad that 
all those lost and abandoned will find a place in God.”96 It is on the cross that Father 
and Son are so distinguished that the gap between them here encompasses all that is 
good and evil in the world, taking this into themselves and thus overcoming it 
through their unification by the Spirit in the resurrection, and, ultimately, in their 
eschatological unification. 
Moltmann also comments on the doctrine of divine unity in his discussion. 
For him, a divine unity that is not prior to but coincident with the trinity of persons 
better allows for the possibility of creation’s eschatological inclusion in that unity. 
Creation will not merely participate in the divine essence but in the distinction be-
tween the trinitarian persons. Therefore, “the unity of God is to be thought of in the 
self-distinction of the Father and the Son.”97 Moreover, in response to Lapide’s ob-
jection that his reading of the biblical texts does not adequately uphold the mystery 
and incomprehensibility of the divine unity, Moltmann clarifies that this is indeed 
something that he would like to maintain: “The unity of God appears to me to be the 
greatest mystery.”98 Nonetheless, he does not make any apologies for rejecting a nu-
merical formulation of divine unity: “Numerical unity is indeed itself no number but 
is the foundation of all numbering. The numerical figures two, three, four, five, and 
so on always proceed out of numerical unity. One must not hold up before Christians 
 
95 JM, 49. 
96 JM, 53. This echoes the line from Adrienne von Speyr that is quoted in FC, 91 (1975); CPS, 
60 (1975); and two years after TKG in HTG, 87 (1982): “The distance separating Father and 
Son has been widened to embrace the whole world.” Adrienne von Speyr, The Word: A 
Meditation on the Prologue to St John’s Gospel, trans. by Alexander Dru (London: Collins, 
1953), 26. 
97 JM, 64. 





the notion that they would have a multiple God if they did not understand God as a 
monarch and if they reject the concept of numerical unity as the mystery of God.”99 
6.2.3. 1979: “Response to the Criticism of The Crucified God” 
A second notable text is Moltmann’s later response to various reviews of and inter-
actions with CG. Here he responds to the allegations of both Klaus Rosenthal and 
Pannenberg that his theology in CG leans towards tritheism.100 But, Moltmann coun-
ters, tritheism in the Christian tradition has never actually existed because nobody 
has ever claimed that there were three gods.101 Rather, the charge of tritheism func-
tions as a diversion to direct attention away from the modalistic tendencies in the 
critic’s own theology. Moltmann points to Calvin and Barth as examples of this, the 
latter whose “reification of the three persons into three ‘modes of being’ corresponds 
to the rehabilitation of Sabellianism through Schleiermacher”!102 It is modalism and 
not tritheism that is the true threat: “The Christian doctrine of the Trinity seems to 
have two dangers: the emphasis on the three persons can lead to tritheism, and the 
emphasis on the unity of God can lead to modalism. The first danger is fictitious; the 
second danger, however, has been real for a thousand years.”103 Reformed theology’s 
 
99 JM, 64. 
100 This is a persistent criticism of Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity, especially after TKG. 
See the examples provided by Remenyi in Um der Hoffnung willen, 107-8. For some further 
examples and a defence of Moltmann against such charges, see Neal, Theology as Hope, 107-
11. 
101 This claim, repeated in TKG, 243 n. 43, has been contested. See Paul D. Molnar, Divine 
Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity, 2nd ed. (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 
2017), 386 n. 28. George Hunsinger’s witty reply is also worth noting in this connection: If 
it is true that there have never being any actual tritheists, “then one can only conclude that 
Moltmann is vying to be the first. Despite the evident scorn with which he anticipates such 
a charge, The Trinity and the Kingdom is about the closest thing to tritheism that any of us 
are likely to see.” George Hunsinger, review of The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of 
God, by Jürgen Moltmann, The Thomist 47:1 (1983): 129-39, at 131. 
102 Moltmann in DGG, 182. Seinsweise might otherwise be translated as “way of being.” The 
common English translation of this term in the context of Barth’s theology unfortunately 
gives inadvertent support to Moltmann’s critique, which is not based on the word but on 
the concept the word represents and how this functions in Barth’s theology. See the edi-
tor’s note in CD, I/1, vii. I attend below to Moltmann’s later, extended criticism of Barth on 
this point, at 6.4.4. 
103 Moltmann in DGG, 182. 
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allegedly modalistic approach to divine unity originates in its desire to uphold the 
sovereignty of God. But this goes back further still. The early church sought the mon-
archy of the single divine essence in order to achieve a unified world. Here, again, 
Peterson’s influence is clear: “If the starting point is in a monotheistic world monar-
chy that is in need of salvation, then the unity of the ruling subject must be so 
strongly emphasised that the divine self-differentiation recedes in the three persons 
or ends up functioning merely to serve this divine sovereignty.”104 Such a monothe-
ism, however, would not be a Christian doctrine of the Trinity, but rather the Neo-
platonic concept of divine emanation, in that the three persons are incidental, not 
essential, to the divine unity. 
 Later in the same essay Moltmann responds to criticism that the theology of 
CG was pneumatologically deficient, largely agreeing with this. He attempted to 
make up for it in CPS, explaining some of the thinking that underpinned this work 
and anticipating the proposals of TKG. The deficient pneumatology of CG was in-
formed in part by Moltmann’s methodology. Even if the Spirit is accorded the role 
of uniting Father and Son despite separation in the crucifixion, its personhood is not 
thereby articulated. The only way to properly acknowledge the personhood of the 
Spirit is to be found in according the Father a passive role within the Trinity. And 
just this is what Moltmann discovered writing CPS, when he began to reflect theo-
logically on the Spirit’s glorification of the Father and the Son.105 It is necessary to 
take such a direction in order to arrive at an account of the Spirit as a distinct, acting 
subject, which, as Moltmann will argue in TKG, is itself necessary to arrive at a con-
cept of divine unity that reflects the true sociality of the Trinity.106 
 Finally, Moltmann reflects on the language of the “Trinity in the origin” and 
“Trinity in the sending” that he employed in CPS.107 Not only do these correspond 
to what others have called the immanent Trinity and economic Trinity, but, in Molt-
 
104 Moltmann in DGG, 183. 
105 CPS, 57-60. 
106 See 6.4.2. 





mann’s theology of trinitarian history they represent different stages or configura-
tions of the Trinity: “In the comprehensive trinitarian history of God, the trinitarian 
relationships of the divine persons also change.” Thus, “we can speak of the Trinity 
in the origin, the Trinity of sending, the Trinity of abandonment, the Trinity of glo-
rification, and the Trinity in the perfection.”108 But Moltmann is not here proposing 
numerous new categories into which the doctrine of the Trinity can be newly di-
vided. Rather, he is problematising a slavish adherence to the sometimes dualistic 
categories of immanent and economic, categories which obscure the rich variety of 
trinitarian configurations that he sees in Scripture. 
 Moltmann’s fertile activity between CG and TKG lays important groundwork 
for the latter. CPS is particularly important in this regard, as it is here that Moltmann 
begins to develop in some detail his concept of trinitarian history. Here, too, his pro-
posals concerning the eschatological unification of the Trinity are implicitly con-
trasted with doctrine of divine unity offered by the tradition—a point to be made 
explicitly throughout TKG. In the context of this dissertation, this is another signifi-
cant application that Moltmann makes of his contrastive paradigm. In this section I 
also attended to two texts from 1979 which reveal notable advances in Moltmann’s 
trinitarian thinking at this time. He displays an interest in rejecting numerical forms 
of divine unity, preferring to ground unity in the relationships between the persons. 
But Moltmann rejects the charge of tritheism as hollow and distracting, and proposes 
a more sophisticated pneumatology that will take into account the active work of the 
Spirit.  
 
108 Moltmann in DGG, 181. 
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6.3. The Trinity and the Kingdom: Methodological Questions 
The Trinity and the Kingdom was first published in German in 1980,109 though its basic 
claims, Moltmann states, had been in development since 1975, the year CPS was pub-
lished.110 I have attempted to demonstrate the extent of this in the foregoing. But TKG 
differs from the previous works in being the first of Moltmann’s systematic contri-
butions to theology,111 intended to be free from the methodological constraint to a 
particular standpoint—such as the resurrection (TH), the crucifixion (CG), or Pente-
cost (CPS).112 As systematic contributions, Moltmann aims in these works to treat the 
theological material “in a particular systematic sequence.”113 But as systematic con-
tributions, on the other hand, he also seeks to depart from the close-endedness that 
he perceives to be a feature of various theological systems: “Systems save some read-
ers (and their admirers most of all) from thinking critically for themselves and from 
arriving at independent and responsible decision. For systems do not present them-
selves for discussion.”114 In contrast, Moltmann seeks to participate in ongoing theo-
logical dialogue with proposals that stimulate rather than stifle new ideas. 
 
109 On this work, see Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, 137-52; McDougall, Pil-
grimage of Love, 68-99. 
110 TKG, xv. 
111 For a brief exposition and perceptive criticism of the first five contributions, see Douglas 
B. Farrow, “Review Essay: In the End is the Beginning: A Review of Jürgen Moltmann’s 
Systematic Contributions,” Modern Theology 14:3 (1998): 425-47. In his review essay, M. 
Douglas Meeks offers a friendly overview and some short critical comments on the first 
four contributions. See M. Douglas Meeks, “Jürgen Moltmann’s Systematic Contributions to 
Theology,” Religious Studies Review 22:2 (1996): 95-102. 
112 But see my comments on CPS at 6.2.1. 
113 TKG, xi. 
114 TKG, xi. Richard Clutterbuck identifies a tension in Moltmann’s theology at this point: 
“There is a major tension… between the disavowal of ‘doctrine’, ‘dogma’, ‘tradition’ and 
‘system’ as helpful concepts, and the strongly doctrinal and systematic content of Molt-
mann's theology.” And, “there have been few theologians who have made such specific 
proposals for key Christian doctrines.” Richard Clutterbuck, “Jürgen Moltmann as a Doc-
trinal Theologian: The Nature of Doctrine and the Possibilities for Its Development,” Scot-
tish Journal of Theology 48:4 (1995): 489-505, at 489, 490-1. Despite Moltmann’s claims 
throughout his corpus that he is offering theological suggestions, Clutterbuck mounts a 
strong argument to the contrary, namely that Moltmann elsewhere demonstrates an ex-






 I have divided the material in TKG into two sections for ease of reading. In this 
first section I attend to key methodological issues. I begin with the influence of Du-
mitru Stăniloae and the theology of other Orthodox figures, proceed to Moltmann’s 
opening chapter in TKG on the possibility of developing a new trinitarian theology, 
and finish with a discussion of Moltmann’s explicit comments on the role that the 
Bible plays in his theology of trinitarian history. 
6.3.1. The Influence of Dumitru Stăniloae and Orthodox Theology 
Moltmann later mentions the theology of Dumitru Stăniloae, whom he first met in 
the 1979 Klingenthal Conference, as the third formative influence on the formation 
of his doctrine of the Trinity, following that of Peterson and the theology of the 
cross.115 Their relationship developed to a point that Moltmann could later refer to 
Stăniloae as a “fatherly friend”: “After my teacher Karl Barth, the encounter with 
Professor Dumitru Stăniloae was my greatest theological discovery.”116 Moltmann 
notes the significance of Stăniloae’s participation in the 1979 conference, concerning 
the ecumenical problem of the filioque: “On the 23-27 May 1979 we met for the second 
time in Klingenthal and reached a successful agreement. Above all, we owed this to 
Dumitru Stăniloae, who, together with his then assistant Daniel, today Patriarch of 
the Orthodox Church of Romania, took part.”117 Daniel Munteanu also sees Stăni-
loae’s influence in Moltmann’s perichoretic concept of divine unity in TKG, though 
he does not account for the development of Moltmann’s theology in this direction 
before meeting Stăniloae.118 Moltmann, too, however, hints at this relationship when 
 
115 ExpTh, 306-8 (2000); cf. BP, 86-87, 291 (2006). 
116 Moltmann, “Dumitru Stăniloae im ökumenischen Kontext,” International Journal of Ortho-
dox Theology 5:2 (2014): 29-40, at 30. 
117 Moltmann, “Dumitru Stăniloae,” 32. 
118 Daniel Munteanu, “Dumitru Stăniloae’s Influence on Jürgen Moltmann’s Trinitarian and 
Ecological Theology,” International Journal of Orthodox Theology 6:4 (2015): 24-52. Three 
other articles from the same journal treat the work of the two theologians side by side, 
which demonstrates something of the significance of this relationship for Orthodox theolo-
gians. Ioan Tulcan, “The Place and the Theological Significance of God the Father in the 
Communion of the Holy Trinity According to Dumitru Stăniloae and Jürgen Moltmann,” 
International Journal of Orthodox Theology 2:2 (2011): 161-75; idem, “Die trinitarische Schöp-
256 
 
he writes, “For me, the Klingenthal Conferences were historic moments of true, sub-
stantial ecumenical theology. As a result, I developed a ‘social doctrine of the Trin-
ity.’”119 
 In the above statements, however, it is perhaps more likely the case that Molt-
mann wishes to honour Stăniloae, rather than name him as a key influence in the 
formation of his doctrine of the Trinity. A few factors suggest this as a possibility. 
Moltmann first met Stăniloae just one year before his next major work, TKG, was 
published. While, as I will show below, other Orthodox figures surely influenced 
Moltmann’s theology in this area, the influence of Stăniloae is much less certain and 
demonstrable. Moreover, no explicit citations of Stăniloae appear in TKG. The earli-
est reference to Stăniloae that I have been able to locate appears in 1982.120 Finally, 
Moltmann names Stăniloae in connection to the resolution of the problem of the fil-
ioque. But the nature of this connection can be determined by reading the papers 
originally presented at the 1979 Klingenthal Conference, later published in 1981. 
Moltmann’s contribution, written independently of Stăniloae, is barely distinguish-
able from the material in TKG.121 Stăniloae presents the concluding paper, offering 
 
fungstheologie Jürgen Moltmanns und ihr Gegenüber in der rumänisch-orthodoxen The-
ologie des XX. Jahrhunderts,” International Journal of Orthodox Theology 4:3 (2013): 85-98; 
Ştefan Buchiu, “Die Schöpfungstheologien Dumitru Stăniloaes und Jürgen Moltmanns,” 
International Journal of Orthodox Theology 4:4 (2013): 32-57. Moltmann has also published 
numerous articles in the journal since its inception, too many to be listed here. One notes 
that he is a member of the journal’s advisory board. Moltmann, “’Wir erwarten die Aufer-
stehung der Toten und das Leben der zukünftigen Welt’. Einführung in ‘Das Kommen 
Gottes. Christliche Eschatologie’,” International Journal of Orthodox Theology 7:4 (2016): 9-18, 
at 9. 
119 Moltmann, “Dumitru Stăniloae,” 35. 
120 Moltmann cites Stăniloae’s “The Holy Trinity: Structure of Supreme Love,” from Theol-
ogy and the Church, trans. by Robert Barringer, 73-108 (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimirs Semi-
nary Press, 1980). The citation appears in Moltmann, “The Reconciling Power of the Trin-
ity in the Life of the Church and the World,” in Conference of European Churches, The 
Reconciling Power of the Trinity: Report on the Study Consultation of the Conference of European 
Churches, 22nd-26th November 1982, Goslar, Federal Republic of Germany, 47-60 (Geneva: Con-
ference of European Churches, 1983), 60 n. 11. A revised, extended version of Moltmann’s 
conference paper also appears in Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel and Jürgen Moltmann, Hu-
manity in God (New York: Pilgrim, 1983), 90-106, though no reference to Stăniloae is made 
there. 
121 See Moltmann, “Theological Proposals towards the Resolution of the Filioque Contro-





constructive evaluations of the papers presented by Jean-Miguel Garrigues and 
Moltmann, and situating them in the context of an Orthodox understanding of pa-
tristic theology.122 Moltmann’s appreciative comments are thus best understood in 
this context—as thanks to Stăniloae for his warm reception of the paper and his im-
portant role in the conclusion of the discussion. Moltmann’s restrospective comment, 
then—“Stăniloae convinced me that the filioque addition is superfluous and detri-
mental”123—citing Stăniloae’s paper, cannot refer to the development of Moltmann’s 
own proposal on the filioque but to the confirmation that the concerns of the Ortho-
dox are legitimate. 
Notably, evidence of Moltmann having drawn on other Orthodox thinkers 
can be found in TKG. As Moltmann writes in a later preface, “The Orthodox tradition 
offered more help for this social doctrine of the Trinity than did its Western counter-
part.”124 Throughout TKG he engages with numerous Orthodox figures who clearly 
inform his conclusions. These include Nikolai Berdyaev,125 Boris Bolotov (a much 
more likely candidate for the source of Moltmann’s response to the filioque),126 Boris 
Bobrinskoy,127 and Vladimir Lossky.128 Andrei Rublev is especially significant here. 
His famous icon of the Trinity guided Moltmann in his reflections throughout the 
course of writing TKG. Commenting on the icon, Moltmann reveals, “Through their 
tenderly intimate inclination towards one another, the three Persons show the pro-
found unity joining them, in which they are one…. Anyone who grasps the truth of 
this picture… understands that people only arrive at their own truth in their free and 
 
Lukas Vischer, 164-73 (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1981); TKG, 178-87. Alterna-
tively, it is possible that Moltmann revised his 1979 paper before its 1981 publication, on 
the basis of his 1980 work in TKG. 
122 Dumitru Stăniloae, “The Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and His Relation 
to the Son, as the Basis of Our Deification and Adoption,” in Spirit of God, Spirit of Christ, 
ed. Vischer, 174-86. 
123 ExpTh, 307 (2000), slightly adjusted. 
124 TKG, viii (1990). Nonetheless, it remains unclear which representatives of the Orthodox 
tradition led Moltmann in this direction. 
125 TKG, 42-47. 
126 TKG, 180, 184-85; Moltmann, “Dumitru Stăniloae,” 31, 33-34. 
127 TKG, 184. 
128 TKG, 245 nn. 72-73, 246 n. 84. 
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loving inclination towards one another. It is to this ‘social’ understanding of the doc-
trine of the Trinity that this book is an invitation.”129 Whereas premodern Western 
art typically depicts the Spirit as a dove and the Father and Son in a humanlike way, 
for Moltmann this convention “expresses a duality rather than a Trinity.”130 “Ru-
blev’s icon is a notable exception,” and likely contributed to Moltmann’s interest in 
developing an alternative approach to the personhood of the Spirit. Two years after 
the publication of TKG, Moltmann also writes approvingly of Nicolai Fedorov, along 
with F. D. Maurice and Nicolai Grundtvig, who promoted the principle, “The Holy 
Trinity is our social programme.”131 Here Moltmann attributes his familiarity with 
Fedorov to Paul Evdokimov’s Christus im russischen Denken (Christ in Russian 
Thought),132 which he also cites three times in the earlier TKG.133 But Moltmann’s in-
terest in Fedorov’s claim, for which Miroslav Volf is better known today,134 can al-
ready be seen in TKG, as Moltmann contends for the surpassing significance of the 
perichoretic divine life in connection to human society. 
 The relevance of Orthodoxy’s influence on Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity 
is less immediately clear when considering the role of Scripture in his theology. Erik 
Peterson contributes to his contrastive paradigm, so that Moltmann can seek what 
he understands to be a doctrine of divine unity that is more faithful to the biblical 
texts than that which allegedly derives ultimately from Aristotelianism. And the 
cross, as in CG, in a central focus of biblical witness. Here, too, Scripture works to 
chasten theological approaches to the Trinity that derive their logic from elsewhere. 
But Moltmann’s concerns in his engagement with Orthodox figures and the connec-
tion of these concerns to exegetical ones is not obvious. Indeed, it could be said that 
 
129 TKG, xvi; cf. Moltmann-Wendel and Moltmann, Humanity in God, 53 (1983); Moltmann, 
Sun of Righteousness, Arise! God’s Future for Humanity and the World, trans. by Margaret 
Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2010), 169 (2008). 
130 TKG, 169. 
131 Moltmann, “The Reconciling Power of the Trinity,” 56; cf. Moltmann-Wendel and Molt-
mann, Humanity in God, 104-6 (1983); Moltmann, Sun of Righteousness, Arise!, 163-64 (2009). 
132 I am not aware of any ET. 
133 TKG, 229 n. 71, 234 n. 33, 244 n. 63. 
134 Miroslav Volf, “’The Trinity Is Our Social Program’: The Doctrine of the Trinity and the 





the opposite is the case. Thus, in his first major criticism of Moltmann’s theology, 
one of Richard Bauckham’s many charges against TKG concerns the exegetical basis 
for its claims. He decries Moltmann’s “unfounded speculation” and inability “to find 
a real basis in the biblical history for the kind of speculation in which he engages.”135 
In his proposal for the filioque, for example, Moltmann “falls back on the traditional 
Greek patristic and Orthodox reliance on the text John 15:26, with no reference to the 
fact that all modern exegesis sees in that text no reference to the pre-temporal origin 
of the Spirit from the Father…. Clearly Moltmann is here the victim of his too re-
spectful immersion in the tradition”!136 Bauckham concludes, “This is hermeneutical 
responsibility in the service of speculation which, whatever its value for ecumenical 
politics, surely lacks any real theological interest.”137 
 The connection between Moltmann’s Orthodoxy-inspired claims and the con-
clusions informed by reading biblical texts, however, need not be completely cast 
aside. The development of an alternative concept of divine unity, latent in CG and 
built upon in CPS, derives predominantly from the need for a trinitarian theology 
faithful to the cross and the biblical witness. It is also encouraged by Moltmann’s 
contrastive paradigm and his broadening rejection of Greek philosophical sources 
for Christian theology. Moltmann’s exposure to Orthodoxy—a tradition otherwise 
opposed to theological innovation based on a distinction between the witness of 
Scripture and that of the Fathers—only reinforces the aims of his own programme in 
providing support in the form of church tradition for his reading of the Bible. That 
is, although Orthodox figures do not play a major role in Moltmann’s hermeneutical 
judgements, they lend support to and provide latitude for the creative expression of 
these. It is in this connection that I have attended to them here. 
 
135 Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 167. 
136 Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 168. 
137 Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 168. Pace Bauckham, the implied distinction 
between “ecumenical politics” (!) and “theological interest” is surely a false one. 
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6.3.2. A Contemporary Prolegomena 
TKG opens with a reflection on the state of trinitarian theology at the beginning of 
the 1980s. Among those without theological training there are a variety of opinions 
on the significance of the doctrine of the Trinity. For many, “whether God is one or 
triune evidently makes as little difference to the doctrine of the Trinity as it does to 
ethics.”138 In contemporary academic theology, too, “the doctrine of the Trinity has 
very little essential importance.”139 Moltmann proceeds to address what he under-
stands to be the two main sources for either explicit opposition to or implicit reser-
vations regarding the doctrine of the Trinity in the church and theology. The first is 
experience. As Schleiermacher had earlier discovered, modern humanity finds 
“statements about God which do not include statements about the immediate self-
consciousness of the believer belong to the realm of speculation, because they are not 
verifiable by personal experience.”140 It is thus that Schleiermacher saw the trinity of 
persons as “superfluous,” secondary to the one God of Christian experience. But, 
contra Schleiermacher, the anthropological centre of this question, “How do I expe-
rience God?” overlooks its theological reverse, “How does God experience me?”141 
For the authentic experience of God, the question of reciprocity must also be ad-
dressed, though without assuming that God experiences us and we experience God 
in the same way. Significantly, the divine experience can only be understood in a 
trinitarian way, as Moltmann had argued in CG through his theology of divine suf-
fering. Moreover, such an investigation will aid in overcoming the narcissistic orien-
tation of modern society. 
 The second source of opposition and reservation is the modern concern with 
pragmatism. This might be expressed as such: “What does not turn into act has no 
value. It is only practice that verifies a theory.”142 On similar grounds, Kant rejected 
 
138 TKG, 1. 
139 TKG, 2. 
140 TKG, 3. 
141 TKG, 3. This question had already been addressed in CPS, 62-64 (1975), though in a dif-
ferent context. Cf. also the more sympathetic reading of Schleiermacher in CG, 238 (1972). 





the doctrine of the Trinity as completely irrelevant for enlightened humanity. “Here 
the transcendental definition ‘God’ is sufficient; for moral monotheism is enough to 
provide the foundation for free and responsible conduct.”143 But these assumptions 
continue into contemporary life. Liberation theology, for example, among other 
movements, has made theological reflection secondary to Christian praxis. Despite 
its important role in directing the church to live out its faith, Moltmann responds, 
“Christian love is not merely a motivation, and Christian faith is more than the point 
from which action takes its bearings.”144 Contemplation is necessary in order to avoid 
the meritocratic pragmatism of modern society. Positively, through contemplation 
the Christian practitioner receives from God new possibilities for action. And, inso-
far as it is contemplation of the one who was crucified, nor does this contemplation 
stifle action. The two are reciprocal. Moreover, in contemplation the triune God is 
worshiped, a point Moltmann will develop later in TKG. Importantly, for Moltmann, 
neither of the contemporary concerns with either experience or pragmatism can be 
adequately met outside of a trinitarian framework. 
 Moltmann addresses the latter section of his introductory chapter to what he 
understands to be the three main ways that God has been conceived of in the West-
ern tradition: supreme substance, absolute subject, and triune God.145 First, God has 
been conceived of as supreme substance. Here, again following Feuerbach, the na-
ture of God is determined on the basis of the negation of the cosmos’s finite limita-
tions. Moltmann points to the five ways of Thomas Aquinas as an example: “They 
 
143 TKG, 6. 
144 TKG, 7. 
145 The first two of these correspond respectively to the cosmological and anthropological 
proofs for God that Moltmann treated in TH, 273-79 (1964), and to the questions of Jesus’ 
divinity and humanity addressed in CG, 87-98 (1972). Contrast the more ecumenical pro-
posal of GC, written just five years later: “The supreme New Testament statement ‘God is 
love’ can only be understood if God is thought of not merely as supreme substance but 
also as subject; and, again, not merely as absolute subject, but also as supreme substance.” 
Nonetheless, “Both possible metaphysical ways of thinking are integrated and excelled by 
the trinitarian justification and interpretation of this ‘practical definition’ of God: Deus est 
caritas [i.e., God is love].” GC, 86 (1985). 
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start from general phenomena in the world and enquire about their ultimate foun-
dation, beyond which nothing can be asked at all.”146 If, however, human under-
standing of the cosmos changes, the conception of the supreme substance of God 
that derives from it must change too. And this is what happened in modern thought 
from Descartes onwards, leading to the second major concept of God, God as abso-
lute subject: “Once man makes himself the subject of his own world by the process 
of knowing it, conquering it and shaping it, the conception of the world as cosmos is 
destroyed.”147 The ontological centre of the modern world is no longer the supreme 
substance, God, but the human subject. Yet God is not thereby done away with. Ra-
ther, the human subject now requires a God to ground him in a true humanity, that 
is, “the infinite, perfect and absolute subject, namely the archetype of himself.”148 
 The western tradition has also conceived of God as triune, though Moltmann 
argues that this conception was incompatible with the other two. Since Thomas, the-
ology in the west has treated the doctrine of God first under the treatise De Deo uno 
and then under De deo trino. But because God’s unity is primarily understood ac-
cording to the divine substance, the nature of which is derived from the negation of 
finite limitations, a properly biblical understanding of God’s trinitarian unity is 
lost.149 So, too, since Hegel the absolute subject of God has been treated as primary 
and the trinity of persons as secondary. Moreover, the concept of person stands in 
contradiction to the absolute subject, because it “also contains the concept of the sub-
ject of acts and relationships.”150 In contrast to the unity of both the supreme sub-
stance and the absolute subject, Moltmann seeks a concept of divine unity that better 
 
146 TKG, 12. 
147 TKG, 13. 
148 TKG, 15. 
149 Moltmann here juxtaposes the Einheit (unit, oneness) of the divine substance with the 
Einigheit (accord, unity) of the triune God. The comparison might otherwise be translated 
as Kohl does, the “unity of the divine essence” against the “union of the triune God.” TKG, 
17; Ger. 32-33. Later in the text, Kohl provides a short commentary-translation of die Einig-
keit des drei-einigen Gottes as “the unitedness, the at-oneness of the triune God.” TKG, 150; 
Ger. 167. It should be noted though that Einheit in theology does not usually need to take 
the restricted, almost numerical sense that Moltmann gives it here for the sake of compari-
son. 





reflects the biblical testimony to God’s trinitarian history. The substantial concept of 
God is no longer possible, due to the changed nature of humanity’s relationship to 
the cosmos. And, with time, it will also become increasingly difficult to affirm that 
God is absolute subject, not only due to growing interest in the relational nature of 
the human subject, but due also to the biblical witness to the relationships between 
the trinitarian persons and their relationships to the world and humanity. What is 
needed, then, is a “social doctrine of the Trinity.”151 
6.3.3. The Bible and the Trinity 
Scripture plays a central role in Moltmann’s trinitarian proposals in TKG.152 In the 
introduction to his third chapter, Moltmann enquires into the origins of the patristic 
doctrine of the Trinity with Adolf von Harnack. He writes, “If we turn back from this 
dogmatic acknowledgement of the Trinity to the proclamation of God as we find it 
in the New Testament, we feel the hermeneutic difference, and ask: are the seeds of 
the development that ended in the church’s doctrine of the Trinity already to be 
found in the New Testament? Or is this doctrine merely the result of a subsequent 
dogmatization on the part of the Christian faith?”153 The spectre of the Hellenistic 
contamination of the gospel once again emerges. But this does not mean that the 
doctrine itself is in conflict with Scripture. Although Moltmann perceives a disjunct 
 
151 TKG, 19. 
152 Moltmann’s intentions are widely acknowledged. E.g., “Moltmann seeks to develop his 
trinitarian thinking from the Bible and thus to give it a biblical basis.” Müller-Fahrenholz, 
The Kingdom and the Power, 138. “Scripture therefore narrates what for Moltmann is the 
trinitarian history of God.” Kurt Anders Richardson, “Moltmann’s Communitarian Trin-
ity,” in Jürgen Moltmann and Evangelical Theology: A Critical Engagement, ed. Sung Wook 
Chung, 17-39 (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2012), 31. But, as Bauckham’s criticism demonstrates, 
discussed above in 6.3.1., the success of carrying out these intentions is another matter. So 
J. Matthew Bonzo alleges that Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity is “itself more a con-
struction than a result of exegesis.” He continues, “There is a fine line between testifying 
about the Trinity as revealed by scripture and espousing an ideology rooted in a meta-
physical construct.” J. Matthew Bonzo, Indwelling the Forsaken Other: The Trinitarian Ethics 
of Jürgen Moltmann (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2009), 9-10. 
153 TKG, 61. 
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between the biblical witness and later trinitarian theology, he also rejects the “irrec-
oncilable contradiction” that theologians in the tradition of Harnack discover be-
tween this witness and the Trinity itself. Moltmann contests the assumptions that 
inform this trend in liberal Protestantism, namely, that the relevance of Jesus’ mes-
sage for today consists in its moral implications. Metaphysical projections such as 
the doctrine of the Trinity are nothing but distractions. 
 One alternative to this Harnackian dismissal might be found in Karl Barth, 
where the doctrine of the Trinity provides the necessary framework for apprehend-
ing God’s revelation. But Barth grounds the doctrine of the Trinity in the divine lord-
ship, prompting critical questions from Moltmann: “Is God’s lordship really what 
has to be interpreted, and is the Trinity merely its interpretation? Does the sole sov-
ereignty of the one God precede the divine Trinity? Is it not the reverse which is 
true?”154 This response anticipates a more extensive reply from Moltmann, appearing 
later in TKG, which I expound below.155 At this stage it will be enough to note that 
Moltmann discovers a common problem in Harnackian and Barthian hermeneutics: 
“Every monotheistic interpretation of New Testament testimony,” here, Barth’s, 
“finds itself in a similar dilemma to the moral interpretation. It too has to reduce the 
history to which the Bible testifies to a single subject.”156 But “according to the testi-
mony of the New Testament it is not God who reveals himself, but the Son who 
reveals the Father (Matt 11:27) and the Father who reveals the Son (Gal 1:16).”157 That 
is, the NT consistently speaks of three interdependent subjects. “For Moltmann, one 
pattern of trinitarian activity cannot adequately convey the activity detailed in the 
New Testament.”158 Harnack’s criticism fails because it bypasses the Trinity com-
pletely, though an essential feature of the biblical witness, but so does Barth’s refor-
mulation and the doctrine upheld by the greater part of the tradition, insofar as the 
oneness is made prior to the trinity of God.  
 
154 TKG, 63. 
155 See 6.4.4. 
156 TKG, 63. 
157 TKG, 64. 





 It is important to comment on the location of Moltmann’s remarks regarding 
the relationship between the doctrine of the Trinity and Scripture. These remarks are 
offered in the conclusion of a very brief discussion of liberal Protestant theology and 
Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity. At least in connection to Barth, they are developed in 
much more detail later on in TKG. My concern here is simply to follow Moltmann in 
providing this brief context as an introduction to his alternative: a doctrine of trini-
tarian history that attempts to remain faithful to Scripture in reflecting on the three 
unique, interdependent, and historical subjects of Father, Son, and Spirit.  
 Barth’s “monotheism” cannot recognise “the history of the reciprocal, chang-
ing, and hence living relationship between the Father, the Son and the Spirit.”159 It is 
in conflict with the NT, which “talks about God by proclaiming in narrative [erzäh-
lend verkündigen] the relationships of the Father, the Son and the Spirit, which are 
relationships of fellowship and are open to the world.”160 Or, as Moltmann writes 
later on in TKG, “History shows us that it is in the abstractions that the heresies are 
hidden. The foundations of orthodoxy, on the other hand, are to be found in narra-
tive differentiation [erzählende Differenzierung].”161 Significantly, there is a conceptual 
connection between history (Geschichte) and narrative (Erzählung) here that English 
does not carry. This is because in German Geschichte can designate either history or 
story.162 Such an observation is particularly important in regard to the role that Scrip-
ture plays in Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity. It is not merely the history preced-
ing the Bible to which the latter is a witness, but the narratival, storied character of 
this witness is valuable in itself. Moltmann seeks to reflect this in his doctrine of the 
Trinity, which only comes into its own in narrative form. As Geiko Müller-Fahren-
holz puts it, for Moltmann “the doctrine of the Trinity is basically not a ‘doctrine’…; 
rather, it is about the telling, or better the retelling, of God's history.”163 
 
159 TKG, 65. 
160 TKG, 64; Ger. 80. 
161 TKG, 190; Ger. 206. 
162 So Ernst Conradie: “Moltmann’s theology is deeply (hi)storical.” Ernst M. Conradie, Sav-
ing the Earth? The Legacy of Reformed Views on “Re-Creation” (Zurich: Lit, 2013), 278. 
163 Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, 142, emphasis original. So McDougall: For 
Moltmann “the biblical witness does not yield a doctrine of the Trinity that can be fixed in 
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 This necessarily narratival character of the doctrine is not new to TKG. Indeed, 
already in 1968 Moltmann observes, “Christian theology speaks of God historically. 
It speaks of the ‘God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,’ and of the ‘Father of Jesus Christ,’ 
and unites the proclamation of God with the memory of historical persons. It speaks 
of the ‘God of the exodus,’ as in the First Commandment, and of the ‘God who raised 
Jesus from the dead,’ as in the Easter kerygma, and unites with faith in God the 
memory of historical events. The hermeneutical starting point of Christian theology 
is therefore the concrete history witnessed to in both the Old and New Testa-
ments.”164 Later, Moltmann’s CG (1972) can be seen as a modern recounting of the 
story of the cross. Thus, in the year following CG, Moltmann writes that the doctrine 
of the Trinity “is nothing other than the shortened version of the history of Christ’s 
passion…. Anyone who talks about God must tell [erzählen] this history [Ges-
chichte].”165 In CPS (1975), too, Moltmann follows Scripture in telling the story of 
God’s future unification. He reflects, “In the Old Testament God’s self-manifestation 
is always associated with a story [Geschichte] which has to be told [erzählen] in order 
to say who God is.”166 
 In this section I have explored three features concerning the methodology and 
assumptions underpinning Moltmann’s project in TKG, with a focus on their rela-
tionship to his use of Scripture. Moltmann’s rejection of the concepts of “absolute 
substance” and “absolute subject” prepares the way for his alternative approach to 
divine unity, which is intended to more faithfully represent the biblical witness. This 
 
static terms or be subsumed into a metaphysical formula.” McDougall, Pilgrimage of Love, 
12. David Kelsey already recognised this perhaps even long before Moltmann himself. 
Concerning TH (1964), Kelsey writes, “For Moltmann too, biblical narrative is the authori-
tative aspect of scripture because, precisely as narrative, it gives an identity description of 
Jesus Christ in the only apposite way.” David H. Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent The-
ology (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 1975), 54. I have not engaged with Kelsey elsewhere in 
this dissertation as his interaction with Moltmann totals about one page in his famous 
work. In my introduction (1.1.) I briefly discuss two dissertations that apply the body of 
theory developed by Kelsey and others in the so-called Yale School to Moltmann’s work. 
164 RRF, 203. 
165 FC, 74; Ger. “Gesichtspunkte der Kreuzestheologie heute,” Evangelische Theologie 33:4 
(1973): 346-65, at 360. 
166 CPS, 209; Ger. 234. For later comments on narrative in Moltmann’s theology, see e.g., GC, 





alternative is closely related to his framework of trinitarian history. Here Moltmann 
seeks to follow Scripture in speaking of three interdependent subjects, distinct but 
unified. I attend to these proposals in greater detail in the following section. A ques-
tion also arose at the beginning of this section, however, in regard to the relationship 
between ecumenical concerns and more exegetically-informed conclusions. I will 
treat this in greater detail in my discussion of Moltmann’s alternative to the filioque 
clause, below.167 
6.4. A Social Doctrine of the Trinity 
Understanding the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity requires 
moving beyond methodological considerations to the proposals themselves. In this 
section, then, I turn to the content and construction of Moltmann’s doctrine of the 
Trinity as it appears throughout TKG. For want of space, I have not commented on 
every claim that Moltmann makes, but I have focussed my attention on the nonethe-
less expansive passages that are most instructive in regard to the role that Scripture 
plays in his theology. I begin with Moltmann’s discussion of trinitarian love and 
freedom, then proceed to his developed concept of trinitarian history. The latter 
raises questions of trinitarian action and personhood, which Moltmann presents in 
the context of his criticisms of Barth’s and Rahner’s doctrines of the Trinity. His re-
flections on these topics conclude with a perichoretic concept of divine unity and an 
alternative to the filioque clause added to the Nicene Creed. In a final subsection I 
expound the last chapter of TKG, in which Moltmann draws connections between 
the Trinity, politics, church, and society. 
6.4.1. Freedom, Love, and the Creation of the World  
Moltmann’s first substantial and positive contribution to a doctrine of the Trinity 
appears in the second chapter of TKG. After expounding various trends in twentieth 
century theology that help to situate his own theology of trinitaran theology as it was 
 
167 See 6.4.6. 
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developed in CG, Moltmann briefly rehearses his earlier conclusions and then pro-
ceeds to reflect on trinitarian love and freedom in light of the cross. Moltmann begins 
with a rejection of the “nominalist doctrine of decree,” namely that “God is free. He 
is compelled to do nothing. He can do and leave undone whatever he likes.”168 The 
act of creation, for example, is free in such a way that God could have chosen not to 
create the world. Again, Moltmann turns to Barth in order to anchor his discussion: 
“Karl Barth tried to get over the nominalist doctrine of potentia absoluta, especially in 
his criticism of Luther. None the less, in his doctrine of God’s primordial decision a 
nominalist fringe remains.”169 For example, Barth had written: “He could have re-
mained satisfied with Himself and with the impassible glory and blessedness of His 
own inner life. But he did not do so.”170 In conceding that God “could have remained 
satisfied” without creating the world, Barth maintains a nominalist understanding 
of freedom. 
In response, Moltmann points to the NT witness to God’s unassailable faith-
fulness and intra-divine love, citing 2 Tim 2:13: “He remains faithful—for he cannot 
deny himself.” That is, there can be no question of a decision to create the world on 
God’s part, at least insofar as such a decision implies the possibility of choosing not 
to create. For Moltmann, “God’s freedom cannot contradict the highest good which 
constitutes his essence,” namely loving faithfulness.171 “He does not have the choice 
between being love and not being love.”172 The biblical witness to God’s love is to be 
the point of departure for any reflection on divine freedom.173 And love is who God 
 
168 TKG, 52. 
169 TKG, 52. 
170 Barth, CD II/2, 166, cited in TKG, 52. 
171 TKG, 53. 
172 TKG, 54-55, emphasis original. 
173 Molnar advances the somewhat odd-sounding criticism that “if God is not his own pris-
oner he is certainly the prisoner of love which by its very nature must freely create another 
in order to be true to its own nature.” Molnar, Divine Freedom, 399. For Moltmann, how-
ever, this “must” is not in conflict with God’s freedom but essential to it. God’s freedom 
would not be loving freedom if it did not result in the creation of something other than 
God. Critics of Moltmann on this point would do well to remember that various necessi-
ties are already conventionally predicated of God, such as that God necessarily exists, is 
triune, and cannot create a square circle, for example. None of these limit who God is but 





is, and who God freely is. But Moltmann’s propositions here do not yet establish a 
necessary connection between God’s essential love and the act of creation. This rela-
tionship is explored in Moltmann’s following section on love itself. 
 Considering this intra-trinitarian love in more detail, Moltmann proposes six 
theses:174 1. “Love is the self-communication of the good.”175 It does not communicate 
anything destructive. 2. “Every self-communication proposes the capacity for self-
differentiation.”176 The lover communicates itself to another in such a way that it is 
the lover who both communicates and is communicated. This process, as such, as-
sumes identity and differentiation. If God is to love the world, then God must be 
trinitarian: “An individuality cannot communicate itself: individuality is ineffable, 
unutterable. If God is love he is at once the lover, the beloved and the love itself.”177 
3. Love, rightly understood, leads naturally to the creation of the world. For God not 
to create would be a denial of the love God consists in because “love not only has the 
potentiality for this, but the actual tendency and intention as well.”178 
 The trinitarian logic of this love is developed more explicitly in the following 
theses: 4. A distinction must be made between the “necessary love” of Father and 
Son, and the “free love” of the trinitarian persons for the world.179 The first is consti-
tutive of the trinitarian being. It consists in “the love of like for like,” as Father and 
 
creation is essential to divine love might be criticised on other grounds, but his application 
of some form of necessity to the Trinity—a necessity which is in no way in the same class 
as those necessities that restrict human freedoms—is not in itself problematic. 
174 These theses, while not developed in great detail in TKG, underpin much of Moltmann’s 
subsequent theological work. For an exposition and criticism, see Farrow, “Review Essay,” 
435-41. 
175 TKG, 57. 
176 TKG, 57. 
177 TKG, 57. 
178 TKG, 58. 
179 TKG, 58. Molnar rejects Moltmann’s characterisation of the relationship between the Fa-
ther and Son as necessary, arguing that “any such necessity would make the love of God 
subject to a higher law encompassing his actual free love.” Molnar, Divine Freedom, 402. 
But Moltmann simply wants to say that God cannot be other than triune. God is neces-
sarily triune. As Barth, whom Molnar attempts to closely follow, wrote, “He cannot not be 
Father and cannot be without the Son. His freedom or aseity in respect of Himself consists 
in His freedom, not determined by anything but Himself, to be God, and that means to be 
the Father of the Son. A freedom to be able not to be this would be an abrogation of His 
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Son share divine being, even if as distinct persons.180 But “like is not enough for 
like.”181 This intense, capacious love seeks to go beyond the like to the unlike as well. 
Thus, the necessary love of Father and Son naturally leads to the free creation of the 
world. It cannot be otherwise. 5. But with the act of creation, self-humiliation and 
divine suffering are initiated, that is, if at least creation is to remain free. 6. Because 
trinitarian suffering is linked to the creation of the world, however, this also means 
that the world’s redemption, secured already in love, takes place within the broader 
context of the redemption of God from suffering.  
 The briefness of the exposition in this subsection reflects the length of Molt-
mann’s own treatment. In my opinion, these claims are somewhat underdeveloped, 
though there is a certain beauty to them that should not be denied. Besides these 
immediate reflections, however, the content addressed here is important for two rea-
sons. First, although the major focus of this chapter is on Moltmann’s contrastive 
paradigm as it concerns his proposals on divine unity in particular, its application 
here to nominalist concepts of freedom—and especially to Barth’s presentation of 
divine freedom—provides yet another example of this paradigm at work. The same 
pattern of confronting a non-biblical culprit with a biblical alternative is clearly dis-
cernible in Moltmann’s aim to supplant a certain concept of freedom with one in-
formed by Scripture’s witness to God’s love. Second, though, the somewhat specu-
lative, propositional character of the second section, in which Moltmann presents his 
six theses, while inspired by 1 John 4:16, is a departure from much of the other ma-
terial in TKG that bears a closer relationship to exegesis. Of course, such speculation 
has its own merits. The main problem here is that Moltmann does not at this stage 
provide an explicit rationale for approaching the subject matter in quite a different 
manner. 
 
freedom.” Barth, CD I/1, 434. Unfortunately, Molnar’s polemical orientation prevents him 
from understanding Moltmann here. 
180 TKG, 58. 





6.4.2. The Trinity in the History of Christ 
Trinitarian proposals with a closer relationship to the narrative of Scripture are of-
fered in Moltmann’s third chapter, “The History of the Son.” Having laid the biblical 
foundations, addressed above,182 Moltmann proceeds to reflect on his subject matter, 
the Trinity, setting out from the person of the Son. He writes, “In order to grasp the 
Trinity in the biblical history, let us begin with the history of Jesus, the Son, for he is 
the revealer of the Trinity.”183 
Moltmann divides the material into four sections: Christ’s sending, surren-
der, exaltation, and future. The first pertains to his baptism, ministry, and divine 
origin; the second to his road to Jerusalem, Gethsemane, and Golgotha; the third to 
his resurrection, resurrection appearances, and Pentecost; and the fourth to his Par-
ousia. Significantly, in each section, Moltmann discovers a different form of the Trin-
ity. And in each form, different divine persons are the subjects of different actions. 
In Jesus’ sending, for example: “The Father sends the Son through the Spirit. The Son 
comes from the Father in the power of the Spirit. The Spirit brings people into the 
fellowship of the Son with the Father.”184 The three persons are differentiated by their 
respective roles in the history of the Son. Here, the Father sends, the Son comes, and 
the Spirit gathers. 
Because the trinitarian persons share a history, their identities are also histor-
ical. They take on different roles at different points in this history. A different form 
of the Trinity can thus be discerned in Jesus’ surrender, for example. Moltmann 
writes, “The Father gives up his own Son to death in its most absolute sense, for us. 
The Son gives himself up, for us. The common sacrifice of the Father and the Son 
comes about through the Holy Spirit, who joins and unites the Son in his forsaken-
ness with the Father.”185 Simply put, the Father offers the Son, the Son offers himself, 
and the Spirit unites the two. 
 
182 See 6.3.3. 
183 TKG, 65. 
184 TKG, 75. Moltmann provides bullet points which I have not reproduced here. 
185 TKG, 83. Moltmann provides bullet points which I have not reproduced here. 
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In identifying different forms of the Trinity at different stages in the history 
of the Son, Moltmann seeks to affirm the historical shape of the Trinity that he sees 
attested in Scripture. Additionally, however, such a project also allows him the op-
portunity to respond to the pneumatological deficit in his previous work. Respond-
ing to criticisms of this deficit before writing TKG, Moltmann had said, “The situa-
tion only changes if it is possible to speak of an event where the Father is passive and 
all activity within the trinitarian life of God comes from the Spirit.”186 This event, 
considered in CPS (1975), turned out to be the eschatological glorification and unifi-
cation of the Trinity.187 In TKG, though, Moltmann applies this logic even more ex-
plicitly. He writes, “In eschatology, all activity proceeds from the Son and the Spirit; 
the Father is the receiver of the kingdom.”188 And, “in eschatology the Holy Spirit is 
the actor equally,” that is, equally with the Son, so that “he glorifies the Father 
through the praise of all created beings who have been liberated by Christ’s rule. The 
Father is the One who receives. He receives his kingdom from the Son; he receives 
his glory from the Spirit.”189  
Summarising his findings, Moltmann notes, “Father, Son and Spirit do not 
only combine or work together according to a single pattern.”190 Rather, the divine 
persons act upon one another and receive one another’s actions in different ways, 
according to the different stages in the trinitarian history. Moltmann strengthens this 
claim with reference to his contrastive paradigm: “Up to now, however, dogmatic 
tradition has only worked with a single pattern. And in the West this pattern has 
always been Father—Son—Spirit.”191 That is, for Moltmann the biblical material re-
quires a much more fluid account of the Trinity—indeed, a historical one—than that 
which is offered by the tradition. 
 
186 Moltmann in DGG, 186 (1979). 
187 See 6.2.1. 
188 TKG, 93. 
189 TKG, 94, cf. 125-26, 204. 
190 TKG, 94. 





 Finally, Moltmann offers two preliminary proposals on the nature of the divine 
unity. First, the historical shape of the Trinity coincides with an openness for the 
eschatological inclusion of humanity and creation into the divine life. Second, God’s 
actions are not the work of a single subject but of three subjects, the trinitarian per-
sons, who act upon and are acted upon by the others in various ways. It follows that 
“the unity of the divine tri-unity lies in the union [Einigkeit] of the Father, the Son and 
the Spirit, not in their numerical unity [Einheit]. It lies in their fellowship, not in the 
identity of a single subject.”192 Moltmann finds further support for this in Jesus’ 
claim: “The Father and I are one” (John 10:30). The word “one” [eins] here is hen in 
Greek, not heis—the latter which would justify the traditional concept of divine unity 
and have Jesus say, “I and the Father are one and the same [einer].”193 Moltmann also 
appeals to John 17:21, where Jesus prays that his disciples will be one just as the 
Father is one with him. This requires that the divine unity is not complete from the 
beginning but is open to the inclusion of creation within it. 
6.4.3. Trinitarian Action 
In chapter four, having reflected on the Trinity through the different stages of the 
Son’s history, Moltmann proceeds to offer a complementary reflection oriented to 
the works conventionally appropriated to the different persons: creation to the Fa-
ther, incarnation to the Son, and glorification to the Spirit. But Moltmann explicitly 
rejects this Augustinian concept of appropriation, in which these works are works of 
the whole Trinity and only appropriated to particular persons. Here, for example, 
 
192 TKG, 95, emphasis original; Ger. 111. Note that Moltmann moves on from the language 
of Vereinigung applied to the Trinity in CPS (1975). Vereinigung is instead appropriated to 
the eschatological unification of creation with God. “The union [Einigkeit] of the divine 
Trinity is open for the uniting [Vereinigung] of the whole creation with itself and in itself.” 
TKG, 96; Ger. 111. Cf. the “unification of the whole creation” on 127 and 157; Ger. 142, 174; 
and “the uniting of isolated individuals” on 216; Ger. 233. 
193 TKG, 95; Ger. 111. This is how Kohl translates Moltmann’s distinction between eins and 
einer. This distinction is not as clear in English, which typically uses one for both German 
words, and sometimes someone for einer. In its first sense, einer might be seen to preclude 
plurality because it refers to one within a group, for example, einer der Götter: one of the 
gods. In its second sense, it could preclude trinitarian distinction insofar as it refers to a 
single, personal subject, for example, da hat das einer hier gelassen: someone left this here. 
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creation would be an undivided act of the whole Trinity, while theology could ap-
propriately speak of the work of creation as being a work of the Father—on the basis 
of his intra-trinitarian generation of the Son and spiration of the Spirit, even if Son 
and Spirit share equally in this act as being the one actor, God. Because Moltmann 
rejects the premise that God is a single subject, however, he also rejects the logic of 
appropriation. 
 Moltmann’s trinitarian doctrine of creation provides one example of his alter-
native conception of trinitarian action, going beyond the parameters set by the doc-
trine of appropriation. In this, the Father is the subject of creation, and “creates the 
world by virtue of his eternal love for the Son.”194 Admittedly, Moltmann follows the 
tradition in drawing a connection between the act of creation and the Father’s active 
relationship to the Son within the Trinity, grounded in his eternal act of begetting 
the Son. But for Moltmann the act of creation is not simply appropriate to the person 
of the Father. Rather, it is his in a much more direct way, insofar as it originates with 
him and is carried out uniquely and actively by him—not in an undifferentiated 
manner by the whole Trinity. This does not mean that Son and Spirit are excluded 
from the act, however. They, too, participate in creation, albeit each in their own way. 
Thus, for the Father’s initiating love the Son offers his own, responsive love, which 
provides the ground for creation to freely give itself back to its Creator. The Father 
also creates not merely out of nothing but “out of the powers and energies of his own 
Spirit.”195 So, too, then, is the Spirit active in the work of creation through giving life 
to all created things. As Moltmann will write a few years later, “Creation exists in 
the Spirit, is moulded by the Son and is created by the Father. It is therefore from 
God, through God and in God.”196 Creation is an act of the one God, but this act is 
accomplished in the interrelated workings of the three persons of the Trinity, and 
not by the one God as a single subject.197 
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6.4.4. Modalism and Modern Theology 
Moltmann opens his fifth chapter with “a criticism of Christian monotheism.”198 The 
doctrine of the Trinity was formulated in the context of various heresies that ques-
tioned Christ’s unity with God. Arianism conceived of God apart from Christ, 
whereas Sabellianism (or modalism) swallowed up Christ within God. For Molt-
mann, these heresies are both “monotheistic” rather than trinitarian, attempting to 
insulate the unity of God from trinitarian differentiation. Importantly, moreover, 
they “are by no means historically fortuitous and a thing of the past. They are per-
manent dangers to Christian theology.”199 But Moltmann is not speaking of fringe 
movements that are not taken seriously by Christian orthodoxy. As he later reveals, 
“Whereas throughout the history of the church Arianism was always tainted with 
‘liberalism’ and heresy, Sabellian modalism was at times established church doc-
trine.”200 After a brief comment on Tertullian in this connection, Moltmann proceeds 
to offer criticisms of Barth’s and Rahner’s doctrines of the Trinity.201 His critique of 
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these two figures is closely related to his rejection of God as absolute substance and 
absolute subject in the first chapter of TKG, treated above.202 
Moltmann situates Barth in the German Idealist tradition which character-
ised God as absolute subject and thus “the subject of his own being and his own 
revelation.”203 In his first chapter, Moltmann had argued that this development arose 
in the context of early modernity and humanity’s newfound powers over nature. A 
new concept of God thus appeared, corresponding to the new conditions the human 
subject found itself in. But this emphasis on the single subject of God also had con-
sequences for trinitarian theology: “If the subjectivity of acting and receiving is trans-
ferred from the three divine Persons to the one divine subject, then the three Persons 
are bound to be degraded to modes of being, or modes of subsistence, of the one 
identical subject.”204 Father, Son, and Spirit, in being made modes of being in Barth’s 
doctrine of the Trinity, forfeit the character of active subjectivity and thus, for Molt-
mann, of distinct personhood. Moltmann takes further issue with other aspects of 
Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity, such as his having made the divine lordship logically 
prior to the Trinity;205 his adoption of Anselm’s formulation of the personal distinc-
tions as repetitions—a “holy tautology”;206 and his pneumatology in the tradition of 
Augustine, where the Spirit is understood as the love between the Father and the 
Son, but as such, in Moltmann’s view, lacks real personhood. 
As he had done earlier,207 Moltmann also criticises Barth for drawing atten-
tion to an apparently non-existent tritheism in order to divert attention away from 
his own “modalism.”208 Indeed, the tritheism Barth is referring to is probably the 
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“triadology of the Eastern church.”209 To characterise this established church doc-
trine as tritheism, a heresy, is a polemical decision on Barth’s part—perhaps only 
matched by Moltmann’s polemical attribution of modalism to Barth himself! None-
theless, Moltmann is not wholly critical of Barth. He is appreciative of Barth’s trini-
tarian theology in the later volumes of the Church Dogmatics, where Barth reflects on 
the biblical witness to God’s covenant and develops what Moltmann characterises 
as a theology of “mutual relationship… in which God does not merely speak and 
decree, but also hears and receives.”210 
Rahner goes down a similar path to that of Barth, designating the trinitarian 
persons as “distinct modes of subsistence” of the one divine subject.211 He, too, po-
lemicises against an apparently non-existent tritheism, but goes even further to say 
that “this danger looms much larger than Sabellian modalism.”212 Following again 
in the German Idealist tradition, Rahner takes particular issue with applying a mod-
ern concept of personhood to the Father, Son, and Spirit. Yet, Moltmann responds, 
the target of Rahner’s objection is “extreme individualism,” so that Rahner overlooks 
the contributions of modern personalist philosophy.213 According to the latter, there 
is no I without Thou. The concept of person is a relational one. Unfortunately, this 
oversight means that the individualistic concept of person, albeit rejected when ap-
plied to the trinitarian persons, is now resituated by Rahner within the sphere of the 
one divine subject.  
Moltmann provides a short conclusion for this first section of his chapter. 
Church history shows that philosophical terms took on new meanings in theology 
to make room for their subject matter. He cites the concept of person as an example. 
Comparatively little progress, however, was made with the concept of divine unity. 
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But a hint is provided in the Nicene Creed. Here, Father, Son, and Spirit are homoou-
sios, so that they share the same substance. They do not necessarily constitute a single 
subject, as in Barth and Rahner. This leads Moltmann to propose the following thesis, 
where his contrastive paradigm is especially evident: “If the biblical testimony is 
chosen as a point of departure, then we shall have to start from the three Persons of 
the history of Christ. If philosophical logic is made the starting point, then the en-
quirer proceeds from the One God.”214 That is, Scripture suggests a doctrine of the 
Trinity that does not share Thomas’s point of departure in absolute substance, nor 
Barth’s or Rahner’s in the absolute subject. A biblical doctrine of the Trinity will have 
to reflect the active, interrelated, and distinct personhoods of Father, Son, and Spirit. 
Moltmann has made steps in this direction already. To complete his proposal he will 
need to reflect more deeply on the unity of the three persons. 
 An important caveat warrants mention at this point, however, before Molt-
mann proceeds to unfold his alternative concept of divine unity in detail. Theological 
reflection that begins with the three persons does not require that their unity is an 
afterthought. Rather, “the unitedness of the triunity is already given with the fellow-
ship of the Father, the Son and the Spirit.”215 As Moltmann later writes, “The unity 
of God is to be found in the triunity of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. It 
neither precedes that nor follows it.”216 Perhaps anticipating charges of tritheism, 
Moltmann contends that the divine unity is concurrent with the trinity of persons, 
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insofar as each is always already volitionally and ontologically intertwined with the 
other. But there is yet more to say of trinitarian unity. 
6.4.5. Divine Personhood and Unity 
Later in his fifth chapter, Moltmann goes on to address the identities of the divine 
persons within the life of the Trinity. First, the Father must be understood primarily 
as the Father of the Son. If his Fatherhood is rather conceived of chiefly on the basis 
of his relationship to the world, namely, that he is its origin, then he becomes an 
almighty power indistinguishable from that principle which has traditionally sanc-
tioned the prevailing religio-political order. Instead, his fatherhood of the world is 
to be understood on the basis of his Fatherhood of Christ, for whose sake he adopts 
human beings as his children. Moltmann also claims that the concept of divine origin 
(archē) can be helpful in bringing clarity to theological thinking, though only insofar 
as the “equally primordial character of the trinitarian Persons,” that is, of the Son 
and Spirit who find their origin in the Father, is also upheld.217 If the Father is pre-
sented as origin in any other sense then the doctrine of the Trinity is again lost to 
monotheism.218 The Father’s personhood is therefore relational, in that it cannot be 
defined apart from the Son, as well as distinct, in that the Father alone is the origin 
of the Son and the Spirit. This will also have important implications for Moltmann’s 
proposed solution to the problem of the filioque. So, too, the Son’s personhood is re-
lational, in that it cannot be defined apart from the Father, as well as distinct, in that 
the Son alone is begotten of the Father. Finally, neither can the Spirit be defined apart 
from the Father and the Son. But the Spirit is also distinct from the other persons in 
that it proceeds from the Father rather than being begotten by him. Moltmann will 
treat this in greater detail in his section on the filioque clause. Before doing so, he 
offers some further reflections on divine personhood and unity. 
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 Taking up Boethius’s definition of personhood, Moltmann offers the following 
thesis: “The trinitarian Persons are not ‘modes of being’; they are individual, unique, 
non-interchangeable subjects of the one, common divine substance, with conscious-
ness and will. Each of the persons possesses the divine nature in a non-interchange-
able way; each presents it in his own way.”219 But this personhood is not to be con-
fused with self-sufficiency or isolation. Rather, “their particular individual nature is 
determined in their relationship to one another…. It is in these relationships that they 
are persons.”220 It is both the personhood of the individual substance after Boethius 
and the relational personhood beginning with Augustine that must be upheld. This 
means, moreover, that neither can the persons be identified exhaustively with the 
relations.221 That would be modalism. For Moltmann, “here there are no persons 
without relations; but there are no relations without persons either.”222 Put differ-
ently, as Moltmann later writes, “The trinitarian concepts of person, relation, pericho-
resis and illumination must be noted in the doctrine of the Trinity…. [N]o concept 
may subsume another and be made a generic term including the other.”223 Finally, 
however, the concept of divine personhood would still be incomplete if it did not 
take into account the historicity of each person, following Hegel. This is one of the 
most distinctive aspects of Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity, which I have been 
exploring throughout this chapter of the dissertation. Father, Son, and Spirit are not 
only personal and relational, but their persons and relations undergo change in his-
tory. 
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 Next, Moltmann turns to the patristic concept of perichoresis, or circumincessio. 
Here “the Persons do not only subsist in the common divine substance; they also 
exist in their relations to the other Persons.”224 That is, the persons are one through 
their intimate indwelling within one another. “By virtue of their eternal love they 
live in one another to such an extent, and dwell in one another to such an extent, that 
they are one.”225 Moltmann finds this concept to be particularly helpful in upholding 
both the trinity of persons and their unity. Because unity is only to be found in the 
interrelationships of the three, the trinity of persons is constitutive of this unity. It is 
a social unity, so that the unity of persons cannot be comprehended apart from the 
persons. This differs from “a general concept of divine substance,” which, if upheld, 
“would abolish the personal differences.”226 Moltmann has already laid such a 
charge against Barth and Rahner. 
 Thus, Moltmann seeks to ground the divine unity in the perichoretic interrela-
tionships between the persons. The unity of God is therefore always already a trini-
tarian unity, and cannot be arrived at independently of the three persons—such as 
in notions of absolute substance or absolute subject. Notably, Moltmann turns to Bo-
ethius, Augustine, and Hegel in this section in order to develop a concept of person-
hood as individual, relational, and historical. His discussion of perichoresis finds its 
starting point in John of Damascus, even if Moltmann has well and truly made the 
concept his own by the end of the discussion. This is to say that while the narrative 
of Scripture encourages Moltmann to depart from traditional concepts of divine 
unity, this narrative is not the only source of his alternative doctrine of the Trinity. 
He takes what he needs from key voices in the tradition in order to reflect more 
deeply on the biblical logic. I argued above that a similar thing transpires in Molt-
mann’s engagement with Orthodox theologians.227 This will also be a feature of his 
discussion of the filioque clause, to which I now turn.  
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6.4.6. An Alternative to the Filioque Clause 
Moltmann goes on to propose a solution to the problem of the filioque, the clause 
which was later included in the Nicene Creed and affirmed that the Spirit “proceeds 
from the Father and the Son.”228 Accepted by the churches of the west, it occasioned 
the 1054 Great Schism between the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches. 
Until the late nineteenth century, little progress was made in attempts to resolve the 
theological conflict. Moreover, Moltmann contends, neither can ecclesial disunity be 
resolved through the simple removal of the clause from the creed. A shared doctrine 
of the Trinity needs to be sought. 
In pursuit of a shared doctrine of the Trinity, Moltmann points to common 
ground between the theologies of east and west in that both acknowledge the prior-
ity of the Father in the Spirit’s procession, even if in different ways. That is, the Father 
remains the only unoriginate person of the Trinity.229 Importantly, moreover, west-
ern readers must not misunderstand the east’s rejection of the filioque. Moltmann ar-
gues that although the Spirit owes its existence to the Father alone in Orthodox the-
ology, the form of relation it takes within the Trinity is determined through the Fa-
ther and the Son. Origin and relation must be differentiated. Having established these 
basic claims, Moltmann turns to the work of Boris Bolotov in order to develop his 
proposal. The Spirit does not proceed from a nameless person but from the Father, 
and the fatherhood of this Father derives from his relationship to the Son, not from 
his relationship to all things. Thus, the Spirit’s procession “presupposes, firstly, the 
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generation of the Son; secondly, the existence of the Son; and thirdly, the mutual 
relationship of the Father and the Son. The Son is the logical presupposition and the 
actual condition for the procession of the Spirit from the Father; but he is not the 
Spirit’s origin, as the Father is.”230 Put succinctly, the Son is “not uninvolved” in the 
Spirit’s procession.231 This can be expressed positively, too, if the distinction between 
origin and relation is observed: “The Holy Spirit has from the Father his perfect, di-
vine existence (hypostasis, hyparxis) and receives from the Son his relational form (ei-
dos, prosopon).”232 And although the latter is also eternal, it presupposes the Spirit’s 
procession, which is logically prior. 
In order to offer a thoughtful response to the scandal surrounding the filioque 
clause, Moltmann again departs from the task of simply reading and reflecting on 
Scripture—something he is criticised for by Bauckham.233 But I think this is a false 
dichotomy. The Bible does not provide an answer to every question. Although 
Bauckham would obviously be aware of this fact, he has not applied its truth to Molt-
mann’s proposal here. Moltmann’s reflections on trinitarian personhood, action, and 
unity attempt to follow the narrative of Scripture closely as a source for trinitarian 
doctrine. But this does not mean that Moltmann closes himself to thought outside 
the Bible that aids him in communicating the biblical witness to the Trinity in the 
context of the concerns of his own time and place. The problem of the filioque is one 
of those concerns, being a focus of the ecumenical movement in particular. It is to 
Moltmann’s credit that in his treatment of trinitarian unity he has sought a corre-
sponding ecclesial unity. This connection is already made in John 17. Thus, while the 
finer details of Moltmann’s proposals are rightly considered, examined, and even 
contested, his entry into the discussion over the filioque, ostensibly a departure from 
NT concerns, is to be celebrated. 
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6.4.7. Trinitarian and Human Community 
In the final chapter of TKG, Moltmann offers some reflections on the significance of 
a social doctrine of the Trinity for human community.234 Whereas historical forms of 
monotheism, including Christian ones, legitimated oppressive political and religious 
orders, Moltmann argues, the doctrine of the Trinity, rightly understood, leads to 
freedom in politics and religion: “A community of men and women without suprem-
acy and without subjection.”235 Moltmann had already begun to move the discussion 
in this direction in his previous chapter. Thus, the nineteenth century theologians 
Richard Rothe, Isaak A. Dorner, and Martin Kähler had developed a concept of God 
as “absolute personality.” This concept corresponded to “the fully developed human 
personality of the bourgeois world.”236 Here, in light of the God who is absolute sub-
ject, the human being who is made in God’s image develops its personhood in self-
relationship. If, however, God is triune, then the human being is only truly personal 
in community with other persons. Barth and Rahner, therefore, who inherit the nine-
teenth century approach, are also subject to this criticism. 
 Moltmann opens this last chapter with a discussion of “political monotheism.” 
Peterson’s influence is again especially clear here, as Moltmann traces the corre-
spondence of the one emperor to the one God in early Christian theology. But Molt-
mann also addresses the undeveloped claim of Peterson’s that the “the European 
Enlightenment preserved nothing of the Christian belief in God except ‘monothe-
ism,’ a result as dubious in its theological substance as in its political conse-
quences.”237 Thus contributions to the Huguenot doctrine of royal absolutism began 
to appear in the seventeenth century. It was the king above all others who repre-
sented God in his majesty and aneuthunia, his “non-accountability towards anyone 
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else.”238 The nominalist aspects of Calvin’s approach to divine sovereignty found 
their political expression here. And while the king’s accountability to God alone was 
intended to prevent tyranny, in practice it actually sanctioned it. With the French 
Revolution this doctrine basically met its end, though it was maintained by various 
Catholic and Protestant thinkers. Moltmann locates its modern manifestation in dic-
tatorships, where the religious rationale finally becomes superfluous. 
Significantly, Moltmann also departs from Peterson on a central claim. 
Whereas Peterson saw an end to Christian political monotheism in the trinitarian 
theologies of Gregory Nazianzus and Augustine, Moltmann argues that “trinitarian 
dogma left this particular dogma,” that is, divine monarchy, “untouched.” There-
fore, “as long as the unity of the triune God is understood monadically or subjecti-
vistically, and not in trinitarian terms, the whole cohesion of a religious legitimation 
of political sovereignty continues to exist.”239 For Moltmann, the Father’s almighti-
ness does not correspond to the almightiness of the monarch because the Father’s 
almightiness is in his power of suffering love. God’s glory does not correspond to 
royal and victorious human glories but to the glory of the crucified Christ and thus 
to that of those who are his brothers in their suffering. God’s power does not corre-
spond to human progress and power but to power in the “shadow of death,” where 
the Spirit of the resurrection is found.240 Finally, neither can there be any legitimation 
of an oppressive political order if the social unity of the Trinity is properly taken into 
account: “The Trinity corresponds to a community in which people are defined 
through their relations with one another and in their significance for one another, 
not in opposition to one another, in terms of power and possession.”241 
 But it is not only political monotheism that has been a feature of Christian his-
tory. Moltmann seeks to go beyond Peterson, applying the latter’s analysis to “cleri-
cal monotheism.” Indeed, this is perhaps a subtle comment on Peterson’s conversion 
to Catholicism. As Moltmann later writes, “Peterson did not even notice the clerical 
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monotheism of the papal hierarchy, the monarchical episcopate: one God—one 
Christ—one pope—one church.”242 Moltmann places the origins of clerical monothe-
ism in Ignatius of Antioch’s theology of the episcopate, which centred church unity 
in the bishop. This “certainly brought unity into the Christian churches, but it did so 
at the cost of eliminating the charismatic prophets.”243 Moreover, those in the com-
munity who departed from episcopal opinion risked excommunication. The theol-
ogy of episcopal unity later developed into papal unity, and ultimately into the doc-
trine of papal infallibility. But all of this, Moltmann argues, overlooks the biblical 
basis for ecclesiastical unity in Jesus’ prayer in John 17, where the unity of the church 
corresponds to the unity of the Father with the Son. If the Trinity instead provides 
the basis for ecclesiastical unity, then a non-hierarchical order is instead adopted, 
such as in presbyterial and synodal models. 
 Moltmann goes on to provide some more generalised comments on the nature 
of human freedom, preparing the way for his adoption of the trinitarian theology of 
Joachim of Fiore, with which he concludes the book. Human freedom, insofar as it is 
understood as freedom from necessity—resulting simply in the freedom to choose—
is not yet full freedom. Moltmann quotes a German proverb: “The person who 
chooses has the torment of choice.”244 That is, freedom of choice does not guarantee 
the proper exercise of that freedom. A second aspect of freedom thus emerges, the 
freedom “to do what is good as a matter of course,” joyfully and without compul-
sion.245 This is freedom in community, not merely the freedom of the individual—
the latter which, though it ostensibly recognises the freedoms of others, is always 
already in competition with these others to gain more freedom from necessity. For 
Moltmann, “I become truly free when I open my life for other people and share with 
them, and when other people open their lives for me and share them with me.”246 
Finally, Moltmann introduces a third aspect. The freedom of the human community 
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takes place in history. Here, freedom is found in the pursuit of a common future, 
because at present freedom has not yet reached its full potential. Nonetheless, the 
freedom of the community that pursues a common future is still perfectly at home 
within an atheistic framework, a framework that assumes that God and freedom are 
contradictions. Moltmann thus proceeds to demonstrate the close relationship be-
tween the doctrine of the Trinity and human freedom. 
 Joachim of Fiore developed a trinitarian schema of the kingdom of God, often 
overlooked in dogmatics, that differentiated between the kingdom of the Father, 
then of the Son, then of the Spirit, and then of the whole Trinity, corresponding to 
different ages in world history.247 And here Moltmann begins, though he departs 
from “Joachim’s modalistic attempt to divide the history of the kingdom chronolog-
ically into three successive eras.”248 The nature of Moltmann’s alternative reading 
will become clear in the following. First, the kingdom of the Father pertains to the 
relationship between God the Father and his creation, over which he is Lord,249 and 
which, as creation, is completely dependent upon him. Nonetheless, in being called 
to service, human beings are exalted above the rest of creation. The servant of God 
“fears God alone and nothing else in the world.”250 Second, the kingdom of the Son 
pertains to the new relationship of human beings to God in Christ. Here, human 
beings call upon God as Father. They are no longer servants but children. Third, the 
kingdom of the Spirit pertains to friendship of God through the indwelling of the 
Holy Spirit. “God does not want the humility of servants or the gratitude of children 
for ever. He wants the boldness and confidence of friends, who share his rule with 
 
247 Cf. Moltmann’s discussion of Thomas Aquinas’s critical responses to Joachim’s theology. 
HTG, 91-109 (1982). For further comment, see A. J. Conyers, “The Revival of Joachite Apoc-
alyptic Speculation in Contemporary Theology,” Perspectives in Religious Studies 12:3 
(1985): 197-211; idem, God, Hope, and History, 159-75. 
248 TKG, 209. 
249 Kohl translates Herr as the lowercase “lord,” perhaps reflecting Moltmann’s consistent 
attempts to overcome the centrality of lordship in the doctrine of the Trinity after Barth, 
though somewhat awkwardly alongside the capitalised “Creator”: “God is the Creator 
and lord of those he has created.” TKG, 219; Ger. 236. It is unlikely that this is a typograph-
ical error as other instances of the lowercase “lord” applied to God appear in this passage. 
250 TKG, 219. 
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him.”251 Rather than being conceived of as different periods of history, however, for 
Moltmann these kingdoms better correspond to the experiences of freedom in the 
human encounter with God, so that he speaks of a general “trend” from servant to 
child to friend.252 Finally, there is the eschatological kingdom of the Trinity, which 
has not yet come. Here at last servanthood, childhood, and friendship find their ful-
filment in “unhindered participation in the eternal life of the triune God himself.”253 
 Moltmann’s application of his doctrine of the Trinity to politics, the church, 
and human relationships raises some important questions concerning the role of 
Scripture in TKG. Although the discussion appears at the end of his book, this does 
not necessarily mean that its conclusions are controlled by the foregoing, more exe-
getically-oriented proposals. Indeed, Moltmann’s interest in the Trinity effectively 
began with his reading Peterson. That is, his original motivation for formulating a 
trinitarian theology was not directly biblical but instead negatively propelled by the 
close association between the tradition’s monotheism and the political order. The 
claims made in the last chapter of TKG—extending to the church and human com-
munity—are essentially developments in the trajectory already set by this earlier dis-
covery. But neither do I think this requires the judgement that Moltmann’s work here 
is wholly abstracted from the biblical narrative. First, his political theology is bound 
up with biblically inspired concerns, such as the liberation of the poor. I have dis-
cussed this connection in an earlier chapter. Second, Moltmann’s applied trinitarian 
theology here is surely not devised independently of his hermeneutical findings. 
Though finding its initial impetus in Peterson’s analysis, it is shaped by the project 
of TKG as a whole, which, as I have shown throughout the last two sections, is in-
tended as a contribution consistently informed by the witness of Scripture. 
 In summary, a number of creative contributions to the doctrine of the Trinity 
are made on Moltmann’s part throughout TKG, though with different relationships 
to Scripture. There are the more speculative reflections on the trinitarian freedom 
 
251 TKG, 221. 
252 TKG, 221. 





and love; the concept of trinitarian history, seeking to do justice to the narrative de-
piction of the trinitarian relationships in the NT; the discussion of trinitarian action 
that arises out of this notion of history; the rejection of Barth and Rahner as modalist, 
revealing again Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm; the positive reply to these two 
figures in an alternative formulation of divine personhood and unity; and, finally, 
Moltmann’s proposals in regard to the filioque and the significance of a social doc-
trine of the Trinity for human community, both of which, while departing from a 
directly biblical rationale, are not unrelated to the concerns of Scripture. 
6.5. Summary 
In this chapter I have explored different aspects of Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity 
and its relationship to Scripture, attending to traces of the doctrine in his earlier 
work, its development in CG (1972) and CPS (1975) especially, and its mature formu-
lation in TKG (1981). As with the theology of promise in TH, and the theology of 
trinitarian suffering in CG, here, too, Moltmann employs a contrastive paradigm to 
distinguish what he understands to be the “trinitarian” witness of Scripture from the 
“monotheistic” doctrines of the tradition. Nonetheless, the paradigm’s role in Molt-
mann’s argumentation appears to be less pronounced in TKG. For example, he does 
not consistently draw an explicit connection between his proposals and the biblical 
witness. While this might be problematic for some, I do not think that venturing into 
extra-biblical territory is in itself problematic. As Karl Barth wrote, “The text of the 
doctrine of the Trinity is at every point related to texts in the biblical witness to rev-
elation. It also contains certain concepts taken from this text. But it does this in the 
way an interpretation does. That is to say, it translates and exegetes the text. And 
this means, e.g., that it makes use of other concepts besides those in the original. The 
result is that it does not just repeat what is there. To explain what is there it sets 
something new over against what is there.”254 The main reason I call attention to this 
 
254 Barth, CD I/1, 309. 
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feature of Moltmann’s theology, then, is not to suggest criticisms but to provide a 
more complete picture of the role that Scripture plays in his project. 
 In addition to some hints of the Trinity in Moltmann’s early theology, his in-
terest in the doctrine begins to develop with reading Erik Peterson in the late sixties. 
Peterson’s analysis of the relationship between emphasis on the divine oneness and 
support for the political order administrated through a single emperor or king, for 
example, will later be a key influence in Moltmann’s rejection of traditional ap-
proaches to divine unity in favour of what he understands to be a more biblical, trin-
itarian approach. Just a little later, Moltmann’s explicit turn to a doctrine of the Trin-
ity in CG is accompanied by some preliminary proposals for what this alternative 
might look like. But these are yet to be formulated in any great detail. 
 It is with CPS that Moltmann responds to this call, situating a theology of the 
eschatological unification of the Trinity within the context of a trinitarian history. 
Indeed, the development of a theology of trinitarian history is significant in itself. 
While in CG Moltmann closely associated the constitution of the Trinity with the 
event of the cross, in his trinitarian history the persons find their origin in eternity 
and undergo changes in identity and relation over the course of their own history. 
With the coming of the kingdom, the Spirit works to unify the Father and Son with 
creation so that the world, too, is ultimately incorporated into the life of the Trinity. 
This alternative concept of divine unity might be said to presuppose a social doctrine 
of the Trinity. But this connection is not explored in detail until TKG. 
 Before the publication of TKG, two texts from 1979 are of note, in which Molt-
mann comments on various aspects of his trinitarian theology. Although not espe-
cially significant as far as they concern his major proposals, these contributions pro-
vide an important glimpse into the development of Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trin-
ity prior to TKG. 
 With TKG, Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity finds its full expression. First, 
though, a number of methodological decisions and assumptions are of note. Molt-
mann points to Dumitru Stăniloae as the third key influence on his trinitarian theol-





of this theology was already in place when Moltmann first met Stăniloae. Nonethe-
less, a definite connection can be established between other figures in the Orthodox 
Church and Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity. In two different places in TKG, Molt-
mann also reveals various considerations that will direct the proposals offered in the 
work. The first of these is a rejection of the concepts of God as absolute substance or 
absolute subject, as Moltmann views these to be incompatible with a doctrine of the 
Trinity. The second concerns the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theological con-
struction. Significantly, the traditional approaches to divine unity that he rejects do 
not only obstruct trinitarian conceptions of God, but depart from Scripture’s witness 
to God in three persons. For Moltmann, a doctrine of the Trinity will need to take 
into account the changing and historical identities and relationships of Father, Son, 
and Spirit, as they are narrated in the biblical story. This claim is also important be-
cause it reveals that Moltmann does not just value the history that Scripture attests 
but the narratival character of its witness. 
 Moltmann forwards proposals pertaining to many different areas of the doc-
trine of the Trinity throughout TKG. I have not provided an exhaustive appraisal in 
this chapter but have directed my attention to those developments that I deem most 
revealing in relation to the role that Scripture plays in TKG. Moltmann’s discussion 
of trinitarian freedom and love, for example, seems to be somewhat abstracted from 
the biblical material, but neither does this require that the discussion be labelled un-
biblical—as the quote from Barth at the beginning of this section suggests. On the 
other hand, however, there is a speculative quality to Moltmann’s argumentation 
here. I do not mean this in a negative sense. Moltmann’s speculations have their own 
value and I will consider them in greater detail in the following chapter.255 
 Quite a different connection between Moltmann’s theological construction and 
the witness of Scripture can be observed in his theology of trinitarian history. Here, 
he seeks to take as his starting point the changing identities and relationships of the 
trinitarian persons throughout the history of the Son in the NT. Such an undertaking 
 
255 See 7.5. 
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reveals a Trinity that adopts different forms throughout this history, where different 
persons act on the other persons and receive from them in different ways in different 
events. Additionally, a more active pneumatology can be secured, a picture of divine 
unity that has a social rather than substantial foundation begins to emerge. This also 
leads to an alternative conception of trinitarian action. Divine acts are not acts of the 
one, undifferentiated divine substance, then appropriated to distinct persons, but 
acts of each person, carried out interdependently with the other persons. The theol-
ogy of trinitarian history that occasions these conclusions, Moltmann believes, better 
represents the complex multi-subjectivity of God’s actions in Scripture. 
 All of this implies a particular doctrine of divine unity that is not yet fully de-
veloped. Proceeding further in this direction, Moltmann turns first to Barth’s and 
Rahner’s doctrines of the Trinity. His criticisms will constitute the negative side of 
his contrastive paradigm, paving the way for his positive alternative. In a polemi-
cally charged denunciation, Moltmann accuses both Barth and Rahner of the heresy 
of modalism. For him, both fail to acknowledge the persons as distinct, acting sub-
jects, locating action instead in the single divine subject. Moreover, the opposite dan-
ger of tritheism, highlighted by Barth and Rahner, and later directed against Molt-
mann’s own work in CG, is dismissed as a smokescreen devised to divert attention 
from the modalist character of their own positions. Taking the biblical narrative as 
his starting point, Moltmann turns to the patristic concept of perichoresis in order to 
develop an alternative proposal. Here, the divine persons are already united in their 
relationships with one another. A substantialist notion of unity is thus at best super-
fluous. 
 Another notable feature of Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity in TKG is his 
rejection of the filioque clause in favour of a doctrine that maintains the procession of 
the Spirit from the Father alone—as in Eastern Orthodox theology—but also affirms 
that the identity of the Spirit is shaped by the Son in its procession. The basis for this 
is found in the fact that the Father who spirates is always already the Father of the 
Son. While Moltmann’s interests here again appear to be a departure from the bibli-





by other developments in his trinitarian theology that assume a much closer rela-
tionship to Scripture, and they go beyond the direct concerns of the Bible in order to 
speak to contemporary issues. The same might be said of Moltmann’s final chapter 
in TKG, pertaining to the connection between trinitarian and human relationships. 
Although the impetus for this exploration likely originates with Moltmann’s reading 
of Peterson, Peterson does not set the terms for the discussion. Rather, Moltmann 
seeks to apply his reading of the biblical narrative to other areas that are not treated 
in as much detail—or even at all—by Scripture. 
 In a final chapter I attend to some key themes and developments in Molt-








7. Towards a Hermeneutics: Later Theology 
Up until now I have been attempting to uncover the biblical logic of the major pro-
posals that Moltmann makes in the first half of his career. There is a significant de-
gree of feet-finding on his part, leading up to the publication of The Trinity and the 
Kingdom (1980), as Moltmann searches for a vantage point to meditate on the God of 
Scripture. In Theology of Hope (1964) he experimented with an eschatological vantage 
point, and in The Crucified God (1972) with a crucicentric one. His explorations in 
political theology in the late sixties might be suggested as another search for this 
vantage point. But it is the concept of trinitarian history, developed in some detail in 
The Church in the Power of the Spirit (1975) and finding a central place in TKG, that 
finally constitutes the fundamental framework of Moltmann’s project—not least be-
cause it provides a ground for articulating his earlier eschatological, political, and 
crucicentric concerns in one place. Thus, a secondary purpose of my exposition so 
far has been to trace the development of Moltmann’s hermeneutic and theology of 
Scripture, alongside the overarching themes of his thought. With his chief aims and 
trajectories now basically established in his mature doctrine of the Trinity, Moltmann 
possesses a sophisticated theological schema in which to address issues and themes 
concerning the contemporary church and society, even if these treatments are not 
always explicitly related to the doctrine of the Trinity. 
 Because the basic shape and concerns of Moltmann’s theology have now been 
established, there is some freedom in this final chapter to explore some of the various 
features of his project in the latter half of his career that reveal the place of Scripture 
in his theology. Indeed, this place remains a central one, as the conclusion to a 1985 
autobiographical piece demonstrates: “If I were to attempt to sum up the outline of 
my theology in a few key phrases, I would have at the least to say that I am attempt-
ing to reflect on a theology which has: a biblical foundation, an eschatological orien-
tation, a political responsibility.”1 This biblical foundation—which, not insignifi-
cantly, is mentioned first—can be discerned throughout Moltmann’s career, from 
 
1 HTG, 182, formatting adjusted. 
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beginning to end. As I will demonstrate in this chapter, it will continue to inform his 
project into the early 2000s. 
In the following, attending to his work after TKG, I begin with two examples 
of Moltmann’s understanding of Scripture in the eighties. In a second section I attend 
to some of the various roles that the Bible plays in his work The Way of Jesus Christ 
(1989), and in a third section I discuss his rejection of biblicism in The Coming of God 
(1995). Finally, I explore the mature hermeneutical programme that Moltmann sets 
forth in Experiences in Theology (2000). 
7.1. The Theology of the Bible in the Eighties 
Moltmann continues writing after TKG, with a steady output into the eighties. The 
second in his series of systematic contributions, God in Creation appears in 1985, fol-
lowed by the third volume, WJC (1989). I have selected one essay to explore in this 
section, where Moltmann provides a critical analysis of the doctrine of verbal inspi-
ration. I then proceed to comment on the role that Scripture plays in GC. Because of 
the wealth of relevant material in WJC, I devote an entire section to that work, in 
order to treat the material in detail. 
7.1.1. 1982: “‘The Fellowship of the Holy Spirit’: On Trinitarian Pneumatology” 
In an important passage from this essay on pneumatology, Moltmann discusses the 
doctrine of biblical inspiration, a topic he has not addressed in detail since 1959.2 
Unfortunately, it remains unaddressed in his volume on pneumatology, SL (1991), 
but receives more extended attention in his ExpTh (2000), which I will address be-
low.3 Perhaps this neglect demonstrates Moltmann’s basic disinterest in the subject—
indeed, something of this disinterest will become clear in the following. Notably, 
much of the discussion in this essay echoes claims made in his earlier theology, par-
ticularly in regard to the centrality of promise and the eschatological openness of 
 
2 See 2.1.1. 





Scripture to the coming kingdom. There is also new content, however, most of which 
can be traced to the pneumatological innovations presented in TKG. The section on 
verbal inspiration, which I address here, thus appears in an essay on pneumatology, 
where Moltmann aims to overcome “reductions and one-sidedness in pneumatol-
ogy,” namely Protestant pneumatology, without sacrificing the place of Scripture as 
the norming norm of theology.4 
 Moltmann begins with a few comments on “the post-Reformation, old 
Protestant doctrine of verbal inspiration.”5 His initial assessment appears to be 
wholly negative. This view that upheld “inspiration down to the Masoretic punctu-
ation of the Old Testament texts led to Protestant biblicism and evangelical funda-
mentalism.”6 Moltmann’s disdain for the apparent excessiveness of the doctrine is 
apparent in his description of it. The doctrine assumes that “Scripture is the ‘perfect’, 
‘exhaustive’, ‘clear’, ‘inerrant’ revelation of God.”7 Rather than scrutinise every as-
pect of the doctrine, however, Moltmann offers some critical reflections on its as-
sumptions. 
 
4 HTG, 65. 
5 HTG, 65. Old Protestantism is not mentioned in this connection in Moltmann, “Die Bibel 
als Gotteswort und Menschenwort: Eine biblische-theologische Betrachtung anhand von 2. 
Kor 4,1-6,” in Die Bibel – Gotteswort oder Menschenwort? Dargestellt am Buch Jona und am 
Apostolat des Paulus nach 2 Korinther 4, ed. Hans Walter Wolff, Jürgen Moltmann, and Ru-
dolf Bultmann, 36-48 (Neukirchen: Neukirchener, 1959). Moltmann’s target there is rather 
“the fact that, as has been consistently claimed out of fear of doubt since the time of the 
early church’s Apologists (Athenagoras), the Bible possesses a tangible, heavenly quality 
that is demonstrable to everyone and automatically given with its origin.” Moltmann, “Die 
Bibel,” 44. 
6 HTG, 65. Moltmann is further critical of fundamentalist readings of Scripture in Christo-
pher A. Hall and Jürgen Moltmann, “Stubborn Hope,” Christianity Today, 11 January, 1993, 
30-33. In another interview, however, he differentiates between evangelical and funda-
mentalist hermeneutics, writing, “I do not know enough about American evangelicals to 
speak about them with much authority or insight. But I do know this: the advantage of 
American evangelicals is that they start with the biblical tradition, while many of the lib-
eral Christians and theologians just start with their own religious feelings…. If, however, 
we are speaking of American fundamentalists, then I believe that they do not understand 
what they read”! Michael Bauman and Jürgen Moltmann, “Jürgen Moltmann,” in Michael 
Bauman, Roundtable: Conversations with European Theologians, 31-41 (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker, 1990), 38. 
7 HTG, 65. 
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 The first issue with this doctrine is a christological one: “There is no longer any 
difference between the Word of God and its written form because scripture accord-
ing to God’s will contains this Word of God completely and fully.”8 The claim of 
Scripture’s exhaustiveness quietly edges Jesus himself out of the picture. A second, 
pneumatological problem also emerges. As the Spirit took a central role in the 
Word’s incarnation, so, too, is it fundamental to the Word’s inscripturation in the 
Bible, and to the Word’s reception in human hearts. But for Moltmann this would 
require that “the Holy Spirit is none other than the effectiveness of the Word of 
God.”9 The distinct person of the Spirit is lost to the Word, which, in turn, is lost to 
Scripture. Thus, “there is no revelation of the Holy Spirit outside scripture or beyond 
it.”10 
These deficiencies result in problems for anthropology, too, because anthro-
pology is sustained by christology, pneumatology, and the doctrine of the Trinity. 
As such, verbal inspiration here takes a “monarchical orientation,” where God re-
lates to humanity one-sidedly through domination.11 Scripture is an authority repre-
sentative of the divine power, to which recognition and obedience is the only appro-
priate response. Moltmann takes the problems with this kind of understanding of 
the Trinity to be self-evident, having already developed his social doctrine of the 
Trinity in TKG (1980).12 He does, however, provide some comment on God’s one-
sided relationship to human beings here: “Holy Scripture is not just testimony to the 
Word of God but at the same time also testimony to the human answer.”13 Moltmann 
 
8 HTG, 66. 
9 HTG, 66. Later, Moltmann writes, “The Spirit is the subject determining the Word, not just 
the operation of that Word.” SL, 3 (1991). In another place, he claims, “The Protestant or-
der of things—first the word and then the Spirit—is one-sided and wrong unless we think 
the converse too: first the Spirit, then the word.” Moltmann, The Source of Life: The Holy 
Spirit and the Theology of Life, trans. by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1997), 
94. The groundwork for this kind of mutual working between the Son and the Spirit is laid 
in Moltmann’s pneumatology in TKG, esp. 125-27 (1980), and his Spirit christology in WJC 
(1989), introduced on 73-78 and informing Moltmann’s christology throughout the whole 
work. 
10 HTG, 65. 
11 HTG, 66. 
12 See 6.4.7. 





identifies this aspect of Scripture with an existentialist hermeneutic, which is not 
contradictory but complementary to understanding Scripture as revelation, such as 
that found in the theology of Barth: “The parallel exegesis of scripture as the testi-
mony of human beings encountered by faith, i.e. existentialist interpretation, need 
not conflict with the exegesis of scripture as the revelation of God.”14 But neither is 
this human response merely human. In responding to the Word of God, human be-
ings are moved by the Holy Spirit both to give thanks and to lament. Indeed, allud-
ing to Rom 8:22-27, Moltmann contends that these are not just our own laments but 
those of the Spirit too. As such, “through scripture not only does God speak to hu-
man beings but human beings also speak to God.”15 
 Lastly, the testimony of Scripture is both final and open to the future. “With 
regard to revelation, one can regard Holy Scripture literally as final proclamation, in 
so far as it attests the one through whom God has spoken to us ‘last of all’… (Heb 
1:2).”16 On the other hand, though, Scripture does not attest the whole work of the 
Holy Spirit, which is still taking place, both in human beings and the whole of crea-
tion. In this sense, the Bible is “closed christologically but open pneumatologically 
to the future of the kingdom of glory.”17 For Moltmann, the doctrine of verbal inspi-
ration is thus only one side of the picture, looking back to the Christ-event but ob-
scuring the forward-looking, eschatological orientation of Scripture to the coming 
kingdom. “Holy scripture is no self-contained system of a heavenly doctrine, but 
promise open to its own fulfilment.”18 
7.1.2. 1985: God in Creation 
In God in Creation,19 Moltmann appeals to the literary and theological contexts of Gen 
1:28 in order to combat various misreadings. In Moltmann’s words, Carl Amery, for 
 
14 HTG, 66. 
15 HTG, 67. 
16 HTG, 67. 
17 HTG, 67. 
18 HTG, 67. 
19 On this work, see Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power: The Theology of 
Jürgen Moltmann, trans. by John Bowden (London: SCM, 2000), 153-66; Petr Macek, “The 
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example, argued that “the biblical charge given at creation… lays the intellectual 
foundations for today’s ecological crisis: unlimited reproduction, over-population of 
the earth, and the subjugation of nature.”20 But while this may be true historically of 
the church and society’s application of the text, Moltmann contends that the text it-
self does not give such a charge. For him, “the charge is a dietary commandment: 
human beings and animals alike are to live from the fruits which the earth brings 
forth.”21 Where the charge to rule is given in v.26, it “can only be a rule of peace,” as 
the rule of human beings is to correspond to the rule of God.22 And here Moltmann 
reveals an important assumption that underpins his hermeneutic: “It always causes 
misunderstanding when biblical texts are torn out of their proper context in the bib-
lical tradition, and are used to legitimate other concerns.”23 He cites the second crea-
tion story in Gen 2:15 where humans are to “till and keep” the garden. That is, the 
commands given to humanity in Gen 1, if read in isolation from the second creation 
story in Gen 2, are in danger of being misunderstood. Indeed, the entire canon must 
be taken into account. “For a biblical doctrine of creation we have to draw on the 
whole testimony of Scripture, not merely on Genesis 1 and 2.”24 Moltmann will later 
also consider the importance of the NT witness in this connection. 
 Here, too, Moltmann makes an important distinction. He wants to pursue a 
“biblical” theology, not a “fundamentalist” or “biblicist” one.25 The latter develops 
into creationism, which is “nothing but a retreat to the doctrine of creation of a past 
 
Doctrine of Creation in the Messianic Theology of Jürgen Moltmann,” Communio Viatorum 
49:2 (2007): 150-84. 
20 GC, 29. 
21 GC, 29, emphasis original. 
22 GC, 30. 
23 GC, 30. 
24 GC, 53, emphasis original. “The stories about creation in the Priestly Writing and in the 
Yahwist’s account do not as yet present a Christian doctrine of creation.” GC, 55, emphasis 
original. 
25 GC, 53-54. Cf. Moltmann’s extended discussion of fundamentalism in “Fundamentalism 
and Modernity,” trans. by John Bowden, in Johann-Baptist Metz and Jürgen Moltmann, 
Faith and the Future: Essays on Theology, Solidarity, and Modernity, 194-200 (Maryknoll, NY: 





era.”26 It does not take seriously new advances in the sciences, and nor does it con-
sider the gravity of the ecological crisis. Against this, the biblical text “must be ex-
posed to the criticism of the present day, so that it may arrive at its own origins.”27 
Wooden, creationist readings attempt to protect Scripture from the modern world, 
but, in doing so, they overlook the original concerns of the text. In particular, these 
interpretations ignore the open-endedness of creation and its eschatological orienta-
tion. “The biblical—and especially the messianic—doctrine of creation fundamen-
tally contradicts the picture of the static, closed cosmos, resting in its own equilib-
rium or revolving within itself. Its eschatological orientation towards a future con-
summation accords far more with the concept of a still incomplete cosmic history.”28 
The theory of evolution reminds the church of this biblical outlook, dissuading it 
from static or anthropocentric views of creation that might otherwise be taken for 
granted in a creationist outlook. 
 Another significant distinction Moltmann makes is that between a doctrine of 
creation derived solely from the OT and a specifically Christian one: “The starting 
point for a Christian doctrine of creation can only be an interpretation of the biblical 
creation narratives in the light of the gospel of Christ.”29 Importantly, however, “this 
Christian understanding does not contradict the statements about creation which 
were arrived at through Israel’s experience of salvation. The Christian understand-
ing is the messianic interpretation of these statements.”30 Thus, Christ, who is the 
ground for the salvation of both the cosmos and humanity, is found to be the ground 
and origin of all existence as well. Moltmann points to texts such as 1 Cor 8:6; Col 
1:15; and John 1:3, which also make this inference. As Source and Saviour of creation, 
Christ is its Sustainer too. In this connection, the Christian doctrine of creation con-
siders the role of the Spirit as well. For the church, “the experience of the eschatolog-
ical reality of the Spirit leads to the conclusion that this is the same Spirit in whose 
 
26 GC, 22. 
27 GC, 22. 
28 GC, 196, emphasis original. 
29 GC, 53-54, emphasis original. 
30 GC, 94. 
302 
 
power the Father, through the Son, has created the world, and preserves it against 
annihilating Nothingness.”31 Again, then, biblical texts must be read in the context 
of the whole of Scripture, which here includes the trinitarian witness of the NT. 
 In this section I have treated one essay and some relevant passages from Molt-
mann’s GC, indicating some of the concerns regarding the role of Scripture in his 
theology in the eighties. The first pertains to the doctrine of verbal inspiration and 
the relationship of this to pneumatology, the second to reading biblical texts in their 
literary and canonical contexts, with some attendant criticisms of biblicist fundamen-
talism. 
7.2. New Christological Readings of Scripture in The Way of Jesus Christ 
Moltmann’s work in his 1989 The Way of Jesus Christ is ripe with new proposals that 
reflect the role of Scripture in his theology.32 I will address four in this section: first, 
his radical affirmation of the Jewish “no” to Jesus; second, his general criticism of 
creedal theology on the basis of Scripture; third, his critical assessment of the doc-
trine of the virgin birth; and, fourth, his dialectical hermeneutic of text and audience. 
7.2.1. The Jewish No to Jesus 
The sustained attention Moltmann gives to the relationship of Jesus to the OT in WJC 
is one of the book’s most promising features.33 He opens his first chapter, writing, 
“There is no such thing as a christology without presuppositions; and its historical 
presupposition is the messianic promise of the Old Testament, and the Jewish hope 
which is founded on the Hebrew Bible.”34 For Moltmann, the latter two—Christian 
 
31 GC, 96. 
32 On this work, see Richard Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann (London: T&T 
Clark, 1995), 199-212; Müller-Fahrenholz, Kingdom and Power, 167-81. 
33 On this section, cf. Stephen R. Haynes, Prospects for Post-Holocaust Theology: "Israel" in the 
Theologies of Karl Barth, Jürgen Moltmann, and Paul van Buren (Atlanta, GA: Scholars, 1991), 
140-45. Eugene Borowitz provides critical comment on similar, less developed proposals in 
CG (1972). See Eugene B. Borowitz, Contemporary Christologies: A Jewish Response (New 
York: Paulist, 1980), 88-90. 





and Jewish hope—are inseparable. Insofar as christology presupposes the OT, it pre-
supposes the Hebrew Bible and the people of Israel. He proceeds to chart a narrow 
course between the messianic understanding of Jesus in Christianity and Judaism’s 
open view of its messiah. Thus, while Moltmann is “not presupposing that the Old 
Testament messianic hope points simply of itself to Jesus of Nazareth,” he is “assum-
ing that Jesus understood himself and his message in the expectation categories of 
this messianic hope, and that his followers saw him in these categories.”35 Im-
portantly, this is to say that Jewish messianism is not exhausted in the figure of Jesus. 
“Christian christology is a particular form of Israel’s hope for the messiah, and it is 
still related to, and dependent on, the Jewish forms of the messianic hope that ante-
ceded Christianity and run parallel to it.”36 
 To begin, Moltmann attends to the origins of messianic hope. He follows Mar-
tin Buber in tracing them to the early development of Israel’s monarchy. With David, 
the ark is brought to Zion and God is given a dwelling place there. Consequently, 
David’s kingship is purposed to represent that of God. But, Buber argues, with the 
transfer from charismatic leadership to dynastic rule under David, and the attendant 
failure of the Davidic line, the possibility of realising the theocratic ideal in this 
sphere was compromised. It was thus that people began to develop a messianic ap-
petite. In addition to Buber’s analysis, Moltmann contributes his own observations, 
noting that “if dynastic rule is to remain enforcible, it is bound to be directed towards 
the legitimation, safeguarding and increase of its own power.”37 This contrasts with 
the precedent set by the exodus, where kingship under Yahweh should be one of 
“defending the rights of the poor, having compassion on the humble, and liberating 
the oppressed.”38 
 These early messianic hopes, in part realised, in part circumvented by the Da-
vidic dynasty, nonetheless persisted. Against the background of the dissolution of 
 
35 WJC, 2. 
36 WJC, 2. 
37 WJC, 7. 
38 WJC, 7. 
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the Northern Kingdom through the Assyrian Empire, Isaiah and other prophets pro-
claimed the hope for a figure who would be anointed by Yahweh to rule Israel and 
defeat her oppressors. But this should not be seen simply as an idealisation of the 
past. “There is more in the new messianic David than there ever was in the historical 
David of old.”39 Hope for this figure looks to a new, alternative future. It is not only 
a reclamation of what once was. Another tradition of messianic hope appears in Dan 
7 and apocalyptic literature—that of the son of man. This tradition is in tension with 
the particularist hope for a Davidic messiah: “In the visions of the son of man in 
Daniel 7:1-14, Israel does not appear—neither historical Israel, nor ‘true’ Israel. ‘The 
Ancient of Days’ has none of the features of the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob; 
nor is the countenance of the son of man an Israelite countenance.”40 Though perhaps 
somewhat overstated, Moltmann’s point remains. There is a tension between the 
particular figure of the messiah and the universal figure of the son of man, a tension 
that is theologically fruitful and should be upheld: “Any dispersion of the messianic 
hope in the apocalyptically universal expectation of the son of man would mean a 
disastrous dissolution of Israel. The converse is also true: any transformation of the 
apocalyptically universal expectation of the son of man into Israel’s messianism 
would put an excessive and destructive strain on Israel.”41 And yet, “both figures are 
also provisional and passing.”42 Messianic hope does not replace hope in the coming 
of God. Rather, the messiah points beyond himself to this final coming. 
 Having briefly outlined the development and content of some of the messianic 
traditions in the OT, Moltmann returns to the question of the relationship between 
Jesus and the figure of the messiah. Is Jesus the messiah? “Is the Jewish ‘no’ anti-
Christian? Is the Christian ‘yes’ anti-Jewish?”43 Buber provides one way of looking 
 
39 WJC, 10. 
40 WJC, 15. 
41 WJC, 17. 
42 WJC, 17. 
43 WJC, 28. Moltmann’s positive interpretation of the Jewish no has occasioned some criti-
cism. See Douglas B. Farrow, “Review Essay: In the End is the Beginning: A Review of Jür-
gen Moltmann’s Systematic Contributions,” Modern Theology 14:3 (1998): 425-47, at 443 n. 
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at the question from a Jewish perspective, writing, “The church rests on its faith that 
Christ has come, and that this is the redemption which God has bestowed on man-
kind. We, Israel, are not able to believe this.”44 For Moltmann, this is a profound an-
swer. He comments, “It is not a question of unwillingness, or hard-hearted defiance. 
It is an ‘inability to accept’.”45 Buber, among others such as Schalom Ben-Chorin and 
Gershom Scholem, takes issue with the Christian claim that redemption has come in 
Christ. The world must either be redeemed in full or it has not been redeemed at all. 
But this leads Moltmann to pose a counter-question. “Can God already have a cho-
sen people, chosen moreover for the purpose of this redemption? Does Israel’s election 
not destroy Israel’s solidarity with unredeemed humanity?”46 That the world is not 
yet redeemed thus problematises Jewish claims too. Moreoever, Moltmann contests 
the spiritualistic notions of redemption that Buber and others attribute to Christian-
ity, where human beings are redeemed internally while the external world remains 
unredeemed. This “is certainly true to a particular kind of historical Christianity; but 
it does not fit Jesus himself.”47 Rather, “Jesus of Nazareth, the messiah who has come, 
is the suffering Servant of God, who heals through his wounds and is victorious 
through his sufferings. He is not yet the Christ of the parousia, who comes in the 
glory of God and redeems the world.”48 In this sense, the Christian yes to God is an 
anticipatory one. The Jesus who has come is not God’s final answer to the unre-
deemed world but a gift so that humanity may share in Israel’s hope for a new crea-
tion. 
 The provisionality of the Christian yes leads, conversely, to the soundness of 
the Jewish no. “Israel’s ‘no’ is not the same as the ‘no’ of unbelievers…. It is a special 
‘no’ and must be respected as such.”49 Through an exegesis of Rom 9-11, Moltmann 
argues that Israel’s heart was hardened not because she was rejected by God but so 
 
44 Martin Buber, Der Jude und sein Judentum. Gesammelte Aufsätze und Reden (Cologne: 
Melzer, 1963), 562, cited in WJC, 28, emphasis Moltmann’s—not found in Buber’s original. 
45 WJC, 28. 
46 WJC, 30. 
47 WJC, 30. 
48 WJC, 32. 
49 WJC, 34. 
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that the gospel might go to the Gentiles, “in order to make my own people jealous” 
(Rom 11:14). With Israel’s no, the Gentiles are given a mission to Israel—not one of 
convincing her to accept Jesus as her Lord but one that consists in “the reminder to 
the Jews of their own gracious election, and its promise for humanity.”50 
 This, then, is what it means for Moltmann to take the OT seriously as an inte-
gral part of Christian faith. The OT as read by Christians and, thus, too, the Hebrew 
Bible as read by Jews, compels the church to rediscover its hope for the coming mes-
siah, to whom it still looks for the fulfilment of God’s promises. If the Jewish no is 
rejected as the no of unbelievers, then the church’s connection to these promises is 
compromised. It no longer seeks alongside Israel new acts of God heralded by the 
OT and Hebrew Bible but not yet consummated in the NT. Of course, this kind of 
hope constituted Moltmann’s basic appeal in TH. Here he has further developed this 
view in arguing that the church needs to look to Israel and her reading of the Scrip-
tures to be reminded that even with the crucifixion and resurrection, all has not yet 
been made new. 
 In a related discussion, Moltmann addresses the relationship between the gos-
pel and Israel’s Torah. He identifies two common approaches. First, the gospel re-
lates to Torah as its antithesis: “faith in the gospel frees people from the requirements 
of the Law.”51 Second, the gospel is the fulfilment of the Torah. Following the Sermon 
on the Mount, however, Moltmann argues for yet another possibility, that the gospel 
is “the messianic interpretation of the Torah for the Gentile nations.”52 Jesus’ preaching 
on the mountain to the people mirrors Moses’ giving of the Torah to Israel on Sinai, 
now extended to the Gentiles. According to Moltmann, the word used for people 
here, ochlos, designates “the poor, oppressed, lost.”53 This is not to say that there were 
necessarily Gentiles in the audience, but, rather, that the make-up of the audience 
demonstrates that “the Sermon on the Mount is popular preaching, not instruction 
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for an élite.”54 As such, it ultimately seeks a universal scope, pushing out beyond the 
bounds of elected Israel to the ochlos of the world. In framing this relationship in 
terms of interpretation, then, Moltmann is careful not to posit the gospel as the re-
placement of the Torah—an inference that might be made from his earlier handling 
of this question in CG (1972).55 The gospel instead presupposes the Torah, which is 
interpreted and adhered to in a new, messianic way in the church. Interestingly, 
Moltmann presents his view as a departure from Reformation theology. For him, not 
only did the Reformers’ antithetical construal of the relationship between Torah and 
gospel fail to capture the complexity of Paul’s theology, but “the Pauline identifica-
tion of nomos and torah was not called into question.”56 In drawing on the theology 
of the Gospel of Matthew, Moltmann seeks to decentre this Pauline bias in Protestant 
theology and at the same time propose a Christian approach to the Torah that is more 
amenable to dialogue with Judaism. 
7.2.2. The Creeds in Light of Scripture 
Moltmann is also critical of the role the Bible played in patristic theology. In contrast 
to his own project in WJC, “christology’s pre-history in the Old Testament’s history 
of promise did not play any constitutive role in the christology of the patristic pe-
riod.”57 With this, the unity of christology and eschatology—something Moltmann 
argues was also inherited from the OT’s messianism and was integral to the NT—
gradually eroded as well. And, in another apparent departure from the NT, “the 
proclamation and ministry of Jesus between his birth and his death are never men-
tioned in the christological dogmas.”58 As such, Moltmann presents a sustained treat-
ment of Jesus’ conception, birth, baptism, reception of the Spirit, mission to the poor, 
 
54 WJC, 124. 
55 See 5.3.3. 
56 WJC, 123. This is, of course, a very generalised and unnuanced assessment on Moltmann’s 
part. He does not differentiate between the views of the various Reformers; nor does he 
provide any literature to back up his broad-brush claim. 
57 WJC, 70. 
58 WJC, 70. But see Ryan Neal’s comment: “Ironically, this same judgment can be lodged 
against his [Moltmann’s] earlier work, which focused strongly on the resurrection and the 
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healing ministry, embrace of outsiders, ethical teaching, and messiahship, among 
other features of his life. For Moltmann, the creedal focus on the incarnate, crucified, 
risen, and exalted Christ sidelined a fundamental feature of the gospels—their wit-
ness to his ministry. Moltmann thus proposes an addition to the creeds. Notably, 
“the intention is not to alter the words of tradition; but one must know what has to 
be added in thought.”59 He suggests that the following appear after “and was made 
man” in the Nicene Creed and after “born of the Virgin Mary” in the Apostles’ Creed: 
 
Baptized by John the Baptist, 
filled with the Holy Spirit: 
to preach the kingdom of God to the poor, 
to heal the sick, 
to receive those who have been cast out, 
to revive Israel for the salvation of the nations, and 
to have mercy upon all people.60 
 
Turning to Scripture to address the creeds themselves, for Moltmann the NT func-
tions here as the impetus for ongoing reform not only in contemporary christology 
but in the use of ancient and authoritative christological sources as well.61 
 
cross largely to the exclusion of Jesus’ teachings, miracles and preaching.” Ryan A. Neal, 
Theology as Hope: On the Ground and Implications of Jürgen Moltmann’s Doctrine of Hope (Eu-
gene, OR: Pickwick, 2008), 154. 
59 WJC, 150. 
60 WJC, 150. 
61 Around the same time Moltmann reveals, “I do believe that we need a new creed”—that 
is, in light of the Nicene Creed. “As a Reformed theologian I do not believe that the Chris-
tian faith can be adequately captured by, or expressed by, any one creed for all time. The 
church needs to remember (and not be afraid of) the fact that to confess our faith is an on-
going process, one that must be carefully related to whatever situation we find ourselves 
in at the moment. Because that situation is always changing, the precise form of our con-
fession and of our apologetic must change as well.” Bauman and Moltmann, “Jürgen Molt-
mann,” 33-34. A few years later he proposes a similar approach, albeit one that takes seri-
ously the claims of the creeds: “According to my Reformed understanding of creedal con-
fession, the creeds are a manual for faith today. Therefore, we should rewrite these creeds 
and confessions, without neglecting the tradition behind them.” Hall and Moltmann, 
“Stubborn Hope,” 33. Moltmann notes the Barmen Declaration (1934) as an example of the 





7.2.3. A Criticism of the Doctrine of the Virgin Birth 
Moltmann’s proposal for biblically motivated revision of the creeds does not mean, 
however, that the NT itself should not be subjected to critical questioning. This be-
comes particularly clear in his discussion of doctrine of the virgin birth. Moltmann 
begins, writing, “At no other point is the difference between the doctrine of the Or-
thodox and Roman Catholic churches and that of the New Testament as great as in 
the veneration of Mary, theological mariology, and the marian dogmas.”62 The early 
church’s developments in mariology had more to do with the Diana cult in Ephesus 
than “Jewish Bethlehem.”63 Nonetheless, where the NT does present a virgin birth, 
namely, in Matthew and Luke, “it is not one of the pillars that sustains the New Tes-
tament faith in Christ.”64 Rather, it is a relatively unimportant claim, made in order 
to complement the glory ascribed to Jesus through his exaltation in the resurrection. 
As such, the claim is effectively superfluous. But there is more. “In the literary sense, 
the stories about the announcement of the virgin birth are legends. They are deliber-
ately told in such a way that no mention is made of either witnesses or historical 
traditions.”65 In this way, they differ from the accounts of Jesus’ resurrection appear-
ances. This does not mean, however, that they are of no value at all theologically. 
The accounts of Matthew and Luke prepare their audiences for the majesty of the 
figure of Christ by projecting it backwards from his resurrection, onto his conception 
and birth. With his rejection of the historicity of the virgin birth, though, it is appar-
ent that Moltmann is still interested not simply in the text itself but the history that 
lies behind it. 
7.2.4. Between Text and Audience: A Dialectical Hermeneutics 
Another notable feature of the role that Scripture plays in WJC can be seen in Molt-
mann’s rejection of christologies derived wholly from a “hermeneutics of origin.”66 
 
62 WJC, 79. 
63 WJC, 79. 
64 WJC, 79. 
65 WJC, 81. 
66 WJC, 43. 
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Such a hermeneutics, he explains, considers the origin of christological claims and 
requires, at least in Protestant theology, that they be in accordance with Scripture. 
“But,” Moltmann counters, “if christology were to confine itself to this ‘origin’ her-
meneutics, it could rapidly become sterile, however much it was ‘in accordance with 
Scripture’.”67 He thus argues that this hermeneutics must be undertaken alongside a 
“hermeneutics of its [i.e., christology’s] effects.”68 This is not to say that the latter 
should replace the former, however, because then it would no longer be speaking of 
Christ. Moltmann is simply restating in different terms the dialectic of identity and 
relevance that he developed in CG. (1972)69 Christology must not only consider Scrip-
ture but its destination in the lives of people today. In particular, Moltmann is con-
cerned that, historically, christology concentrated on the “metaphysical wretched-
ness of human beings,” to the detriment of “physical and moral, economic and social 
wretchedness.”70 If christology today is to faithfully address the latter, it must con-
sider, for example, the significance of Christ for the threats of nuclear annihilation 
and ecological catastrophe. A christology that attempts only to restate what the Bible 
itself has said, without considering contemporary relevance, becomes isolated from 
society and speaks only to itself. 
7.3. Universalism against Biblicism in The Coming of God 
For want of space, I have set aside comment on Moltmann’s next major work, The 
Spirit of Life (1991)—an otherwise deeply innovative and theologically stimulating 
book—in order to focus on what I understand to be the most significant develop-
ments in connection to the role of Scripture in his theology from this period. I now 
turn, then to his 1995 The Coming of God.71 I focus on scattered comments throughout 
the work where Moltmann again speaks of his aversion to “biblicism.” Notably, im-
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plicit in his criticisms is an alternative approach to Scripture, though such a herme-
neutic is not developed at length. Moltmann proceeds to demonstrate the internal 
contradictions of a biblicist hermeneutic in his discussion of universalism. Richard 
Bauckham has also taken issue with some of Moltmann’s treatments in CoG. In a 
second subsection I discuss this criticism and Moltmann’s response to it. 
7.3.1. Against Biblicism 
The first reference to Biblicism in CoG appears in Moltmann’s introductory discus-
sion to the theme of death in the Bible. He writes, “The Bible is a collection of testi-
monies to the living God, testimonies too about life, but it is not a theological text-
book for conceptualities about life and death. So there is no ‘biblical concept’ of 
death.”72 The purpose of the Bible is to witness to the living God. Moltmann down-
plays any role it might otherwise have in making claims about the nature of life and 
death in themselves, or at least in isolation from the God who gives life. 
 In another place, Moltmann addresses the use of the Bible as a “divine com-
mentary on divine acts in history.”73 Scripture, interpreted rightly, would here pro-
vide a map to the outworking of God’s plan in different historical periods, accurately 
predicting the time of the end of the world. Such a view derives from early Pietism 
and Enlightenment deism, though it finds more recent expression in strands of fun-
damentalism and dispensationalism.74 But this hermeneutic is particularly problem-
atic for Moltmann. “In that case the testimonies of the Bible would in no way be the 
self-revelation and self-communication of God; they would merely be the revelation 
of God’s providence.”75 Scripture’s primary purpose as witness to God would be 
compromised. Further contrasts follow. The Bible “is the source for a historical the-
ology in testimony, assailment, struggle and suffering, not for a speculative theology 
 
72 CoG, 78. 
73 Gottfried Menken, “Über Glück und Sieg der Gottlosen” (1795), in Schriften, vol. 7 (Bre-
men: I. G. Heyse’s, 1858), 82, quoted in CoG, 145. Moltmann’s criticism here goes back as 
least as far as TH, 69-76 (1964). Cf. also ExpTh, 93-94 (2000). 
74 CoG, 158-59. 
75 CoG, 145.  
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of universal history and a divine plan for salvation.”76 In short, the theology of hope 
found in Scripture “is a theology of combatants, not of onlookers.”77 As Moltmann 
writes in a later chapter, “Jewish and Christian apocalypses… do not talk like Cas-
sandra; nor do they interpret humanity’s crimes and cosmic catastrophes religiously, 
so that people may accept them, collaborate with them, or simply resign themselves 
to them.”78 
7.3.2. Biblicism and Universal Salvation 
The best illustration of Moltmann’s position, however, is perhaps found in his dis-
cussion of universalism.79 Although not his chief aim, Moltmann will demonstrate 
the shortcomings of biblicism in his contention that the doctrine of universal salva-
tion cannot be either established or denied on the basis of proof-texts. 
Moltmann begins with a short historical assessment of universalism. While 
Origen sought to see all humanity and the devil, too, ultimately redeemed, it was 
Augustine’s theology of a double outcome at the last judgement that ultimately pre-
vailed in the church tradition. Interestingly, though, when universalism re-emerged 
in early modern Protestantism, it took its cues from Scripture. Thus, “it was his own 
biblicism, not secular humanism, that convinced the influential Württemberg theo-
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salism, though, strangely, he does not engage in detail with the arguments Moltmann 
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tion of Christian Universalism, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2018), 812-30. A 
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logian Johann Albrecht Bengel (1687-1752) of the truth of the doctrine of apokatasta-
sis.”80 From Bengel, Moltmann traces the development of Protestant universalism 
through Friedrich Christoph Oetinger and the Blumhardts. Karl Barth, too, stands in 
this tradition, though he was accused by Emil Brunner and Gerhard Ebeling of going 
beyond Scripture. But, Moltmann responds, “The decision for one or the other can-
not be made on the ground of ‘scripture,’” as both “universal salvation and a double 
outcome of judgment are… well attested biblically.”81 
 Moltmann finds biblical support for universalism in Eph 1:10, where God’s 
plan has been made manifest in Christ, namely, “to gather up all things in him, things 
in heaven and things on earth.” A similar hope is expressed in Col 1:20: “Through 
him God was pleased to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in 
heaven, by making peace through the blood of his cross.” Moltmann comments, 
“Not only all human beings and earthly creatures but the angels too—evidently the 
disobedient ones, since for the others it is unnecessary—will be reconciled through 
Christ.”82 Related claims appear in Paul’s undisputed letters. “For as all die in Adam, 
so all will be made alive in Christ” (1 Cor 15:22; cf. Rom 5:18). And, “for God has 
imprisoned all in disobedience so that he may be merciful to all” (Rom 11:32). In-
deed, “the great chapter on the resurrection, 1 Corinthians 15, makes no mention at 
all of a judgment with a double outcome.”83 
 Conversely, such a double outcome is evident elsewhere in Scripture, “espe-
cially in Matthew’s Gospel.”84 Various texts speak of judgement leading to condem-
nation, such as Matt 7:13: “Enter through the narrow gate; for the gate is wide and 
the road is easy that leads to destruction, and there are many who take it.” The par-
ables of the wise and foolish virgins and the judgement of the nations, both in Matt 
25, provide lengthier treatments of this theme. Mark 9:45 presents a picture of hell, 
 
80 CoG, 238. Apokatastasis, here universal salvation. 
81 CoG, 241, emphasis original. 
82 CoG, 240. 
83 CoG, 240. 
84 CoG, 241. 
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“where their worm never dies, and the fire is never quenched.” Other contrasts be-
tween the saved and the condemned appear elsewhere in the gospels, such as in 
Luke 16:23 and John 3:36. Additionally, Moltmann finds a link with Paul’s theology 
of the “lost”85 in Phil 3:19; 1 Cor 1:18; and 2 Cor 2:15. 
 Having argued that both options can be located in the biblical material, Molt-
mann acknowledges that hermeneutical options are still available to those who think 
the question can be answered on the basis of different texts. “If one presupposes that 
scripture does not contradict itself… one can then try to resolve the contradiction in 
the sense of the one side or the other.”86 For the universalist, damnation can be con-
ceded but understood to be temporary rather than eternal. The fires of hell would be 
rehabilitative and not strictly punitive. For the adherent of the doctrine of eternal 
damnation, the universal possibilities in God’s offer of salvation might be condi-
tional on the individual’s response to this offer, that is, their faith. Thus, “we have to 
ask whether God’s grace is still free grace if at the end all human beings are bound 
to be saved.”87 
Moltmann does not attempt to resolve this “dispute about the Bible,” as he 
refers to it in the heading which introduces his discussion.88 It is only in his following 
subsection that he addresses “the theological argument.”89 Here he begins to show 
his explicit preference for universalism. The implication is that not only do both sides 
find support in Scripture but that no conclusive case for either can be made with a 
merely biblicist hermeneutic, that is, one that collects various texts on the theme in 
order to demonstrate unified, biblical support for its argument. A case that takes 
broader theological commitments into consideration must instead be made. For 
Moltmann, such a case rests first of all on the character of God as revealed in Christ. 
“If Jesus is the judge, can he judge according to any other righteousness than the law 
which he himself manifested—the law of love for our enemies, and the acceptance 
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of the poor, the sick and sinners?”90 God’s anger is always executed in love, in order 
that the wrongdoer may be made new. Conversely, the doctrine of eternal condem-
nation “is the expression of a tremendous self-confidence on the part of human be-
ings,” because it places the decision for salvation “in the hands of human beings.”91 
Moreover, “God’s function is reduced to the offer of salvation in the gospel…. Christ 
becomes a person’s Saviour only when that person has ‘accepted’ him in faith.”92 To 
conclude, Moltmann takes up Luther’s theology of Christ’s descent into hell, discov-
ering a more thoroughly christological basis for universalism. Notably, however, the 
theological commitments that inform his rejection of arguments against biblicism 
that are made on the basis of proof-texts—these commitments themselves arise from 
the biblical witness, namely in the company that Jesus kept and testimony to human 
weakness. 
7.3.3. A Response to Richard Bauckham 
In 1997, Moltmann travelled to St Andrews in Scotland for a conference on his es-
chatology, following the publication of CoG. The discussion of his exegesis is partic-
ularly relevant to the aims of this dissertation. 
In regard to the biblical basis for Moltmann’s theology of time and eternity, 
Richard Bauckham alleges, “It has to be said that Moltmann leaves it wholly unclear 
how he knows that Jesus and the early Christians understood the relation of time 
and eternity the way he does…. What little exegesis he offers tends to be remarkably 
ignorant and incompetent.”93 Bauckham provides three examples. First, Moltmann 
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Moltmann, 25-26. Quite the opposite position is taken by Robert Walton: “Like the theology 
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reads Rev 10:6 as saying, “Time shall be no more.”94 But the meaning of the verse is 
rather that “when the seventh angel blows his trumpet there will be no more time 
left before the completion of God’s purposes.”95 Bauckham finds support for this 
reading in “virtually all modern exegetes (followed by most modern translations).”96 
Second, Moltmann takes Rev 5 to mean that “the unfurled times of history will be 
rolled up like a scroll.”97 For Bauckham, this “requires an exegesis that no hermeneu-
tic, however pre-modern or post-modern, could conceivably support.”98 Finally, 
Moltmann contends that “the verb used in Rev 21:5—[is] not ‘Behold, I will create’ 
(Hebrew barah), but ‘I will make (Hebrew asah) all things new.’”99 This, again, is “a 
blatant example of demonstrably erroneous exegesis.”100 Not only is Revelation not 
written in Hebrew, but its Greek verb, poieō, is used to translate bara’ in Gen 1:1. 
Moreover, the verse echoes Isa 65:17, which also uses bara’. If the Hebrew ’asah un-
derlies any NT text, it is not this one. 
 Interestingly, despite Bauckham’s discussion of Moltmann’s theology of time 
and eternity being over seventy pages, most of Moltmann’s response is directed to 
the criticisms expressed in this one paragraph. This is perhaps because—as Molt-
mann reveals—“my relationship to the Bible and to professional exegesis has been 
subjected to critical questions by other people too.”101 
 
of all modern systematic theologians, Moltmann’s theology [in TH] is only biblically based 
in a secondary sense. His biblical orientation is largely dependent upon the latest develop-
ment in New Testament criticism.” Robert C. Walton, “Jürgen Moltmann’s Theology of 
Hope: European Roots of Liberation Theology,” in Liberation Theology, ed. Robert H. Nash, 
143-86 (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1984), 157. Because of the ever-changing nature of bibli-
cal studies, Walton believes its conclusions to be a precarious foundation for theological 
construction. 
94 CoG, 280. 
95 Bauckham in GWBAA, 179. 
96 Bauckham in GWBAA, 179; cf. Rev 10:6-7, NRSV. 
97 CoG, 294-95. 
98 Bauckham in GWBAA, 180. 
99 CoG, 271, emphasis original. 
100 Bauckham in GWBAA, 180n.52. 






Although it is not until the end of his response that Moltmann addresses the 
particular texts noted by Bauckham, I will attend to this part of his response first, for 
ease of comparison.102 In regard to Rev 10:6, Moltmann understands his own reading 
to be an implication of Bauckham’s more basic reading. “In the realm of God’s eter-
nal presence, chronos can surely have just as little power as death.”103 The completion 
of God’s purposes, immediately following the seventh angel’s trumpet blast, coin-
cides with the end of created time as we know it, the latter being renewed and trans-
formed with the rest of creation. Next, Moltmann replies that his reference to the 
times being “rolled up like a scroll,”104 in connection to Rev 5, is not exegetical but 
rather illustrative, borrowing an image from Revelation in order to depict a theolog-
ical claim established on other grounds. Lastly, for Rev 21:5, Moltmann notes that 
poieō in the Septuagint not only translates bara’ but ’asah as well. The rationale behind 
his preference for ’asah is that it presupposes something that is already there (e.g., 
Gen 2:2), whereas bara’ is used only of bringing things into being. Moreover, Molt-
mann argues, whereas Isa 65:17 refers to the creation of a new heaven and new earth, 
the theology of Rev 21:5 depends on a subtle difference, referring rather to heaven 
and earth being recreated. Whatever the accuracy of Moltmann’s exegesis, though—
and his exegetical conclusions are rightly questioned and debated—in my opinion it 
is his comments on the hermeneutical task that are most valuable here. 
Ahead of these finer, exegetical points, Moltmann begins his reply to Bauck-
ham by introducing a distinction between the “literal exegesis” of modern biblical 
scholarship and the role of Scripture in systematic theology. He writes, “Theology is 
not a commentary on the biblical writings, and commentaries on the biblical writings 
are not a substitute for theological reflection.”105 Rather, whereas exegesis determines 
the meaning of the text in its original context, theology seeks to hear the concern of 
 
102 Bauckham does not offer any further response to Moltmann’s defence, but see the criti-
cism offered by Michael Gilbertson in God and History in the Book of Revelation: New Testa-
ment Studies in Dialogue with Pannenberg and Moltmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 184 n. 137. 
103 Moltmann in GWBAA, 232. 
104 CoG, 295. 
105 Moltmann in GWBAA, 230. 
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the text in a contemporary context. Moltmann’s words are worth quoting at length 
here: 
 
That [i.e., hermeneutics] is not simply a problem of translation. Hermeneu-
tics is not restricted to the renovation of ancient buildings. Theology has to 
do with the theological concern which the biblical texts are trying to talk 
about in their own way and in their own time. So as a theologian I begin by 
reading the texts, then ask what they are saying, and turn to their subject 
and concern, trying to understand it with my own mental categories, which 
are the categories of my own time. After that I come back to the biblical text 
and ask whether it brings out adequately the subject or concern as I have 
understood it with the help of the text itself…. From this a thematic criti-
cism of the texts emerges which is committed to their concern.106 
 
Alongside other kinds of biblical criticism, then, such as textual, form, and literary 
criticism, Moltmann advances a “thematic criticism.”107 Here, exegesis is not primar-
ily concerned with understanding each word and sentence, nor reconstructing the 
history of the text’s development, nor even with determining the meaning of the text 
as a whole. Rather, it seeks the overarching concern of the text—its theme—and asks 
what it would mean to undertake theology today if this concern were to be taken up. 
 Following this, Moltmann again mentions the doctrine of inspiration. “Ques-
tionings as to whether the theology is ‘in conformity with Scripture’ seem to me to 
 
106 Moltmann in GWBAA, 230. Moltmann’s words are helpfully paraphrased by Jeremy 
Law, who writes, “Moltmann will always frustrate exegetes, just as he has been frustrated 
by them… because he will always want to go beyond the text, from, as he says, what it 
meant to what it means.” Jeremy Law, “Jürgen Moltmann’s Ecological Hermeneutics,” in 
Ecological Hermeneutics: Biblical, Historical and Theological Perspectives, ed. David G. Horrell, 
et al., 223-39 (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 237, emphasis original.  
107 Moltmann’s responses were originally written in German and translated by Margaret 
Kohl. The German versions have not been published and I cannot find any instances of 
this term elsewhere in his corpus. Nonetheless, the immediate context provides a strong 
indication of the likely meaning of the term. While there is some resemblance to Sachkritik, 
it remains unknown whether Moltmann uses this term or another. Cf. Robert Morgan, 
“Sachkritik in Reception History,” Journal for the Study of the New Testament 33:2 (2010): 175-
90. (Moltmann is cited in the article, though only peripherally and not in direct relation-
ship to the notion of Sachkritik) Indeed, the biblical Sache over and against the text itself is 
of central importance to Moltmann’s theology of Scripture in ExpTh, which I treat below in 





be a remnant left over from the old doctrine of verbal inspiration.”108 He mentions 
Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, Barth, and Tillich as examples of theologians whose 
works were not merely written as “disciplined exegesis.” For instance, “Barth’s dia-
lectical doctrine of predestination cannot be found in this form in the Bible, nor can 
the magnificent structure of his doctrine of reconciliation.”109 Moltmann clearly sees 
a similar relationship to Scripture in his own theology. He writes, “I am a theological 
partner in dialogue with the texts I cite, not their exegete.”110 That is, Moltmann does 
not try to erase himself and his own context in order to read the texts objectively. 
Rather, he embraces these as legitimate and valuable factors in the conversation with 
Scripture, especially insofar as these situate the conversation in a contemporary con-
text. Notably, Moltmann’s response might be read back onto earlier uses of Scripture 
in his theology, such as in TKG, where Bauckham made a similar criticism.111 
 CoG and the associated conference, then, provide much insight into Molt-
mann’s concerns regarding Scripture at this late stage in his career. His rejection of 
biblicism, indicated in GC (1985),112 is here further developed in the context of the 
debate over universalism. Proof-texting is not enough to establish theological truth. 
The discussion must take broader theological commitments into consideration. Molt-
mann’s response to Bauckham touches on similar concerns, with his distinction be-
tween commentary and theological reflection anticipating his mature hermeneutics 
in ExpTh. 
 
108 Moltmann in GWBAA, 230. 
109 Moltmann in GWBAA, 231. 
110 Moltmann in GWBAA, 231. As Moltmann later writes, “Other people have ironically crit-
icized my use of the Bible as a ‘use à la carte’, although it is no different in principle from 
the way Karl Barth or Basil the Great used Scripture—except in the deficiency of my bibli-
cal knowledge.” ExpTh, xxi (2000). 
111 See 6.3.1. and 6.4.6. 
112 See 7.1.2. 
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7.4. A Long-Awaited Hermeneutics: Moltmann’s Experiences in Theology 
It is in his 2000 Experiences in Theology that Moltmann finally begins to develop his 
hermeneutics and theology of Scripture at length.113 This is because this work is the 
final instalment in the systematic contributions to theology, treating—not without 
irony—the theme of theological methodology at the end of his career. But neither is 
this without design. As Moltmann writes in his introduction to this volume, “Up to 
now these questions about method have not greatly interested me, because I first 
wanted to get to know the real content of theology.”114 In excluding extended discus-
sion of theological methodology up until this point, Moltmann is already making a 
methodological statement. It is the theological content—the last things, the crucifix-
ion, the God who lives in loving Trinity—that primarily drives the methodology, 
and not vice versa. And while the work in ExpTh can certainly at times provide an 
interesting retrospective on earlier stages of Moltmann’s career, readers should be 
careful to heed Moltmann’s message here and not take ExpTh as their starting 
point.115 In the following then, I aim to treat ExpTh as a later, separate contribution, 
rather than as a guide to understanding earlier works. 
This section will be the largest of the current chapter, reflecting the relative 
breadth of relevant material in ExpTh. I begin with Moltmann’s comments on Scrip-
ture in his earlier theology, proceed to his proposal for a promissory hermeneutics, 
and then address his comments on the nature of Scripture and its relationship to the 
 
113 On Scripture in ExpTh, see David N. Field, “The Theological Authority of the Bible and 
Ecological Theology,” Scriptura 101 (2009): 206-18, at 208-10; Poul F. Guttesen, Leaning into 
the Future: The Kingdom of God in the Theology of Jürgen Moltmann and in the Book of Revelation 
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2009), 26-37; Sung Wook Chung, “Moltmann on Scripture and 
Revelation,” in Jürgen Moltmann and Evangelical Theology, ed. Chung, 1-16. 
114 ExpTh, xiv. 
115 I do not intend this as a major criticism, but, with respect, see for example, Guttesen, 
Leaning into the Future, 26-37; and Chung, ed., Moltmann and Evangelical Theology. This is 
symptomatic of the deeper problem of treating Moltmann’s theology synchronically rather 
than diachronically—understandable when presented for a popular-level audience, and to 
some degree necessary in more thematically oriented analyses, but generally dissatisfac-
tory in academic monographs and articles where reading the material in its developmental 





Trinity. Lastly, I attend to Moltmann’s criticism of patriarchal features of the biblical 
texts, drawing on excerpts from his other works. 
7.4.1. Reflections on Earlier Theology 
In the preface to ExpTh, Moltmann looks back on the use of Scripture in his earlier 
theology, recollecting the influence of Gerhard von Rad and Ernst Käsemann. But 
his interest in biblical scholarship did not last long. He writes, “Sometime in the 
1970s, the exegetical discussion became hazy and confused for me, and the herme-
neutic discussion even more. I found it more of a hindrance in listening to the biblical 
texts.”116 While “historical criticism disappeared almost entirely,” however, herme-
neutical programmes looked to various human experiences to ground their reading 
of Scripture—following from existential theology’s hermeneutical centre, human 
historicity.117 Nonetheless, Moltmann did not ultimately lose interest in the texts, de-
spite the ongoing developments in the scholarship. “Finding myself at a loss, I then 
doubtless developed my own post-critical and ‘naive’ relationship to the biblical 
writings.”118 Consequently, he continues, “I discovered how much at home I felt in 
the Bible, and how gladly I let myself be stimulated to my own thinking by different 
texts.”119 And yet, Moltmann also became “critical and free” towards the texts.120 “It 
is ‘the matter [Sache] of scripture’ that is important, not the scriptural form of the 
matter.”121 Moltmann advances a hermeneutics on this basis in later chapters. Im-
portantly, though, these comments demonstrate that he will not be proposing an en-
tirely new method. Although the explicit formulation of it will be new—and, at-
tendant to this, surely some minor innovations as well—the core hermeneutical as-
sumptions have been with Moltmann across his career, informing his conclusions 
throughout. 
 
116 ExpTh, xxi. 
117 ExpTh, xxi. 
118 ExpTh, xxi. 
119 ExpTh, xxi. 
120 ExpTh, xxii. 
121 ExpTh, xxii; Ger. 17. 
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7.4.2. Promissory Hermeneutics 
In view of his career, it is not surprising that Moltmann holds to the claim that “all 
God’s words and everything God says when he speaks to a man or woman have the 
character of promise.”122 This extends to Scripture as well. Moltmann can thus write 
with agreement, “According to the Reformers, the correlative to Christian faith is 
actually God’s promise…. And by God’s promise what was meant was the essential 
content of the biblical traditions.”123 Moreover, as in TH (1964), these promissory in-
teractions with human beings say something about God’s “essential nature,” 
namely, that it “is not timeless eternity; it is his identity in time—his faithfulness.”124 
Moltmann proceeds to cite 2 Tim 2:13: “If we are faithless, he remains faithful—for 
he cannot deny himself.” Scripture’s content is the divine promise. And Scripture’s 
content is the God of Israel, the Father of Jesus Christ. These two claims stand side 
by side in Moltmann’s theology: The promise comes from God and this God gives 
the promise. They come together in the framework of trinitarian history, which I ex-
pounded in the previous chapter.125 That is, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are in-
separable from the history they share with human beings, the history of promise. 
Keeping this in mind, Moltmann will nonetheless focus the conversation on the 
promise itself, the connection to the Trinity being presupposed.  
Such a “hermeneutics of promissory history” reads Scripture in order to dis-
cover the promised future, an alternative future for the present, revealing new pos-
sibilities and stirring readers to action.126 So far, this is nothing new in Moltmann’s 
thought. Here, though, he also universalises this hermeneutic so that it is extended 
to all human history, not just biblical history. Of course, the notion that the past can 
be reread in order to discover hopes for the present “is true especially of the unique 
character of the biblical history of promise”—so the particular biblical witness is not 
 
122 ExpTh, 55. 
123 ExpTh, 61. Moltmann proceeds to provide short comment on various biblical texts relat-
ing explicitly to this theme on pp.96-98. 
124 ExpTh, 55; Ger. 61. Kohl supplies the English adjective, “essential,” in her translation of 
Wesen here. On TH, see 3.3.2. 
125 See 6.3.3. 





simply relativised, being interchangeable with other historical texts.127 But neither 
does the witness stand above other histories so that they remain abstract from it. 
Rather, the hermeneutic that Moltmann uncovers in the promissory history enables 
related hermeneutical endeavours. He asks, for example, “What past did the Reform-
ers see as their past? And what future for the church and Christian society did they 
have as a goal when they entered upon reformation?”128 It is not only the particular 
events attested in Scripture, then, but other historical events, such as those connected 
to the Reformation, which can stimulate action towards an alternative future. That 
is, the promissory nature of the Bible functions to remind us of forgotten hopes in 
other histories, working, seeking, and waiting for their fulfilment as well in the com-
ing kingdom. 
 Another feature of Moltmann’s promissory hermeneutics in ExpTh is the way 
he relates it to Judaism. The Bible is distinctive in being made up of both the OT and 
the NT. “This links Christianity indivisibly with Judaism, since for Judaism this Old 
Testament is its own Tenach.”129 Building on his earlier work on the relationship be-
tween Judaism and Christianity,130  Moltmann contends that the two are united in 
their orientation to a common future. The church has not yet seen the fulfilment of 
all of God’s promises in the coming of Christ and the outpouring of the Spirit. God 
is not yet all in all. The church shares with Israel, then, the hope for the coming king-
dom and the universal rule of God. And this has implications for how the Bible is 
understood, as well as for the relationship between the two peoples: “If the future of 
Scripture is apprehended in the symbol of the kingdom of God, then this becomes 
the scarlet thread of a biblical theology which does not just read the Old Testament 
in light of the New, and the New Testament in light of the Old, but reads both in the 
light of God’s coming to his whole creation…. Then, together with the Jews, Chris-
tians testify ‘to all nations’ and to the whole of creation on earth the righteousness, 
 
127 ExpTh, 106. 
128 ExpTh, 106. 
129 ExpTh, 125. 
130 See 7.2.1. 
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justice and peace of God’s coming world.”131 This “future of Scripture” is to be dif-
ferentiated from the Reformation “centre of Scripture,” the latter concept which 
Moltmann finds unhelpful because it primarily directs the reader’s gaze backwards, 
rather than both backwards—to God’s faithfulness—and forwards—to the fulfil-
ment of the promise—with both Scripture and Israel.132 
 Moltmann further develops his promissory hermeneutic in conversation with 
the Reformation principle that “’Holy Scripture is its own interpreter.’”133 This man-
tra had a double significance. First, it confronted the church with the claim that “it is 
not the church which interprets scripture but scripture which interprets the 
church.”134 Second, it reminded other human interpreters that their reason alone was 
insufficient for their task. Moltmann does not voice any protest at this point. Indeed, 
his subsequent reflection on the principle reveals a significant degree of admiration 
for the Bible: “Throughout the whole of church history, the Bible has continually 
made its own way, in opposition to the interpretative authority of the church, among 
the Waldensians as well as at the Reformation, in the Catholic Bible movement today 
as well as in the Pentecostal movement in Latin America. That is why the church 
repeatedly forbade the laity to read the Bible for themselves…. The Reformation was 
a Bible movement, and is the proof that scripture does in practice interpret itself. It 
comes close to all who read it and who can form their own judgment.”135  
This raises an important question, however: “But does that make it [i.e., the 
Bible] a kind of Protestant pocket-pope, infallible and inerrant?”136 Moltmann re-
sponds by indicating that there is still a distinction between text and interpreter, and 
declares that “scripture has to be tested” against the “matter [Sache] of scripture.”137 
These two claims, that Scripture interprets itself and that individual texts are to be 
 
131 ExpTh, 127-28. 
132 ExpTh, 127. 
133 “Scriptura sacra sui ipsius interpres.” Martin Luther, Weimar Ausgabe VII, 97, cited and 
translated in ExpTh, 128. 
134 ExpTh, 128. 
135 ExpTh, 128-29. 
136 ExpTh, 129. 





read against a broader Sache, are also connected in that “if a text ‘interprets [auslegen] 
itself’, there is evidently something in it [i.e., Scripture] which thrusts and ferments, 
something which has to come out and must be e-lucidated [aus-gelegt], because it 
cannot remain within itself.”138 And this something, for Moltmann, is the history of 
promise. He has already argued that the promise is the Sache, the hermeneutical cen-
tre of Scripture, albeit in different words. Here Moltmann points out that it belongs 
to the biblical promise to speak again to readers in different generations, reminding 
them of the hope that Scripture attests, and precluding interpretations that deny this 
hope. “What is in the process of becoming event,” that is, the promise, “and is only 
comprehensible if the comprehension sees itself as a function of that event, is told 
from generation to generation, so that in the telling the reader is drawn into the event 
that is still incomplete.”139 With the promise, then, the reader does not stand outside 
of Scripture but within it, insofar as both reader and text stand within the same his-
tory of promise. 
 Yet, because the history of promise extends into the present, this hermeneutic 
must consider another factor: the contemporary context. And this context does not 
seek knowledge alone. Through Scripture, readers are led to an alternative praxis. 
“The road of hermeneutics does not merely lead from text to preaching (important 
though this is for preachers); it leads from a text springing from a past praxis to the 
praxis of our own lives today.”140 Conversely, the context of the reader plays a deter-
minative role in their reading of the text. “As is evident from the history of Israel 
since the Exodus from Egypt, and the history of Christ from the manger to the cross, 
there is a continuing, ongoing ‘preferential option’ for the poor on God’s part. God’s 
promises are understood best by those without hope.”141 This leads Moltmann to two 
conclusions. First, no hermeneutic that excludes the poor, oppressed, and marginal-
 
138 ExpTh, 129; Ger. 123. To legen something is to read it, whereas to legen something aus—
literally: to read it from or to from-read it—is to interpret it. 
139 ExpTh, 129. 
140 ExpTh, 131. 
141 ExpTh, 131. 
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ised from its reading is true to the Sache of Scripture. Second, neither can such a her-
meneutic be satisfied with a purely noetic reading. Because it stands within the his-
tory of promise, it must also seek a praxis—an ethics and politics. 
7.4.3. Defining Scripture 
Having established a hermeneutic, Moltmann proceeds to look more closely at the 
nature of Scripture itself. Considering scriptures in general—not only Christian 
ones—he begins with the question, “What makes writings ‘holy scriptures’?”142 One 
of two answers might be given. It is either the community of readers that makes texts 
holy through their usage, or that holy thing which the texts represent and are thus 
holy through association. In the Christian context, this question takes the form of 
whether the church or the Bible is prior to the other. It can be argued that Scripture 
is a product of the church, insofar as the latter writes it, employs it in worship, and 
canonises it. Conversely, it can be argued that it is the Sache of Scripture that precedes 
the church, determines the oral traditions, and leads to the writing, usage, and can-
onisation of sacred texts. 
 Moltmann is reluctant to favour one definition of Scripture over the other. Ra-
ther, “Scripture and church have to be seen in a dialectical process, where the salient 
point is the understanding of ‘the matter of scripture’. For either scripture or the 
church to stand alone has far-reaching consequences.”143 Scripture stands apart from 
the church, for example, “in the various doctrines about the verbal inspiration of scrip-
ture.”144 In particular, Moltmann is referring to the developments in post-Refor-
mation theology, though precedents for these can be found in patristic and Refor-
mation theology as well.145 These doctrines limit the Sache of Scripture to the words 
themselves, severing the line between the historical promise and the Spirit’s work in 
actualising this today. Yet it is not just the biblical texts but the whole creation that 
 
142 ExpTh, 134. 
143 ExpTh, 136. 
144 ExpTh, 136. 
145 Otto Weber, Foundations of Dogmatics, vol. 1, trans. by Darrell L. Guder (Grand Rapids, 





is being sanctified. Conversely, the church stands apart from Scripture insofar as it 
determines what counts as Scripture, who is to read it—the clergy, for example—and 
how it is to be read—according to the lectionary, for example. While not all of these 
actions are necessarily opposed to God’s purposes, Moltmann is wary of the ways 
that the Sache of Scripture can be obscured through human interaction with Scrip-
ture. “It is ‘the matter of scripture’ which alone prompts the desire to read the scrip-
tures, understand them, live in accordance with them, and proclaim them.”146 
 Briefly departing from the main discussion, Moltmann turns to the concept of 
scripture in some interfaith feminist communities.147 Whereas Christian feminist the-
ology initially sought to criticise various biblical texts in light of the Sache of Scrip-
ture, communities are now emerging that seek to adopt new texts and canons based 
not on this Sache but on the basis of their own needs as marginalised people. But 
Moltmann expresses some criticism at this point: “If the determining subject is the 
community of people which produces these scriptures and then sanctifies them, then 
this community could just as well express itself in other ways—poetically, dramati-
cally, ideologically or scientifically. It would thereby avoid handicapping itself in its 
productivity through the ‘sanctification’ of particular writings.”148 Yet, neither does 
Moltmann completely dismiss the approach. Such a process of canonisation can be 
viewed theologically, insofar as it rests on “the divine authority of the oppressed and 
suffering people who hunger to be free for life and for their full humanity.”149 Similar 
sentiments are expressed with regard to black theology and liberation theology.150 
This requires some additional exposition before attending to Moltmann’s conclusion. 
 
146 ExpTh, 137. 
147 Here, Moltmann only cites Pui-Lan Kwok and Elisabeth Schüssler-Fiorenza, ed., Women’s 
Sacred Scriptures (London: SCM, 1998), in ExpTh, 137 n. 98. 
148 ExpTh, 138. 
149 ExpTh, 138. 
150 “Black theology knows no other authority than the misery of the oppressed and is there-
fore not prepared to maintain any biblical or theological doctrine ‘which contradicts the 
black demand for freedom now’.” ExpTh, 212, quoting James H. Cone, Black Theology and 
Black Power (New York: Seabury, 1969), 120. “It follows from what the texts say, first, that 
the theological location of the texts must be looked for among the poor, to whom the prefer-
ential option of the church applies. But in addition the original subject of the theology must 
be sought for in the ‘commitment of these people’ and in ‘their struggles to become free 
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 In part three of ExpTh, Moltmann explores several critical theologies, namely, 
black, liberation, minjung, and feminist theologies. His aim is to accurately represent 
these perspectives (which, he admits, are nonetheless varied in themselves) and let 
them speak into and challenge prevailing dominant theologies. Throughout each ex-
position, Moltmann is rarely critical of his subject matter. In a concluding chapter, 
however, he presents a number of “unanswered questions” that have occurred to 
him over the years. The questions are as follows: First, “If praxis is the criterion of 
theory, what is the criterion of praxis?” Second, “If the crucified people are to redeem 
the world, who then redeems the people?” Third, “If the goal of liberation is to make 
people the determining subject of their own history, what is the goal of that history?” 
And fourth, “Does liberation theology lead to the liberation of the poor and women 
from Christian theology?”151 Moltmann provides further commentary, though the 
meaning of the questions is largely self-explanatory. Interestingly, a common theme 
is discernible throughout—one that goes back to the identity and relevance dilemma 
expounded in CG.152 With each question, Moltmann’s concern is to uphold the prior-
ity of faith in Christ. Where critical theologies tend away from the Sache of Scripture 
and eventually replace it with another hermeneutical authority, they are in danger 
of forgetting their original, specifically Christian character, and becoming indistin-
guishable from other human agendas. They make themselves vulnerable to confus-
ing their own victories with the work of new creation, the latter which is not yet 
complete. But this is not to outright reject the methods and conclusions of these re-
spective approaches. Moltmann is cautious in his formulation of them as questions 
(not “criticisms”), acknowledging that it is not his place to make ultimate evaluations 
on the theologies of the marginalised.153 Rather, his questions are intended to probe 
 
human beings’.” ExpTh, 232, emphasis original, quoting Gustavo Gutiérrez, We Drink from 
Our Own Wells: The Spiritual Journey of a People (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1984), no page 
given. 
151 ExpTh, 293-99. 
152 See 5.2.1. 
153 “I can well imagine that some theologians, men and women both, who have become in-





some basic, common assumptions and contribute to ongoing dialogue between dif-
ferent groups and individuals. 
 Returning to Moltmann’s discussion of what constitutes Scripture, his conclud-
ing paragraph is particularly noteworthy. Here, Moltmann reveals his own position 
on whether or not the canon is open. He finds fault with both the fundamentalism 
and interfaith feminism examined above, in that their focus is on the texts them-
selves. This results in either a closed canon, or a canon open to other texts on the 
basis of the community’s concerns. “But if we look at the scriptural texts from the 
angle of ‘the matter of scripture,’ then the canon remains open: we can, for objective 
[sachlich] reasons, judge the Epistle of James to be ‘an epistle of straw,’ as Luther did, 
and might prefer to exclude the book of Revelation; but we can also preach from 
non-biblical texts if they accord with ‘the matter of Scripture.’”154 That is, for Molt-
mann, it is not a question of which texts are or are not in the canon but of the rela-
tionship between the Sache and particular texts.155 The textual accounts of the exodus 
and the resurrection, for example, are not valid on their own. In relation to the Sache, 
the promise, they function as witnesses to God’s promissory history. The processes 
of writing Scripture and the church’s canonisation of it are part of this history insofar 
as they contribute to this witness, but they do not replace the history itself, which 
precedes these processes and continues long after they have been completed. In this 
way, the Sache cannot be changed, as it can be in Moltmann’s example of interfaith 
feminism. But the texts are also subject to the approval and criticism of the Sache, 
something which, for Moltmann, is lost in a fundamentalist doctrine of Scripture. 
 
imagine that these critical questions will earn me applause from the wrong side. But I be-
lieve that truth compels us to face up to them so that we may arrive at more serviceable 
answers than the ones we have found up to now.” ExpTh, 299. 
154 ExpTh, 138; Ger. 130. By “sachlich reasons,” Moltmann means reasons that are in accord 
with Scripture’s Sache. 
155 Elsewhere, however, Moltmann notes the ecumenical value of a shared canon of particu-
lar texts. “A shared theology of all believers in the different cultural and economic contexts 
still seems a long way off, except that—as every ecumenical conference shows—the text of 
the biblical message is the same everywhere.” ExpTh, 13. “Every Christian theology, how-
ever conditioned it may be by its context, kairos and culture, follows and interprets the text 
of the biblical writings.” ExpTh, 60. 
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 A more complete picture of the relationship between Sache and text appears 
when reading Moltmann’s introductory comments on hermeneutics. Earlier on in 
ExpTh, he claims that in the hermeneutical process “the text and the thing it talks 
about will not be able to remain unchanged.”156 After hearing and understanding the 
text, we, as readers, are to consider “the way the text talks about the matter [Sache] 
we have in common.”157 (This Sache is later identified as the promise, as shown above, 
though Moltmann leaves it undefined at this earlier point) Such a consideration may 
result in altering the text—not permanently, that is, but for the sake of translating its 
Sache into the present. “The ‘anti-Jewish’ pronouncements of the early Christian 
communities which were being persecuted by Jewish synagogue are an example. To 
take these pronouncements over and repeat them unchanged in the twentieth cen-
tury would not be in conformity with ‘the cause [Sache] of Christ’ which we have in 
common.”158 Moltmann continues, writing, “The androcentric and patriarchalist 
texts in the Bible, which are humiliating to women, are a further example.”159 If the 
Sache of Scripture is to be heard today, then anti-Jewish and anti-woman statements 
in the texts must be criticised in line with it. I will discuss the issue of patriarchy in 
detail below. Here it will be enough to note, though, that while the persecution of 
Christians at the hands of Jewish authorities may—at least in part—explain the ori-
gins of anti-Jewish sentiment in first century Christian texts, there is no comparative 
persecution of Christians at the hands of women to explain anti-woman sentiment 
in Scripture.160 Prioritising the Sache, then, does not necessarily mean that the texts 
as originally written or canonised were perfect witnesses to their subject-matter. 
From the start, they contained elements that compromised faithful representation of 
the Sache, though the Sache itself was not thereby compromised. 
 
156 ExpTh, 124. 
157 ExpTh, 125; Ger. 119. 
158 ExpTh, 125; Ger. 119. 
159 ExpTh, 125. 
160 Of course, there are oppressive female figures in Scripture, such as Jezebel (e.g., 1 Kgs 
18:4; 21:1-16) and the “cows of Bashan” (Amos 4:1). But even if—despite the ideological lo-
cation of the texts—these testimonies are accepted, they cannot speak for the entirety of 





7.4.4. Scripture in the Context of Trinitarian History 
While such presuppositions can already be seen in his comments on the relationship 
between Sache and text, Moltmann proceeds to discuss the human quality of the bib-
lical writings. Later Protestantism, especially in Reformed theology, found an anal-
ogy between the Word’s incarnation and inscripturation. Here, “the Bible is no less 
than ‘Jesus Christ existing as scripture.’”161 Moltmann proceeds to the example of 
Karl Barth, who understood the Sache to be the sovereign God, rather than the history 
of promise. Unlike his forbears, Barth did not identify the Sache with the text itself. 
But, because of Barth’s conception of the divine unity, something which Moltmann 
had earlier criticised as “modalist,”162 Moltmann contends that Scripture is tied too 
closely to God’s being in Barth’s theology. “On the basis of the identifications in the 
sovereign movement of God’s self-revelation and self-communication, we can then 
say: scripture is God’s Word, God’s Word is God himself. Barth always stressed the 
unity of the subject of the self-revealing and speaking Person of God.”163 Conse-
quently, the unity of the OT and NT is also secured in this way—a unity which is 
“not wrong” considering that it is the same God who speaks, but nonetheless prob-
lematic insofar as “the differences between the human vehicles of the writings are 
no longer taken seriously.”164 A unified Scripture assumes a unified people of Jews 
and Gentiles, but this unified people has not yet come about. 
 An alternative approach to the unity of the OT and NT is found in existentialist 
theology.165 The OT and NT are unified with each other and human beings today not 
 
161 ExpTh, 139, quoting Helmut Kirschstein, Der souvera ̈ne Gott und die heilige Schrift. 
Einführung in die biblische Hermeneutik Karl Barths (Aachen, Germany: Shaker, 1998), 211. 
Moltmann also wrote the foreword for this book. 
162 See 6.4.4. 
163 ExpTh, 140, emphasis original. 
164 ExpTh, 141. 
165 Somewhat atypically, Moltmann does not mention Bultmann at all at this point but in-
stead cites Gerhard Ebeling and refers to the “motley variety of further methods” that 
were developed in subsequent hermeneutics. ExpTh, 142. Moltmann points to Anthony C. 
Thiselton’s coverage of the latter in New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of 
Transforming Biblical Reading (London: HarperCollins, 1992). 
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through the divine unity but rather through the constancy of the “historicity of hu-
man existence.”166 What varies is how this historicity is interpreted by different read-
ers in different times. Later hermeneutical approaches, though departing from exis-
tentialist interpretation, shared with existentialism this interest in the human 
speaker of the text, as the opposed to the message of the text itself. “While a congre-
gation gathers together for worship, the hermeneut investigates its social status. 
While a person praises God, the androcentricism or misogynist sexism of which he 
is unconscious is probed.”167 Interestingly, Moltmann finds that there is some theo-
logical precedent for this approach. In the Bible, “there are also many stories to be 
told, and prayers, psalms, hymns and doxologies to be prayed, sung and danced, 
and where God is extolled…. [I]n these writings people do not only listen to God’s 
Word; they also want to open their hearts before God.”168 Nonetheless, neither does 
Moltmann want to base the value of these texts on “the assumption of anthropolog-
ical constants.”169 Indeed, elsewhere he criticises the assumption of these alleged con-
stants for overlooking the open-endedness and thus inconstancy of human exist-
ence.170 
 Moltmann concludes his discussion, rejecting Barth’s approach, which repre-
sents a “hermeneutics from above,” as well as rejecting that of existentialist theology 
and various subsequent schools of interpretation—the “hermeneutics from below.” 
He writes, “In actual fact both hermeneutics… live from the same monistic premise: 
history is the work of a single determining subject.”171 Moltmann has advanced this 
criticism before.172 Here, however, he wants to emphasise that history is perichoretic, 
driven by three divine subjects—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—interpen-
etrating both one another and created subjects. This trinitarian conception of history 
 
166 ExpTh, 142. 
167 ExpTh, 142, spelling corrected. 
168 ExpTh, 142-43. 
169 ExpTh, 143. 
170 See Moltmann’s criticism of the anthropological proof for God, expounded in 3.3.2. 
171 ExpTh, 144. 





makes it possible to express history’s polycentric course. Conversely, neither herme-
neutical approach treated above, adequately accounts for the three divine subjects 
and the human subject, which co-determine one another—though this is always vol-
untary and in love on part of the divine subjects—and are yet incomplete, looking to 
the perfection of their unity in the coming kingdom. Moreover, a trinitarian concep-
tion of history requires a differentiated approach to Scripture. On the one hand, 
“scripture is closed and complete,” insofar as there is an “eschatological finality” to 
Christ’s death and resurrection (cf. Heb 1:2).173 But on the other hand, Scripture is 
incomplete in that it needs to be “continually interpreted afresh” to address different 
periods in the history of promise, until it finds its fulfilment in the coming king-
dom.174 
 This leads Moltmann to name the Spirit as the “real interpreter” of Scripture.175 
Such a view finds support in the theology of John 14-16, where after Jesus’ death the 
Father will send the Paraclete, the Spirit of truth, who “will teach you everything, 
and remind you of all that I have said to you” (John 14:26). Moltmann reflects, “This 
is formulated as if it were a limiting condition, but what it means is the very re-
verse…: the person who knows Christ and believes the God who raised him from 
the dead is illuminated by God the Spirit, and enters into the eternal light.”176 That 
is, the Spirit’s illuminating role should not primarily be seen as a contradiction of the 
efforts of human reason but as a gift that is given in order to know Christ. 
 Here, too, Moltmann makes an interesting turn in the discussion. The Spirit’s 
role is to be seen in terms of giving life—“life that is healed, freed, full, indestructible 
and eternal,” a life that people “experience with all their senses.”177 Moltmann con-
tinues, “From this we can conclude that a ‘spiritual interpretation of scripture’ has 
to be a biographical interpretation.”178 The Spirit does not just awaken and renew 
 
173 ExpTh, 144. 
174 ExpTh, 144. 
175 ExpTh, 145. 
176 ExpTh, 145-46. 
177 ExpTh, 146. 
178 ExpTh, 146, emphasis original. 
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one part of life, such as human reason, but the whole life, resulting in a much richer 
hermeneutics than one that is informed merely by the illuminated faculty of reason. 
Unfortunately, Moltmann does not pursue the suggestion of a biographical 
hermeneutic any further, though his subsequent thoughts on the scope and nature 
of the Spirit’s vivifying work are stimulating. Nonetheless, I have found three exam-
ples from elsewhere in ExpTh that are obliquely related to what might be called a 
biographical hermeneutic, even if they do not directly concern the life-giving minis-
try of the Spirit. First, Moltmann recalls the hermeneutical method he developed in 
his early days as a pastor. Reading the text at the beginning of the week, Moltmann 
writes, “I… took it with me in my way through the parish—and then knew what I 
had to say in my sermon.”179 His interactions and conversations with those in the 
community were what shaped and determined the content of the sermon, alongside 
the text. Second, commenting on Luther’s biographically-informed theology—the 
Reformer’s fear of damnation having played a significant role in his understanding 
of justification—Moltmann writes, “Reading, reflection and understanding of Scrip-
ture have to be accompanied by this [i.e., Luther-like] personal wrestling with God, 
so that theology becomes not just a scholarly study which teaches, but also a wisdom 
which makes wise out of the experience of God.”180 In that case, it is not just any life-
experience that informs the hermeneutic but, in particular, the experience of suffer-
ing.181 
A third example of potential material for a biographical hermeneutic appears 
during an aside on feminist hermeneutics. Moltmann affirms that “a human being’s 
natural constitution as woman or man must be taken into account when we try to 
understand the past and its historical testimonies.”182 Of course, he admits, mascu-
linity and femininity are culturally conditioned, but this conditioning still results in 
differentiated ways of experiencing the world. Thus, Moltmann can write in a later 
 
179 ExpTh, 5. 
180 ExpTh, 24, emphasis original.  
181 Cf. Moltmann’s theology of experience in SL, 5-8, 17-82 (1991), where suffering is not the 
only focus. 





chapter, “Through feminist exegesis, I read the Bible with my own eyes and theirs, 
and noticed to my shame how much—and how much that was important—I had 
simply overlooked, because it had never struck me.”183 A related hermeneutic was 
in development much earlier in Moltmann’s theology, namely reading the Bible 
“through the eyes of the poor.”184 None of these, however—a hermeneutics of parish 
ministry, of suffering à la Luther, nor of women’s experiences—fully executes what 
seems to be a promising but as of yet unfinished thought for Moltmann: that of a 
biographical hermeneutics. And he does not develop the concept at all in the chapter 
in which he introduces it. In any case, it should be noted that Moltmann’s stance on 
these differing approaches is affirming, in contrast to his critical evaluation of the 
various manifestations of a “hermeneutics from below.” This is because it is not 
merely the human subject at work here, as might otherwise be the case in a herme-
neutics from below, but the human subject in the midst of the trinitarian history, 
illuminated by the Holy Spirit. Even where Moltmann does not engage pneumatol-
ogy explicitly in the three examples given, it would be inconsistent with the rest of 
his theology if he were affirming any interpretation isolated from the all-encompass-
ing Spirit of Life.185  
 What Moltmann does develop in some detail from this focus on the Spirit’s 
vivifying work, though, is a hermeneutic that reads “the biblical texts as furthering 
life.”186 With such a hermeneutic, “we shall work out what in the texts furthers life, 
and we shall subject to criticism whatever is hostile to life.”187 Moltmann proceeds to 
list a number of examples. This hermeneutic will, for example, affirm human life in 
both individual and social forms, foster love for life, lead to healing and liberation, 
and develop hope for new beginnings. Importantly, “what furthers life is, first and 
last, whatever makes Christ present,” namely the crucified, risen, and coming 
 
183 ExpTh, 270. 
184 ExpTh, 132. See 4.1.7.-4.1.8. 
185 E.g., GC, 98-103 (1985); SL, 8-10, 31-38 (1991). 
186 ExpTh, 148. 
187 ExpTh, 149, emphasis original. 
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Christ.188 While Moltmann does not explicitly relate this discussion to his hermeneu-
tic of the Sache of Scripture, the promissory history, the two approaches are clearly 
complementary. The gift of the Spirit that drives a life-centred hermeneutic is itself 
an event in the history of promise, looking back to the promises of the Spirit in the 
OT. As it is the promise and not the text itself that determines what is to be taken up 
for the sake of hope, so, similarly, the Spirit as life-giver determines what in the text 
is valuable in order to further life. 
7.4.5. A Critical, Feminist Reading of Scripture 
Moltmann’s exploration of feminist theology and the accompanying exegesis in 
ExpTh provides a good example of where he is confident to be critical of biblical texts 
on the basis of a more fundamental Sache.189 
Moltmann attributes the origin of his interest in feminist theology to his wife. 
“I did not come to feminist theology. It came to me through the discoveries of my 
wife, Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel.”190 When Moltmann-Wendel began to show in-
terest in feminist theology from around 1972 onwards, Moltmann’s own outlook be-
gan to change too. “It was not always easy for me personally to understand the ne-
cessity for taking this road… but I was curious enough to go along with it.”191 This 
extended, not least, to his reading of Scripture. Moltmann also observes the perennial 
attempts of male theologians to address feminist agitations in the church. Unfortu-
nately, these thinkers proceeded “as if the problem was ‘the new woman,’ not the 
man in his traditional dominating roles.”192 Thus, “the biblical models based on the 
 
188 ExpTh, 150. 
189 My focus in this subsection is on the relationship between feminist concerns and the Sa-
che of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology. For general comment on gender and feminism in 
Moltmann’s theology, see Catherine Keller, “Pneumatic Nudges: The Theology of Molt-
mann, Feminism, and the Future,” in The Future of Theology: Essays in Honor of Jürgen Molt-
mann, ed. Miroslav Volf, Carmen Krieg, and Thomas Kucharz, 142-53 (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1996); Sarah A. Coakley, “The Trinity and Gender Reconsidered,” in God's Life 
in Trinity, ed. Miroslav Volf and Michael Welker, 133-42 (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 
2006). 
190 ExpTh, 268. 
191 ExpTh, 269. 





creation accounts and the apostolic letters were to be actualized, because their au-
thority as the Word of God must not be infringed, even though they after all derived 
from a pre-democratic and pre-modern culture.”193 Beginning with CPS in 1975, 
Moltmann takes an alternative direction. Since his interest in a feminist hermeneutic 
extends back far beyond ExpTh, it will be helpful to attend to some precedents in 
other parts of his corpus before addressing the latest material. 
Following this developing interest in feminist theology, Moltmann had no 
difficulty identifying traditions in Scripture that caused women harm throughout 
history. In CPS (1975), he observed, “The Hebrew and Christian traditions have often 
taught the subordination of women as an order of creation and the result of the Fall: 
the woman was created ‘second’ and was ‘the first’ to fall a victim to sin; and this 
legitimated her double subordination,” an allusion to 1 Tim 2:13-14.194 That Molt-
mann is referring to Scripture here and not simply its reception in the Jewish and 
Christian traditions becomes even more clear a little later, in his discussion of Gal 
3:28: “There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no 
longer male and female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus.” Whereas the first two 
pairs, “Jew or Greek” and “slave or free,” attend to religious and economic differ-
ences, “the third pair, ‘man or woman,’ goes back to the creation of mankind as ‘man 
and woman’ and reaches beyond the order of creation to a new order of these rela-
tionships.”195 That is, whatever allegedly sexist assumptions underlie particular bib-
lical texts, this key text in Galatians goes beyond these and requires them to be reas-
sessed in light of their Sache, the history of promise. New life in Christ is the begin-
ning of the end of patriarchal domination. 
Later comments further demonstrate Moltmann’s reluctance to endorse 
every biblical statement concerning gender. In TKG (1980), he writes, “The Pauline 
kephale [i.e., head] theology of 1 Cor 11:3 shows a corresponding derivation of male 
 
193 ExpTh, 272. 
194 CPS, 184; cf. Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel and Jürgen Moltmann, Humanity in God (New 
York: Pilgrim, 1983), 116 (1981). 
195 CPS, 188. 
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primacy over the woman.”196 Moltmann discovers a similar logic at play in Eph 5:22-
23. He continues, “The derivation in Heb 12:5-10 must also be called patriachalist. 
Karl Barth… developed a theory of female subordination out of Paul’s kephale theol-
ogy which rightly met with astonishment and opposition.”197 A year later, in 1981, 
referring again to Paul’s theology in 1 Cor, Moltmann writes, “The God of patriarchy 
is often portrayed through Christian forms in terms of the head and the body.”198 The 
Yahwist’s account of creation is also implicated here. Genesis 3:12 “includes the first 
male disclaimer [i.e., denial] of guilt,” when Adam blames Eve for giving him the 
fruit. Moltmann points to an alternative, however—the Priestly account of the fall in 
Gen 6, where the earth’s corruption derives from widespread human violence and 
not a misdeed attributed to a single woman. Nonetheless, the Yahwist framing is 
“unfortunately” to be found “in the New Testament as well,” in 1 Tim 2:13-14.199 And 
the potential harm of these passages is only exacerbated by later theological inter-
pretation, such as that of Augustine, Thomas, and Barth.200 
In a 1983 discussion, Moltmann presents a slightly more detailed criticism of 
patriarchal assumptions in particular texts. In the NT, “the theology of the head pre-
supposes a hierarchical gradation of relationships between head and body. Even 
though these are modified by Christ’s role as a servant, they are nevertheless main-
tained and are further stabilized by it. The ‘head’ theology, too, is theistic, not trini-
tarian, in conception.”201 Strikingly, then, Moltmann views the apostle’s own state-
ments as departing from the God of the NT. It was this trend towards a christological 
or trinitarian reading of Scripture that informed Moltmann’s earlier juxtaposition of 
1 Tim 2:13-14 and Gal 3:28, noted above. Such a trend is also observable in his 1991 
introduction to HTG: “The New Testament shows no unanimity over the practical 
 
196 TKG, 250 n. 24. 
197 TKG, 250 n. 24. Further criticism of Barth’s approach to gender can be found in HTG, 137-
38 (1987). Moltmann revisits this theme over a decade later with a tribute to Henriette 
Visser ‘t Hooft. See “Henriette Visser ‘t Hooft and Karl Barth,” Theology Today 55:4 (1999): 
524-31. 
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consequences of belief in God the Father.”202 Whereas Paul grounds his headship 
theology in God’s fatherhood, the Synoptics develop an “anti-patriarchal ethic,” 
based on following Christ.203 “By contrast, Jesus is essentially superfluous for the 
Christian patriarchalism of the household codes…. In terms of content they say al-
most nothing that has not already been said by Jewish wisdom and Stoic-Cynic di-
abtribe.”204 
Finally, in another 1983 article, Moltmann is critical of “the way in which 
since Paul congregations have been addressed as ‘Dear brothers.’”205 Related to this 
is Paul’s language of “sonship” for believers. Moltmann suggests a connection here 
to headship. “Are women to feel like ‘sons’ before God the Father or are they to be 
subordinated to the ‘sons of God’ as their heads?”206 
It is in ExpTh, though, that Moltmann first provides a detailed exploration of 
his hermeneutical assumptions in regard to these texts. “No one has to adopt the 
social concepts and the patriarchal sexual hierarchies of the Bible. If that were so, for 
biblical reasons we should have to reintroduce slavery into Christianity, revert to 
absolute monarchy instead of democracy, and so forth.”207 Moltmann notes, how-
ever, that this immediately raises the question as to what pertains to the context of 
the time and what pertains to the central message of the Bible. Responding to this, 
he writes, “The God who is present to his people in promise, Exodus, covenant and 
law is, in my view, the first objective criterion [das erste Sachkriterium] in the Tenach 
or Old Testament.”208 Every biblical claim must be assessed against the background 
of this God. Moltmann perceives a way forward through the concept of the image of 
 
202 HTG, 15. 
203 HTG, 15.  
204 HTG, 16. 
205 HTG, 2. 
206 HTG, 2. 
207 ExpTh, 279. 
208 ExpTh, 280, emphasis original; Ger. 249. Only Sachkriterium is italicised in the German. 
What Moltmann means here is that the God of promise is the erste criterion (primary in 
importance and/or in terms of the order of the biblical narrative) for reading Scripture in 
line with its Sache.  
340 
 
God. Both men and women are created in this image, so that any other image is in-
adequate and human beings are thus forbidden to fashion one (Exod 20:4). Im-
portantly, this also means that God is neither male nor female. “So if we know that 
God is neither the one nor the other, we can say: God is like a father, and like a 
mother, like the old and like a child, like an Almighty Being and like a co-sufferer, 
and so forth.”209 For Moltmann, the God of Israel cannot be bound to a single anal-
ogy, and certainly not a gendered one. This holds true for the NT as well, where the 
way Jesus relates to women in the gospels and the pouring out of the Spirit on both 
women and men provide the hermeneutical centre from which to read biblical texts 
that hold patriarchal biases. Moltmann’s answer to the question of distinguishing 
between context and message, text and Sache, then, has the reader look first to God 
of the Bible. 
In this connection, Moltmann also highlights the human side of the biblical 
texts and canonisation. “Because the biblical traditions were all written by men, with 
the experiences and opinions of their time, and because these traditions were also 
gathered together by men into the canon of ‘holy scripture’, a critical feminist her-
meneutics is necessary.”210 And because the Bible has these sources and this history, 
feminist hermeneutics takes up a hermeneutics of suspicion, asking not just what the 
texts say but what motivations informed their being written and compiled. This 
leads Moltmann to another criterion implicit in his own reading of Scripture. “Do 
they [i.e., particular texts] serve to legitimate domination or to liberate from oppres-
sion?”211 Indeed, “that is not just a contemporary secular interest, but the Bible’s very 
own concern [Interesse] too.”212 It derives from the history of promise, in which God 
dwells among the oppressed and gives them hope for an alternative future. 
Moltmann develops his theology of Scripture and hermeneutical programme 
in greatest detail in ExpTh. In this section, I have explored his reflections on his pre-
vious theology; his articulation of a hermeneutics centred on the divine promise; his 
 
209 ExpTh, 280, translation slightly adjusted; Ger. 249. 
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definition of Scripture, particularly in dialogue with feminist theology; and the rela-
tionship of the Bible to Christ and the Spirit in the trinitarian history. In a final sub-
section I focussed on Moltmann’s treatment of texts that he deemed to run contrary 
to Scripture’s liberatory concern, here in connection to the liberation of women. 
7.5. Moltmann’s Methodology: Challenges and Prospects 
Ahead of a concluding chapter, a final aspect of the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s 
theology warrants attention. Throughout the decades, various commentators have 
criticised Moltmann’s work and hermeneutic for their methodological looseness. As 
I noted at the beginning of the previous section (7.4), it was not until the end of his 
systematic contributions that he addressed methodological questions in detail. In 
addition to this, nonetheless, Moltmann provides brief comment on his methodology 
in various places in his earlier works, especially in the prefaces. In this section I will 
consider some of the criticisms made of Moltmann’s general and hermeneutical 
methodology and his replies to these. Then, following Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz, I 
will propose that Moltmann can be read fruitfully as a speculative theologian. 
7.5.1. Moltmann’s Methodological Commitments 
Over the course of writing his major works, Moltmann claims to have been driven 
by two different sets of methodological commitments. In his first three works, TH, 
CG, and CPS, Moltmann employed a programmatic methodology, treating “the 
whole of theology in a single focus.”213 The resurrection, the cross, and Pentecost, 
respectively, provided points of departure for theological construction in each vol-
ume. In the latter six works, TKG, GC, WJC, SL, CoG, and ExpTh, however, Moltmann 
adopted a different approach: 
 
I no longer presented the whole of theology in a single focus but now 
viewed my ‘whole’ as a part belonging to a wider community, and as my con-
 
213 TKG, vii (1990). 
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tribution to theology as a whole. I know and accept the limits of my own ex-
istence and my own context. I do not claim to say everything, as earlier dog-
matic and systematic theologians once did, in their summas and systems. 
What I should like to do, however, is participate in the great theological dia-
logue with theologians of the past and present…. These contributions are 
not offered in the form of a dogma or system; they are suggestions. They are 
not intended to conclude discussions; they are meant to open new conversa-
tions.214 
 
This later preface to TKG, written ten years after the original publication in German, 
provides a helpful summary of Moltmann’s original aims for the series.215 He sought 
to recognise the contextual nature of his theology, which always—whether implicitly 
or explicitly—reflects the concerns of the author’s time and place. But this also meant 
that he had to forsake any claim to comprehensiveness or perfect objectivity. 
 In addition to the negative rationale—the inevitability of a contextual theol-
ogy—Moltmann reveals two theological reasons for his particular approach. First, 
“humanly speaking, truth is to be found in unhindered dialogue.”216 Here Moltmann 
distinguishes his dialogical contributions from “theological systems and assertive 
dogmatics,” which allegedly “exert coercion” and “leave the individual mind little 
room for creative fantasy.”217 In contrast, “it is only in free dialogue that truth can be 
accepted for the right and proper reason—namely, that it illuminates and convinces 
as truth.”218 The way to truth does not lie in the prowess of an individual, gifted 
thinker, but in the dialogue that takes place between teacher and student, man and 
woman, black and white, rich and poor, first world and third world.219 Second, ahead 
of the coming of Christ, truth remains an unfinished process. Though not a major 
feature of the prefaces to TKG, this assumption is apparent in Moltmann’s work from 
 
214 TKG, vii-viii, emphasis original. 
215 The same commitments are evident in the original preface and are presented there in 
greater detail. TKG, xi-xvi (1980).  
216 TKG, xiii (1980). 
217 TKG, xiii. 
218 TKG, xiii, emphasis original. 
219 These are Moltmann’s categories. The teacher-student and man-woman relationships are 





the beginning.220 He provides further comment in subsequent prefaces. Thus WJC 
(1989): “The knowledge of Christ remains a provisional knowledge. It has to be for-
mulated as a promise, which can only thrust forward to the seeing face to face.”221 
And ExpTh (2000): “The divine promise and the awakened hope teach every theol-
ogy that they must remain fragmentary and unfinished, because it is the thinking 
about God of men and women who are on the way and, being still travellers, have 
not yet arrived home. That is why the mediaeval cathedrals and minsters also had to 
remain unfinished, so that they might point beyond themselves.”222 
 Besides these commitments and assumptions that shape his systematic contri-
butions from the beginning, Moltmann later reveals another feature of his theologi-
cal approach that he apparently applies to his whole theological career.223 He opens 
ExpTh with the admission: “Up to now these questions about method have not 
greatly interested me, because I first wanted to get to know the real content of theol-
ogy.”224 He continues, “For me, theology was, and still is, an adventure of ideas. It is 
an open, inviting path. Right down to the present day, it has continued to fascinate 
my mental and spiritual curiosity. My theological methods therefore grew up as I 
came to have a perception of the objects of theological thought.”225 M. Douglas Meeks 
puts it well when he writes, “Moltmann’s theology reads less like a hyper-self-con-
sciously methodological philosophy than a dense novel that inserts one deeper into 
relationships of lived history by the imaginative drawing of heretofore unrecognized 
relationships.”226 Together with its contextual, dialogical, and eschatologically open 
character, then, Moltmann’s theology should be viewed in retrospect as methodo-
logically light. That is, he has sought to engage material from the Bible, tradition, 
contemporary theology, and his own experiences of suffering and hope as a stimulus 
 
220 See, e.g., 5.2.2. 
221 WJC, xiv. 
222 ExpTh, xvi. 
223 Perhaps only the work of the late fifties and early sixties on historical Reformed thinkers 
is to be excluded here. 
224 ExpTh, xiv. 
225 ExpTh, xv. 
226 M. Douglas Meeks, “Jürgen Moltmann’s Systematic Contributions to Theology,” Religious 
Studies Review 22:2 (1996): 95-102, at 95. 
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for creative theological thinking. His theology is not without method, but neither is 
methodological rigour a primary concern of his. 
 Notably, while each of these commitments can be found generally in Molt-
mann’s methodology, they are also apparent specifically in his use of Scripture. The 
Bible is always read in a particular context, such as in the context of being a 
woman.227 It represents a dialogue through time as different authors and communi-
ties are met with the divine promise.228 This promissory history remains incomplete 
so that Scripture must point beyond itself to the future.229 And, especially with the 
beginning of the systematic contributions, Moltmann developed his “own post-crit-
ical and ‘naive’ relationship to the biblical writings,” reading and reflecting on them 
without strict controls in place.230 
7.5.2. Criticisms of Moltmann’s Methodology 
Over a long career, Moltmann has provided his readers with plenty of material to 
understand many of the various methodological commitments that drove his theo-
logical construction. I have outlined what I view as the most important and obvious 
ones in the previous subsection. Nonetheless, Moltmann’s explicit comments on 
methodology were often made in response to criticism. Indeed, even after having 
written on his methodology at length in ExpTh, older criticisms persist and new crit-
icisms have since been made. I will consider some of these in this subsection. 
 First, there is the general criticism of ambiguity. Stephen Williams writes, “To 
many of us who have read his work over the years, it is frequently not clear (and just 
because undeclared by Moltmann) whether language is being used literally, univo-
cally, symbolically, analogically, metaphorically, not quite any of the above, or some 
 
227 See 7.4.4. and 7.4.5. 
228 The biblical testimonies “were the beginning of an unbroken, still incomplete, and un-
completable dialogue in history.” TKG, xiii (1980), emphasis original. 
229 See 7.4.2. 






of the above in some combination.”231 As Bauckham summarises, “Many critics, es-
pecially in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, find Moltmann’s work lacking in philosophi-
cal analysis and logical rigour. This is a question of theological style, and Moltmann’s 
way of doing theology has other merits, such as breadth of vision, which more ana-
lytical treatments lack. But it is true that it sometimes obscures conceptual problems 
in his work which could otherwise come to light and be overcome more quickly.”232 
Don Cupitt thus puts it curtly: “I do not understand how an academic can be content 
to be so deeply ambiguous and evasive as this.”233 Out of the three criticisms I will 
outline, I find this one the most convincing and am happy to share in the frustration 
of others who have puzzled over certain passages and concepts in Moltmann’s work! 
Nonetheless, it can also be overstated, and Bauckham provides the best articulation 
of it in my opinion. 
 Second, there is the criticism of speculation, particularly regarding Molt-
mann’s claims about God and the Trinity. So Paul Wells frets, “One of the most in-
furiating things about his idealistic constructions regarding the divinity is their lack 
of theological humility…. Such assurance in charting the depths of God’s inner life 
is unjustifiable in the light of the mysteries of Scripture. He seems to talk about God 
like one might talk about other human beings.”234 And Tim Chester can quip, “One 
is left asking from where Moltmann gets his special knowledge of the trinitarian 
 
231 Williams, “Moltmann on Jesus Christ,” 122. 
232 Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 25. 
233 Don Cupitt, review of The Future of Creation, by Jürgen Moltmann, Theology 83:693 (1980): 
215-16, at 216. Cupitt continues, “My hypothesis is that the blame for this deplorable state 
of affairs lies with neo-orthodoxy. Neo-orthodoxy seemed to say that you do not actually 
need to prove your theological statements nor to explain in philosophical language what 
their status is. It is enough to invoke the concept of revelation, and it will give you carte 
blanche. Similarly Moltmann, like so many other theologians, seems to think that it is not 
necessary even to attempt to prove that the New Testament christological confession is a 
true verdict upon Jesus of Nazareth. The NT christology is just accepted dogmatically, as if 
merely by existing it had established a claim to be taken seriously.” Clearly Cupitt is work-
ing with quite a different set of assumptions to Moltmann! 
234 Paul Wells, “God and Change: Moltmann in the Light of Reformed Theism,” in The Power 
and Weakness of God: Impassibility and Orthodoxy, ed. Nigel M. de S. Cameron, 53-68 (Edin-
burgh: Rutherford House, 1990), 66-67. 
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life!”235 Ryan Neal takes yet another step, stating that Moltmann displays “a self-
assured confidence that disallows mystery; there are no dark corners of theology, 
everything is clearly in view.”236 This criticism merits further comment and I will 
attend to it in more detail in the following subsection. 
 A recent, third criticism has been advanced by Randal Rauser from the per-
spective of analytic theology, concerning Moltmann’s quest for a theology in the 
form of dialogue. Not unprovocatively, Rauser applies Harry Frankfurt’s category 
of “bullshit” to “Moltmann's view of theology as perpetual conversation.”237 That is, 
because Moltmann’s emphasis is on the openness of the conversation and not on the 
truthfulness of the contributions, the overall quality of conversation is compromised. 
There is a place for conversation, an anything-goes “bull session,” which functions 
as a space for experimenting with new ideas and approaches. Rauser admits as 
much. But, he adds, the conversation is only valid insofar as “one is committed to 
closing the loop by discerning which of the results are worth keeping and which 
should be discarded.”238 Yet Moltmann does make definite judgements throughout 
his career, outright rejecting various contributions from Bultmann, Barth, and Rah-
ner, or Thomas, Augustine, and Paul, among many others! The problem for Rauser 
is that such judgements are out of step with Moltmann’s stated commitment to the-
ology as dialogue. Thus, “when necessary, Moltmann strikes out on tactical sorties 
to demolish contrarian positions, but then when the polemic is turned back on him, 
 
235 Tim Chester, Mission and the Coming of God: Eschatology, the Trinity and Mission in the The-
ology of Jürgen Moltmann and Contemporary Evangelicalism (Milton Keynes, UK: Paternoster, 
2006), 27. 
236 Neal, Theology as Hope, 208. 
237 Randal Rauser, “Theology as a Bull Session,” in Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Phi-
losophy of Theology, ed. Oliver D. Crisp and Michael C. Rea, 70-86 (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
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he beats a hasty retreat back behind the wall of congenial conversation.”239 Finally,240 
this alleged double standard in Moltmann’s approach is further exacerbated by his 
ambiguous style. In contrast, in analytical theology, “the appeal of your rhetoric, im-
penetrability of your prose, and security of your reputation matter nothing if your 
arguments are poor. It is on this egalitarian and iconoclastic ground that upstart Ber-
trand Russell could write his famous 1903 letter shooting down Frege's Basic Law V. 
Now try to imagine this dazzling exercise of analytic reasoning if Frege had written 
with Heideggerian obfuscation. In such a climate, Russell could easily be dismissed 
as a smarmy upstart whose temerity to challenge such a profoundly difficult thinker 
could only come from youthful ignorance.”241 
 Rauser criticises Moltmann’s theology on the grounds that Moltmann places 
emphasis on the dialogical process to the detriment of the results; the appeal to con-
versation allows him to resist scrutiny; and the general ambiguity of his style disal-
lows straightforward, analytic assessment. I do not think much can be gained here 
from contesting Rauser’s judgements. From the perspective of analytic theology, he 
offers valuable criticism.242 And if the future of theology is to be an analytical one, 
then there is likely little that Moltmann has to offer. But the future remains open, the 
 
239 Rauser, “Theology as a Bull Session,” 84. Richard Clutterbuck observes a similar disso-
nance in Moltmann’s work. “Moltmann has to be called a doctrinal theologian for his pro-
posals are never expressed merely as theological opinions; they are addressed to the 
churches and are claimed as necessary doctrinal adjustments for the corporate life of the 
Christian community.” Richard Clutterbuck, “Jürgen Moltmann as a Doctrinal Theologian: 
The Nature of Doctrine and the Possibilities for Its Development,” Scottish Journal of Theol-
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CoG, “My own propositions are intended to be a challenge to other people to think for 
themselves—and of course they are a challenge to objective refutation too.” CoG, xiv 
(1995). 
240 I have ordered the points of Rauser’s argument differently for succinctness. 
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sal of carefully reasoned analysis as a hubristic power grab could easily become a means to 
indemnify the academic elite against criticism.” Ibid., 84. But Rauser confuses Moltmann’s 
rejection of fortress-type theological systems (see the previous subsection, 7.5.1.) with a re-
jection of “carefully reasoned analysis.” Moltmann does not reject the latter. He only 
claims that such systems, though internally coherent, isolate themselves from the broader, 
global and intergenerational theological task. 




world still reads poetry, the church still needs its hymn writers, and people still 
dream.243 As Oliver Crisp writes, analytic theology is “one way in which a faith seek-
ing understanding approach to theology might be had.”244 The implication is that 
analytic theology is not the only approach. This does not mean that Moltmann’s the-
ology should be immune to criticism by virtue of the different commitments that 
inform it, but neither does it require that his theology be rejected wholesale on the 
basis of these commitments.245 
There will surely be other criticisms of Moltmann’s methodology that I have not cov-
ered here.246 Moreover, there is some overlap among those outlined above, and dif-
ferent readers who voice similar criticisms do so with a different degree of fairness 
or nuance. Some tend towards an unwillingness to hear what Moltmann is saying at 
all, apparently rejecting his conclusions before having attempted to understand him, 
while others offer more measured responses, celebrating some of Moltmann’s pro-
posals and questioning others—or at least affirming the intentions behind his work. 
Despite criticisms, though, I do not think that Moltmann’s methodological commit-
ments prevent constructive readings of his claims. In this last subsection, I turn to 
 
243 Add to this the political and practical orientation of Moltmann’s theology. I cannot agree 
with Michael Rea, who writes the introduction to the volume which Rauser’s work ap-
pears in, that Scripture and not theology should lead to the cultivation of wisdom. For Rea, 
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Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz’s characterisation of Moltmann as a speculative theologian 
in order to provide a positive point of departure for Moltmann’s future readers. 
7.5.3. Moltmann as Speculative Theologian 
Towards the end of his book on Moltmann’s theology, Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz 
characterises Moltmann’s project as a “speculative theology.”247 Although the term 
is commonly used in a negative sense, Müller-Fahrenholz means something differ-
ent. Appealing to the term’s application to figures such as Origen and Thomas Aqui-
nas, Müller-Fahrenholz links speculation to “sensual or historical experience,” which 
“becomes the ground for the development of more complex connections.”248 Thus, 
Müller-Fahrenholz writes a little earlier, “Precisely because Moltmann is aware of 
the deep mystery which we cannot fathom with our knowledge, he says everything 
that he thinks as he thinks it, trusting that in the community of seeking and ques-
tioning Christians this may be accepted as his voice and his contribution.”249 In Molt-
mann’s own words: “Some people have critically remarked that I think I know more 
about God and his future than human beings can ever know. They counsel me to 
more silence before the unfathomable, nameless Mystery, and to more negative the-
ology in ‘the missing of God’ (J. B. Metz’s phrase). I am enough of a mystic to under-
stand what they mean. But just because the disclosed mystery of God’s name is un-
fathomable, one can’t get enough of wanting to know about it. The Spirit searches 
everything, even the depths of God…”250 Moltmann does not equate his proposals 
with knowledge of God but rather characterises them as reflections that arise in the 
 
247 Müller-Fahrenholz, Kingdom and Power, 236. So, too, Meeks, though I think his characteri-
sation of Moltmann’s critics is a bit unfair: “The most frequent charge against Moltmann’s 
theology has been that it is ‘speculative.’ This criticism comes from those who feel it is im-
possible to experience God in either the history of Jesus as scripturally narrated or the ex-
periences of the sufferings of these times.” Meeks, “Jürgen Moltmann’s Systematic Contri-
butions,” 96. 
248 Müller-Fahrenholz, Kingdom and Power, 236. Another connotation of the word in contem-
porary usage is that of financial speculation. Some may view this as positive connotation. I 
do not intend such a connotation here, however. 
249 Müller-Fahrenholz, Kingdom and Power, 218. 
250 ExpTh, xxi (2000), quoting 1 Cor 2:10, ellipsis original. 
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act of “wanting to know” God. And this is why he is to be called a speculative theo-
logian, in the best sense of the term. His experiences of the presence of God in hope 
and suffering, and his imaginative readings of Scripture and tradition yield theolog-
ical conclusions whose primary goal is to stimulate and inspire further thought and 
action, even if—or, perhaps, especially because—they lack a disciplined methodol-
ogy. In my opinion, this central feature of Moltmann’s thought, can be retrospec-
tively located not only in his systematic contributions but in his early programmatic 
works too—TH and CG.251  
 Moltmann still can and should be read critically. His theology can and should 
be judged against the biblical witness. What I want to suggest here, though, follow-
ing his own indications, is that the main point of reading Moltmann should not be 
to accept or reject his proposals. As he himself writes, “What I do wish, however, is 
for my suggestions to be taken seriously in the theological community—that they 
should not simply be met with agreement or disagreement, but that they should 
stimulate theology’s ongoing dialogue.”252 Here Moltmann provides a retrospective 
key to reading his corpus. Does the theology of hope spur the church on or burden 
it? Does the crucified God invoke feelings of compassion or disgust? Does the social 
doctrine of the Trinity inspire loving community or domestication of the divine mys-
tery? How can readers speak to these from their own contexts, and even speak these 
into their own contexts? How might or might not Moltmann’s work in his own time 
and place provide a model for future theological thinking? This, I think, is what it 
means for Moltmann to be a speculative theologian. He is the storyteller or lyricist, 
the painter or sculptor who uses his imagination to engage not only the head but the 
heart too, enabling his audience to hear and see Scripture in new ways and inspiring 
them to new thinking and action. Like C. S. Lewis’s Narnia or Rublev’s icon, Molt-
mann’s theology is subject to criticism—indeed, more so, due to its textual medium 
and academic register—but to end there would be to misunderstand his project. 
 
251 Earlier, I argued that CPS (1975) is closer in approach to the systematic contributions 
than it is to TH or CG. See 6.2.1. 






In this chapter I have explored various aspects of Moltmann’s use of Scripture in the 
latter half of his career. Following Moltmann’s own hint at the beginning of this pe-
riod that the key to his theology is its biblical foundation, two examples from the 
eighties are particularly noteworthy. In a first essay, biblical inspiration, a rare topic 
in his corpus, is treated in light of his recent theology. He rejects approaches to verbal 
inspiration that implicitly equate Christ with Scripture, and also confuse the person 
of the Spirit with that of Christ. Moreover, such approaches tend to have little to say 
about the human character of Scripture and its open nature in view of the future 
work of the Spirit. Further important reflections on the Bible are offered in the 1985 
work, GC. Here, Moltmann makes a plea for reading the creation stories within their 
wider canonical context, in order to stave off harmful misappropriations of the text, 
such as using it to justify ecological domination. Moltmann also rejects conservative 
readings of the creation stories that conflict with the claims of modern science, par-
ticularly in the theory of evolution. Rather than inhibit a properly biblical under-
standing of human origins, science provides a new context within which to hear 
afresh the concerns of Scripture. 
 In the third volume of his systematic contributions, WJC (1989), Moltmann ad-
vances a number of proposals in creative conversation with the biblical material. 
Thus, in dialogue with Judaism, Moltmann suggests that the OT be read not simply 
as a testimony to Jesus but to the messiah—a figure that is not exhausted in the per-
son of Jesus. While this by no means requires that Jesus is dissolved into the general 
figure of the messiah, it does allow space for affirming the Jewish rejection of Jesus 
as their messiah, hearing their concerns for a world that has not yet been redeemed. 
Another aspect of Moltmann’s use of Scripture in this work is his rereading of the 
Nicene Creed and Apostles Creed in light of the biblical text, focussing especially on 
the neglect of Jesus’ ministry in each creed. Interestingly, such revision extends to 
Scripture itself, so that Moltmann rejects the doctrine of the virgin birth as a distrac-
tion from the core claims of the gospel. Finally, Moltmann briefly comments on the 
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need for hermeneutics to look not only to the origin of christological claims in Scrip-
ture but their future in engaging the issues of today, such as the nuclear and ecolog-
ical crises. 
 Scripture continues to play an important role in the fifth volume of the system-
atic contributions, CoG (1995). Here Moltmann again reveals his distaste for bibli-
cism, criticising approaches to the text that treat it as a source of detailed knowledge 
about the future, rather than as a witness to the divine promise. This criticism is fur-
ther developed in the discussion about universalism. In Moltmann’s opinion, a bib-
licist approach fails here because the question of whether all people will eventually 
be saved cannot be resolved on the basis of biblical texts alone. The question needs 
to be explored in the context of broader theological commitments—and Moltmann 
argues that this naturally leads to affirming the reality of universal salvation. In an-
other connection, Bauckham is critical of Moltmann’s exegesis of biblical texts in 
CoG. Moltmann’s response is helpful because it reveals key assumptions underpin-
ning his hermeneutic. His aim is not simply to understand the meaning of the texts 
but to uncover the concern that informs them and speak it again in the contemporary 
context. 
 It is in his ExpTh (2000) that Moltmann sets down an extensive hermeneutical 
programme. Looking back on earlier work, he comments on advances in biblical crit-
icism that he found increasingly alienating, ultimately seeking instead to reflect on 
the texts in his own way, in accordance with the concern (Sache) with which they 
were written. Moltmann identifies this Sache with the history of promise. The role of 
interpreters is to locate themselves within this history and hear the promises of the 
Bible for their generation and context—a context which itself forms part of the his-
tory of promise. Defining Scripture by a Sache quickly leads to identity problems, 
however, if the Sache is confused with the community that is reading the text. The 
unique history of promise, attested in the biblical text and anchored in the person of 
Christ, remains the measure of what constitutes Scripture. Nonetheless, this also en-





read critically in light of it. Such a critical approach can be seen throughout Molt-
mann’s career, for example, in his treatments of biblical texts that hold patriarchal 
assumptions about women and womenhood. These texts should not be read literally 
but rather in light of the liberating history of promise. 
 Promissory history in Moltmann’s theology effectively overlaps with the no-
tion of trinitarian history. In accordance with this, then, Moltmann develops a trini-
tarian hermeneutic in another part of ExpTh. Most notably, he points to the work of 
the Holy Spirit as interpreter for the human reader. The Spirit brings together the life 
experiences of the reader with the text of Scripture in order to illuminate it through 
these experiences. These interpretations can be illuminating for other readers as well, 
and Moltmann points to the new understanding with which he read Scripture after 
becoming familiar with feminist hermeneutics. 
 In the final section of this chapter I offered a proposal for reading Moltmann. I 
identified various methodological commitments, evident particularly in his system-
atic contributions. These included a self-consciously contextual approach, conduct-
ing theology as dialogue, remaining open in light of the future coming of God, and 
prioritising content over formal methodology. But Moltmann’s readers have also 
been critical of his methodology and style. Three themes in the criticism stand out, 
namely charges regarding ambiguity, speculation, and a lack of conclusiveness. 
While I do not dismiss these criticisms, I encourage readers to read Moltmann as a 
speculative theologian in the best sense of the term, being inspired by his creative 










In the preceding chapters I have provided a study of the role of Scripture in Molt-
mann’s theology. At the end of each chapter I have summarised the exposition and 
discussion, and I refer the reader to these larger summaries for Moltmann’s use of 
the Bible at different stages in his career. I briefly rehearse them here in order to 
provide an outline of the project. 
 In CHAPTER ONE I discussed previous studies that attended to various aspects 
of the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology. Despite many excellent projects un-
dertaken ahead of the present one, I noted the need for an investigation that was 
general, inductive, and diachronic. I then identified what I have termed Moltmann’s 
“contrastive paradigm,” his ongoing endeavour to differentiate theological claims 
derived from Scripture, and those that allegedly run contrary to the biblical witness. 
In CHAPTER TWO I began my exposition proper with a study of Moltmann’s writings 
in the late fifties and early sixties. A number of significant themes were identified, 
including Scripture as a witness to Christ, the shortcomings of the doctrine of verbal 
inspiration, and the ongoing need to revise tradition in light of the Bible. The most 
pervasive theme found in this period, however, was that of the eschatological hori-
zon of Scripture, the horizon of Christ’s lordship. Moltmann rejects Barthian, Bult-
mannian, and historical-critical endeavours to locate the centre of Scripture in any-
thing other than this future. 
 In CHAPTER THREE I turned to Moltmann’s first major work, Theology of Hope 
(1964). Here I drew attention to an early application of his contrastive paradigm—
the contrast that Moltmann perceives between the eternal present of God in the tra-
dition and Scripture’s witness to the historical being of God. I also identified six in-
dividuals whose work had played a decisive role in forming Moltmann’s articulation 
of the paradigm at this stage in his career. Besides this, I explored other aspects of 
the role of Scripture in TH, namely Moltmann’s relationship to historical criticism, 
the character of the Bible as a witness to Christ, the canon in TH, and the continuity 
between the two Testaments. In CHAPTER FOUR I did two things. First I attended to 
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the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology during the late sixties. I traced his de-
velopment of a distinction between two kinds of future, adventus and futurum, which 
informs the contrastive paradigm of TH, and I discussed his use of the Bible in his 
political theology at this time. Second, I responded to Ryan Neal’s argument that 
Moltmann’s second major work, The Crucified God (1972), represents a significant de-
parture from the claims of TH. I saw much more continuity between the two works, 
which would shape my investigation in the next chapter. 
 In CHAPTER FIVE I proceeded to CG. I focussed on a second application of Molt-
mann’s contrastive paradigm—the contrast between the tradition’s concept of a God 
who does not suffer and the crucified God that Moltmann finds in Scripture. A key 
finding here was that the bogeyman in TH, Greek influence on the Christian tradi-
tion, had now been universalised to encompass all thought that departed from the 
biblical witness. I also discussed other aspects of the role of Scripture in CG, particu-
larly the relationship between Christ and the OT, and that between Christ and the 
NT. In CHAPTER SIX I turned to Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity, discussing his 
third major work, The Church in the Power of the Spirit (1975), and giving particular 
attention to his fourth major work, The Trinity and the Kingdom (1980). My main con-
cern was with a third application of his contrastive paradigm—the contrast between 
the “monotheistic” God of the tradition, a term of disparagement in Moltmann’s vo-
cabulary, and the trinitarian God of the Bible. Here I also outlined criticisms of Molt-
mann’s hermeneutic, preparing the way for my final chapter. 
 In CHAPTER SEVEN I attended to Moltmann’s use of Scripture in his later work: 
God in Creation (1985), The Way of Jesus Christ (1989), and The Coming of God (1995). 
The majority of this chapter, however, was given to Experiences in Theology (2000), 
where Moltmann develops a detailed theological methodology—and attendant her-
meneutic—for the first time. I concluded with a response to criticisms of his meth-
odology, a response that I will revisit shortly. 
 While I set out in the introduction with the intention of identifying the role of 





to speak of the roles that Scripture has played throughout his career. Certainly, com-
mon themes emerge. But, in view of the decades-long programme that is Moltmann’s 
theology—its ever-new embarkments, stopovers, and anticipated homecomings, its 
contextual and dialogical, ad hoc and speculative character—it is difficult to trace 
consistent exegetical and hermeneutical commitments, or a consistent theology of 
Scripture. Each of these evolve as Moltmann engages his subject matter, whether that 
be the promise, the cross, or the Trinity—to name some of the ones featured in this 
dissertation. Nonetheless, one thing is at least clear at this point. Scripture plays a 
central and non-negotiable role in the construction of Moltmann’s theology. He can-
not be properly understood apart from this commitment. There are also two themes 
from the foregoing which I want to highlight here. 
 Throughout this dissertation I have often commented on the contrastive para-
digm Moltmann employs. This is a fundamental element in his theology of Scripture, 
and it manifests in different ways at different stages in his career. I have drawn at-
tention to three of these in particular. The first is developed at length in TH, where 
Moltmann contrasts the historical and promissory nature of biblical revelation with 
allegedly Greek-influenced approaches to revelation in traditional and modern the-
ology, approaches which locate God in an eternity separate from history. The second 
finds its major articulation in CG. Again, Moltmann points to an unwelcome Hellen-
isation of Christian doctrine in the church’s commitment to divine impassibility. This 
is contrasted with a theology of the cross that Moltmann closely associates with the 
NT message. Even so, his scope is broadened to encompass the universal—and not 
simply Greek—trend of human beings towards self-aggrandisation as the negative 
side of his contrastive paradigm. The final application of this paradigm that I dis-
cussed in some detail is presented in TKG. Here Moltmann contrasts the biblical wit-
ness to the Trinity with the ancient world’s conception of God as absolute substance 
and modern theology’s conception of God as absolute subject. The latter two are dis-
missed as modalist, unable to accommodate the three trinitarian subjects of the NT. 
 The other theme I wanted to highlight is addressed at the end of the preceding 
chapter (7.5). Drawing on Moltmann’s own reflections, from ExpTh in particular, his 
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final major work, I proposed that his corpus can be read retrospectively as a specu-
lative theology. There are indeed ends that it will serve, as indicated by the various 
criticisms levelled against it, but this should not be grounds for discounting it as a 
whole. Rather, as a speculative theology it provides material to stimulate readers to 
develop theologies appropriate to their own contexts. Nonetheless, Moltmann still 
can and should be read critically, especially as his proposals are negotiated in new 
contexts and in dialogue with other thinkers. I bring attention to this basic aspect of 
Moltmann’s theology in a dissertation on his use of Scripture as I think it also pro-
vides a constructive point of departure when considering this aspect of his work. 
This is largely in response to Richard Bauckham’s comments at various points that 
Moltmann’s biblical hermeneutic acquires a certain looseness with the systematic 
contributions.1 Instead of viewing Moltmann as an exegete—a title he himself re-
jects—it is more fruitful to read him as a theological interpreter of Scripture, as a 
storyteller or artist communicating biblical themes with creative means. Again, this 
does not disqualify criticisms of his use of Scripture but only asks his critics to 
acknowledge the broader context in which Moltmann’s readings are made. 
As I indicated in my introduction, I intended this dissertation to be a general 
study of the role of Scripture in Moltmann’s theology. The reason for this was, 
simply, that no book-length, general study of this theme has yet appeared—previous 
studies nonetheless helpfully attending to particular aspects of Moltmann’s use of 
the Bible. But with generality I have also had to refuse certain lines of inquiry. I have 
not been able to treat specific periods in Moltmann’s career in as much detail as I 
would have liked, as I wanted to explore the role that Scripture has played through-
out his whole career. Perhaps this dissertation will be a useful resource for those 
undertaking more focussed studies. Relatedly, though I have made minor remarks 
throughout, I have not offered any extended criticism of Moltmann’s methodology 
and claims, concentrating instead on exposition. My main reason for doing so was 
to allow Moltmann to be heard on his own terms, ahead of hasty denouncements 
 





that seem to be all too common in the secondary literature. Future studies will be 
able to devote more critical attention to the finer points of Moltmann’s exegesis, her-
meneutics, and theology of Scripture. Before closing, however, there is yet space for 
some critical comment. 
I noted in my previous chapter some critics that charged Moltmann with is-
suing quite definite judgements on those he disagreed with but then defended 
against judgements on his own conclusions by invoking the experimental, open-
ended character of his theology.2 Such dissonance is perhaps evident here, too, in my 
comments on Moltmann’s contrastive paradigm and reading his theology specula-
tively. Does a speculative theology not entail some kind of level playing field, where 
the God unaffected by time and suffering, in substance and subject one, is just as 
valid an option for this kind of mystical reflection on the biblical witness?—Or, per-
haps even more valid in light of earlier mystical reflection in the tradition? Molt-
mann’s speculative theology is not only an enthusiastic yes to lavish visions but a 
decided no to earlier developments in the tradition—a no informed not simply by 
the freedom of the spirit to soar to ethereal heights but reason (albeit an impassioned 
one) that measures other contributions to the conversation against the biblical wit-
ness. I do not think that it is unfair to say that there is some degree of incongruity 
between the mystical and rational poles in Moltmann’s thought. But neither do I 
want to end this study on a negative note. 
 There is no one way to approach reading Moltmann’s theology and under-
standing the role that Scripture plays within it. In this conclusion I have pointed to 
his use of a contrastive paradigm, proposed reading him as a speculative theologian, 
and then briefly commented on the potential contradiction of these themes. I think 
that reading Moltmann as a speculative theologian is a constructive way to under-
stand him, but I do not think that such an approach can be applied to every aspect 
of his theology, as suggested in the previous paragraph. Acknowledging the limits 
 
2 See the discussion of Randal Rauser under 7.5.2. 
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of reading Moltmann in this way, then, I want to consider what his contrastive par-
adigm might offer future theology. Of course, I am writing quite abstractly, and this 
paradigm is rightly understood first in its specific articulations. Moreover, Molt-
mann does not only draw contrasts. He is a theologian of connections, bringing 
Marxist, Jewish, Orthodox, liberation, feminist, black, and Pentecostal voices, among 
others, into conversation with his proposals. Where Moltmann does employ his con-
trastive paradigm, however, readers are confronted with the question: To what ex-
tent is this theological commitment compatible with Scripture? Should we cling to 
divine timelessness and impassibility or revise earlier commitments like these as our 
context allows us to understand Scripture in new ways, and, conversely, to under-
stand traditional claims within their own contexts? Without following Moltmann in 
making judgements on these particular issues, I at least want to follow his line of 










Appendix: Scripture Index to Moltmann’s Works in English 
Abbreviations 
Works by Moltmann 
BP  A Broad Place. 
CJF  Creating a Just Future. 
CoG  The Coming of God. 
CPS  Church in the Power of the Spirit. 
EB  In the End – The Beginning. 
EG  Experiences of God. 
EH  The Experiment Hope. 
EthH  Ethics of Hope. 
ExpTh Experiences in Theology. 
FC  The Future of Creation. 
FJC  Following Jesus Christ in the World Today. 
GC  God in Creation. 
GL  The Gospel of Liberation. 
GSS  God for a Secular Society. 
HD  On Human Dignity. 
HP  Hope and Planning. 
HTG  History and the Triune God. 
HumB On Human Being. 
JCTW Jesus Christ for Today’s World. 
LG  The Living God and the Fullness of Life. 
M  Man. 
LaD  Is There Life after Death. 
PDDP The Politics of Discipleship and Discipleship in Politics. 
PL  The Passion for Life. 
PP  The Power of the Powerless. 
RRF  Religion, Revolution and the Future. 
SL  The Spirit of Life. 
SoL  The Source of Life. 
SRA  Sun of Righteousness, Arise! 
SW  Science and Wisdom. 
TH  Theology of Hope. 
TJ  Theology and Joy. 
TKG  The Trinity and the Kingdom. 
TT  Theology Today. 
TP  Theology of Play. 




Co-Authored and Edited Works 
CF  Bryan, ed., Communities of Faith and Radical Discipleship. 
FF  Metz and Moltmann, Faith and the Future. 
FH  Herzog, ed., The Future of Hope. 
GHH  Moltmann-Wendel and Moltmann, God: His & Hers. 
GWBAA Bauckham, ed., God Will Be All in All. 
HC  Runyon, ed., Hope for the Church. 
HG  Moltmann-Wendel and Moltmann, Humanity in God. 
JM  Lapide and Moltmann, Jewish Monotheism and Christian Trinitarian Doc 
  trine. 
MP  Moltmann and Metz, Meditations on the Passion. 
PG  Moltmann and Moltmann-Wendel, Passion for God. 
PGR  Volf, ed., A Passion for God’s Reign. 
RPS  Moltmann et al., Religion and Political Society. 
TSTB  Moltmann and Weissbach, Two Studies in the Theology of Bonhoeffer. 
 
The reader will note that I have not italicised abbreviated book titles, as I have elsewhere in 
the dissertation. This is a deliberate aesthetic choice. The index is easier to follow with all 
text in roman. 
Introduction 
Up until this point, only three of Moltmann’s works in English have been published 
with a Scripture index, namely TSTB, HTG, and SL.1 In his 1978 doctoral dissertation, 
Steven Phillips compiled an index to the English editions of TH, HP, RRF, TP, CG, 
and CPS.2 I have developed these indices here, my contribution being not only the 
inclusion of works previously not indexed but the inclusion of uncited references 
and allusions to Scripture in Moltmann’s works in English. These uncited references 
and allusions are indicated with asterisks in the respective entries. 
Works included in this index are arranged according to the year of their orig-
inal publication in English and then alphabetically for works published in the same 
year: TH (1967), TSTB (1967), RRF (1969), FH (1970), HP (1971), M (1971), TP (1972), 
 
1 The most recent German editions of TH, CPS, GC, WJC, SL, CoG, and ExpTh also include 
biblical indices. 
2 Steven Phillips, “The Use of Scripture in Liberation Theologies: An Examination of Juan 
Luis Segundo, James H. Cone, and Jürgen Moltmann,” Ph.D. diss., Southern Baptist Theo-





GL (1973), TJ (1973), CG (1974), RPS (1974), EH (1975), CPS (1977), FC (1977), PL 
(1978), HC (1979), MP (1979), EG (1980), JM (1981), TKG (1981), FJC (1983), HG 
(1983), PP (1983), HD (1984), GC (1985), CF (1986), TT (1988), CJF (1989), WJC (1990), 
GHH (1991), HTG (1991), SL (1992), JCTW (1994), FF (1995), CoG (1996), SoL (1997), 
LaD (1998), PGR (1998), GSS (1999), GWBAA (1999), ExpTh (2000), PG (2003), SW 
(2003), EB (2004), PDDP (2006), BP (2009), HumB (2009), SRA (2010), EthH (2012), LG 
(2015). Although arrangement according to the original publication dates in German 
would be preferable, some English translations do not correspond directly to a work 
in German, being collections of translated essays, which complicates the chronology 
even further as the collections cover various periods of time. This index thus pro-
vides a very rough bird’s eye view of the development of Moltmann’s interest in 
particular texts over time. For more exact information on the original publication 
details of essays and works up to 2001, readers should consult Wakefield. And while 
many earlier translations of Moltmann’s essays tended to lack details of original pub-
lication, most newer collections include these. 
Some works have been excluded from this index, namely The Open Church,3 
which is identical in all but title to PL, and the Collected Readings, the corresponding 
passages for which are easy to track down in Moltmann’s other works.4 Six obscure 
works have also been excluded.5 The only difference between M and HumB other 
than the title is the new preface in the latter, which has been indexed. Otherwise, the 
pagination is identical. For the rest of HumB, then, readers should refer to entries 
under M. Most of the text of TP and TJ is identical, but because the pagination differs 
 
3 The Open Church: Invitation to a Messianic Lifestyle, trans. by M. Douglas Meeks (London: 
SCM, 1978). 
4 Margaret Kohl, ed., Jürgen Moltmann: Collected Readings (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2014). 
5 Moltmann, Human Identity in Christian Faith, ed. by M. Douglas Meeks (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1974); idem, The Christian-Marxist Dialogue in Europe (Seoul: Institute of 
East and West Studies, Yonsei University, 1985); idem, The Doctrine of the Trinity (Ru-
schlikon, Switzerland: Baptist Theological Seminary, 1986); idem, God Means Freedom (Nai-
robi: Association of Theological Institutions, 1987-89); idem, Justice Creates Peace, trans. by 
Glen Harold Stassen (Louisville, KY: Baptist Peacemakers International, 1988); idem, Theol-
ogy and the Future of the Modern World (Pittsburgh, PA: Association of Theological Schools 
in the United States and Canada, 1995). 
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in each I have indexed both works. This is also the case with sections of FJC, HD, and 
PDDP. Elsewhere, duplicates of essays or passages appearing in separate works have 
been included because of pagination and translation differences. In works with con-
tributions by other authors I have only indexed the references and citations to Scrip-
ture that appear in Moltmann’s contributions. In co-authored essays I have indexed 
all references and citations, unless the text is structured so that the distinct contribu-
tions of each author can easily be identified. 
Where Moltmann provides a single f. following a citation, the full citation is 
supplied here. Rom 2:1f. becomes Rom 2:1-2. The only exception to this is when the 
f. follows a chapter number. Rom 2f. thus remains as it is. An ff. also remains as it is, 
because the extent of the passage that Moltmann is citing is not always clear. Where 
Moltmann provides a par. following a citation, indicating that there are parallel pas-
sages to the one cited, I have only supplied the cited passage. Mark 14:25 par. is in-
dexed under Mark 14:25 and not Matt 26:29 and Luke 22:18 as well. Next, where a 
lowercase letter follows a citation, drawing attention to a particular part of the verse, 
I have omitted the letter. 1 Cor 15:3b is indexed under 1 Cor 15:3. This is because the 
convention is hardly used consistently by Moltmann, so that often no letter is sup-
plied when only part of the verse is under discussion, and my omitting the letter will 
avoid needlessly lengthening an already lengthy index. Finally, where Moltmann 
has cited two verses and separated them with a comma, a potentially confusing con-
vention for some English readers that is often unfortunately carried over into the 
translations, I have indexed these verses as continuous rather than discrete, unless 
the context suggests otherwise. John 1:3, 4 is thus indexed under John 1:3-4. 
I have indexed Moltmann’s citations of the Masoretic Text according to Eng-
lish versification, indicating such citations with a superscript E following the entry. 
For example, I have supplied CG 146E under Psalm 22:1 where Moltmann cites MT 
Psalm 22:2. Other versification traditions such as 2 Cor 13:14 for 2 Cor 13:13 have 
been standardised and are noted in the footnotes. I have also corrected citation errors 





Tim 2:13, for example. I have not checked every one of Moltmann’s citations for ac-
curacy, however. Additionally, I have also indexed citations and references appear-
ing in passages that Moltmann quotes. I have done this to indicate Moltmann’s po-
tential debt to particular authors for the use of certain passages. But biblical citations 
that form part of the title of a work that Moltmann cites have not been included. 
Moltmann often highlights uncited references with inverted commas. For ex-
ample, he writes in the introduction to TH, “Everywhere in the New Testament the 
Christian hope is directed towards what is not yet visible; it is consequently a ‘hop-
ing against hope’.”6 I have indexed this as an uncited reference to Rom 4:18. Else-
where Moltmann will quote biblical texts without either citing them or enclosing 
them in inverted commas. For example, in his bibliography he writes, “The Son of 
man who came to seek that which was lost must himself take their lostness on him-
self.”7 I have indexed this as an uncited reference to Luke 19:10. Moltmann will also 
refer to passages of Scripture such as the Ten Commandments, the Sermon on the 
Mount, Deborah’s Song, or a particular parable. I have included references such as 
these in the index as well. Finally, I have included entries for various strong allusions 
to biblical texts, such as when Moltmann writes of “the new creation, in which there 
will be no more sorrow, no more crying and no more tears,” an allusion to Rev 21:4.8 
Where possible, I have indexed references appearing in Hebrew, Greek, and Latin 
phrases and quotations. 
Uncited references that appear more than once in the Pentateuch are indexed 
according to their first appearance in the canon. Uncited references to the Ten Com-
mandments, for example, are indexed under Exod 20:2-17, and not Deut 5:6-21. Un-
cited references that appear more than once in the Gospels are indexed according to 
their first appearance in Mark, then Matthew, Luke, and John, unless the context 
suggests otherwise. Although Moltmann’s preference for a certain Gospel likely 
changes with the time and purpose of his writing, I am following his early preference 
 
6 TH, 18. 
7 BP, 195. 
8 CG, 173. 
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for Mark and early reticence towards John.9 But, depending on the context of the 
reference, I have not followed this pattern consistently. If Moltmann cites a passage 
from Luke that can be found in the other synoptics, and then quotes it a few pages 
later without providing a citation, for example, it will be indexed under Luke. Fi-
nally, phrases that appear in both Testaments have been indexed on a case by case 
basis. For example, the allusion to Rev 21:4 that I quoted above might also be taken 
as an allusion to Isa 65:19. Because of the prominence of Rev 21 in Moltmann’s the-
ology, however, I have taken this to be an allusion to Rev 21:4. Elsewhere, the context 
suggests an allusion to Isaiah, as Moltmann is paraphrasing the words of a Rabbi.10 
Moltmann himself sometimes cites different texts in different places for the same 
biblical quote. With citations such as these, I have provided a cross-reference in the 
notes. I have not done this with parallel passages in the synoptics though, as the 
index would soon be flooded with footnotes. Common biblical phrases such as 
“kingdom of God” or “I will be with you” have not been indexed, unless the context 
suggests that Moltmann has a particular passage in mind. 
Caution should be taken when using this index. The trends visible here may 
give some insight into Moltmann’s preference for certain texts, but there are a num-
ber of limitations. First, I have only indexed English publications. Many of Molt-
mann’s works, essays, and sermons, etc, are yet to be translated. Second, of that 
which has been translated I have not indexed all of Moltmann’s essays, such as those 
that appear in journals and not in collections. Third, as noted above, various indexed 
works repeat essays and passages from elsewhere in Moltmann’s corpus. In some 
cases, then, apparent trends will result from an essay or passage appearing in more 
than one place in English. Fourth, although I have outlined a rough methodology 
 
9 On Mark, see CG, 146-47; CPS, 236-37; WJC, 75. On John, see Moltmann, “God in the 
World – The World in God: Perichoresis in Trinity and Eschatology,” in The Gospel of John 
and Christian Theology, ed. Richard Bauckham and Carl Mosser, 369-81 (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2008), 369-72. 





above for determining references and allusions, this task remains incomplete, espe-
cially insofar as it relies on verbal clues alone. I am thinking of Richard Hays’s words 
to readers of the Gospel of Matthew: 
 
We must reckon with a Matthean hermeneutical program considerably 
more comprehensive than a collection of a dozen or so prooftexts…. There 
are at least sixty explicit Old Testament quotations in the Gospel. That 
means that the formula quotations constitute, even by the most generous es-
timate, only one-fifth of Matthew’s total. And that does not even begin to 
reckon with the hundreds of more indirect Old Testament allusions in the 
story. 
Above and beyond the question of citations of particular texts, we 
must reckon also with Matthew’s use of figuration, his deft narration of 
‘shadow stories from the Old Testament.’ Through this narrative device, 
with or without explicit citation, Matthew encourages the reader to see Je-
sus as the fulfillment of Old Testament precursors, particularly Moses, Da-
vid, and Isaiah’s Servant figure. And at a level still deeper than these narra-
tive figurations, Matthew’s language and imagery are from start to finish 
soaked in Scripture; he constantly presupposes the social and symbolic 
world rendered by the stories, songs, prophecies, laws, and wisdom teach-
ings of Israel’s sacred texts.11 
 
Matthew’s and Moltmann’s works were of course penned in vastly different 
contexts. The basic insight remains, however. Insofar as this index provides a picture 
of Moltmann’s overall use of Scripture, it does so “through a glass, darkly.” Finally, 
because of the extent of this project I have not checked every entry. I have likely 
missed some citations and references, and incorrectly indexed others. In light of all 
of this and the above, I recommend that readers treat this index as a rough guide 












1  TH 11; GC 33, 53, 329n.5, 
341n.2, 344n.4; WJC 302; 
HTG 170; SL 299; CoG 
149; GSS 225; SW 184; 
SRA 67, 141, 203; EthH 
135 
1-3  TSTB 53; SW 71 
1:1  TKG 209*; GC 54, 72*, 73, 
81*, 158; WJC 328; HTG 
75, 130*; SoL 119; 
GWBAA 231, 262*; ExpTh 
109; SW 36*, 37*, 108, 150; 
BP 211*, 212*; SRA 73*, 
204*; EthH 121, 123*; LG 
29*, 69*, 110*, 111*, 184 
1:2  RRF 168n.48*; GC 73, 99; 
WJC 91, 288; HTG 73; SL 
41; JCTW 96; CoG 228, 
282; SoL 116; GSS 103; 
GWBAA 279*; SW 191; EB 
36* 
1:3  GL 55*; GC 76, 217; WJC 
288; JCTW 96; SW 119; 
SRA 52, 195* 
1:4  SW 150 
1:5  RRF 35*; CoG 282; EB 17; 
SRA 64 
1:6-8  GC 148 
1:9  RRF 35* 
1:9-12 GC 148 
1:10  EthH 234* 
1:11  WJC 311; CoG 276l SoL 
85; GSS 103*; SRA 205 
1:20  GC 187; EthH 112 
1:20-21 GC 217 
1:20-22 GC 148 
1:21  CJF 70; WJC 311 
1:22  GC 188, 281; EthH 232 
1:24  CJF 70; WJC 311; CoG 276; 
SoL 85; GSS 108; EB 37; 
SRA 205; LG 81 
1:24-25 EthH 112 
1:24-28 GC 149 
1:26  TSTB 54; CPS 171*, 174*, 
179*; TKG 86, 118*, 121*; 
GC 29, 77, 188, 215, 217, 
222, 225, GC 285; SL 36; 
CoG 112; GSS 54*, 108; 
ExpTh 280, 281; SRA 205; 
EthH 23, 135, 219, 226; LG 
110 
1:26-27 TKG 116; GC 216, 235; HG 
91; ExpTh 285 
1:26-30 GC 217 
1:27  M 108; RPS 36*; PL 39*; 
TKG 155; HD 23*, 25; GC 
77, 215, 222, 235; CJF 78; 
WJC 266*; GHH 39; HTG 
21, 32*, 37*, 62*; SL 94, 
221, 239*; JCTW 86*; FF 
125, 182*, 187*, 190*; SoL 
79; LaD 14*; PGR 33; GSS 
83, 123*; ExpTh 49*, 125*; 
PDDP 138; SRA 61*; EthH 
62*, 193, 220*; LG 159 
1:27-28 CPS 100 
1:28  M 110; CPS 376n.66; FC 
115, 119*, 127, 129; PP 4, 5; 
HD 25; GC 4*, 21*, 29, 188, 
224, 245, 281; TT 17*, 91; 
CJF 54*; CoG 91*, 276; 
LaD 29; GSS 97*; SW 33, 
38*, 47, 50; EthH 124, 135, 
150, 232; LG 80*, 81* 
1:28ff. HD 26 
1:29  GC 224 
1:29-30 PP 6 





1:31  TH 34*, 120*, 215*; RRF 
146*; HP 25*; GL 46*, 108*; 
CPS 269*; FC 116*, 118*; 
PL 75*, 80*; GC 39, 278; 
CJF 84; HTG 72*; CoG 91*, 
262*, 264*; SoL 113; ExpTh 
110*; SW 34*, 35*, 37*; EB 
39; EthH 231 
2  GC 53; SoL 25; SW 184; 
EthH 61, 115 
2-3  EthH 135-36 
2:1-4  WJC 327 
2:2  CPS 269*; PL 75*; GC 73, 
278; CJF 61*, 83*, 84; 
JCTW 118*; CoG 265, 283*; 
GSS 77*, 114*; GWBAA 
231; ExpTh 109*; EthH 231 
2:2-3  HTG 118* 
2:3  GC 278, 281, 283, 355n.6; 
EthH 232* 
2:4  GC 187, 341n.1; SW 150 
2:7  GC 187, 256, 302; CoG 78; 
EB 151; BP 349 
2:9  SL 284 
2:15  TSTB 89; FC 127*; HD 27, 
40; GC 30; SW 47* 
2:18  GC 188, 223; ExpTh 277* 
2:19  GC 187, 188 
2:19-20 GC 159 
2:21-23 WJC 374n.63 
2:21ff. HTG xv 
2:23  HG 103*; HTG 75*; SL 
159*, 286*; SoL 110*, 118*; 
GSS 105*; BP 248* 
2:24  SL 158* 
3  HD 30; CJF 42; WJC 127; 
HTG 45; SL 126; CoG 90, 
94, 352n.83; ExpTh 137, 
281 
3:5  RRF 33*; TP 42*; GL 28*; 
TJ 62*; HD 31*; CoG 93*, 
272*; LG 104* 
3:9  M 13*; GSS 173*; ExpTh 
69* 
3:12  HG 116; GHH 8; ExpTh 
281 
3:15  FF 134; CoG 180 
3:17  EthH 147 
3:17-18 ExpTh 30 
3:19  CoG 276*; LG 89 
4  HD 30; HTG 45; SL 125; 
CoG 94 
4:1  GC 70; GSS 138; SRA 172* 
4:9  M 14*; GSS 173*, 186*; 
ExpTh 69* 
4:9-13 GSS 190 
4:10  GC 183*; GSS 173*; ExpTh 
30; SW 186* 
4:11-14 TKG 51* 
4:12  ExpTh 30 
4:15  GSS 190; PDDP 130* 
4:17  CoG 314 
5:1  GC 215 
5:2-3  GC 232 
6  PP 2; WJC 128; HTG 45; 
SL 126; CoG 95, 352n.83; 
SRA 205 
6-9  PG 96; EB 36 
6:1  CoG 228 
6:3  CoG 94 
6:4  WJC 128; CoG 94, 95; EB 
37, 38 
6:5  SW 35; EB 37 
6:5-6  PP 4; EB 38 
6:5-7  CoG 90 
6:6  CJF 31*; LaD 14*; PG 97*; 
EB 18, 39, 73*, 106*; EthH 
123; LG 37 
6:7  EB 38 
6:9  CJF 42; WJC 128 
6:11  HG 117; SW 35 
6:11-13 GHH 8 
6:12  EB 36 
6:12-13 PP 2 
6:13  CJF 42; WJC 128; CoG 228; 
EB 36 
6:24  WJC 220 
7:1  EB 40 
7:23  EB 40 
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8  CoG 228 
8:21  GWBAA 268*; EB 40 
8:22  GC 119* 
8:21-22 LG 37 
9:1  EB 40 
9:1-7  PP 2; WJC 117* 
9:2  PP 5 
9:3-4  PP 6 
9:4  WJC 128 
9:5-6  PP 8 
9:6  PP 9; WJC 128; GC 215, 
232; SL 133* 
9:8-11 SL 57 
9:9-10 GSS 110; EB 40; SRA 60; 
EthH 61, 112, 125, 142 
9:9-11 LG 37 
9:9-14 ExpTh 96 
9:10ff. SoL 12 
9:11  CoG 70, 228, 270; PG 96; 
EB 40 
9:13  CoG 94; EthH 113; LG 82 
9:13-14 EB 40 
9:13-15 PP 10 
9:13-17 PP 2 
9:16  CoG 94 
12  EB 3; BP 101 
12:1  RRF 65*; PGR 30; GSS 80 
12:1-2 EH 47; CJF 96 
12:1-3 WJC 238*; GSS 75; ExpTh 
29, 96; LG 106 
12:1-4 ExpTh 29 
12:2  ExpTh 98* 
12:3  TH 130*; 329; CJF 96 
12:4  LG 106 
13:14-17 WJC 238* 
15:6  ExpTh 99, 127 
15:18  ExpTh 96 
16:5  EB 144; SRA 139 
17:2  ExpTh 96 
17:3  SoL 127; LG 202 
17:17  SoL 127; LG 202 
18  HG 53; ExpTh 305; SRA 
169 
18:18  HD 214* 
18:22-33 EthH 15 
18:32  TSTB 41 
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40:3  TKG 66 
40:3-5 WJC 321; BP 100 
40:4  RRF 142*; EH 149 
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40:4-5 CPS 351, 352*; CJF 16*; 
EthH 35*, 36* 
40:5  RRF 142*; GL 90*; EH 149; 
CPS 58, 93, 180; FC 88; 
WJC 219, 322; CoG 24; 
SRA 46, 60; EthH 101; LG 
47 
40:27  GL 16 
40:30-31 EB 28 
40:31  EH 187*; SL 195; CoG 29 
41:11  TKG 101 
41:27  CPS 216* 
42:1  TKG 67; WJC 19; HTG 46; 
SL 53, 129; EB 62 
42:6  M 17*; CPS 147*; HD 16*; 
WJC 347n.80*; FF 119; 
CoG 174*, 316*; SoL 46 
42:7  JCTW 117* 
42:17  TKG 101 
43:1  CoG 75; LaD 15, 30; PGR 
30; GSS 80; EB 106; LG 75 
43:1-7 GL 85 
43:3  SL 174; SoL 44 
43:3-4 HG 59 
43:8-13 HP 85 
43:9-13 FF 119 
43:10  FF 119 
43:12  FF 119 
43:18  WJC 22; CoG 27, 28 
43:18-19 RRF 8; GC 120, 209; JCTW 
113; CoG 27, 139; ExpTh 
111; EthH 121; LG 181 
43:19  SL 9, 54; EthH 123 
43:24  FC 121; GC 210; SW 40 
43:24-25 HD 42; GC 89 
44:3  CPS 294 
44:7-11 FF 119 
44:8  FF 119 
44:26  WJC 19 
45:7  GSS 177 
45:8  GC 160, 171; WJC 333; 
CoG 91, 278; EthH 115; 
LG 82 
45:14-15 TKG 101 
45:18-25 TH 329 
45:24  TKG 101 
46:4  EthH 123 
48:21  TKG 101 
49:6  FF 119, 150*; SoL 46 
49:11  TKG 101 
49:13  TKG 101; EthH 115 
49:14  GL 16 
49:15  TKG 70; WJC 142 
51:1  LaD 16* 
51:15  FF 140 
51:17  TKG 76 
51:22  TKG 76 
52  CPS 77; PL 106; HC 23, 44 
52-66  HC 23 
52:1-2 CPS 78 
52:2  HC 23, 45; WJC 96 
52:5  CG 156n.41 
52:7  RRF 9; CPS 77; HC 23, 45; 
WJC 95; JCTW 145; ExpTh 
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52:11-12 CPS 78 
52:12  HC 45; TKG 101; WJC 96; 
EB 44 
52:13ff. WJC 220 
53  FC 121, 158; EG 44; TKG 
67, 219; PP 147; HD 42; 
GC 89; WJC 20, 168, 187; 
HTG 47; SL 130; JCTW 40, 
54; FF 113; GSS 187; 
ExpTh 236, 258, 259, 260, 
296; PG 76; SW 40, 182; EB 
44; PDDP 143; EthH 123, 
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53:2  CG 33; EH 65; PP 149*; 
CoG 278 
53:3  EH 65 
53:3-5 M 113 
53:4  HC 28; PP 148*; GC 89; 
HTG 47; SL 62, 130, 134*, 
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53:4-5 PL 25*; WJC 110 
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GC 210; WJC 32*, 188*; 
HTG 47, 52*; SL 130, 136* 
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53:12  WJC 20 
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54:7  PP 119*; WJC 180*; GHH 
67* 
55:1  TP 33; TJ 54 
55:1ff. SL 283 
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55:6-11 GL 13 
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56:1  GWBAA 266, 289 
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58  SL 96 
58:5  GWBAA 282 
58:6-8 SL 96; SoL 84; GWBAA 
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60  TKG 85 
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60:1-22 TH 329 
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61:1-2 EH 61; CPS 76, 113; PP 71, 
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63:16  WJC 355n.33; HTG 21; FF 
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65  CoG 266, 275 
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SoL 47; EthH 111 
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66:22ff. SL 54 
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31  ExpTh 75, 76 
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31:13  SoL 131 
31:15  CoG 80 
31:29  CoG 114; LaD 37; EB 115*; 
EthH 173* 
31:31  RRF 8*; SL 56 
31:31-34 PP 39; SL 53* 
31:31ff. HTG 193n.32 
31:33  ExpTh 72* 
31:33-34 SL 56; ExpTh 71 
31:34  TP 40; TJ 60; RPS 29*; CPS 
85; SL 296*; ExpTh 74; EB 
44 
44:8  GL 16 
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3:22  SW 65, 186; EB 18 
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3:23  RRF 37*; HTG 75; CoG 
115*, 284*; SoL 119; EB 17, 
115*; EthH 174f 
5:1  WJC 208; JCTW 48 
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11:19  SoL 25 
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34:17  EB 144; SRA 139 
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36:26-27 SL 41, 45, 56 
36:27  CPS 294; SoL 25 
37  RRF 9; EH 35; WJC 248; 
HTG 53; SL 9, 52*, 55, 66, 
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37:10  WJC 248 
37:11  TH 209 
37:12  CoG 67 
37:14  TH 115; CoG 67 
37:22  CoG 149 
37:24  CoG 149 
37:26  CoG 149 
37:27  CoG 305, 315; BP 290; 
EthH 150 
38  CoG 152 
38:8  CoG 149 
38:16  CoG 149 
40-48  CoG 304 
40-49  SRA 105 
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43:2  SL 279 
43:7  CoG 267; GWBAA 80* 




2  CoG 141, 148, 154, 162, 
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2:34-35 ExpTh 223 
2:40  CoG 141; PDDP 136 
2:44  ExpTh 223 
2:44-45 CoG 178*; PDDP 136 
6:27  WJC 324 
7  M 111; EH 60, 149; CPS 
101; MP 9*; WJC 13, 16, 
17, 126, 324, 332; GHH 51; 
SL 145; FF 109; CoG 94, 
95, 141, 142, 148, 150, 152, 
154, 162, 182, 227, 357n.9, 
373n.228; GWBAA 150; 
ExpTh 222, 261; PG 91, 93, 
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7:1-8  WJC 13 
7:1-14 WJC 15 
7:3  WJC 332 
7:6  WJC 13 
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7:9-14 WJC 13 
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7:13-14 CoG 94, 141; PDDP 136; 
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7:14  WJC 15, 324; ExpTh 222; 
SRA 11 
7:15  WJC 14 
7:18  WJC 325; CoG 149, 161; 
ExpTh 222 
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7:23  CoG 141; PDDP 136 
7:27  WJC 14, 15; CoG 141, 149; 
ExpTh 222; SRA 11 
8:17  SoL 127; LG 202 
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10:14  TH 193 
11:36  GSS 37 
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12:1-3 RRF 45 
12:2  CG 174; EH 56; TKG 85; 
WJC 220, 223; CoG 68, 80-
81, 110 
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2:21-22 GC 160 
4:1  ExpTh 39 
8:7  LaD 37*; EB 115*; EthH 
173* 
8:14  ExpTh 39 
9:7  CG 272*; FC 70*; EH 76*; 
JM 49*; TKG 27*; HG 73* 
 
16 Cf. Acts 2:17. 
11:1  TKG 68; LG 141 
11:8  EB 73*; LG 141 
13:4-6 ExpTh 39 
13:14  CoG 84 
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288; EthH 39, 130 
2-3  CoG 227 
2:1  WJC 321 
2:11  WJC 321 
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32*; HG xvi*, 73, 81*; PP 
124*; GC 67, 96; CJF 57*; 
GHH 15E, 39E; HTG 67*; 
SL 56, 120*, 230*; CoG 70; 
SoL 12, 93*, 94*; GSS 240*; 
GWBAA 82*, 284*; SW 
43*, 53*, 151, 183* 
2:28-29 CPS 294; SL 240*, 241*; 
ExpTh 12 
2:28-30 SoL 100 
2:28-32 TKG 110; SoL 23; EthH 5 
2:28ff. EG 77; TKG 104; SL 212, 
239 
2:31  WJC 321; EthH 39 
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3:7  CG 167; WJC 19 
3:8  SL 45 
5:18  WJC 321 
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4  WJC 9, 334 
4:1  WJC 334 
4:1-3  CoG 309 
4:1-4  WJC 11 
4:1-5  WJC 133 
4:3  LG 136 
4:4-5  WJC 133 
4:5  WJC 11, 133 




1:18  SL 279 
3:9  CPS 146; JM 92 




3:1-7  WJC 19 
4  WJC 18 
4:3  WJC 18 
4:6  CPS 294 
4:14  WJC 19 
8:3  SRA 105 
9  WJC 9 
9:9-10 WJC 11 
12-14  CoG 227 
12:1-14 CoG 310 
13:1  SL 53 
13:7  WJC 217, 343n.23 





3:1  SoL 38* 
3:2-3  SL 280 
4:2  HP 33*; SRA 1*, 128E; 
EthH 59*, 114*, 177* 




1:4-7  CoG 310 
13:15ff. FC 159 




9:11  RPS 42 
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1:7  CJF 59; HTG 133; SL 34, 
46; SoL 24, 25*, 133; PGR 
20; GSS 22; ExpTh 339; 
SW 151, 152, 192; EthH 
137; LG 200 
2:23  GC 215; EB 154; SRA 62 
6:21  ExpTh 25 
7-8  SW 149 
7:17ff. SW 150 
7:21-22 SL 46 
7:24  SW 150 
7:25-26 SW 151 
7:26  TKG 86 
8:1  SoL 133 
9-11  SL 344 
9:10  TKG 233n.20 
10:18  ExpTh 34 
11:24  LG 29 
11:24-12:1 GC 19; CJF 57 
11:26  GC xiv*; SL 37*; CoG 50*; 
SoL 125; SW 150, 192; SRA 
207 
11:26-12:1 FF 145 
12:1  HTG 74, 133, 164; SL 46; 
FF 140*; SoL 117, 134; GSS 
104; SW 169; SRA 31; 










1:1-10 SW 151 
1:4  WJC 282; JCTW 92; ExpTh 
339 
1:9  TKG 68; SL 46 
1:11  ExpTh 338; SW 149 
1:14  ExpTh 338; SW 148 
1:16  ExpTh 338; SW 148 
7:12  ExpTh 343 
17:3  GC 215 
24  WJC 18; SL 46 
25:24  CoG 81 
40:1  CoG 78; SoL 25, 85; LaD 




7:38  CG 156n.41 




7  CoG 68* 
8:4  CG 156n.41 
12:4  CG 156n.41 
12:40-46 CoG 99 
 
2 Esdras17  
 
3:7  CoG 81 
4:23  RRF 45; HP 34; CG 174 
7:11  CoG 81 
7:16  RRF 45 
7:28-29 CoG 152 
7:31  CoG 280; SW 106 
7:35  WJC 336 
7:73  WJC 335 
8:52  CoG 310 
8:63  CPS 368n.68 
9:5  CG 167 
9:5-6  WJC 96 
13:32  WJC 16 
 
17 4 Esdras in the Vulgate. 




1:18  SoL 15* 
1:18-25 WJC 78*, 81 
1:18ff. CPS 53; FC 83 
1:20  WJC 81, 88*; SoL 15* 
1:21  WJC 81 
1:23  RRF 208*; M 17*; CPS 96*; 
HD 151*; WJC 81 
2:15  TKG 68 
2:18  CoG 80 
3:2  HP 166*; GC 159; WJC 88; 
HTG 106; SL 60 
3:5  ExpTh 316; SRA 153 
3:9  WJC 87 
3:10  TKG 66; HG 73; WJC 87 
3:11  TKG 66; SL 53, 280 
3:14ff. CPS 237 
3:15  WJC 87 
3:16  GC 171; WJC 93* 
3:17  TKG 66; HG 73; WJC 90 
4:1  TKG 74*; WJC 73* 
4:1-11 WJC 92 
4:4  RRF 105*; FC 110* 
4:8-9  CG 142* 
4:17  WJC 88, 119; SL 60; CoG 
24 
5  ExpTh 253; PDDP 129 
5-7  TH 38*; RRF 212*; CG 
125*, 128*, 132*, 248*; CPS 
106*, 320*, 322*, 325*; FJC 
17*, 31*, 34*, 36*, 66*, 85*, 
100*, 102*; HD 71*, 74*, 
75*, 80*, 114*, 125*, 127*, 
215*; GC 123*; WJC 42*, 
97*, 103*, 124*, 125*, 126*, 
127*, 129*, 130*, 131*, 132*, 
136*, 153*, 358n.79*, 
359n.82*; GHH 8*; HTG 
386 
 
185n.30*; SL 59*, 84*, 175*, 
242*; FF 191*, 200*; CoG 
8*, 127*; SoL 48*, 59*; 
GWBAA 272*, 280*, 286*, 
287*; ExpTh 132*, 253*, 
254*; PDDP xiii*, xiv*, 12*, 
15*, 16*, 52*, 63*, 64*, 124*, 
125*, 127*, 131*, 133*; SRA 
29-30; EthH 11*, 29*, 38*, 
177*, 181*, 189*, 202*, 204*, 
205*; LG 6*, 197* 
5:1  WJC 124; PDDP 131 
5:3  TH 32*; M 18*; CPS 79*, 
82*, 105*; HC 25; WJC 100, 
101*, 102*; JCTW 17*, 18; 
ExpTh 232*, 252*; PDDP 
123*; BP 206* 
5:3-5  M 114 
5:3-12 RRF 212*; HP 24*; TP 32*; 
TJ 53*; RPS 42*; CPS 81*, 
106*, 357*; PL 85*, 91*, 94*; 
FC 57*; WJC 103*, 124*, 
125*, 355n.45*; SL 324n.6*; 
SoL 48*; ExpTh 131*, 132*, 
147*; 254*; EthH 181*; LG 
189* 
5:4  CPS 221*; CoG 127; ExpTh 
57*; EB 130 
5:5  TKG 33*; GC 210; CoG 
274; SW 183 
5:6  RRF 142*; PP 135*; CJF 6*; 
WJC 187; SL 284; SoL 110* 
5:8  EG 56*; PP 26*; SL 198*; 
CoG 97; LaD 44; ExpTh 
50; EB 110*, 155 
5:9  PP 47; PDDP 133; EthH 
33*, 199* 
5:10  EG 72; WJC 187; SL 208 
5:13  RRF 34*; GL 90 
5:13-16 WJC 126 
5:14  SL 282 
5:20  PP 56*; WJC 126; EthH 
227 
5:25  SoL 129 
5:30  JCTW 59 
5:34ff. FC 79 
5:38  CF 27* 
5:39-42 WJC 129 
5:40  WJC 99 
5:43-45 HTG 15* 
5:43-48 PP 55; CF 27-28*; ExpTh 
58; BP 175 
5:43ff. CJF 43; FF 154 
5:44  CG 141*; CPS 88*; FJC 
102*, 107*; HD 130*; PP 
47*, 53*, 54*; CoG 236*; 
GSS 146*; PDDP 68*; BP 
259*; EthH 200* 
5:44-45 EthH 202 
5:45  FJC 100*, 101-2*; PP 51*, 
52*, 53*; WJC 131; ExpTh 
14; PDDP 146*; SRA 1*, 
128; EthH 177, 203* 
5:45-46 PDDP 144 
5:46  WJC 129 
5:48  FJC 101*; PP 53*; HTG 15; 
LG 198 
6:7  SoL 137 
6:9  TKG 164*; HG 74*; WJC 
145*, 332*; GHH 34*, 35*; 
HTG 2*, 13*, 14*, 20*, 21*; 
SoL 47*, 136*, 141*; BP 
269*, 272*, 274*; SRA 150*; 
LG 61* 
6:9-10 CG 259*; GC 149*; CoG 
xv*; PG 62* 
6:9-13 CG 278*, 307*; CPS 147*, 
148*; TKG 71*; HD 211*; 
CJF 25*; WJC 120*; HTG 
29*; SoL 130*, 137*, 141*; 
GSS 182* 
6:10  HP 26*; GL 33*; PP 63* 
69*; GC 5*, 161*, 163*, 
167*, 170*, 174*, 181*, 183*; 
WJC 97*, 333*; SL 50*, 
332*; JCTW 20*, 105*; CoG 
15*, 303*; SoL 12*, 80*; SW 
121; EB 83*; BP 349*; SRA 
34*, 72*, 79-80*; EthH 21*, 





6:10-11 FC 110* 
6:11  SoL 143 
6:12  CPS 353*; EB 53* 
6:13  CG 294*; EH 189*; EB 53*; 
LG 198* 
6:24  CF 16*; BP 173; EthH 11* 
6:25  HD 119*; PDDP 56* 
6:25-33 WJC 100 
6:26-29 CJF 78* 
6:28  FC 123*; SW 42* 
6:33  HP 182*; CPS 283*; HD 
57*; JCTW 21*, 24, 28*, 29*; 
SoL 22*; PGR 2*; EB 92*; 
BP 154*; SRA 80*; EthH 
118 
7:8  PP 104* 
7:12  EH 127; SRA 145*; EthH 
175 
7:13-14 CoG 241 
7:17  TP 49*; TJ 68* 
7:18  EH 124* 
7:19  WJC 88 
7:24-27 WJC 126 
7:28-29 WJC 124 
8  SRA 136 
8:1  CG 54 
8:11  CPS 248; HC 53 
8:13  PP 146* 
8:17  CG 47; HTG 186n.17; PP 
146; SL 62, 191; SoL 64; EB 
70 
8:29  WJC 106 
9:15  CoG 336 
9:36  CPS 399n.45; EB 45* 
10:3ff. CPS 322 
10:5  WJC 147 
10:5ff. WJC 147 
10:7-8 CPS 76; FC 186n.9; HC 
132; WJC 43; JCTW 21, 47; 
GC 291; GSS 241; EB 92; 
PDDP 123 
10:8  HC 22; SL 189; CoG 81; 
SoL 64 
 
18 Matt 5:6, corrected. 
10:16  WJC 154* 
10:18  FF 120 
10:19  FF 122 
10:19-20 PP 15 
10:20  SL 8*, 11*, 82*, 291*; 
ExpTh 312* 
10:22  WJC 339 
10:24  CG 54 
10:28  CoG 73 
10:32-33 FF 118 
10:34  PP 57; WJC 154; PDDP 
135 
10:38  HC 132; PP 57 
10:39  CoG 66 
10:42-45 CPS 103 
11  SRA 136 
11:2  GL 126; GC 313 
11:2-5 WJC 99 
11:2ff. CG 98 
11:3  RRF 212*; EH 61*; WJC 4*, 
28*; JCTW 119*; FF 109* 
11:4  FF 109 
11:4-5 EB 92 
11:4-6 GL 126; EH 61; FJC 67; 
HD 102; PDDP 39 
11:5  CPS 221*, 270*; FC 186n.9; 
HC 22; TKG 69; PP 74*; 
WJC 97*, 99, 139; JCTW 
47; CoG 81; PDDP 123; 
ExpTh 100; BP 230* 
11:5-6 CPS 76; GC 29118; WJC 43 
11:6  CG 121*; EH 55*, 61*; CPS 
81 
11:9  TKG 66; WJC 88 
11:11  TKG 66; HG 73; WJC 91 
11:12  CG 139; CoG 9 
11:14  WJC 88; SL 60 
11:19  RRF 146*; CG 51*; EH 54*; 
PL 34*, 87*; HC 24*; PP 
52*, 96*, 105*; WJC 76*, 89; 
FF 142*; EB 45*; BP 210*; 
LG 120, 121* 
388 
 
11:27  TKG 64, 67, 68, 73, 74; HG 
73, 89; WJC 90, 112, 143; 
HTG 11, 14, 21, 33, 35; SL 
299-300; FF 125; ExpTh 62, 
145, 166, 172* 
11:27-28 CoG 335 
11:27-29 TKG 7019 
11:28  TH 32*; RRF 68*, 96*, 103*, 
104*, 142*; FH 44*; EH 38*, 
39*; CPS 259*; TKG 74*; 
HC 45; WJC 90*; HTG 35, 
150*, 169*; ExpTh 58*, 173; 
BP 164*; SRA 145*; EthH 
176*, 179*; LG 179* 
11:28-30 WJC 126 
11:30  PDDP 124* 
12:28  ExpTh 248; EB 67* 
12:32  CoG 99, 241 
12:39  CPS 39* 
12:46  WJC 148 
12:50  WJC 144; HTG 12 
13:13  PG 64; EB 85; LG 174 
13:31  GWBAA 289* 
13:35-36 WJC 326 
13:55  CG 51*, 130*; CPS 81*; PL 
54*; LG 120* 
14:5  PL 103 
14:13  CG 54 
14:35  ExpTh 316; SRA 153 
15:21ff. WJC 111, 146; SL 190 
15:24  CPS 218* 
15:28  WJC 111; SoL 138; LG 206 
15:30-31 SoL 130 
16  TKG 201; WJC 39 
16:3  TH 71*; CG 21*; CPS 19*, 
37*, 38*, 44*, 47*, 49*, 50*, 
243*; HC 44*; ExpTh 227*; 
BP 162*, 205* 
16:13ff. CG 103 
16:16  EthH 25 
 
19 Moltmann writes of “the revelation for-
mula in Matt. 11:28f.” TKG, 70. But Matt 
11:27-29 or 11:27-28 is likely meant, as 
16:18  CPS 313*; TKG 201; SL 
157* 
16:24  PL 88 
16:25  PL 88 
16:28  BP 207* 
17:1-9 TKG 123; PP 64 
17:2  GC 221; SL 66; CoG 273; 
SoL 127, 129 
17:2ff. SoL 80 
17:6  SoL 127; LG 202 
18  HTG 122 
18:3  GC 319; SL 160; SW 185*; 
EB 4*, 13; EthH 76 
18:4  EB 13 
18:5  ExpTh 267 
18:6  EB 13 
18:16  JM 91* 
18:20  CPS 124; HC 132* 
18:21ff. WJC 120 
18:23-35 WJC 99; ExpTh 164 
19:14  WJC 100; JCTW 18; EB 12 
19:23  CG 141* 
19:26  RRF 67; HG 61; LG 108 
19:27  CPS 322 
19:28  CPS 278, 278-79; PL 39; 
EG 30; GC 100*; WJC 86, 
249; HTG 72; SL 145, 146; 
JCTW 84, 136; CoG 229; 
SoL 27, 114 
20:25  EthH 204 
20:25-28 HC 32 
20:26  CPS 315; PL 119; CF 16; 
EthH 29 
20:26ff. FJC 86; HD 115; PDDP 53 
21:1ff. SL 266 
21:23-46 PL 103 
21:32  HG 73; WJC 88 
22:2  CPS 109* 
22:2-10 CPS 248; HC 53; WJC 115 
22:2ff. GC 304 
22:10  WJC 115 






22:21  CPS 169; EthH 193 
22:30  EB 162 
22:37-40 LG 147 
23:9  WJC 83, 144; HTG 12, 
186n.32 
23:12  CPS 142* 
23:37-39 WJC 154 
24  WJC 153; CoG 227 
24-25  SRA 148 
24:1-14 GL 106 
24:3  CoG 232 
24:3ff. CPS 131 
24:8  CoG 231 
24:9  JM 91 
24:13  WJC 339 
24:14  HTG 106; FF 120; CoG 232 
24:29  CoG 228 
24:30  CPS 39* 
24:31  WJC 326 
24:34  HTG 194n.51 
24:38-39 EthH 4 
25  RPS 43; EH 67, 117; CPS 
128, 129, 132; FC 53; PL 
103, 104, 105; PP 86; TT 77; 
CJF 34; WJC 43, 102, 157; 
GHH 51; HTG 47, 122; SL 
129, 245; FF 114; CoG 241, 
242; GWBAA 287; ExpTh 
132, 215, 235, 295; EB 63, 
85, 136; PDDP 129; LG 174 
25:1ff. GC 304 
25:21  CPS 64; FC 94; PL 56*, 93; 
SL 299; CoG 336; ExpTh 
26; LG 121* 
25:31ff. CPS 127; HC 25, 45 
25:31-46 CPS 126, 127; WJC 336; 
CoG 108, 241; EB 71 
25:32  HD 153* 
25:35-36 SW 126 
25:36  CPS 129*  
25:37  EthH 6 
25:40  M 19; GL 110*; CG 24*, 
53*; RPS 44*; EH 4*; CPS 
 
20 Matt 15:45-56, corrected. 
98, 123*, 347*; PL 110*; 
WJC 149; HTG 48*; SL 51, 
131*, 140*; ExpTh 232*, 
235, 256, 267; BP 203*; LG 
125* 
25:41  CPS 153* 
25:42-45 PG 65 
25:42-46 LG 174 
26:31  WJC 343n.23 
26:36-46 PG 58* 
26:37  EG 45*; TKG 76; PP 116*; 
WJC 166*; GHH 64*; 
JCTW 33*; EB 80*; LG 171* 
26:38  LG 48 
26:39  EG 45*; TKG 76*; PP 116*; 
GHH 64*; JCTW 33*; SoL 
127 
26:40  CJF 19* 
26:41  CJF 19*; PG 62* 
26:46  PG 59*, 63*, 67* 
26:52  PP 9; PDDP 133 
26:63  WJC 161 
26:65  FF 120 
26:65-66 EthH 170 
27:17  M 101* 
27:24  HD 193* 
27:26  JCTW 64* 
27:45-56 WJC 15420 
27:46  GL 132; CG 279n.6; PG 71* 
28:5  FH 30* 
28:6  CoG 309 
28:18  M 113; CPS 103, 237, 338*; 
FC 129; FJC 46*; GC 172, 
227; SW 50; PDDP 136*; 
EthH 191-92* 
28:18-19 CPS 100 
28:18ff. CPS 123 
28:19  HP 173*, 191*; JM 45*; 
TKG 90; HG 70*; GSS 
110*, 227*; ExpTh 309*, 
310*, 312; SRA 150* 






1:1  CG 193; SRA 54 
1:2  WJC 88 
1:2-28 WJC 105 
1:4  CPS 233*, 234*; TKG 66 
1:6  WJC 88*; EB 45; LG 121* 
1:9-11 TKG 66 
1:9ff.  CPS 53; FC 83 
1:10  TKG 66*; HG 73*; WJC 78, 
89, 93*, 160 
1:10-11 HTG 33* 
1:10ff. CPS 236; SL 61 
1:11  CG 193; TKG 66; WJC 90, 
105; LG 41, 60, 66, 204 
1:12-13 WJC 92 
1:13  CPS 322*; CJF 69; WJC 
93*, 308; GSS 103 
1:14  CPS 80, 217*; WJC 87 
1:15  GL 126*; CG 129*, 138*, 
171*; EH 53*; CPS 99*, 
217*, 233*; FC 47*; HC 23; 
FJC 68*; PP 74*; GC 122; 
WJC 90, 97*, 102, 119, 
158*; HTG 11*; JCTW 11*, 
117*; CoG 11*, 24, 81; 
ExpTh 4421, 71*, 126; EB 
45; PDDP 123*; EthH 54, 
55*, 230* 
1:17  CG 54 
1:20  ExpTh 254 
1:22  ExpTh 253 
1:23  EB 64 
1:24  WJC 105, 106 
1:29  CG 54 
1:32-34 EB 64 
1:32ff. SL 189; JCTW 13 
1:34  WJC 111 
1:34ff. ExpTh 253 
1:39  WJC 111 
2:4  ExpTh 253 
2:5  WJC 111 
2:14  CG 54 
 
21 Mark 1:14, corrected. 
2:15  WJC 112 
2:16  CG 44*, 51* 
2:16-17 WJC 112; ExpTh 254 
2:17  HC 25* 
2:18  RRF 146*; CPS 234*; TKG 
69* 
2:19  CoG 336 
2:22  RRF 4*, 137* 
2:27  GC 291 
2:27-28 CPS 270; PL 76 
2:28  GC 291 
3:4  GC 291 
3:7ff.  ExpTh 253 
3:11  WJC 105 
3:14  WJC 147 
3:15  WJC 104 
3:21  WJC 143; HTG 12 
3:22  WJC 106 
3:23  CG 335* 
3:29  SoL 54 
3:31-35 WJC 80, 143; FF 131; SRA 
93 
3:32-35 WJC 124; HTG 11 
3:34  WJC 148; ExpTh 253 
3:35  FF 133 
4  JCTW 10 
4:2ff.  ExpTh 253 
4:3  GC 63* 
4:11  HTG 100 
4:11ff. CPS 203 
5  WJC 111 
5:7  WJC 105 
5:10  ExpTh 253 
5:15  WJC 106 
5:24ff. WJC 146 
5:25-34 EB 64, 66* 
5:25ff. SL 190; JCTW 15 
5:30  WJC 111 
5:34  WJC 111; SoL 138; LG 206 
6:5  SL 190; JCTW 14; EB 66 
6:6  WJC 111 
6:14-15 CG 172* 





6:34  WJC 148; ExpTh 253 
6:56  WJC 111; ExpTh 253; EB 
64 
7  WJC 111 
7:14  ExpTh 253 
7:27  CoG 150 
8  ExpTh 253 
8:27-31 WJC 137, 138 
8:27-33 CG 142 
8:27-35 WJC 153; GHH 40 
8:29  MP 5*; GHH 39; HTG 32; 
SL 63; SRA 43-44 
8:31  CPS 81-82*; EG 44; TKG 
75; PP 115; WJC 325 
8:31-33 MP 7-13* 
8:31-38 CG 54; MP vii, 3 
8:34  HC 29; PP 115*; WJC 148; 
ExpTh 253 
8:34-35 MP 15-18* 
8:34-38 PDDP 120 
8:34ff. ExpTh 253 
8:35  RRF 57; HP 48; CG 15*, 54, 
55; PL 26*; GC 269 
8:38  WJC 324, 332 
9:1-8  SRA 51 
9:2-9  TKG 123 
9:3  PP 66-67* 
9:7  CPS 236 
9:9  CPS 219 
9:23  RRF 67; FC 102*, 154; HG 
61; PP 140*; HD 150*, 
152*; WJC 112; SL 115, 
187*; SoL 63*; GSS 160*; 
EB 66; LG 108 
9:23-24 SL 190; JCTW 14; EB 66 
9:24  EG 4*; HD 67*; SL 156*; 
SoL 33*; ExpTh 17*; EthH 
10* 
9:35  CPS 102* 
9:37  EB 4*, 13 
9:40  SRA 143 
9:45  CoG 241 
9:48  CoG 241 
9:49  CoG 242 
10-11  CoG 8 
10:9  CG 24*, 321*; RPS 21*; EH 
6*; PL 47*; HC 26*; SL 
112*; CoG 102* 
10:14  WJC 100; EB 12; PDDP 
129; EthH 76 
10:15  TP 18; TJ 42; CoG 15 
10:27  FC 102*, 154; PP 140*; GC 
168*; SL 115*, 187*; SoL 
63*, 137*, 139; GSS 160*; 
ExpTh 98*; LG 206 
10:29-30 WJC 144; HTG 12 
10:30  CoG 150 
10:31  TH 147*; TP 24*; TJ 47*; 
CPS 139*, 143*; HC 133*; 
WJC 35*, 149*; JCTW 127*; 
GC 312*; CoG 140*; EB 
13*, 69; EthH 185* 
10:38  MP 10* 
10:38ff. CPS 237 
10:42-45 CG 138; CPS 292; WJC 
125; EthH 40 
10:45  CPS 103*, 119*; FC 129*; 
PL 49*; HC 52*, 54*; PP 
23*; WJC 146; ExpTh 254; 
SW 50*; BP 206* 
11:9-10 EG 44; PP 115*; GHH 64; 
JCTW 32; CoG 150; EB 45 
11:10  SRA 44 
11:15-17 WJC 161 
11:20-23 WJC 112 
11:23  FC 102* 
11:30  TKG 66; HG 73; WJC 88 
12:17  FJC 31*; HD 70*; EB 134*; 
PDDP 12*, 137* 
12:27  TH 132*; LaD 23* 
12:28-34 JM 91 
12:33  SL 172*, 220*, 259* 
13  WJC 153, 154; CoG 227; 
SRA 148 
13:1-2 WJC 161 
13:4  SRA 201 
13:4ff. CPS 40  
13:10  TH 194; ExpTh 128* 
13:13  TH 135*; HP 90*; CoG 
 137*; EG 20*, 36*; CoG 
392 
 
228*; PG 99*; EB 51, 90*; 
BP 77*, 97* 
13:14  CPS 41*, 43* 
13:25-27 WJC 324 
13:26  WJC 332 
13:27  WJC 332 
13:28  JCTW 10 
13:30  SW 71* 
13:32  FC 43 
13:33  CoG 204* 
14  WJC 205 
14:3ff. WJC 146 
14:9  WJC 205 
14:24  JM 56*; HD 16*, 21*; WJC 
209; ExpTh 254 
14:25  PL 106; WJC 116, 154; 
HTG 108 
14:25ff. CPS 249 
14:27  WJC 217, 343n.23 
14:32-42 WJC 166; SL 63; PG 58* 
14:33  GL 132*; CG 146; EG 45*; 
TKG 76; PP 116*; GHH 
64*; JCTW 33*; EB 80*; LG 
48, 66, 171* 
14:33-34 HG 75 
14:34  GL 132*; EG 45*; TKG 76; 
PP 116*; GHH 64*; JCTW 
33*; EB 80*; LG 48, 66, 
171* 
14:35  TKG 76 
14:36  GL 132*; CPS 280*; PL 39*; 
MP 10*; EG 4522; TKG 76; 
HG 76; PP 69*; WJC 16623; 
GHH 64, 65*; HTG xvii*; 
SL 64*, 136*; JCTW 33; 
CoG 252*; SoL 32*; ExpTh 
322*; PG 78*; EB 46*, 80*; 
SRA 43; LG 66, 144, 172* 
14:37  CJF 19*; SoL 137*; EB 80*; 
EthH 6; LG 48*, 171*, 172* 
14:38  CJF 19*; SL 64; PG 62*; 
EthH 6* 
 
22 Mark 14:35, corrected. 
23 Matt 14:36, corrected. 
14:41  WJC 166; SoL 127 
14:42  PG 59*, 63*, 67*; EB 80*, 
84*, 86*; LG 172* 
14:44  SRA 43 
14:45  SL 265* 
14:48  WJC 161 
14:50  CG 132; SRA 44 
14:58  WJC 161 
14:61  WJC 161 
14:61-62 CPS 236 
14:62  WJC 161, 324, 332 
14:63  FF 120 
14:66-72 SRA 44 
14:71  MP 15* 
14:72  PP 85* 
15:2  WJC 163; SL 65; EB 4624 
15:15  JCTW 64* 
15:34  HP 34*; GL 38*; CG x*, 55, 
146, 147, 153*, 193, 225*, 
226*, 227*, 229*, 279n.6; 
EH 79; CPS 94; FC 65*; 
MP 8*; EG 15*, 47, 82n.11; 
TKG 4*, 78, 229n.63*, 
233n.27; HG 76; PP 117*, 
118*, 119*; TT 38*; WJC 
166, 172*, 180*, 211*, 
364n.35*; GHH 66, 67*, 
75*; HTG 10*, 27, 29*, 70, 
85*, 172*; SL 64, 77; JCTW 
2*, 34, 35*, 36*, 144*; FF 91; 
CoG 126*, 253*, 329*; SoL, 
5*, 32*, 111; GWBAA 46*; 
ExpTh 16*, 173*, 304*, 
375n.134*; PG 71*, 90*; EB 
35*, 46*, 147*; BP 30*, 191*, 
281*; LG 96*, 144* 
15:37  CG 146; SL 64; FF 91 
15:39  CG 147, 193, 194*, 195*; 
EH 79*; CPS 87, 237; WJC 
180; FF 91* 
15:40  SRA 44 
15:40-41 WJC 217 





15:41  WJC 146 
16:2  GC 292 
16:3  BP 56* 
16:6  FH 30*; CPS 229; SRA 44 
16:7  WJC 219; ExpTh 254 
16:8  SRA 44 
16:11  SRA 44 
16:13  SRA 44 
16:15  CPS 8* 
16:16  CoG 241 




1:15  WJC 87, 88; SL 60 
1:26-35 WJC 78* 
1:26ff. CPS 53; FC 83 
1:33  GHH 52* 
1:35  WJC 78, 80; FF 136 
1:38  SoL 38* 
1:46-47 LG 91 
1:46-54 RPS 42; EH 115; WJC 99 
1:46-55 GL 113 
1:50-53 FC 170 
1:51-52 HTG 121 
1:51-53 GL 90; EthH 40 
1:51ff. CPS 351 
1:52  RRF 12; LG 47 
1:52-53 SRA 145 
1:78  SRA 52 
1:80  WJC 88; SL 60 
2:1  TKG xi; CoG 160 
2:9  CPS 58; FC 89 
2:9-15 GC 170 
2:10  CoG 337 
2:10-11 LG 91 
2:14  EH 172; CJF 7*; EthH 115* 
2:19  SL 103 
2:29  SoL 38* 
2:40  WJC 78 
3:7  PL 102; HG 73 
3:10  PL 102 
3:14  WJC 87 
 
25 Cf. Isa 61. 
3:16  SL 280 
3:21  WJC 89 
3:21ff. CPS 237 
3:22  WJC 93* 
3:23  WJC 87 
4  EthH 53 
4:1  SL 61 
4:1-13 WJC 92 
4:14  CPS 236; SL 61 
4:14-21 PP 71 
4:1825  CPS 236; FC 107; HC 22; 
WJC 119; BP 172; EthH 
181 
4:18-19 EH 61; CPS 76; FF 110; 
GWBAA 282; EthH 54 
4:18ff. CPS 48, 270; FC 186n.9; PL 
76; TKG 74*; FJC 68; HD 
102; GC 6, 291; WJC 91, 
99, 119; HTG 11, 35; CoG 
267; GWBAA 283; PDDP 
39 
4:19  CPS 113 
4:21  CG 121; CPS 91*; JCTW 3; 
GWBAA 282 
4:22  PP 74* 
4:40-41 WJC 105 
5:8  M 16 
5:34  CoG 336 
6  SRA 136 
6:13  CPS 358 
6:17-49 GC 123* 
6:18  WJC 107 
6:20  HC 45; EB 13* 
6:20-23 WJC 103 
6:21  WJC 99; SoL 136 
6:24  CG 141; WJC 100; EB 13* 
6:34ff. WJC 120 
7:1  WJC 124 
7:9  CG 54 
7:20  RRF 32 
7:22  PP 76 
7:32  EB 12 
394 
 
7:34  CG 141; CPS 102*, 116, 
117*, 119*; PL 55, 56* SL 
258; LG 120, 121* 
7:35  WJC 89 
7:36-50 WJC 114; SoL 8* 
7:36ff. WJC 146 
7:50  FC 154*; WJC 114 
9:10ff. WJC 100 
9:11  CG 54 
9:20  JCTW 123* 
9:28-36 TKG 123 
9:28ff. CPS 58; FC 89 
9:29  PP 66*, 67* 
9:58  WJC 100 
10  CoG 9 
10:1  GHH 40 
10:16  GL 61*; RPS 44*; CPS 123*, 
124*, 126*, 127*, 129*, 132*; 
PL 104*; SL 232*; ExpTh 
132*, 266; EB 13*; BP 203* 
10:17ff. CoG 150 
10:18  GC 171 
10:21  ExpTh 344n.2 
10:27  JCTW 107*; SoL 49* 
10:42  HD 45*, 57*; ExpTh 179* 
11:5-8 PL 59*; LG 124* 
11:5ff. CPS 118 
11:11ff. GL 20 
11:20  WJC 107 
11:29  CPS 39* 
12:4-12 PP 79 
12:6  PP 83* 
12:8  FF 118 
12:12  FF 122 
12:16ff. CG 141; ExpTh 164 
12:29ff. WJC 120 
12:37  SoL 142 
12:49  SL 280; PDDP 135 
12:49-51 GL 95 
12:51  WJC 154; PDDP 135 
12:54-56 CPS 48* 
12:58  WJC 99 
13:10-17 GHH 57; SoL 130 
13:29  CPS 248; HC 53; WJC 115 
13:32  CG 138 
13:34  WJC 154 
14:14  CPS 248 
14:17  HC 46 
14:21  WJC 115 
14:21-23 WJC 99 
14:23  CPS 259* 
15  WJC 113; JCTW 11; SoL 
14; BP 278 
15:1-32 LG 94 
15:2  CPS 248; PL 106; HC 53; 
WJC 112; JCTW 15, 16*; 
EB 67 
15:5  LG 94 
15:7  CPS 64; FC 94; PL 93; HC 
25*; GC 183*; SL 299; 
JCTW 11; LG 94 
15:10  SL 299; LG 94 
15:10ff. EG 24 
15:11-32 JCTW 133*; SoL 40* 
15:18  LG 95 
15:20  LG 95 
15:22  WJC 115 
15:22ff. CPS 248 
15:24  JCTW 11; LG 95 
15:32  LG 95 
16  EH 116; FC 57; WJC 168 
16:1ff. WJC 120 
16:8  GC 63* 
16:13  CF 16* 
16:19-31 CPS 127*; HC 25* 
16:22  GL 119*; CoG 78, 105*; SW 
105* 
16:23  CoG 241; LaD 52*, 56* 
17:21  CPS 48; JCTW 29*; LG 
189* 
17:22  EB 142* 
17:33  CG 15*; CoG 66 
18:1  SoL 137 
18:9  PP 89* 
18:9ff. WJC 113 
18:10-14 PP 88 
18:13  SL 135 
18:14  HC 25* 
18:16  EB 12 





19:7  WJC 114 
19:9  HC 26; WJC 114 
19:10  CPS 249*; PL 106*; HC 54; 
FJC 53*; WJC 116*; CoG 
253*; SoL 145*; GWBAA 
46*; SW 122*; EB 142*; BP 
30*, 195*; SRA 136 
19:41  PG 65-66, 72 
19:44  CPS 146 
20:25  CG 141 
20:34ff. GC 319 
20:35  WJC 262; CoG 151 
20:35-36 GC 247 
20:36  GC 213; WJC 333; CoG 75; 
LaD 18 
20:38  GC 92, 184; CoG 124; EB 
108, 128 
21  WJC 153; CoG 227 
21:25  CoG 229 
21:28  HG 61; WJC 340; CoG 229, 
230*; SoL 129; PG 99; EB 
51; EthH 7, 237*; LG 203 
22:18  CPS 250; HC 54; WJC 154 
22:19  CG 43*; CPS 250 
22:20  CPS 223*; PP 43* 
22:25-27 CG 138 
22:31-32 PP 85; SoL 33 
22:32  SL 156 
22:35-38 CG 139 
22:37  CG 133; CPS 87, 88* 
22:42  EG 45*; TKG 76*; PP 116*; 
GHH 64*; JCTW 33* 
22:44  EG 43*; PP 117*; GHH 65*; 
JCTW 34*, 54*; CoG 252*; 
LG 4826 
22:54-62 EB 46 
23:34  PP 34*, 61*, 68*; HD 126*; 
ExpTh 326*; PDDP 64*, 
144 
23:35  WJC 109 
 
26 Luke 22:24, corrected. 
23:43  CPS 91*; PP 74*; HTG 34; 
CoG 102; LaD 49*; SW 
103; EB 112 
23:44  LG 66 
23:46  HP 35; CG 147; EG 47*; 
TKG 78; SL 41; FF 91*; 
CoG 73; LaD 14; EB 106; 
BP 202* 
24:10-12 GHH 6* 
24:15-16 PL 86* 
24:21  WJC 170; CoG 150; EB 46; 
SRA 44 
24:26  CG 181; WJC 170, 171 
24:30  PL 87 
24:31  ExpTh 130*; EB 47 
24:34  WJC 219 
24:36-43 SRA 48 
24:42-43 SRA 49 




1  GC 328n.5 
1:1  GL 19*; GC 95; WJC 78; 
GSS 103*; EB 12*; SRA 195 
1:1-3  WJC 281; SW 53 
1:1-13 JCTW 92 
1:1-14 HTG 34*; EthH 227* 
1:1ff.  CPS 5327; FC 83 
1:3  TKG 103; GC 95; SRA 31, 
195 
1:3-4  WJC 286 
1:4  SRA 52, 77; EthH 56; LG 
74 
1:9  CJF 57*; SL 281 
1:11  HP 119*; TKG 103; SW 122 
1:12  WJC 85 
1:12-13 WJC 83 
1:14  TKG 67; CG 88*; GC 102*, 
245*; WJC 84*; SL 233; 
CoG 267, 302*, 305, 306*; 
SoL 140*; PGR 17; GSS 19; 
27 John 1:11ff., corrected. See the parallel 
passage in FC, 83 
396 
 
ExpTh 315; SW 122; SRA 
30*, 31*, 60*, 111, 15228; 
EthH 61, 150; LG 54, 55*, 
74 
1:16  SL 283; CoG 336, 337*; 
SoL 8*; ExpTh 105*, 149* 
1:18  RRF 66 
1:29  WJC 188* 
1:32  WJC 90*; HTG 33*, 34*; EB 
64; EthH 150 
1:46  CG 122* 
3:2  EH 122*; FF 121* 
3:3  EG 77; TKG 104; HG 103; 
SL 158*, 212; JCTW 136; 
SoL 28; ExpTh 52; SW 52 
3:3-5  SL 145, 151 
3:3-6  HTG 65; SL 271; SoL 27 
3:5  HG 103; GC 99; GHH 36; 
SL 283 
3:5-6  TKG 105 
3:6  WJC 86 
3:8  SL 273*; SoL 93* 
3:16  GL 84; CG 21, 192, 244; 
EH 137; CPS 95; JM 54; 
TKG 57, 82; HG 78; GC 83; 
WJC 175; GHH 70; HTG 
52, 87; FF 95; CoG 241, 
245; SoL 19*; LG 142 
3:17  WJC 336; SL 272 
3:18  WJC 337 
3:34  WJC 90; HTG 33; SL 61 
3:36  CoG 241 
4:14  SL 35*, 89*, 97*, 98*, 146, 
159*, 176, 195*, 271*, 275, 
283, 310*; JCTW 136; CoG 
118*, 124*, 292*; SoL 12; 
ExpTh 146*, 291* 
4:16  CG 244 
4:24  TKG 168; SL 317n.30*; 
CoG 310; ExpTh 351n.93* 
5:12  CG 106 
5:24  CoG 20, 82 
5:26  CJF 57*; EthH 56 
 
28 John 1:1, corrected. 
5:36  GC 313 
5:46  HTG 102 
6:2  CG 54 
6:35  EthH 56 
6:44  SL 103, 321n.25 
6:47  LG 74 
6:64  SL 103 
6:69  EG 2; WJC 39; ExpTh 46 
7  ExpTh 253 
7:12  PL 103 
7:17  CG 106 
7:21  GC 313 
7:23  WJC 108 
7:31  PL 103 
7:38  SL 275 
7:39  TKG 122, 251n.33; FF 136 
7:48ff. PL 103 
7:49  ExpTh 253 
8:1-11 GL 100* 
8:7  GL 101*; CG 143 
8:12  PP 32; SL 281; EthH 56 
8:12ff. FF 119 
8:32  RRF 139*; GL 10*; SL 114*; 
GSS 189* 
10:10  LaD 24*; ExpTh 149*; LG 
ix, 74, 13029 
10:30  EG 45*; TKG 76*, 95; PP 
116*; GC 16; WJC 166*; 
GHH 64*; HTG 20*, 21, 
85*; JCTW 33*; FF 125, 
143*; ExpTh 322; SRA 94, 
112; LG 62 
10:33  WJC 162 
11  WJC 39 
11:4  SL 88*, 97*; EB 61*, 72* 
11:19ff. WJC 146 
11:24  CoG 195, 196; SRA 45 
11:25  TH 82-83*; HC 31*; EG 
75*; GHH 52*; SL 210*; 
CoG 69, 82, 195; SoL 19*; 
LaD 24*; ExpTh 146*; SRA 
40*; EthH 56; LG ix*, 74, 
147 





11:25-26 CoG 74 
11:25-27 EH 94* 
11:27  HTG 32; EthH 25; LG 189 
11:44  EH 94* 
11:50  WJC 162 
12  ExpTh 253 
12:2430 PL 25; GC 269, 302*; WJC 
248; JCTW 84; CoG 66; 
LaD 19; SRA 65; EthH 102 
12:24-25 GL 135; EG 74 
12:27  SoL 133* 
12:31  HD 66*; GSS 36; PDDP 8* 
12:34  GC 302 
13:1-16 CPS 103 
13:1-17 SL 264 
13:14  SL 264 
13:31  CoG 334 
13:34  RRF 5*; HP 184* 
14  SL 60; SoL 17 
14-16  ExpTh 145 
14-17  CPS 34*; ExpTh 311* 
14:2  GWBAA 264 
14:3  CG 263 
14:6  WJC 34; JCTW 125; CoG 
104* 
14:9  TKG 32*, 82*; HG 89; WJC 
174*; GHH 35*, 69*, 75; 
HTG 19, 21; SL 101; JCTW 
38; FF 125; ExpTh 316, 
322; EB 63; SRA 153, 184 
14:10  CJF 56*; WJC 177*; HTG 
xv; SRA 94, 112 
14:10ff. HTG xvi 
14:11  GC 16; CJF 56*; HTG 85; 
FF 143; ExpTh 316, 322; 
SW 57, 117; EB 63; SRA 
112, 153 
14:12  GC 313 
14:15  SL 157*, 271*, 272* 
14:15-31 SL 232* 
14:16  SL 70; CoG 334; SoL 17 
14:16ff. SL 123 
 
30 Cf. 1 Cor 15:36. 
14:19  EG 20*; CoG 127; SoL 19; 
PGR 61; GSS 240; ExpTh 
108*, 146 
14:23  GWBAA 40; ExpTh 323; 
SRA 26, 156 
14:26  CPS 54; FC 84; TKG 123, 
170; HTG 65; SL 70, 158; 
CoG 334; SoL 17, 35 
14:30  GSS 36 
15  PL 56; TKG 220; SL 284; 
SRA 166 
15:4  SL 116* 
15:5  SL 284; SRA 166 
15:11  CPS 64, 118; FC 94; PL 57*; 
CoG 337; LG 122 
15:12-13 LG 122 
15:13  CPS 316*; PL 58*; LG 123*, 
144 
15:13-14 CPS 117; TKG 220; GHH 
20*; BP 210 
15:13-15 SL 258 
15:15  CPS 118; TKG 220; EB 156 
15:16  CPS 118; PL 59; LG 124 
15:26  CPS 54, 370n.101; FC 84; 
TKG 89, 123, 170, 182; 
GHH 36; SL 70; FF 119 
16  HTG 99, 100; CoG 334 
16:7  SL 68, 69; SoL 17 
16:7-8 SL 123 
16:8  SL 272 
16:11  GSS 36 
16:12  HTG 99 
16:13  SL 297*; ExpTh 145 
16:14  FH 35*; CoG 334; ExpTh 
145 
16:20  CPS 64; FC 94; CoG 229 
16:20-22 WJC 249 
16:20-23 WJC 153 
16:21  WJC 249; CoG 229 
16:23  HP 36* 
16:27  TKG 182 
16:32  WJC 217 
16:33  SL 114 
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17:1  CoG 334 
17:3  LG 96* 
17:4-5 CoG 334 
17:11  SL 340n.56* 
17:20ff. TKG 251n.29 
17:20-21 TKG 201-2; HTG 63 
17:21  CPS 345; PL 82; TKG 95, 
126, 158; HG 98; GC 241, 
258; GHH 37; HTG 25, 60, 
85, 132, 181; SL 219; FF 
129, 143; CoG 299, 335*; 
SoL 91; GSS 101; GWBAA 
39; ExpTh 311, 322, 328, 
330; BP 86, 288, 289*, 327; 
SRA 26, 112, 156, 160; LG 
62, 63, 149 
17:21-22 HTG xvi 
17:21ff. HG 88; HTG xiii 
17:33  GC 269; LaD 19 
18:36 CG 140; CPS 90*; 
WJC 91; JCTW 20 
18:37  SL 208*, 209*; FF 119 
19:1  JCTW 64* 
19:5  M 16*, 18*, 19*; CG 205*; 
MP 10* 
19:6  CPS 146 
19:7  CG 33 
19:30  CG 147; TKG 78; HG 54*; 
HD 42*; GC 89; SL 64; FF 
91; EthH 37 
20  SRA 48, 49, 50 
20:1  GC 292 
20:13  SRA 49 
20:17  SRA 49 
20:18  WJC 219; SRA 49 
20:19  GC 292 
20:20  SRA 52 
20:21-23 CPS 123 
20:21  PL 104; WJC 220; JCTW 
75; ExpTh 177, 266 
20:21-22 TKG 123 
20:21-23 ExpTh 177 
 
31 Cf. Joel 2:28 and onwards. 
20:22  SL 68; SoL 16; ExpTh 178*, 
179* 
20:23  PL 104; ExpTh 106*, 177, 
178*, 179*; SW 178* 
20:25  SRA 50 
20:27  SRA 50 
20:28  SRA 50 
20:29  WJC 226; SoL 16; ExpTh 
51 




1:1-11 WJC 221 
1:5  HTG 100 
1:5-8  CPS 237 
1:7  HTG 100 
1:8  CPS 249; WJC 33; SL 279; 
JCTW 124-25; CoG 167 
1:14  WJC 80, 144; HTG 13; FF 
133 
1:21ff. CPS 358 
2  TKG 122; HD 31; HTG 
100; SoL 57, 61; ExpTh 
130, 288 
2:1-21 BP 349 
2:2  SL 279* 
2:2-4  SL 278 
2:3  LG 219n.7 
2:4  SL 170* 
2:14-21 CPS 294 
2:16ff. EG 77; TKG 104; SL 212 
2:16-21 EthH 5 
2:1731  HP 22; CG 338*; CPS 
xviii*, 11*, 86*, 247*, 257*, 
279*, 297*, 301*; FC 108*; 
TKG 66*, 74*, 89*, 110, 
113*, 124*, 126*; HG 81*; 
CJF 57*; WJC 253*; SL 84*, 
195*, 232*, 233*, 242*, 270*, 
284*, 288*, 299*; CoG 197*, 
230*; SoL 58*, 71*, 101*; 





147*, 179*, 284*, 326*; SRA 
60*; EthH 59*, 61*; LG 93*, 
158* 
2:17ff. SL 239; SoL 12, 23, 100; 
EthH 39 
2:22ff. WJC 224 
2:23  HP 42*; CG 187; WJC 178 
2:23-24 FC 157 
2:24  TH 166; CG 179; WJC 225; 
CoG 252 
2:26  WJC 267*; LG 160 
2:27  WJC 225 
2:37  SL 103 
2:38ff. CPS 237 
2:44  PL 119 
2:44-46 CPS 315 
2:46  CPS 251* 
3:15  TH 166; RRF 52*; FH 30; 
HP 44*; CG 163*, 187; EH 
56*; CPS 71*, 74*; FC 166*; 
PL 72*; TKG 85*; FJC 69; 
HD 103*; CJF 57*; WJC 4*, 
40, 221*; CoG 69, 151*, 
196*32, 230*, 335*; SW 70*; 
EB 47*33; PDDP 40; BP 
102*; LG 192* 
3:21  GC 172; CoG 237*, 238*, 
239*, 240, 250*, 251*, 254*, 
294*, 371n.205*; EB 149*, 
150*, 151* 
4:10  CG 187 
4:12  FC 192n.3* 
4:13  ExpTh 344n.2 
4:31-35 PP 127; GC 99; SoL 103 
4:32  HG 100; GHH 37; SoL 
105*, 106*; BP 252*, 289 
4:32-34 FF 144 
4:32-35 SL 194; GWBAA 281; 
EthH 157; LG 15234 
4:32-37 ExpTh 330; SRA 162 
4:32ff. CJF 10 
 
32 Attributed to Paul.  
33 Attributed to Paul. 
34 Acts 4:32-25, corrected. 
4:34  HG 100; PP 129; CJF 67; 
WJC 306; SoL 104*, 106* 
4:34-35 WJC 100 
4:35  SoL 110* 
5:29  FJC 30*, 88*; PP 45*; HD 
70*, 116*; CF 17*, 18*; 
HTG 25*; PDDP 11*, 54* 
5:31  TH 166; WJC 220 
6-7  GC 293 
6:14  GC 293 
7:2  TP 41; TJ 60; CG 187; CPS 
58; FC 89 
7:48-49 WJC 285; HTG 74; SL 37; 
SoL 117; GSS 104 
7:48-50 JCTW 93; EthH 150 
7:49  CJF 84; JCTW 133; SoL 47; 
EthH 111 
7:49-50 SRA 69 
7:55-56 GC 171 
9  WJC 216; SRA 46 
9:3  WJC 216; SRA 46, 52 
9:5  WJC 216; SRA 46 
9:18  SW 143* 
9:22  WJC 217 
9:28  WJC 217; JCTW 74* 
10:38  WJC 89; HTG 33 
13:31  WJC 219 
13:33  HTG 34* 
15  GC 293 
15:7  CPS 220* 
17:6  EH 6 
17:22-31 JCTW 91 
17:25  TKG 54 
17:28  M 35*; CG 277; PP 48*, 
134; EG 16*, 79-8035; GC 
11, 300; WJC 28136; GHH 
38; HTG 133; SL 213; CoG 
299; JCTW 91; SoL 109*, 
134; GSS 152; EthH 137; 
LG 53*, 170 
17:28-29 GC 85; LG 75 
35 Acts 18:28, corrected. 
36 Acts 17:27, corrected. 
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17:31  WJC 336 
19:26  PL 103 
20:7  GC 292; EthH 235 
20:35  TKG 106*; HD 44 
23:6  TH 22; EB 95 
24:5  CPS 317 
24:14  CPS 317 
26:23  CoG 69 




1  BP 195 
1-3  CPS 94; FC 169 
1:1  HD 43 
1:1-4  SL 66 
1:2  TH 153, 153n.2 
1:3  CG 192; EH 68n.4; FF 
115n.4 
1:3-4  TKG 87; WJC 77, 81, 162 
1:4  CG 179; TKG 88; HG 80; 
WJC 170; SRA 54; LG 146 
1:5  TH 301; RRF 98 
1:7  HTG 14  
1:9  CPS 218*; TKG 87; HG 80 
1:14  EH 11; CPS 1 
1:16  RRF 46; CPS 82, 141, 
375n.49; FC 159*; HD 201; 
WJC 147* 
1:16-17 FC 161; HD 31 
1:17  TH 205; FH 5n.6; TP 42; TJ 
61; CPS 88, 222; FC 162, 
166; WJC 184 
1:17ff. FH 157; CG 69 
1:18  TH 145*; CG 242; CPS 222; 
FC 162; WJC 185 
1:18ff. CG 211, 241; RPS 36; EH 
112; FC 74; JM 52; TKG 80, 
81; WJC 172, 173; GHH 68; 
HTG 27; FF 94 
1:19-20 CG 209 
1:19ff. HP 21 
1:22  CG 208 
1:23  GL 82-83; GC 226, 229 
1:24  CG 242; FC 163; HG 77; 
EB 74 
1:25  GL 83 
1:26  CG 242; EH 64; FF 112; EB 
74 
1:28  CG 242; PP 3*; EB 74 
2  HTG 44; SL 124 
3  FC 192n.4; HTG 44; SL 124 
3:9  CPS 141; EB 71 
3:10-11 HP 16 
3:20  CPS 89* 
3:21  FC 161*, 162* 
3:22-3 SL 115, 124 
3:23  FH 8, 37*; CG 194; CPS 82, 
140-41*; FC 124, 162; GC 
226, 229, 230; WJC 112, 
186, 195; HTG 44; CoG 
273; GSS 204; SW 45; EB 
67, 72 
3:23-24 HD 201 
3:24  CG 194 
3:25  CG 183; FC 28 
3:28  RRF 125; TP 56*; TJ 74*; 
WJC 184*; CoG 115*; 
ExpTh 250 
3:30  CPS 141; HTG 44 
4  FC 192 n.4 
4:1ff.  SL 258 
4:5  TH 146*, 147*, 154*, 225*, 
301*, 302*; RRF 12*, 46*, 
51*; HP 51*; CG 27*, 189*, 
244*; HD 201*; EB 72; WJC 
224*; SL 146*, 148* 
4:11  EH 47; PL 58*; TKG 220*; 
PGR 31*; GSS 81*; ExpTh 
99* 
4:14  TH 145*, 146 
4:15  TH 145 
4:16  TH 146; CPS 30; WJC 36; 
ExpTh 29 
4:16-18 LG 109 
4:17  TH 30, 31*, 91*, 145, 146*, 
221*; RRF 12, 158; FH 
1n.2; HP 23*, 42*, 170*; GL 





EH 35; CPS 240*, 295; FC 
108, 123, 156*, 169; TKG 
34, 106; PP 123; HD 40*; 
GC 66, 93*; WJC 224*, 281; 
JCTW 91; FF 104; CoG 28, 
69; ExpTh 99; SW 43, 70, 
150, 184; SRA 67; LG 32, 
183 
4:17-18 HP 150 
4:18  TH 18*; RRF 9*, 46*, 51*, 
53*; 173, 214*; HP 44*, 88*, 
193; M 36*, 58*; CG 146*; 
HTG 155* 
4:20  TH 145 
4:24  FH 1, 1n.2 
4:25  TH 205; HP 46; CG 182, 
192; CPS 30; FC 162, 165; 
EG 34*; TKG 116; HD 31; 
CJF, 5; WJC 182, 186, 195, 
224; HTG 44; SL 125, 149; 
JCTW 42; FF 147, 170; 
CoG 82; GSS 193; ExpTh 
107; EB 73, 74; EthH 32, 
55, 182 
5  TSTB 39, 40; HD 30; CoG 
82; LG 67 
5ff.  FC 30 
5:1  CPS 291; SL 154; SoL 31 
5:2-5  GL 71 
5:5  EG 77; TKG 104, 11037; SL 
3, 148, 154, 195*, 212, 304; 
SoL 31; LG 61, 75, 142, 158 
5:6  CG 61; PP 60 
5:8  CG 61, 181; CPS 212; PP 
53* 
5:9  SRA 132 
5:9-11 FC 28 
5:10  CPS 31; PP 60; WJC 171, 
185, 233, 284; HTG 53; BP 
107* 
5:10ff. PL 93 
5:14  HTG xv 
5:15-20 FC 105; FF 107 
 
37 Rom 5:3, corrected. 
5:18  TH 205; HTG 44; SL 124; 
CoG 241 
5:20  CG 261; FC 77; TKG 116; 
WJC 171, 185; HTG 45; SL 
126; CoG 243, 263; PG 84; 
EB 75; LG 67, 101 
5:21  TH 206 
6  TP 49; TJ 68; CPS 59, 124, 
195, 237; HC 49; ExpTh 
173; EB 74 
6:2  EB 72* 
6:4  TP 40; TJ 60; CG 56, 152*; 
CPS 58; FC 88; TKG 88; 
HG 80; SL 66, 208* 
6:4ff.  GC 122 
6:6  EthH 104 
6:8  CPS 238*; CoG 195 
6:8ff.  CPS 31 
6:9  CG 43, 170; PL 75; WJC 
52; CoG 232 
6:10  WJC 195; CoG 69, 263; 
SoL 28; ExpTh 144 
6:10-11 TH 205 
6:12-14 HTG 51; SL 135 
6:13  TH 206 
6:13ff. SL 123 
6:16  EB 72* 
6:16ff. FH 28 
6:17  GC 232 
6:19  TP 49; TJ 68 
6:19-23 HTG 51 
6:23  TH 206; CPS 295; TKG 50; 
WJC 169*; HTG 138*; SL 
127*, 181; CoG 81, 86*, 89*, 
90*, 93*, 94* 
7  CPS 195; SL 88, 101, 127; 
EthH 59; LG 49 
7:7-11 CG 293 
7:8ff.  FC 162 
7:10ff. CPS 89 
7:14  SL 87 
7:15  EB 59 
7:19  FC 150; WJC 185; SL 127 
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7:19-20 EB 59 
7:24  CPS 113*; GC 68 
8  RRF 5; TP 20, 31; TJ 43, 52; 
EH 4, 84; CPS 195; FC 129; 
PL 75; EG 74; GC 246; 
WJC 32; HTG 76; SL 65, 
101; JCTW 123; SoL 120; 
PGR 31; GSS 82; ExpTh 
72, 288; SW 50; SRA 70, 
206 
8:2  FC 163 
8:3  FC 64; HG 74; GC 246; 
WJC 349n.20; HTG 27 
8:3-4  TKG 72 
8:6  SL 87 
8:8  SL 149 
8:9  TKG 123; HG 81; SL 68 
8:11  TH 91*; 162, 211; CG 178, 
188; EH 46*; CPS 99, 236, 
295; FC 162; TKG 88, 89, 
122, 123; FJC 69; HG 80; 
HD 103; GC 66; WJC 241, 
242*; SL 95, 146, 178*; 
JCTW 81; CoG 69, 200; 
SoL 29, 53, 73; ExpTh 112, 
148; PDDP 40; SRA 61 
8:13  TH 212*, 222* 
8:14  CPS 354; TKG 107, 123; 
GC 264; WJC 142; SL 149; 
CoG 74; SoL 132; LaD 17; 
ExpTh 150; EB 77, 108*; 
LG 199 
8:14-15 HTG 83 
8:15  TKG 72, 73*, 89, 163*; HG 
75, 81, 89; WJC 145; HTG 
13, 15*, 21, 33; SL 63, 149; 
FF 126; SW 193; LG 60, 75 
8:16  WJC 142; CoG 73; LG 61 
8:17  FH 34*; TKG 73*; GC 319; 
ExpTh 55; EB 77 
8:17ff. ExpTh 157 
8:18  RRF 46, 47*, 53*; FH 4n.6; 
CG 24*, 65*, 78n.41, 101*; 
 
38 Rom 18:19, corrected. 
EH 4; CPS 2*, 58*, 162*; FC 
60*, 162, 163*; PL 82*, 85*, 
89*; PP 149*; TT 90*; WJC 
152*, 155, 157*, 170, 185; 
HTG 139; CoG 28*, 233; 
GWBAA 261; ExpTh xx*; 
SRA 114* 
8:18ff. TH 162; RRF 65, 168n.48; 
HP 21, 172, 199n.15; EH 
121 
8:19  TH 35, 289*, 291*; RRF 
193n.15; HP 53n.4, 104, 
144, 195*; CG 57; FC 
174n.17; TKG 121; WJC 
356.54; FF 103; SoL 132; 
BP 173; SRA 204; EthH 
126; LG 199, 20038 
8:19-21 HP 166*; GC 39; CoG 70 
8:19-22 RRF 93*; HTG 96, 193n.31; 
SRA 60 
8:19-23 EH 184; ExpTh 111 
8:19ff. TH 69; CPS 222; FC 98, 
122; TKG 11139; GC 60, 67, 
101, 189; WJC 170; HTG 
75, 98; CoG 91, 144, 229, 
276; SoL 119, 132; SW 41; 
EthH 139 
8:20  TH 94*; HP 34; CG 218; 
GC 68; WJC 252; CoG 90 
8:20ff. TH 215 
8:21  RRF 67*; GL 22; CPS 83*; 
TKG 87*, 121; PP 68; HD 
16*; WJC 90*; HTG 72, 
130; SL 105*; JCTW 42; 
CoG 92*; SoL 132; EthH 
171*; LG 199 
8:22  RRF 47, 216*; HP 35*, 49*; 
M 58*; CG 24*, 101*; EG 
34*; TKG 4*; GC 101; CJF 
77*; WJC 169*, 241*, 258*, 
291*; HTG 70; SL 26*, 88*; 
JCTW 98*; CoG 93*; SoL 
111, 113; ExpTh 173*, 326*; 





SRA 61; EthH 37*; LG 195, 
229n.16* 
8:22-23 TH 229*; EH 189*; FC 
164*, 167*; SoL 73; SRA 73; 
EthH 101 
8:22ff. FH 157 
8:23  TH 158*, 224; GL 88; CPS 
34, 59; FC 90*; TKG 121, 
124, 125; GC 101, 226; 
WJC 283, 291*; HTG 98*, 
101*; SL 12, 74, 89; JCTW 
99*; CoG 91; ExpTh 112* 
8:24  RRF 173; HD 203; WJC 
108; LaD 52 
8:24-25 TH 18; HP 195; EH 36; 
HTG 99; ExpTh 99 
8:25  GL 51 
8:26  HP 16; CG 313*, 338*; EH 
81*; CPS 64*, 65*; FC 98; 
GC 16*, 69, 97*, 101, 102*; 
CJF 35*; WJC 314*; HTG 
xvii*, 66*, 70; SL 51*, 64*, 
76, 77*, 288*; SoL 11, 132, 
142*; ExpTh 112; LG 200 
8:28  FH 28; CPS 114 
8:29  TH 333n.1; RRF 68*; FH 
30; CG 266; CPS 101; FC 
166; PL 119*; JM 83*; TKG 
87, 107*, 117, 120, 124*, 
166*, 183*, 210*, 238n.37*; 
HG 80*; HD 215*; GC 189, 
218, 226, 242, 264; WJC 83, 
275*; HTG 13*, 19*, 32*, 
36, 40, 48, 83, 119; SL 131, 
233, 278; ExpTh 329; EB 
77; BP 204*; SRA 22; LG 
60, 205* 
8:30  FC 125; GC 226; WJC 185; 
SL 174; SW 45 
8:31  PP 84*, 96*; SL 286 
8:31-32 CG 242; WJC 178; CoG 
245 
8:31-39 HTG 52; SL 137; EB 69; 
SRA 93; LG 145 
8:31ff. CPS 94, 96 
8:32  CG 192, 241, 244; EH 80; 
CPS 96; FC 72, 73, 74, 161; 
JM 52, 53, 54; TKG 24, 64, 
67, 81; HG 74, 77; WJC 
172, 175; GHH 68, 73; 
HTG 28; JCTW 37; FF 95; 
BP 195, 199*; LG 144 
8:33-34 WJC 337 
8:34  CPS 119*; WJC 171, 185, 
214; SL 137; PG 84; EB 75; 
LG 67, 101 
8:35  EB 69 
8:38  PP 84*; WJC 191; CoG 
106*; SRA 95* 
8:38-39 CPS 96; GC 172; SL 131; 
CoG 105; GSS 194-95; BP 
199*; EthH 57; LG 49 
8:39  EG 54*; TKG 82; WJC 174; 
GHH 69; SL 286; EB 69; 
LG 136 
9-11  TH 147; FH 23; FC 38; JM 
73, 78, 89; HD 201; WJC 
34, 323; HTG 108, 121; 
JCTW 125; GWBAA 150, 
262 
9:1  TSTB 46 
9:2-5  WJC 35; JCTW 126 
9:3  CG 133 
9:4  HTG 21 
9:4-5  CPS 141, 145; HD 201 
9:11  CPS 30 
9:15  CG 170 
9:20  HTG 27 
9:22-23 CoG 297-98 
10:3  TH 206 
10:4  TH 145, 146; CG 133; EH 
57; CPS 141*; FC 72, 161; 
WJC 122 
10:6  CG 116 
10:9  TH 165; HP 170; FC 161*; 
GC 172; WJC 140, 170; SL 
102*; CoG 69, 74; SRA 39; 
LaD 17 
10:9-10 CPS 98; SL 101 
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10:12  TH 147*, 286*; CPS 106; 
HC 33; FF 144 
10:17  SRA 181; EthH 138* 
11:1-2 CoG 197 
11:2  CPS 141; HD 201 
11:5  GC 227 
11:11  CPS 149; JM 89; HD 213 
11:11ff. CPS 350 
11:11-32 CPS 146 
11:12  WJC 35; JCTW 126 
11:14  CPS 149; JM 89; HD 213; 
WJC 36; JCTW 128 
11:15  RRF 33*, 46, 168n.48; FH 
23*; GL 86, 87, 132*; EH 
35, 38*; CPS 144, 350; FC, 
25, 152, 166, 169; JM 74; 
TKG 234n.34; WJC 35, 
323; HTG 107; JCTW 126, 
127; CoG 151 
11:15-16 CoG 198 
11:17-24 CPS 145 
11:25  CPS 203; WJC 34; HTG 
107*; JCTW 125 
11:25-26 WJC 35; JCTW 127; CoG 
198 
11:25-32 GWBAA 151 
11:26  WJC 33, 220, 323; HTG 
108; JCTW 125; CoG 198, 
309; SRA 41 
11:28  CPS 146; HD 201; WJC 34; 
HTG 108; JCTW 126; SRA 
39-40* 
11:28-29 CPS 146  
11:29  TH 333n.1; CPS 144*, 147*; 
WJC 35; JCTW 126 
11:32  CPS 86, 141, 145*; HD 201; 
CoG 241; SRA 144, 148 
11:33  CPS 33 
11:36  CPS 59-60; EG 80; SL 213 
12  FC 113; FJC 47; SL 183; 
SoL 58; PDDP 23 
12-13  ExpTh 304 
12:1  CPS 114, 271, 272*; PL 77; 
HD 111; LG 198* 
12:1-2  FJC 80; PDDP 48; LG 196 
12:1ff. TH 330 
12:2  CG 56; EH 58; CPS 89; FC 
109; JCTW 137; LG 197 
12:3ff. CPS 31; GC 67; HTG 63 
12:7  ExpTh 55 
12:9ff. CPS 297 
12:12  CG 176* 
12:15  TP 32; TJ 53; HC 30*; LG 
190 
12:17  M 77*; CF 27*; WJC 129; 
LG 197 
12:20  WJC 129 
12:21  M 77*; CPS 88*, 189*; FJC 
36*; CF 27*; WJC 129; 
EthH 183; LG 197 
13  RRF 68; RPS 16; FJC 46, 
47; HD 85; PDDP 23; BP 
261; EthH 186 
13:11  WJC 339; CoG 293 
13:11-12 CoG 18, 293 
13:12  TH 51, 57; FH 40n.54; GL 
94; CG 170; CPS 99; FC 
47*; TKG 85; PP 74*; GC 
122; WJC 158, 326, 339; SL 
89, 164; JCTW 137, 146*; 
CoG 17, 19, 139, 194, 231, 
293, 294*; SoL 72; 
GWBAA 81, 266; PG 66; 
SW 23; EB 86; SRA 46, 184; 
EthH 5, 7, 41; LG 175, 184 
13:12ff. CPS 80; WJC 102 
13:14  WJC 340 
14:5  CPS 271; PL 77 
14:6-8 SL 182* 
14:7-9 GC 92, 270 
14:8  PP 130 
14:8-9 FF 142 
14:9  HP 50, 170*; CG 163; CPS 
31, 95*, 100; FC 166, 
176n.8; HC 33; TKG 92, 
235n.44; WJC 182, 191, 
249; CoG 92*, 105; LaD 45, 
53; SW 105; EB 135; LG 78 
14:10  JCTW 142* 





14:17  CPS 64; FC 94 
14:23  SL 182* 
15:3  PP 102* 
15:4  TH 153; GL 29; GC 123; 
HTG 68 
15:4-13 GL 26 
15:6  RRF 158; HTG 14; FF 141 
15:7  CPS 188, 342; PL 27; PP 
98, 112*; WJC 195; SL 142, 
258; FF 153; GSS 207; 
EthH 127* 
15:8  TH 146; CPS 141* 
15:8-9 JM 56; HD 202; WJC 36; 
JCTW 128 
15:8-13 TH 329 
15:9  CPS 141; WJC 170 
15:13  TH 16, 26*, 30*, 126*, 154*, 
289*; RRF 20*, 60*, 201*, 
208*; HP 146; CG 129*, 
256*; RPS 41; EH 40, 50*, 
51*; CPS 64; FC 94; PL 27; 
PP 98; GC 66; WJC 321*; 
CoG 24*; EB 11, 87, 163*; 
BP 101; SRA 101, 222*; 
EthH 128; LG 31*, 181 
15:17  CJF 39 
15:18  TH 329 
15:19  ExpTh 126 
15:26  CPS 355; CoG 309 
16:16  SL 265 
16:25-27 HP 84 




1  CG 211 
1:2  CPS 353 
1:3  HTG 14; FF 141; SRA 159 
1:5  PP 129 
1:7  PP 129 
1:8  HP 166*; WJC 322; SoL 33 
1:9  TH 333n.1; HG 80; SoL 33 
1:10  SL 340n.56; LG 154 
1:10-18 CPS 237 
1:13  CPS 343; PL 88; ExpTh 
326 
1:17  CG 182, 214*, 225*, 245*, 
247*; CPS 235 
1:18  HP 45*; GL 89; CG 2*, 18*, 
32*, 36*, 44*, 56, 67, 68*, 
73*, 74*, 123*, 124*, 131*, 
194, 292*; RPS 42*; CPS 
82*, 97*, 218*, 221*, 239*; 
FC 161; WJC 227*; CoG 
241, 329*; ExpTh 108*; 
SRA 47* 
1:18-24 SW 152 
1:18ff. CG 70 
1:20ff. FH 38 
1:20-29 RRF 69 
1:21  CG 211; CoG 244 
1:23  CG 24*, 196*; FC 155* 
1:23-24 GL 99 
1:24  WJC 170 
1:25  LG 46  
1:25-31 CG 70 
1:26  TH 333n.1; HC 33 
1:26-28 RPS 42 
1:26-29 HP 20; GL 120; HTG 121; 
ExpTh 148; SRA 146; 
EthH 40 
1:26-30 RRF 34 
1:26-31 RRF 142; CPS 93; FF 104 
1:26ff. CPS 351; PP 151; LG 47 
1:27-31 FC 170 
1:27ff. RRF 12 
1:28  TH 211 
1:29-31 CPS 93* 
1:30  SW 152 
1:30ff. CPS 353 
1:31  GL 120 
2:2  EG 63; SL 203 
2:7  CPS 217 
2:8  TP 41; TJ 60; CPS 58, 114*, 
109; FC 89; PL 73; TKG 
124; PP 23*; LG 193 
2:9  RRF 66; HTG 150; ExpTh 
52; SRA 171 
2:9-10 SRA 52 
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2:10  SL 73*; ExpTh xxi* 
2:11  TKG 123; ExpTh 74 
2:14  TKG 123 
3:10  HTG 93 
3:11-15 CoG 99 
3:15  EB 143; SRA 137 
3:21  M 30* 
3:21-23 RRF 67; GL 54 
3:22-23 TKG 219; HTG 21; SL 115, 
121; FF 125 
4  EG 74; SL 209 
4:7  ExpTh xix* 
4:9  GC 308 
5:5  WJC 322; JCTW 59 
5:13  CJF 79 
5:20  CJF 79 
6  FH 38; WJC 340; HTG 62 
6:2  CoG 150; PG 92; PDDP 
135; EthH 191 
6:9  WJC 219 
6:11  CPS 353 
6:13  RRF 103; GL 88; HC 26; 
HG 104; GC 264; WJC 340; 
SL 84; SoL 71 
6:13-20 EG 77-78; TKG 104; GC 
96; SL 212; LG 159 
6:13ff. TKG 212; GC 239; HTG 62 
6:14  TKG 88, 122; HG 80; GC 
66; WJC 340 
6:19  GC 264; WJC 340; SL 37*, 
69*, 84*, 186; JCTW 86*; 
CoG 305; SoL 6240, 71*, 
131*; ExpTh 200*, 316; 
SRA 152; EthH 150; LG 61, 
75 
6:19-20 SL 3; ExpTh 291; SRA 113 
6:20  HG 104; WJC 340; LG 75 
7  RPS 40; GC 329n.12; SL 
181; SoL 57; GSS 244 
7:7  CPS 296 
7:8-10 PGR 63 
7:14  CPS 354; EB 134 
7:15  CPS 291 
 
40 2 Cor 6:9, corrected. 
7:17  CPS 8*, 296; PP 151; HD 
44; SL 180; SoL 56; ExpTh 
288; BP 208 
7:18ff. FC 108 
7:20  CPS 296; SL 181; SoL 57 
7:20-21 SL 182 
7:21  SoL 57 
7:23  CPS 297 
7:24  CPS 296 
7:29  M 44, 95* 
7:29-31 LG 190 
7:30  EthH 55* 
7:31  CPS 105*, 297; PP 47*; 
WJC 157-58, 314; SL 89*; 
CoG 269; GWBAA 83, 
262* 
8:1-13 WJC 280; JCTW 91; SRA 
68 
8:6  TKG 103; GC 95; WJC 280, 
305; JCTW 91; FF 140; 
SRA 68; EthH 139 
9:1  TH 299; WJC 216; JCTW 
73 
9:16  TH 194n.1; GL 90 
9:16-17 HD 43 
9:22  CG 101* 
10:11  CPS 13, 364n.13; HTG 86, 
193n.31 
10:16  CG 183 
10:17  CPS 342 
11  CPS 249; HC 54; GC 240; 
WJC 204; HTG 15; SL 240; 
SoL 101; ExpTh 281; SRA 
89 
11:1  CG 56 
11:3  TKG 250n.24; HG 114; GC 
236; GHH 6; HTG 21; FF 
125 
11:3-4 HTG 63 
11:7  HG 100; GC 215, 236; 
GHH 6; HTG 61; ExpTh 
281 





11:23  PL 106*; LG 194* 
11:23ff. CPS 124, 250 
11:24  CPS 255*; WJC 209 
11:24-25 CG 43*; CPS 250 
11:26  FH 35*, 44*; CG 44; CPS 
124, 220*, 250; PL 73*; HC 
46*, 54; TKG 79; WJC 42, 
212*, 338; LG 194* 
11:27  CPS 260 
11:29  WJC 207 
12  CPS 238, 297; FC 113; HC 
32, 50; TKG 104; PP 77; 
GC 67, 100; WJC 268; HTG 
63; SL 181; ExpTh 330; BP 
173; SRA 161; LG 16 
12-14  BP 330; SRA 24 
12:3  TH 57; SL 300, 321n.25 
12:4  SL 184, 194*, 195*; SoL 60, 
92; GSS 244; ExpTh 145, 
329; BP 174*, 204*; SRA 24; 
EthH 37* 
12:4-6 SL 233; ExpTh 287, 330; 
SRA 24, 161 
12:5  HC 32 
12:6  CPS 295 
12:7  CPS 34*, 65; FC 108; SL 
184; SoL 60 
12:7ff. CPS 31 
12:10  RRF 102*; CPS 75*; HTG 
84*; SL 2*; SoL 18 
12:11  CPS 295; SoL 92 
12:13  CPS 106, 235, 342 
12:24  PP 151; SL 193; SoL 68 
12:26  CPS 344; HD 11*; SRA 32* 
12:28  SL 183* 
12:31  CPS 323* 
13  CPS 297, 375n.58; FJC 101; 
HD 126; SL 163; PDDP 64; 
LG 132, 183 
13:1-3 LG 133 
13:2  WJC 112; GSS 244* 
13:4  SW 65 
 
41 2 Cor 13:10, corrected. 
13:7  TKG 42*; CF 27*; CJF 33; 
GHH 70*; HTG 76; SL 213; 
SoL 119; SW 65 
13:8  RRF 169* 
13:9  GC 65*; HTG 107*; SL 302 
13:9-10 ExpTh 49; SRA 199 
13:9ff. JM 93; BP 272 
13:10  GC 65; HTG 93, 97, 98; 
SoL 3541; SRA 182 
13:1242 RRF 215*; HP 217; M 14; 
CPS 131, 193*, 212*, 358*; 
TKG 4*, 161*, 187, 222*; 
GC 58, 59*, 221, 228; WJC 
xiv*, 71*, 226, 243*, 301*, 
320*, 346n.79*; HTG 69*, 
98, 110*; SL 205*, 297*, 
302, 304*, 305*; CoG 268*, 
295*; SoL 8*, 14; ExpTh 
49*, 50*, 62*; SW 19, 75; EB 
155; HumB xii*; SRA 181, 
182 
13:13  HTG 98; LG 133 
14  CPS 294; GC 67 
14:1  SL 186 
14:2  CPS 203 
14:20  EB 12 
14:26  SRA 24 
14:33  GL 98*; CPS 291 
14:34  SoL 100 
15  TH 51, 163; RRF, 46, 213; 
FH 28; HP 20, 50; CG 255, 
264, 278; CPS 31, 375n.58; 
FC, 25, 30, 52, 125; WJC 
230, 304; SL 9; JCTW 105; 
CoG 82, 163, 196, 240; SW 
45, 81; SRA 46, 55, 61, 95, 
141 
15:3  WJC 187 
15:3-4 CG 181, 182 
15:3-5 TH 162, 162n.1; FC 158 
15:3-6 HP 39 
15:3-8 WJC 219 
15:4  TH 166; WJC 221 
42 Cf. Exod 33:11. 
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15:5-8 WJC 216*; JCTW 73* 
15:8  TH 299; SRA 46 
15:13ff. TH 168 
15:14  HP 31; CG 161; WJC 213; 
JCTW 71; SRA 39 
15:20  TH 193*; RRF 52*, 214*; 
FH 30; HP 44*; CG 163*; 
EH 56*; CPS 74*; PL 72*; 
TKG 85; FJC 69; HD 103; 
WJC 155*, 221, 249; CoG 
151, 230*; SW 70*; EB 47*; 
PDDP 40; BP 102*; SRA 
40*; LG 192* 
15:20-24 GC 66 
15:20-28 WJC 193; CoG 335 
15:20ff. TH 162n.1; FC 123; SW 43 
15:22  CoG 241; EthH 56; LG 80 
15:22ff. TKG 91 
15:22-28 TKG 91; HG 83; SRA 95 
15:23  TKG 235n.44; WJC 323 
15:23-24 HD 204 
15:23-26 CoG 110 
15:23ff. FH 24; CoG 151 
15:24  RRF 34*, 68; CG 264, 
287n.133, 329*; CPS 104; 
350; JM 55, 77; PP 124; 
WJC 194, 285; FF 104*, 
142; BP 65; SRA 56; EthH 
1443 
15:24-26 CPS 178; FC 125; SW 45; 
PDDP 127 
15:24-28 CG 257; CPS 63*; LG 68 
15:25  TH 162, 194; FC 166; EG 
34; HD 94; WJC 6, 193; 
CoG 240; PDDP 32* 
15:25-26 WJC 182; LG 49 
15:25-28 CPS 32; WJC 319 
 
43 1 Cor 1:24, corrected. 
44 2 Cor 15:28, corrected. 
45 It is possible that 1 Cor 15:26 is in-
tended instead: “This is the hope for the 
annihilation of death itself (1 Cor. 
15.28).” 
15:26  TH 21; RRF 120, 174; GL 
49, 128*, 133*; FJC 59; HD 
95; GC 90; WJC 194, 285; 
HTG 139; JCTW 85; CoG 
66, 69, 83; SW 52, 104; 
PDDP 33; SRA 56, 142 
15:26-28 FC 94 
15:27  CG 288n.134 
15:28  TH 163, 201, 224*, 278*, 
281*; RRF 61, 207*; FH 
5n.6*, 27; HP 26*, 87*, 215; 
TP 112*; CG 101, 255, 257, 
261*, 264, 265, 287n.132, 
335*; RPS 29*; EH 30, 66, 
84; CPS 33, 100*, 350*; FC, 
22, 25, 74, 105*, 120, 125, 
166; EG 78; TKG 29*, 82*, 
92, 105, 109*, 110, 138*, 
161*; HD 94, 111*, 181, 
182*; FJC 5844, 80*; GC 288; 
WJC 33, 97*, 10845, 174*, 
182, 191, 283, 285, 292*; 
HTG xviii, 36*, 84, 85*, 87, 
95*, 120*, 162; SL 102, 
162*, 212; JCTW 99*, 124; 
FF 104, 113, 142; CoG 104, 
154, 238*, 240, 259, 277, 
278*, 294*, 306*, 335, 
361n.53, 372n.221*; LaD 
25, 52; GSS 185; GWBAA 
40; ExpTh 50, 100, 158*, 
310, 316, 323; SW 1746, 39, 
45, 53, 60, 108, 123; EB 76, 
150, 155, 158; PDDP 3247, 
48*; SRA 32, 152, 157, 166, 
168, 184, 185*, 207; EthH 
1448, 3849, 122; LG 49 
15:32  CoG 202*; EthH 52* 
46 1 Cor 15:23, corrected. 
47 2 Cor 15:28, corrected. 
48 1 Cor 1:28, corrected. 





15:35ff. TH 215; GC 302 
15:3650 GL 135; WJC 248 
15:38  WJC 261 
15:39-42 WJC 262 
15:42  JCTW 84 
15:42-44 GC 269; WJC 248; CoG 66; 
LaD 19; LG 76 
15:42ff. TH 224 
15:43  CPS 356 
15:44  TH 213n.1*; GC 67* 
15:45  TH 211*; CG 56*, 252*; 
CPS 236, 295, 360*; FC 
124*, 162*, 169*; TKG 89, 
92*, 122, 197*, 198*; HG 
81*, 124*; GC 208*; CJF 
59*; WJC 82, 241*, 248, 
249, 279*; HTG xv; SL 67, 
74*, 121, 178*, 219*, 220*, 
221*, 225*, 228*, 245*, 254*, 
264*, 271; JCTW 84; CoG 
xii*, 94*, 195, 200; ExpTh 
101*, 131*, 178*, 311*; SRA 
41*; EthH 56 
15:49  CG 266; CPS 101 
15:50  GWBAA 83 
15:51  HP 167*; CPS 203; CoG 82 
15:52  EG 76; WJC 35*, 239, 326; 
JCTW 127*; CoG 19, 70, 
102, 103*, 279, 292, 293; 
LaD 49, 50*; SW 52, 81, 
102; EB 112*, 162; SRA 45, 
62, 165, 182, 226n.851 
15:53  WJC 262; JCTW 23; CoG 
29; SoL 22; LaD 18; PGR 
61; GSS 241; GWBAA 83; 
SRA 51, 63 
15:53-54 EB 160; LG 76 
15:5452 RRF 16*, 163*; HP 23; CG 
217*; FJC 23*, 45*; HD 64*, 
84*; SL 112*; CoG 65, 70, 
83, 110*, 294*; GWBAA 
 
50 Cf. John 12:24 
51 1 Cor 15:32, corrected. 
52 Cf. Isa 25:8. 
118*; SW 52; EB 48*; 
PDDP 7*, 22*; SRA 77*, 
81* 
15:54-55 GL 133*; CoG 84, 253; LG 
194 
15:54-57 PP 122 
15:55  HP 217; CG 170; PP 119; 
WJC 356n.54; GHH 67; 
JCTW 67, 145; CoG 196; 
GWBAA 46; ExpTh 26; 
SW 19, 81, 104; EB 148; BP 
173; SRA 56, 137, 239n.15; 
EthH 12; LG 67 
15:55ff. TH 206; FC 108 
15:55-57 TP 29; TJ 51; CPS 110; PL 
74; GC 90; FF 104; LaD 25 
15:57  JCTW 67, 145; CoG 83, 253 
15:58  RRF 220*; FH 48; HD 44 
16:2  GC 292; EthH 235 
16:20  SL 265 
16:2253 WJC 208*, 313, 318*, 338*; 





1:14  WJC 322 
1:19  TKG 87; HG 80 
1:20  TH 147, 228; CG 155n.33; 
FC 33*; CoG 197; ExpTh 
100, 126; BP 102; EthH 38 
1:2254  TH 68*, 162*, 211*, 222*, 
224*, 326*; HP 22*, 150*; 
CPS 34, 131*, 191*, 234*, 
354*; FC 54*, 90*; TKG 89*, 
124, 211*, 217*; GC 96; 
HTG 98*; SL 66*, 69*, 74, 
162*; CoG 330*; SoL 11, 
34*; ExpTh 100*; EthH 38 
1:24  PL 49; LG 94 
2:15  CoG 241 
53 Cf. Rev 22:20. 
54 Cf. 2 Cor 5:5; Eph 1:14. 
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2:17  CG 67 
2:18  TH 215 
3  SL 120 
3:7ff.  FC 90 
3:9  TH 206 
3:17  RRF 11*; FC 160; TKG 89, 
122, 123, 206; HG 58, 81; 
WJC 242; HTG 21; SL 99, 
102, 120, 270; JCTW 81; FF 
122*, 125; ExpTh 34; LG 
62, 107 
3:18  RRF 152, 158*; TP 42; TJ 
61; CPS 101-2; FC 126*; 
TKG 168*, 187; GC 214, 
221, 228*; HTG 144*; SL 
305; CoG xiii*, 63*; SoL 14; 
ExpTh 49*, 318*; SW 108*; 
EB 156; HumB xii*; SRA 
155*, 183, 184; LG 178* 
4  CG 56, 64 
4:4  CPS 102; FC 129*; TKG 86; 
GC 225; WJC 195; GSS 36 
4:6  TP 41; TJ 60; CPS 58; FC 
89, 123; TKG 86, 124, 187; 
GC 66, 221, 225; WJC 254; 
HTG 77, 95; SL 67, 196, 
281; JCTW 75; FF 104; SoL 
14, 122; SW 43; EB 156; 
SRA 52, 184 
4:7  CoG 298; BP 208 
4:7-18 CPS 375n.52 
4:7ff.  PP 151; GC 90 
4:8  CPS 286; PL 46, 91 
4:8-9  PP 85* 
4:8-10 GL 77 
4:10  CG 52; CPS 93, 124, 287; 
PL 48, 91; GC 264; WJC 
156; EthH 56; LG 142, 159 
4:10ff. CoG 195 
4:12  CG 52, 56; CPS 124 
4:13  TKG 89; HG 81; SL 68 
4:14  GC 66 
4:16  SL 170* 
 
55 Cf. 2 Cor 1:22. 
5:555  CPS 34, 59; GC 96; SL 74 
5:6  HP 98n.78 
5:7  HTG 99; ExpTh 51; SRA 
181 
5:10  FH 14*; WJC 322, 337; EB 
142; SRA 136 
5:14  FJC 103; HD 128; CF 29; 
PDDP 65 
5:15  CPS 6 
5:16  CG 74 
5:1756  TH 34*, 222*; RRF 5*, 12, 
133*; GL 46*, 78, 102*; CPS 
3*, 235*; GC 99, 122, 189, 
208*; WJC 156, 181*, WJC 
381n.27; SL 131, 138, 151; 
HTG 53, 119; JCTW 134, 
135*, 140; CoG 28, 306; 
ExpTh 111, 127*; SW 52; 
EthH 36, 40; LG 181 
5:17-21 GL 34* 
5:18  GL 87; CPS 96*, 148*; HC 
27 
5:18-21 FC 28 
5:18ff. TH 329; HD 31 
5:19  GL 87; CG 192, 203*, 233*; 
EH 78*; CPS 86; FC 64*; 
HD 31; WJC 177, 225*, 
248*, 283; GHH 75; HTG 
xvi, 28, 48; SL 67, 68*, 131; 
JCTW 37, 134, 146*; CoG 
245, 306, 330*; SW 57; BP 
258; EthH 172, 238; LG 
161 
5:19-20 GL 78 
5:20  M 104*; CG 74; EH 67; 
CPS 123, 124; PL 104; HC 
46; JCTW 146*; FF 114; 
ExpTh 266 
5:21  TH 205; CG 187*, 191, 
192*, 242; CPS 30, 95; FC 
161, 162, 163*; EG 48; JM 
53; TKG 79, 81; WJC 173, 





195; GHH 68; SL 136; CoG 
249*, 252 
6  CG 56; CPS 361; EG 74 
6:2  CoG 293; ExpTh 44, 248; 
SRA 165, 226n.8 
6:4ff.  GC 90 
6:9  CPS 284*; FC 101*; PL 43; 
HD 186*; HTG 155; SL 
278; EthH 56 
6:9-10 CPS 356 
6:16  SRA 113, 167; EthH 150; 
LG 142 
7  CPS 361 
7:9  JCTW 5557 
7:10  EG 49 
8:9  CG 25, 52, 186*, 250*; CPS 
30, 355, 356*; WJC 174; 
JCTW 135*; ExpTh 232 
11  EG 74 
11f.  SL 209 
11:22ff. CG 56 
11:23-28 HD 43 
11:23ff. PL 91 
11:31  HTG 14; FF 141 
12  CG 289n.145; EG 74 
12:2  GC 159; SRA 48* 
12:7  TH 88* 
12:9  CG 206; CPS 356; FJC 58; 
HD 94; GC 90; WJC 93*; 
SL 192; SoL 66; PDDP 32 
12:12  CPS 40 
12:19  EH 143 
13:1  JM 91* 
13:4  TH 212; WJC 173, 176, 
249; SL 67, 192; SoL 66-67 
13:12  SL 265 
13:13  CPS 306*; HG 8958, 101*; 
HTG 57*, 63*; SL 4*, 8*, 
10*, 143*, 194*, 217, 218*, 
219, 220*, 221*, 224*, 225*, 
229*, 230*, 233*, 235*, 245*, 
247*, 338n.19*; CoG 183*; 
 
57 An earlier version of this text in EG, 49, 
has 2 Cor 7:10 instead. 
SoL 57*, 80*, 89, 90*, 91*, 
92*, 97*, 126*; ExpTh 324, 
326*; BP 253*, 347*; SRA 




1:1  CG 188; HTG 14 
1:2ff.  TH 299 
1:12  HTG 108 
1:14  CPS 142 
1:15  CG 167; TKG 86 
1:15-16 TH 301; WJC 216; HTG 
108; JCTW 73 
1:16  TKG 64; HG 80; WJC 324; 
SL 67; ExpTh 51, 62; SRA 
52 
2  EB 71 
2:15-16 EB 72 
2:16  CPS 30 
2:19  WJC 195 
2:20  CG 192, 243, 244; CPS 94; 
FC 72, 73; EG 16*, 63; JM 
53, 54; TKG 64, 81; HG 77; 
WJC 51, 173; GHH 68; 
HTG 40; SL 203; JCTW 37; 
FF 95; SoL 91; BP 195; 
SRA 166; LG 60, 144 
3:7  CPS 145 
3:13  CG 33, 242; EH 57; CPS 
30, 95; FC 161, 166; EG 48; 
JM 53; TKG 79, 81; HG 77; 
WJC 173, 184; GHH 68; 
HTG 52; SL 136; CoG 
249*, 252 
3:15ff. TH 124 
3:18  TH 145*, 146 
3:26  SRA 22 
3:26-29 GL 63 
3:27-29 HTG xiv 




3:2859  TH 142, 329*; RRF 11, 
141*; GL 91; CG 52*, 194*; 
CPS 84, 106, 188, 292, 338, 
339*, 342*, 386n.94; FC 79, 
124, 159*, 162*; PL 119; 
HC 33, 38; TKG 215*; HG 
63*; HD 16, 21, 32; GC 99, 
238; WJC 262, 374n.63; SL 
117; FF 144; ExpTh 125, 
191, 281, 345n.5; SW 44; 
EB 14, 137; BP 326*; SRA 
2*, 22, 40, 160*; EthH 76; 
LG 112 
3:28-29 CPS 316; TKG 165; PP 111; 
HTG 16, 23, 25; FF 127; 
SoL 97, 101; GWBAA 281 
3:29  TH 146; CPS 84*, 188, 
386n.94; GC 320; ExpTh 
55; EB 77 
4:3  HP 106*; CPS 293 
4:4  CPS 54; TKG 72; HG 74; 
WJC 91 
4:4-5  CG 191; CoG 267 
4:4-6  CPS 53; FC 83, 84 
4:5-6  SL 149 
4:6  CPS 54; TKG 123, 186*; 
WJC 145; HTG 13, 15*; SL 
11*, 63, 68, 291*; ExpTh 
312*; LG 60 
4:7  GC 320 
4:8  PL 77 
4:8-10 GC 293 
4:10  CPS 271 
4:11  HD 43 
4:25  CoG 310 
4:26  CoG 310 
5:1  TP 29; TJ 59; CPS 292; FC 
102; EG 34*; TKG 211; HG 
61; SL 113, 114; SW 42; LG 
107 
5:1ff.  CPS 271, 278; PL 77 
5:5  TH 205; RRF 46; FH 5n.6; 
FC 166; SL 149 
 
59 Cf. Col 3:11 
5:13-15 GL 53 
5:15  GL 60 
5:16  SoL 75* 
5:19  SL 176 
5:19-20 SoL 52 
5:22  TSTB 83*; CPS 34*; SL 154, 
176, 284 
5:22-23 SoL 52 
5:24  EthH 103 
5:25  CPS 34* 
6:2  WJC 127 
6:7  LaD 37* 
6:7-8  CoG 114 
6:14  CG 56; CPS 89 
6:15  SL 151 




1  TSTB 58; WJC 194; HTG 
129; CoG 238 
1:7  CPS 88*, 89* 
1:9ff.  TKG 103; GC 95 
1:10  TH 278*; TSTB 61; CPS 
72*; FC 166*; GC 171, 299*; 
WJC 286*; CoG 240; 
GWBAA 38; EB 150; LG 
31*, 82, 161 
1:11  GC 171 
1:13  CG 247* 
1:1460  GC 96, 320; SL 74; SoL 11, 
34*; EthH 38 
1:17  TKG 176; HTG 14 
1:19  CPS 112 
1:19-20 GC 67 
1:20-21 GC 171, 172 
1:20-23 WJC 107 
1:20ff. CPS 348 
1:21  WJC 284, 285; PDDP 127 
1:22  WJC 285 
2  EthH 238 
2:8  GC 320 
2:9  CPS 30 





2:12  RRF 136 
2:14  GL 100*; CF 29; JM 91; FJC 
103; HD 128; PDDP 65, 
144; BP 257 
2:14-16 CPS 145 
2:14ff. GL 91 
2:15  RRF 5*, 137*; CPS 108*, 
279*, 292* 
2:16  GL 87; CJF 66*; WJC 282, 
337; PDDP 144; EthH 238 
2:18  CG 179*; TKG 127 
2:20  CPS 146*, 311* 
2:22  SW 126 
3:1-3  HP 84 
3:4ff.  CPS 203 
3:6  TH 146 
3:14  HTG 14; FF 141 
3:19  CPS 112; CoG 336 
4  CPS 293; GC 67 
4:1ff.  CPS 338 
4:3  CPS 291, 342, 345* 
4:4-5  CPS 298*; GWBAA 281 
4:5  CPS 342; SoL 27* 
4:6  HTG 14 
4:7  HTG 63 
4:8  CPS 293; GC 172 
4:10-12 CPS 293 
4:11-12 TH 333n.1 
4:13ff. CPS 112 
4:23-24 JCTW 137 
4:24  GC 227 
4:26  PL 53; SL 263 
4:30  CPS 300*; GC 97; SL 50*, 
51*, 156*; SoL 33*, 90*, 92*, 
100* 
5  Gc 300 
5:8  SL 282 
5:8-9  WJC 339 
5:8ff.  SL 308 
5:18ff. SL 181 
5:21ff. SL 194 
5:22-23 TKG 250n.24 
5:23  HTG 21; FF 125 
5:24  WJC 339 
5:25  CG 192 
6:1  HTG 6* 
6:5-8  HD 46* 
6:15  EH 172, 175*; CF 29; FJC 





1:1  CPS 353 
1:3  BP 57 
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